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When we think about expertise, we usually consider people who master tasks at a level not 
reachable by most other people. Although we rarely realise it, however, most humans are experts 
in many aspects of everyday life. This expertise enables us to find our way through a complex 
environment that is our life. For instance, we can instantly recognise multiple objects and rela-
tions between them to form a meaningful unit, such as an office. Thus, research on expertise is 
not only important to investigate the cognitive and neural processes within an “elite” group, but 
it is also a powerful tool to understand how everyone can acquire complex skills. 
The goal of this RESEARCH TOPIC is to shed further light on the common and distinct neural 
mechanisms that implement various kinds of expertise. We broadly define expertise as skill 
in any perceptual, cognitive, social or motor domain, with the common core being optimised 
information processing due to knowledge acquired from repeated experiences. Thus, we are 
interested in the full range of mental processes modulated or modified by expertise, from “simple” 
object or pattern recognition to complex decision making or problem solving in a particular 
domain. These domains can range from everyday or occupational expertise to sports and rather 
artificial domains such as board games. In all cases, the aim should be to elucidate how the 
brain implements these sometimes incredible feats. We are particularly interested in connecting 
cognitive theories about expertise and expertise-related performance differences with models 
and data on the neural implementation of expertise. We welcome original research contributions 
using the full range of behavioural neuroscience methods, as well as theoretical, methodological 
or historical reviews, and opinion papers focusing on any of the above-mentioned aspects.
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How the brain enables humans to reach an outstanding level of performance typical of expertise
is of great interest to cognitive neuroscience, as demonstrated by the number and diversity of the
articles in this Research Topic (RT). The RT presents a collection of 23 articles written by 80 authors
on traditional expertise topics such as sport, board games, and music, but also on the expertise
aspects of everyday skills, such as language and the perception of faces and objects. Just as the
topics in the RT are diverse, so are the neuroimaging techniques employed and the article formats.
Here we will briefly summarize the articles published in the RT.
Board Games
The traditional expertise domain of board games has been covered in the RT by two articles,
both employing the expertise approach of pitting experts against novices (Bilalić et al., 2010, 2012,
2014) but employing differing neuroimaging techniques. Bartlett et al. (2013) employed fMRI to
demonstrate that chess experts engage the fronto-parietal network when they try to find a logical
pattern in a “constellation” of randomly placed chess pieces. Jung et al. (2013) found structural
differences as well as differences in brain networks between Baduk (Korean name for the board
game Go) experts and novices, which point out the importance of visuospatial processing in
problem solving and decision making of board-game experts.
Sport
Wright et al. (2013) extended the research on anticipation of action in sport by showing that
the neural basis for deception involves, besides the well-known action observation network, the
structures responsible for social cognition and affection. Turella et al. (2013) review other recent
studies on the anticipation of action in sport and connect them with the mirror neurons in animal
research. The review by Chang (2014) deals with motor domains such as sports and music and
the structural and functional changes associated with expertise. Debarnot et al. (2014) go a step
further in their review and contrast the neural changes during skill acquisition with those in mental
training techniques such motor imagery and mediation.
Music
Music has been one of the most often investigated domains in expertise because its complexity
and richness enable researchers to tackle diverse topics. The variety of themes in the domain
of music is also evident in this RT. Tervaniemi et al. (2014), for example, pitted expert
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musicians against novices in a novel paradigm to investigate
memory and attentional processes with EEG. On the other
hand, Bergman Nutley et al. (2014) used the music domain
to investigate longitudinal effects on cognitive processes such
as working memory, speed of processing, and reasoning, while
Fauvel et al. (2013) apply the promising findings of transfer and
neural plasticity associated with musical practice to cognitive
aging in their review.
Language
Unlike the previous articles, which deal with specialized expertise
domains, a number of contributions highlight the fact that
even the everyday skills we often take for granted represent
impressive feats of human expertise. One group of articles deals
with language, which is one such everyday skill. Reichle and
Reingold (2013) review the electrophysiological evidence of the
link between eye movements and the mind during reading.
The learning of a second language based on its similarity to
one’s native language was investigated by Grimaldi et al. (2014),
while Dietrich et al. (2013) demonstrated the neural changes
associated with the process of learning to comprehend speech
that was several times faster than normal speech. Finally, Lotze
et al. (2014) demonstrate by means of resting-state fMRI that
people who write highly creatively have increased functional
connectivity between the task-related brain regions in the right
hemisphere but reduced interhemispheric connectivity.
Perception
Similarly, a couple of articles deal with perception of own-race
and other-race faces (Wiese, 2013) as well as with perception of
familiar faces and objects and the functional connectivity within
the medial temporal lobe (McLelland et al., 2014). The role of
the fusiform face area (FFA) in expertise has been a bone of
contention between Harel et al. (2013, 2014), on the one hand,
and Wong and Wong (2014), on the other.
Theoretical and Simulation Work
Finally, a number of articles provide either new theoretical
ideas or revisions of already established theories. Campitelli
and Speelman (2013) highlight the advantages of using the
expertise paradigm in investigating memory, while Brogliato
et al. (2014) expand the Sparse Distributed Memory (SDM)
model to incorporate the effects of practice on memory retrieval.
Guida et al. (2013) extend their two-stage framework of skill
acquisition (Guida et al., 2012) by arguing for the functional
cerebral reorganization (FCR) as being the neural signature of
expertise. The way one structures training studies is considered
by Coffey and Herholz (2013), who suggest a new approach
for characterizing and deconstructing the task requirements in
training studies. Finally, Harré (2013) demonstrates the parallels
between two seemingly unrelated fields, perceptual expertise and
social cognition.
Conclusion
It is clear that we cannot do justice to all submissions in
this brief editorial. We hope, however, that our brief summary
demonstrates the diversity in topics and methods employed in
research on human expertise and also, indirectly, the growing
interest in the field of expertise. It should become evident that
research on expertise is not only relevant for understanding
exceptional human performance but also for understanding how
mind and brain work more generally. We are grateful to all
authors for their contribution and hope that the RT, with its broad
and deep coverage, will provide a useful reference for the reader
interested in expertise and, particularly, current approaches to its
neural implementation.
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A classic finding in research on human expertise and knowledge is that of enhanced
memory for stimuli in a domain of expertise as compared to either stimuli outside that
domain, or within-domain stimuli that have been degraded or distorted in some way.
However, we do not understand how experts process degradation or distortion of stimuli
within the expert domain (e.g., a face with the eyes, nose, and mouth in the wrong
positions, or a chessboard with pieces placed randomly). Focusing on the domain of chess,
we present new fMRI evidence that when experts view such distorted/within-domain
stimuli, they engage an active search for structure—a kind of exploratory chunking—that
involves a component of a prefrontal-parietal network linked to consciousness, attention
and working memory.
Keywords: chess, chunking, consciousness, expertise, meaning, prefrontal-parietal network, structure
INTRODUCTION
A useful strategy for addressing a complex cognitive process is to
present people with stimuli that engage that process, but which
will also disrupt or interfere with it, creating errors or difficul-
ties in its execution. A classic example is Bartlett’s (1932) famous
study of memory for an English translation of a North American
(Inuit) folk tale called “The War of the Ghosts.” To his English
participants, the story was strange with bizarre details and weird
turns of events, and yet it was, quite clearly, a story. The well-
known finding was that participants’ reproductions of the story
were distorted in a way that made them more coherent and plau-
sible than the original story was, a phenomenon Bartlett called
“rationalization” and which he attributed to “effort after mean-
ing.” According to Bartlett (and many others since), rationaliza-
tion and effort after meaning cannot be studied using meaningless
stimuli, such as lists of nonsense syllables, because the relevant
process—effort after meaning—will not be activated with such
materials. At the same time, the cognitive effects of effort after
meaning may be hard to discern with materials that are easy to
interpret and readily assimilated with a person’s prior knowl-
edge. The effortful component of effort after meaning might be
minimized in such cases.
Much more recently, Bor and colleagues (Bor and Owen, 2007;
Bor, 2012; Bor and Seth, 2012) have proposed a conception of
human consciousness that emphasizes the importance of frontal
and parietal neural networks in the active search for patterns or
chunks in stimulus displays, a process akin to Bartlett’s concept
of “effort after meaning.” A core observation comes from work-
ing memory tasks in which participants are able to improve their
memory for a sequence of numbers by detecting that the sequence
follows a rule or is a repetition of a previously studied sequence,
allowing chunking on that basis. Chunking of such sequences
is associated with extensive activation of a prefrontal-parietal
network, as detected by fMRI. In considering these studies, it
is important to keep in mind the distinction between active,
strategic chunking and the identification of overlearned stimu-
lus patterns such as familiar words and acronyms (e.g., dog, FBI,
see Gobet et al., 2001, for an elaborated theoretical discussion).
In Bor’s theory, it is only active, strategic chunking that engages
the prefrontal-parietal network. Thus, as chunking of stimuli in a
given domain becomes automatized through practice—as might
be the case in domains of expertise—the role of the prefrontal-
parietal network will be decreased. For the sake of clarity, we will
refer to such automatized chunking as “pattern recognition.”
The present paper is focused on stimuli that differ rather dras-
tically from sequences of numbers, but which are well suited
for the study of chunking and pattern recognition as a func-
tion of expertise. Specifically, we examine working memory for
chessboard displays by master-level chess players, as well as, for
comparison, less skilled players and novices at chess. Our find-
ings suggest that chess masters engage at least one component of
the prefrontal-parietal network in the service of chunking chess-
board displays. However, they do this more with “scrambled”
displays—boards on which the pieces are placed randomly—as
opposed to normal displays that represent possible chess game
positions. We argue that our findings are in line with the view
that the prefrontal-parietal network is involved with strategic,
non-automatized chunking, as opposed to the automatized pat-
tern recognition that occurs with chess experts viewing normal
chessboard displays.
The basis for our argument is perhaps the best known find-
ing from over 60 years of research on expertise: Chess experts are
much better at recalling normal displays than randomized dis-
plays and, with the former, their recall is much greater than that
of novices or less skilled players (Chase and Simon, 1973). The
result has been attributed to knowledge structures in long-term
memory that allow experts to encode a normal chessboard as a
relatively small number of patterns or groups, each including sev-
eral pieces and their relative positions on the board. Novices lack
such knowledge structures, and therefore, are unable to perform
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this type of grouping. Less skilled players have fewer such struc-
tures, and/or less elaborated structures, as compared to more
skilled players. Therefore, less skilled players encode chessboards
less effectively than more skilled players do, encoding fewer and
smaller patterns (see, e.g., Gobet and Simon, 1996a,b).
The pattern recognition account of normal/random chess-
board recall is virtually unchallenged in the expertise literature,
and we accept it for purposes of the present research. However,
little is known about what occurs when expert players encounter
random chess displays. Gobet and Simon (1996a) marshaled evi-
dence that recall of random chessboards is positively correlated
with chess expertise, albeit more weakly than the recall of nor-
mal chessboards. This finding suggests that experts perform some
degree of pattern recognition, even with random boards. Indeed,
this finding (and others) was predicted by a computer model
that was trained in identifying patterns of pieces in positions
from master-level chess games (Gobet and Simon, 1996b). As
the degree of simulated training increased, the model recognized
more patterns in random boards.
Yet the processes that differentiate more and less skilled play-
ers when encoding random boards are not fully understood. The
computer simulations of Gobet and Simon (1996b) give strong
support to one hypothesis: Because chess experts have a huge data
base of chess-piece configurations in long-term memory, they are
more likely than less skilled players to recognize meaningful pat-
terns that occur by chance in random games. However, Gobet and
Simon noted that some of the chunks encoded by chess players are
not meaningful in chess, citing the example of an expert noticing
that three white pawns formed a diagonal from a1. Based on such
observations, they concluded that “.. chessplayers may use special
strategies to recall pieces on a board that is almost bare of familiar
patterns” (p. 501). Similarly, Gobet and Simon (1996a) suggested
that stronger and weaker players might differ in “the possession
of strategies for coping with uncommon positions” (p. 161).
The present study addressed an idea that links the special-
strategies hypothesis to the prefrontal-parietal network as con-
ceptualized by Bor and Owen (2007). We propose that experts’
processing of random chess displays differs from their processing
of normal displays not only quantitatively (involving fewer and/or
smaller patterns or groups), but qualitatively as well, engaging the
prefrontal-parietal network in an active search for chunks. The
chunks in question may include patterns of pieces identical or
similar to what might occur in real chess games, as well illegal,
strange, or highly unlikely patterns that are, nonetheless, encod-
able based on knowledge of chess (e.g., three white pawns on a
diagonal from a1). The key claim is that experts engage this active,
knowledge-based search process more than less skilled players do.
Our thinking departed from two recent studies comparing
neural processing of chessboard displays—as well as faces and
other stimuli—by experts and novices at chess (Bilalić et al.,
2011; Krawczyk et al., 2011). Both studies were focused on the
fusiform face area (FFA) in the ventral temporal cortex, due to its
importance in the processing of faces. Further, both addressed the
question of whether the FFA is better characterized as being face-
specific—responding more to faces than non-faces—or expertise
specific—responding to faces as well as other objects with which
observers have high expertise. Using a standard working memory
task (one-back), Bilalić et al. (2011, Experiment 1) reported that
FFA activity was substantially greater for faces than chessboards,
whether shown in standard upright orientation or upside-down.
However, they also found that FFA activity in response to chess-
boards was greater among expert players than among novices at
chess. Using a similar one-back working memory task, Krawczyk
et al. (2011) also observed substantially higher FFA activation for
faces than chessboards, though they found no evidence that FFA
activation in response to chessboards was greater among experts
than novices. Despite this discrepancy, the two studies converged
in another respect: Both showed that FFA activation was as strong
if not stronger with random chessboards than normal boards.
In fact, in five of six conditions across Experiments 2 and 3 of
the Bilalić et al. study, there was a statistically reliable interactive
pattern such that experts showed stronger FFA activation with
random boards than normal boards, while novices showed no dif-
ference. The normal-random comparison in the Krawczyk et al.
study produced only non-significant trends in FFA activation,
possibly due to the limited sample size.
The experiment reported here is the same as that reported
by Krawczyk et al. (2011), with the addition of: (a) five new
master-level chess experts, bringing the total expert sample to
an n of 11, and (b) five midlevel players. According to their
international Elo ratings (Elo, 1986), our master-level experts
(M = 2469) had greater expertise than the Bilalić et al. experts
(M = 2117). Our midlevel players had lower expertise, yet they
were active players with national Elo ratings (M = 1501), and
were substantially more skilled than our novice participants (n =
6), all of whom had played chess but did not do so regularly.
Our goal was to further assess the strength of our prior observa-
tions, and, more importantly, to determine if experts’ processing
random boards produces not only an FFA response, but also acti-
vation of the prefrontal-parietal network previously described
by Bor and Owen (2007). Our guiding hypothesis was that
players with greater expertise would engage an active chunking
strategy with the random chessboards to maximize their perfor-
mance on the working memory task, and that their use of this
strategy would involve activation in the prefrontal-parietal net-
work, possibly extending to FFA regions due to top-down control
effects (Corbetta and Shulman, 2002). Others have reported that
prefrontal-parietal activation associated with working memory
typically decreases in novices with practice up to a certain point
at which functional reorganization occurs with greater expertise
(Guida et al., 2012). Once an expert has achieved functional reor-
ganization, he or she is more likely to access long term memory
representations in the domain of expertise. Our expert players
would likely fit this profile, showing reduced prefrontal-parietal
activation during working memory for normal chess displays.
Notwithstanding, an active chunking hypothesis predicts they
will show increased prefrontal-parietal activation during working
memory for random displays.
We planned to test our hypothesis with a whole-brain analysis
as well as with more focused region-of-interest (ROI) compar-
isons based on coordinates for seven prefrontal-parietal regions
provided by Bor and Owen (2007). These regions consisted of the
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) (Duncan and Owen, 2000), the
left and right inferior parietal sulcus (IPS) (Duncan, 2006), the
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left and right ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (VLPFC) (Bor and
Owen, 2007), and the left and right dorsolateral prefrontal cor-
tex (DLPFC) (Bor et al., 2003, 2004). We also collected subjective
reports of participants’ chunking activity at the end of the experi-
mental session. One goal was to determine whether any increment
in activation for random boards as compared to normal boards
extends throughout the entire prefrontal-parietal network, or is
restricted to one or two components. A second goal was to test
our assumption that such activation increments reflect an active
search for chunks. To the extent that they do, these activation
increments should show correlations with subjective reports of
chunking.
In addition to the prefrontal-parietal ROI analyses, we also
conducted ROI analyses for the left and right FFA. The goal
here was to determine whether activation increments for random
boards in the FFA (Bilalić et al., 2011) are linked to activation
increments in the prefrontal-parietal network.
One final ROI analysis was aimed at linking our active-
chunking hypothesis with accumulating evidence that highly
expert individuals show activation in medial-temporal brain
regions in working memory tasks with objects of expertise (see
Campitelli et al., 2007 and Guida et al., 2012). The dominant
explanation for these medial-temporal activations is that well-
formed stimuli in a domain of expertise contain many famil-
iar patterns that activate representations in long-term memory,
allowing long-term memory to support performance in working
memory tasks. Because normal chessboards contain more famil-
iar patterns than randomized boards, expertise-related medial-
temporal activations should be largely restricted to normal
chessboards. Hence, while expertise-related prefrontal-parietal
activations should be stronger with random boards than normal
boards, expertise-related medial-temporal activations might be
stronger with normal boards than random boards. We chose four
medial-temporal ROIs—the left and right hippocampus and the
left and right parahippocampal gyrus—to asses this possibility.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
SUBJECTS
Subjects were 22 healthy, right-handed, male volunteers. Eleven
subjects were chess experts recruited from the UT Dallas Chess
Program, age 19–28 (M = 23 years). These subjects ranked
within the top one percent of active tournament players (three
Grandmasters; eight International Masters) at the time of the
experiment. Subject expertise was substantiated by their com-
petitive ratings (Elo range 2353–2570; M = 2469), their years
playing chess (M = 16 years), and their tournament activity
(M = 13 per year). Six of the remaining subjects were healthy
males who were chess novices age 21–27 (M = 25 years). These
subjects reported that they rarely played chess and had never
participated in chess tournaments. Lastly, we included five play-
ers (age range 19–40, M = 24) who had some tournament
experience in chess and were competitively rated (Elo range
= 1332–1634; M = 1495), but did not approach the skill-level
of the experts. Given the strong differences in expertise level
between the experts and the other two groups (novices and
individuals with some experience), we collapsed the non-expert
groups forming a larger group of 11 individuals termed “less
experienced players.” Notably there was no significant difference
in behavioral accuracy on the chessboard conditions between
the true novices and the individuals with some chess experi-
ence. This experimental protocol received approval from the
Institutional Review Boards of The University of Texas at Dallas
and UT Southwestern Medical Center. All subjects provided
informed consent in accordance with the 1964 Declaration of
Helsinki.
MRI PERCEPTION TASK
We used a one-back task previously described by Krawczyk et al.
(2011). In the task we presented blocks of visual items and sub-
jects judged whether each item was a repeated image or new
image. Stimuli consisted of sets of images of chess boards from
normal games, randomly positioned chess boards that could not
occur in normal games, faces, everyday objects (from Geusebroek
et al., 2005), and outdoor scenes (Figure 1). Images were pre-
sented in five runs of 8 blocks with 12 images per block, 2 s per
image, 500 ms inter-stimulus-interval (ISI). Stimulus exposure
times and ISIs were set to ensure that novices could reasonably
perform the task given the degree of visual complexity present
in chess board stimuli. Images were presented offset from center
to the right or left in an alternating sequence to avoid appar-
ent motion effects that occur in the chess conditions between
non-matching stimuli that occur in sequence. One or two images
repeated per block, and subjects were instructed to press both but-
tons (one in each hand) when a repeat was detected. Each block
contained one type of image (e.g., faces) or was a fixation block
lasting 30 s. Block order was presented in a pseudo-randomized
manner.
FIGURE 1 | Task figure showing each of the different condition blocks.
Images repeated twice in each stimulus block.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org December 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 825 | 10
Bartlett et al. Processing distorted structure in chess
POST-SESSION QUESTIONNAIRE
After the imaging task participants completed a questionnaire on
which they rated the difficulty they experienced normal chess-
boards, random chessboards, faces, scenes, and objects on a 1 to 7
scale. They also estimated the average number of groupings they
perceived with normal and random boards, the average number
of chess pieces per grouping, and the average total number of
pieces they tracked.
FUNCTIONAL MRI ACQUISITION AND ANALYSIS
Images were acquired using a 3T Philips Achieva MRI scanner
running a gradient echoplanar sequence (TR = 2000 ms, TE =
28 ms, flip angle = 20◦) sensitive to BOLD contrast. Each volume
consisted of tilted axial slices (3 mm thick, 0.5 mm slice gap) that
provided whole brain coverage. Anatomical T1-weighted images
were acquired in the following space: TR = 2100 ms, TE = 10,
slice thickness = 4 mm with no gap at a 90◦ flip angle. Head
motion was limited using foam head padding.
FMRI block design analyses were carried out using multiple
regression. Preprocessing was conducted using SPM5 (Wellcome
Trust Center for Neuroimaging, www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm).
Echoplanar Images (EPIs) were realigned to the first volume
of acquisition and then smoothed (8 mm 3D Gaussian ker-
nel). Separate regressors were used to model each block-type.
Each regressor was convolved with a canonical hemody-
namic response function (HRF) used to model blood oxy-
gen level dependent (BOLD) responses to trial blocks. A
t-statistic was generated for each voxel, and a subsequent map
(an SPM) was created. Linear contrasts were used to test
the relative activation associated with conditions of interest.
Resulting contrast maps reflected the differences in activation
between the conditions at each voxel location. Significant vox-
els met both a whole brain threshold of p < 0.001, and a
minimum Familywise Error-corrected cluster size threshold com-
puted using the SPM data structure for each relevant con-
trast map (requiring minimum cluster sizes ranging from 60
to 100 contiguous voxels). Contrasts between normal chess-
boards minus random chessboards and for random chessboards
minus normal chessboards were used for each of the subjects
independently. We then performed a second-level analysis of the
group activation for these contrasts. Finally, we performed a
between groups analysis contrasting the experts and less experi-
enced players on both the normal-minus-random contrast and
random-minus-normal contrast in order to localize areas in




Experts performed with significantly greater accuracy
(M = 98%) than less skilled players (M = 84%) for normal
chessboard stimuli, t(19) = 3.09, p < 0.01. There were no group
differences and high accuracy with random chessboards (experts:
M = 89%, less skilled: M = 86%), faces (experts: M = 96%,
less skilled: M = 93%), objects (experts: M = 95%, less
skilled: M = 88%), and scenes (experts: M = 82%, less skilled:
M = 86%).
The expert and less skilled groups varied on several question-
naire dimensions reported after the task, further establishing that
the two groups differed in their processing of chessboard stim-
uli (evaluated with independent samples t-tests). Note that data
were incomplete for some comparisons due to some participants
not answering some questions. Looking first at the difficulty rat-
ings, less skilled players reported significantly greater difficulty
(n = 11, M = 4.27, 1–7 scale) with tracking normal chess stimuli
than experts (n = 11, M = 2.05), t(20) = 3.82, p < 0.001, but not
with random chess stimuli (M’s = 4.18 and 4.52, respectively).
There were no significant differences in reported difficulty for
comparisons of experts and less skilled players on faces, scenes, or
objects. We note that nine of the eleven experts reported that the
random chessboards were more difficult to perceive than the nor-
mal chessboards, with the two remaining experts reporting that
they were equally difficult. Only three of the eleven less skilled
players reported that the random boards were more difficult to
perceive than the normal boards with all others reporting equal
difficulty.
With normal chessboards, experts reported tracking a greater
number of pieces (n = 9, M = 21.22) than did less skilled par-
ticipants (n = 11, M = 6.73), t(18) = 4.75, p < 0.0001, as was
expected given the difference in expertise. With random boards
as well, experts reported tracking more pieces (n = 9, M = 10.28)
than less skilled participants (n = 11, M = 5.00), though the dif-
ference was smaller and only marginally significant, t(18) = 1.80,
p = 0.08.
Many participants reported seeing groupings of pieces (i.e.,
chunks) within chessboards. Experts reported more pieces per
grouping (n = 8, M = 9.69) than less skilled players (n = 10,
M = 2.75), t(16) = 2.15, p < 0.04. Looking at normal and ran-
dom chessboards separately, there was also a marginally signifi-
cant difference with experts reporting more groupings of pieces
than did less skilled participants in normal chessboards (n = 8,
10, M’s = 2.94 and 1.45, respectively, t(16) = 1.81, p = 0.08), but
not in random chessboards (M’s = 1.80 and 1.00).
NEUROIMAGING RESULTS
Our initial comparisons were conducted independently on each
group (experts and less skilled players). A normal—random
contrast (i.e., the normal-minus-random-chess difference)
showed activation in the bilateral insula among the experts
(Figure 2A), but it did not show any significant regions of
activation among the less skilled players. The reverse, random—
normal, comparison resulted in extensive activation in the
experts within the left inferior parietal lobe, the left middle
frontal gyrus, the lingual gyrus of the occipital lobe bilater-
ally, the left cuneus, and the right temporal lobe (Figure 3A).
By contrast, the less skilled players showed activation only
within the bilateral fusiform gyrus for the random—normal
comparison (Figure 3B, and refer to Table A1 in the Appendix
for activation coordinates and cluster sizes). Note that the
random—normal contrast showed extensive activation in
the expert group but not the less skilled group within pari-
etal and frontal cortical regions that overlap with regions of
the prefrontal-parietal network identified by Bor and Owen
(2007).
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FIGURE 2 | Task-related activation comparing groups. (A) Chess
experts showed bilateral activation of the insula for the comparison of
real chess perception minus randomly scrambled chess. (B) Chess
experts differed from less skilled players in showing more activation
in posterior cingulate and right superior temporal cortex when
processing normal chess as compared to random chess. (C) Chess
experts differed from less skilled players in showing more activation
within the left parietal cortex when processing randomly scrambled
chess as compared to normal chess.
FIGURE 3 | Brain activation relevant to random chess. (A) Regions of
the bilateral occipital and parietal cortex were active for experts when
contrasting randomly scrambled chess minus real chess. In addition the left
DLPFC was active along with a left predominance in parietal activation. (B)
Less skilled players showed bilateral occipital activation with active clusters
extending into the inferior parietal cortex when contrasting randomly
scrambled minus real chess.
As a conservative test of the group differences, we com-
pared the experts to the less skilled players with respect to both
the normal—random difference (Figure 2B) and the random—
normal difference (Figure 2C). The first of these comparisons
identified two brain regions—the bilateral posterior cingulate
and the right middle and superior temporal gyri—as those in
which the normal—random difference was reliably greater in
the expert group than in the less skilled group. The underly-
ing pattern was that, with normal chessboards, experts exceeded
less skilled players in mean percent signal change in both areas
(M’s = 0.42 and 0.09, respectively, for the posterior-cingulate
area, and −0.02 and −0.13, respectively, for the combined right
temporal areas). These differences were absent or reversed with
random chessboards (M’s = 0.10 and 0.11, respectively, for the
posterior cingulate area and = −0.19 and −0.17 for the lateral
temporal areas).
The second comparison identified a single brain region—the
left inferior parietal cortex—as one in which random—normal
difference was reliably greater in the expert group (Figure 2C).
This area overlaps with the left inferior parietal region (the IPS)
in Bor’s frontal-parietal network. The next section examines the
activation pattern in that region well as other frontal-parietal
regions.
PREFRONTAL-PARIETAL REGION-OF-INTEREST RESULTS
The left inferior parietal region identified by our between-
group analysis of the random—normal contrast is only one
of seven areas that Bor and Owen (2007) linked to the
prefrontal-parietal network. We sought to determine whether
one or more of the remaining six areas might show a similar
effect among experts—as compared to less skilled players—if
examined with more sensitive ROI-based analyses. We created
regions of interest (ROIs) using the coordinates and diame-
ters specified by Bor and Owen (2007) based on prior reports
from Duncan and Owen (2000), Bor et al. (2003, 2004),
and Duncan (2006) using MarsBaR software (http://marsbar.
sourceforge.net/). All ROIs were spherical with diameters of
10 mm and centers specified as follows in MNI coordinates:
ACC (1, 33, 23), left DLPFC (−42, 33, 11), right DLPFC
(39, 36, 13), left VLPFC (−43, 22, −6), right VLPFC (41,
22, −5), left IPS (−38, −47, 45), and right IPS (41, −47, 43).
All ROI center coordinates were obtained by converting the
Talairach coordinates reported in Bor and Owen (2007) to MNI
using the Signed Differential Mapping software (http://www.
sdmproject.com/utilities/?show=Coordinates). These regions are
shown in Figure 4. ROI data were extracted and converted to
percent-signal-change for each participant using MarsBar soft-
ware (sourceforge.net/projects/marsbar, Brett et al., 2002). We
extracted percent signal change for all ROIs for the chessboard
and random chessboard conditions. We statistically evaluated
the ROI data first by conducting 2 (group) × 2 (stimulus cat-
egory) × 7 (area) ANOVA, which supported two interactions,
an area by group interaction, F(6, 120) = 3.09, p = 0.01, and an
area × stimulus interaction, F(6, 120) = 4.89, p = 0.0002. We fol-
lowed this with separate group × stimulus ANOVAs for each of
the seven areas.
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FIGURE 4 | Regions of interest in the prefrontal-parietal network as
defined by Bor and Owen (2007). Included are four regions: left and right
DLPFC, left and right VLPFC, left and right IPS, and the ACC.
The ANOVAs of the DLPFC and VLPFC ROIs yielded no sig-
nificant effects. However, the VLPFC areas showed significant
correlations that are described in the subsequent correlational
analyses section.
In the ACC ROI, we observed a significant main effect of
group, F(1, 20) = 10.77, p = 0.004, in which less skilled partici-
pants showed greater activation (M percent signal change = 0.51)
than experts (M = −0.12). This group effect was approximately
equally strong with normal chess and random chess, as shown in
Figure 5 (lower panel).
The IPS showed a different pattern, bilaterally differentiating
the groups by stimulus category activation levels. The left IPS
region showed a significant effect of category with random chess-
boards resulting in greater activation (M = 0.91) than normal
boards (M = 0.67), F(1, 20) = 31.32, p = 0.0001. It also showed
a group by stimulus interaction, F(1, 20) = 6.54, p = 0.02, such
that the increased activation for random boards over normal
boards was stronger among experts (M’s = 0.99 and 0.65, respec-
tively), than among less skilled players, (M’s = 0.82 and 0.69
respectively), as shown in Figure 5 (upper panel). A similar but
less robust pattern was observed in the right IPS, where there
was a significant main effect of stimulus category, with random
boards yielding greater average activation (M = 0.66) than nor-
mal chessboards (M = 0.55), F(1, 20) = 9.06, p = 0.007, with a
marginal group by stimulus interaction present, F(1, 20) = 3.88,
p = 0.06 (Figure 5, middle panel).
As the left IPS ROI overlaps with the region in which we
previously found a reliable group difference in random-minus-
normal activation levels (Figure 2C), the ROI-based analysis of
this region confirms our prior observation that experts more than
less skilled players show increased activation to random boards
than normal boards. The analysis of the right IPS suggests that
the group difference is largely if not completely bilateral. Finally,
the ACC analysis shows that this interactive pattern obtained in
the IPS regions does not extend to the entire prefrontal-parietal
network, and that, moreover, at least one region within this
network—the ACC—shows a strikingly different pattern.
The significant group x stimulus category interaction in left
parietal cortex—and, by a less stringent criterion, right parietal
cortex—suggests that parts of the prefrontal-parietal network
may be relevant for the processing of random boards by experts.
FIGURE 5 | Regions of interest in experts and less skilled
players for randomly scrambled and normal chess. (A) The left
IPS showed greater activation for scrambled over normal chess and
a group by category interaction. (B) The right IPS showed greater
activation for scrambled chess over chess and a marginally
significant interaction. (C) In the ACC, there was a significant main
effect of group in which less skilled participants showed greater
activation than experts.
However, the theoretical significance of this pattern depends
on whether experts’ left parietal activation for random boards
exceeds their left parietal activation not only for normal boards,
but also for nonchess stimuli. We therefore, examined IPS acti-
vations in response to faces, scenes, and objects, in addition to
random chessboards. The left IPS showed significant effects of
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both category, F(3, 60) = 123.59, p < 0.001, and group (experts
greater than novices), F(1, 20) = 4.59, p < 0.05. Similar results
were observed for the right IPS, with significant effects of cat-
egory, F(3, 60) = 63.43, p < 0.001, and group (experts greater
than novices), F(1, 20) = 69.02, p < 0.001. To establish whether
the IPS activation to random boards was different than other
categories in the experts, we conducted additional post-hoc com-
parisons (Bonferroni corrected p < 0.05). For the left IPS in
experts, post-hoc comparisons revealed that random chess acti-
vation (M = 0.99) was higher than faces (M = 0.25), scenes
(M = 0.29), and objects (M = 0.40). Similarly for the right IPS
in experts post-hoc comparisons also showed that random chess
activation (M = 0.71) was higher than faces (M = 0.13), scenes
(M = 0.21), and objects (M = 0.20).
FUSIFORM FACE AREA REGION-OF-INTEREST RESULTS
To evaluate effects of stimulus and group in the FFA, we cre-
ated left and right FFA ROIs independently for each partici-
pant by defining maximally active voxels within the fusiform
gyrus based on a contrast of face activation minus scene and
object activation. Note that this ROI does not violate inde-
pendence, as the defining contrast did not include either of
the conditions to be evaluated in the ROI data (normal and
random chess). We then conducted 2 (group) × 2 (normal
chess, random chess) ANOVAs like those we performed on the
prefrontal-parietal ROIs. As shown in Figure 6, the left FFA
showed a significant effect of stimulus category, F(1, 19) = 11.75,
p < 0.01, with the FFA response to random chess (M = 0.73)
being higher than that for normal chess (M = 0.54). Similar
results were observed for the right FFA, F(1, 19) = 6.49, p < 0.05,
with higher activation for random chess (M = 1.13) than normal
chess (M = 0.96). Neither ANOVA supported effects involving
expertise.
MEDIAL-TEMPORAL REGION-OF-INTEREST RESULTS
To examine expertise and stimulus effects in medial temporal
regions linked to long-term memory, we evaluated hippocam-
pus and parahippocampal gyrus ROIs bilaterally. These ROIs
were created by using the anatomically defined ROI from the
WFU PickAtlas tool (Maldjian et al., 2003, 2004). A set of four
ANOVAs supported no significant differences within the right
or left hippocampus, but did support a significant interaction of
stimulus category and expertise, F(1, 20) = 6.75, p < 0.02, in the
left parahippocampal ROI. As shown in Figure 6, left parahip-
pocampal activation to normal chess for experts (M = 0.27) was
higher than that for less experienced players (M = 0.06), while
both groups exhibited very similar activation levels to random
chess (experts M = 0.18, less experienced players M = 0.16).
A similar, marginally significant, interaction emerged in right
parahippocampal gyrus, F(1, 20) = 3.96, p < 0.06, with the acti-
vation to normal chess for experts (M = 0.34) being higher than
that for less experienced players (M = 0.17), and both groups
similar for random chess (experts M = 0.25, less experienced
players M = 0.25). These interactions are in line with prior
evidence for activation increases in memory-related, medial-
temporal regions with experts processing well-formed objects
of expertise (Campitelli et al., 2007; Guida et al., 2012). Note
also that the previously reported whole brain normal—random
FIGURE 6 | Activation from Regions of Interest within the FFA and
Parahippocampal gyrus. (A) Left FFA activation showed a significant
effect of stimulus category with the response to randomly scrambled chess
being higher than that for real chess. (B) Similar results were observed for
the right FFA with higher activation for random chess than real chess. (C)
An interaction in the left parahippocampal gyrus with activation to normal
chess for experts being higher than that for less experienced players. Both
groups showed similar activation to randomly scrambled chess. (D) A
marginally significant interaction in right parahippocampal gyrus with the
activation to normal chess for experts being higher than that for less
experienced players.
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contrast (Figure 2B) supported similar patterns in the posterior
cingulate and right middle and superior temporal brain regions.
CORRELATIONAL ANALYSES
Of interest was whether activation differences between random
chessboards and normal chessboards in the seven prefrontal-
parietal ROIs might be correlated with (a) self-reported
chunking-related activity, and (b) activation differences in the
FFA and parahippocampal gyri. We computed a mean percent
signal change difference score from each ROI for each par-
ticipant by subtracting mean percent signal change from the
normal chess condition from that of the random chess condi-
tion. We then computed inter-correlations (Pearson correlation
coefficients, r) between these ROI difference scores for the five
prefrontal-parietal areas and the following behavioral measures:
mean number of groupings of pieces for random chess trials,
mean number of pieces per grouping for random chess tri-
als, and mean overall estimate of number of pieces tracked for
random chess trials (the latter measure was strongly correlated
with the product of the first two, r = 0.87). Total-pieces-tracked
was reliably correlated with activation differences in both left IPS
(r = 0.48, p < 0.05) and right IPS (r = 0.51, p < 0.05, df = 20
in all cases).
We next computed correlations between random—normal
differences in the five prefrontal-parietal ROIs with random—
normal differences in the FFA and parahippocampal gyri (df =
19 for correlations involving FFA, 20 for all others). Activation
differences in the ACC were reliably correlated with activa-
tion differences in both left and right FFA and in both left
and right parahippocampal gyrus (r’s = 0.54, 0.45, 0.46 and
0.52, respectively, all p’s < 0.05). Similarly, activation dif-
ferences in the left VLPFC were correlated with activation
differences the left FFA and left and right parahippocampal
gyrus (r’s = 0.54, 0.59 and 0.52, respectively, p’s < 0.05).
Finally, activation differences in the right VLPFC were corre-
lated with activation differences in the left FFA (r = 0.49, p <
0.05). The correlations involving the ACC and VLPFC regions
should not be viewed as independent, as activation differences
in ACC were reliably correlated with activation differences in
the left and right VLPFC (r’s = 0.60 and 0.48, respectively,
p < 0.05), though activation differences in the left and right
VLPFC were only weakly (and non-significantly) intercorrelated
(r = 0.34). We note that activation differences in the left and
right FFA and in the left and right parahippocampal gyri were
strongly intercorrelated (r’s = 0.73 and 0.95, respectively, p’s <
0.01).
DISCUSSION
The main purpose of this study was to test the hypothesis
that when experts encounter stimuli that fall within their skill-
domain, but that are distorted in a manner which makes them
impossible or in violation of rules in that domain, these experts
engage an active search for structure akin to Bartlett’s (1932) con-
ception of effort after meaning. We framed this hypothesis in
light of Bor and Seth’s (2012) more recent theory linking con-
scious awareness to an active search for units or chunks, a process
akin to effort after meaning. Bor’s (2012) theory links this active
chunking process to neural activity in prefrontal and lateral pari-
etal brain regions, and this theory is supported by recent fMRI
studies showing that neural activation in these brain regions—
known to be increased in a range of working memory and
attentional tasks—are particularly increased in tasks involving
active chunking of information.
Our focus here was on how extreme expertise might be related
to this prefrontal-parietal chunking network in the domain of
chess. Our starting point was the surprising observation that ran-
domly scrambled chessboard displays, which violate the rules of
chess and are known to disrupt expert performance, evoke as
much if not more neural activation than do normal, meaningful
displays in a ventral visual processing region linked to expertise,
the FFA (Bilalić et al., 2011; Krawczyk et al., 2011). Considering
other evidence that the prefrontal-parietal network exerts top-
down control over ventral visual cortex activity (Tomita et al.,
1999), including the FFA (Chadick and Gazzaley, 2011), we
hypothesized that experts’ processing of random displays, as
compared to normal displays, should be linked to activation in
prefrontal and lateral parietal brain regions, as well as in the FFA.
We tested this prediction with 11 master level chess experts and
11 less skilled players, all of whom performed a simple working
memory task with normal chessboards, random chessboards, and
three other types of stimuli using a blocked design. A whole-brain
analysis identified a left IPS region that was reliably more active
with random boards than normal boards in our expert group.
This effect was not observed among our less skilled players, and,
moreover, the random—normal difference in this region was sig-
nificantly greater in the expert group than in the less skilled group
(Figure 2). This observation was extended in a ROI analysis based
on Bor and Owen’s (2007) coordinates for seven subregions of
the prefrontal-parietal network. In one of these regions, the left
IPS, we found an interaction such that experts more than less
skilled players showed increased activation for random boards
over normal boards, confirming our finding from the whole-
brain analysis (Figure 5, panel A). Activation in the right IPS
showed a similar pattern, though it was less robust statistically
(Figure 5, panel B).
The IPS data are in line with the hypothesis that expert
chess players performing a working memory task respond
to random boards by engaging an active search for novel
chunks involving prefrontal-parietal network. In further sup-
port of this hypothesis, IPS activation among expert sub-
jects not only was higher for random boards than normal
boards; it also was higher for random boards than for three
types of nonchess stimuli (faces, objects, and scenes). Finally,
we observed correlations between random—normal activation
differences in the left and right IPS and self-reports of the
number of pieces tracked from random boards (a measure
strongly correlated with product of the reported number of
groups and the average size of groups). These two findings
strengthen the case that IPS activation is functionally linked to
an active search for chunks, in line with the active chunking
hypothesis.
It may seem odd to propose that experts engaged in more
chunking activity with randomly scrambled boards than nor-
mal boards, as the former are undoubtedly difficult for them to
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encode and might reasonably be expected to support the detec-
tion of fewer and/or smaller patterns or groups. Indeed, our
post-test questionnaire data support this proposition. However,
our proposal is more intuitive by a dual-mode view (Bor, 2012,
pp. 152–156), a view that distinguishes the active search for
and discovery of chunks from a more automatic process of
identifying previously learned patterns. It is the former pro-
cess that we suggest is supported by the IPS, and that is more
strongly engaged in expert processing of random boards than
normal boards. Of course, a change in the behavioral task
from our simple working memory test to one more demand-
ing of chess expertise might increase experts’ active search for
chunks in normal chess displays. The conditions in which experts
engage an active search for structure have only begun to be
explored.
Although an active chunking hypothesis is consistent our
data from the IPS brain regions, it was not supported for five
other components of the prefrontal-parietal network identified
by Bor and Owen (2007). In none of these five regions did
we find support (in the form of a group x stimulus category
interaction) for experts showing increased activation for ran-
dom boards than normal boards relative to less skilled play-
ers. In fact, in one of these regions—the ACC—we found a
strikingly different pattern: In that region associated with detec-
tion of conflict and executive function (Botvinick et al., 1999,
2001; Botvinick, 2007), experts showed reliably less activation
than less skilled persons with both normal and random boards
(Figure 5, panel C). We did not predict this pattern, but it is
consistent with much evidence for reduced activation in pre-
frontal brain regions as a function of expertise with the stim-
uli being processed (Hill and Schneider, 2006). The fact that
our ACC data support this effect with random boards as well
as normal boards might be viewed as contradicting this gen-
eral expertise-deactivation relationship. However, Bilalić et al.
(2010) have provided evidence that chess expertise entails object
level processing (identifying individual chess pieces) as well as
pattern-level processing (processing chess configurations). Thus,
one possible resolution is that our ACC data reflect the effects
of expertise on object level processing of chessboard pieces,
which might proceed similarly with normal boards and random
boards.
Another interesting difference between the ACC area and the
IPS regions concerned correlations with the ventro-temporal FFA
regions. We expected to observe correlations between random—
normal differences in FFA activation and random—normal dif-
ferences in prefrontal-parietal regions. Indeed, activation differ-
ences in the left FFA were reliably correlated with activation
differences in the ACC, and in the left and right VLPFC areas.
However, activation differences in the FFA were not reliably cor-
related with activation differences in the IPS areas. The pattern is
puzzling, as the ACC region did not show an overall random—
normal difference while the FFA and IPS regions did. Further,
only the IPS regions supported the critical prediction of an
increased random—normal difference in experts as compared to
less skilled players.
There is much to learn. However, thinking more broadly, the
striking difference between the IPS and ACC areas in the pattern
of group and randomization effects underscores the impor-
tance of characterizing the functions of different prefrontal-
parietal regions as they relate to expertise. It is possible that
only some of these regions contribute to the active search for
chunks, or that, alternatively, all contribute to active chunk-
ing, but in different ways. One plausible and readily testable
hypothesis is that our simple, 1-back working memory task
did not evoke a full-fledged active chunking strategy, but only
one component of that strategy. There is evidence that the IPS
region may be involved in the conjoint encoding or “binding”
of features “intrinsic” to a stimulus (e.g., the color and spa-
tial location of a word, Uncapher et al., 2006). In the case
of chess displays, binding of color, spatial location and shape
might constitute one component of an active chunking strat-
egy, one that is engaged in simple, time-limited tasks, such
as the 1-back task used here. In more complex and tempo-
rally extended tasks, other components of an active chunking
strategy might become engaged, and expertise-related random—
normal differences might emerge in other prefrontal-parietal
brain regions.
A subsidiary goal of this study was to extend prior evi-
dence bearing on the hypothesis that well-formed stimuli in a
domain of expertise contain many familiar patterns that acti-
vate representations in long-term memory, allowing long-term
memory to support performance in working memory tasks
(Campitelli et al., 2007; Guida et al., 2012). An ROI analysis
of the left and right parahippocampal regions supported this
hypothesis: In both of these regions, known to be involved
in recollection and memory for the spatial contexts of objects
(Eichenbaum et al., 2007), chess expertise was linked to increased
activation with normal boards, but not with random boards
(see Figure 6). Our whole brain normal—random contrast sup-
ported a similar interactive pattern in the posterior cingulate
and the middle and superior right temporal gyri (Figure 2B).
Using a threat-detection task, Bilalić et al. (2012) observed a
similar interactive pattern in both the parahippocampal and ante-
rior cingulate regions, though in their case expertise effect was
larger with normal than random boards, though it appeared
to be present with both. More research is needed to better
characterize the processes linked to these regions in expert
chess processing, as there are several viable candidates includ-
ing episodic memory retrieval, pattern recognition, visuospatial
semantic memory retrieval, and self-referential/default network
processing (discussions in Krawczyk et al., 2011 and Bilalić et al.,
2012). For the present, the data from this and several other
recent studies are consistent with the use of long-term mem-
ory in working memory tasks as one aspect of expertise. At the
same time, the present study suggests that an active chunking
strategy—or some component of that strategy—is engaged by
experts when processing distorted structure in their domain of
expertise.
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APPENDIX




Laterality Voxels Peak coordinates
x, y, z (MNI)
EXPERTS
Chess minus random chess
Insula L 127 −40, −14, 14
−42, −24, 20




Random chess minus chess



















L 1439 −16, −82, −4
−26, −76, −12
−38, −84, −6




Random chess minus chess
Fusiform gyrus Bilateral 3595 −30, −78, −18
32, −42, −24
−38, −70, −14
EXPERT > LESS EXPERIENCED PLAYERS
Chess minus random chess
Posterior
cingulate
Bilateral 22 10, −52, 8




R 14 46, −64, 20
10 54, −66, 22
40 46, −56, 18
EXPERT > LESS EXPERIENCED PLAYERS
Random chess minus chess
Inferior parietal
lobule
L 291 −36, −56, 40
−30, −62, 46
−44, −46, 40
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One major characteristic of experts is intuitive judgment, which is an automatic process
whereby patterns stored in memory through long-term training are recognized. Indeed,
long-term training may influence brain structure and function. A recent study revealed
that chess experts at rest showed differences in structure and functional connectivity
(FC) in the head of caudate, which is associated with rapid best next-move generation.
However, less is known about the structure and function of the brains of Baduk experts
(BEs) compared with those of experts in other strategy games. Therefore, we performed
voxel-based morphometry (VBM) and FC analyses in BEs to investigate structural brain
differences and to clarify the influence of these differences on functional interactions. We
also conducted graph theoretical analysis (GTA) to explore the topological organization
of whole-brain functional networks. Compared to novices, BEs exhibited decreased and
increased gray matter volume (GMV) in the amygdala and nucleus accumbens (NA),
respectively. We also found increased FC between the amygdala and medial orbitofrontal
cortex (mOFC) and decreased FC between the NA and medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC).
Further GTA revealed differences in measures of the integration of the network and
in the regional nodal characteristics of various brain regions activated during Baduk.
This study provides evidence for structural and functional differences as well as altered
topological organization of the whole-brain functional networks in BEs. Our findings also
offer novel suggestions about the cognitive mechanisms behind Baduk expertise, which
involves intuitive decision-making mediated by somatic marker circuitry and visuospatial
processing.
Keywords: amygdala, Baduk , head of caudate, intuitive judgment, resting-state functional connectivity, somatic
marker hypothesis, voxel-based morphometry
INTRODUCTION
Board games such as chess have been studied by researchers from
a variety of fields, such as economics (Levitt et al., 2011), com-
puter science (Bouzy and Cazenave, 2001; Cai et al., 2010), and
cognitive science (de Groot, 1965; Chase and Simon, 1973),
because of the similarity between board games and real life in
terms of the need to engage in decision-making and adaptive
behavior to achieve specific goals under changing environmen-
tal conditions. Cognitive science, in particular, has used board
games to study cognitive expertise, as playing involves diverse
cognitive functions such as attention, working memory, visuospa-
tial processing, and decision-making (Chase and Simon, 1973;
Gobet and Charness, 2006). Board-game players with the high-
est level of skill, known as grand masters, are considered cognitive
experts who develop the knowledge structures used in problem
solving in a given domain through long periods of deliberate
practice (Chase and Simon, 1973). Using these knowledge struc-
tures, called chunks, templates, or schemas (Chase and Simon,
1973; Gobet and Charness, 2006), experts can rapidly match the
patterns they have learned and make faster and better decisions.
Such chunk-driven unconscious automatic cognitive processes
are often referred to as intuition, which is defined as the recog-
nition of patterns or structures stored in long-term memory
(Chase and Simon, 1973), and a number of researchers have
proposed accounts of the mechanisms underlying intuitive judg-
ment (Hodgkinson et al., 2009; Minavand chal et al., 2013),
such as the following: dual-process theory, naturalistic decision-
making (NDM), and somatic marker hypothesis (SMH). For
example, the recognition-primed decision (RPD) model within
the NDM approach focuses on the success of expert intuition
(de Groot, 1965; Klein, 1998, 2008), as opposed to the heuristic-
and-biases approach which adopts a skeptical attitude toward
expert judgment (Kahneman and Klein, 2009). This shows how
experts can make extremely rapid and favorable decisions by
combining two processes: (i) an intuitive (automatic) process
involving pattern matching based on past experience and (ii)
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a deliberative (conscious) process involving mental simulation
(or analysis) to imagine how a course of action will play out
(Klein, 1993; Kahneman and Klein, 2009). The SMH emphasizes
the influence of emotion-based signals (somatic states) emerging
from the body, such as gut feelings on intuitive decision-making
(Damasio, 1996; Dunn et al., 2006). Despite previous extensive
studies on the mechanism behind intuitive expertise in board
games, its neural basis remained largely enigmatic until the last
two decades (Nichelli et al., 1994). Recent brain imaging studies
during board-game play have resulted in renewed interest in the
neural basis of cognitive expertise and have revealed brain regions
associated with object recognition, such as the lateral occipital
complex, occipitotemporal junction, (Bilalić et al., 2011a,b) and
the fusiform cortex (FFC) (Bilalić et al., 2011c), with pattern
recognition, such as the collateral sulcus (CoS) and retrosplenial
cortex (RSC) (Bilalić et al., 2010, 2011b), with recognition of rela-
tions between objects, such as the supramarginal gyrus (SMG)
(Bilalić et al., 2011a,b), and with intuitive best next-move gener-
ation during chess play, such as the head of the caudate (HOC)
(Wan et al., 2011, 2012). However, most neuroimaging studies
with board-game experts have involved chess, even though Baduk
differs fundamentally from chess in terms of the mental strategies
involved.
Baduk, as it is known in Korean (Go in Japanese and Weiqi in
Chinese), is a popular board game in East Asia; it is played on
a square board consisting of a pattern of 19 by 19 crossed lines.
Whereas chess pieces have specific identities and functions, all
Baduk pieces (called stones) have the same value and function.
Rules of the game are very simple (http://english.Baduk.or.kr);
two players, one playing with black stones and the other play-
ing with white ones, alternately place a stone to capture as large
an area as possible on the board by surrounding the opponent’s
stones. Despite its simple rules, Baduk is characterized by greater
combinatorial complexity than chess due to the tremendous size
of its game tree; the average branching factor (i.e., the num-
ber of move choices available per turn) is approximately 200 in
Baduk, whereas it is about 35 in chess (Keene and Levy, 1991).
Additionally, unlike most other strategy games, Baduk cannot
be won by a computer program, whereas computerized chess
programs can beat even the world’s best human player (Bouzy
and Cazenave, 2001). Although chess and Baduk share common
cognitive and affective processes, such as memory, attention, per-
ception, and emotional regulation, the two games nonetheless
differ in the following important ways. Given its larger game
tree and heavy dependence on spatial positioning rather than
on selecting pieces according to their roles, knowledge and pat-
tern recognition with respect to spatial positioning may be more
important in Baduk than in other strategy games (Gobet et al.,
2004). Recent neuroimaging studies on Baduk experts (BEs) have
demonstrated increased activity in the occipitotemporal and pari-
etal cortices, areas associated with visuospatial processing, such
as integration of local features (Kourtzi et al., 2003) and spa-
tial attention (Fink et al., 1996) respectively, while performing
Baduk tasks (Chen et al., 2003; Ouchi et al., 2005). In addition
to cognitive competences such as spatial processing, researchers
have recently emphasized emotional processing in competitive
board-game (Grabner et al., 2007) because based on evidence for
the SMH (Bechara et al., 1994; Blakemore and Robbins, 2012),
our performance (i.e., decision-making) is strongly affected by
emotions. Thus, since board-game players experience a vari-
ety of emotions while playing, an imbalance in the emotions
can cause mistakes (DeGroot and Broekens, 2003). Accumulated
evidence from neuroimaging and lesion studies implicates the
amygdala (AMY), striatum, and orbitofrontal cortex in emotional
processing (Phillips et al., 2003a,b), and suggests the ventro-
medial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), AMY, somatosensory cortex,
and insula as regions of brain circuitry involved in the SMH
(Damasio, 1996; Dunn et al., 2006). Particularly, the vmPFC is
thought to play a role in generating somatic markers (Damasio,
1996). Taken together, BEs may show differences in morphology
and/or function in brain regions associated with spatial process-
ing and emotion-based decision-making. However, until recently,
there have not been studies investigating whether such specific
differences exist in the brains of long-term trained BEs.
Many neuroimaging studies about the learning- and practice-
based superior performance of experts have provided evidence
for cross-sectional differences and longitudinal changes in brain
structure and function, known as neuroplasticity, in brain areas
underlying specific skills. Such brain areas include the occipito–
temporal cortex, which is associated with complex visual motions
in jugglers (Draganski et al., 2004), the hippocampus, which
is associated with spatial learning and memory in taxi drivers
(Maguire et al., 2000; Spiers and Maguire, 2006), and the medial
prefrontal cortex (mPFC)/medial orbitofrontal cortex (mOFC),
which is associated with emotion regulation and self-referential
processing in meditation experts (Jang et al., 2011; Kang et al.,
2013). In particular, recent studies have revealed that, compared
to novices, chess experts demonstrate morphological differences
in the HOC and its influence on functional circuits, showing
a decrease in gray matter volume (GMV) and an increase in
functional connectivity (FC) in this region during resting-state
(Duan et al., 2012). However, whether such brain differences are
specific to chess experts or extend to experts in other strategy
games remains unclear. To address this issue, we used voxel-based
morphometry (VBM) and resting-state functional connectivity
(RSFC) analysis to compare BEs and novices in terms of GMV
and to examine the effects of these morphological differences on
functional brain connectivity at rest.
RSFC analysis based on resting-state functional magnetic
resonance imaging (rs-fMRI) reveals spontaneous or intrinsic
functional connections of the brain, which are reflected in the cor-
relation pattern of low-frequency blood-oxygen-level-dependent
(BOLD) fluctuations between small regions of interest and all
other brain regions (Fox et al., 2005). Recently, this approach
has been extensively used in conjunction with graph theory to
investigate the topological organization of brain networks (Wang
et al., 2010). Graph theoretical analysis (GTA) of rs-fMRI enables
visualization of the overall connectivity pattern across all brain
regions and provides quantitative measurement of complex pat-
terns of organization across a network, such as small-worldness,
which measures global network connection efficiency. Using this
approach, recent studies have reported differences in topological
organization of the whole-brain functional network between per-
sonality dimensions of extraversion and neuroticism (Gao et al.,
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2013), as well as between various brain diseases that involve cog-
nitive impairments, such as Alzheimer’s disease (Supekar et al.,
2008) and schizophrenia (Lynall et al., 2010), and healthy con-
trols. However, the topological organization of the whole-brain
functional network in cognitive experts is yet to be elucidated.
We hypothesized that BEs would exhibit morphological differ-
ences in brain regions underlying expertise in Baduk, particularly
the occipitotemporal and parietal areas associated with visuospa-
tial processing and spatial attention respectively, as well as the
somatic marker circuitry involved in emotion-based decision-
making, and that these morphological differences may be associ-
ated with alterations in the functional circuits of these regions. We
also predicted that the topological organization of their whole-
brain functional network would be altered in the service of
achieving the most efficient network for playing Baduk. To test
our hypotheses, we employed VBM and RSFC, and further ana-
lyzed the topological properties of the intrinsic brain connectivity
network using a graph theoretical approach. We expect that this
study will provide evidence for structural and functional brain
differences in BEs, as well as offer additional insight into the
nature of the varied and complex cognitive mechanisms that
enable superior performance by BEs.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Seventeen BEs who had been training for 12.47 ± 1.50
years were recruited from the Korea Baduk Association
(http://english.Baduk.or.kr/). BEs experts were statistically
matched for age, sex, and education level to 16 novices who
knew the rules for playing Baduk. All subjects were right handed
and had no history of neurological or psychiatric problems.
The demographic characteristics of each group are presented in
Table 1. All procedures performed in this study were approved
by the Institutional Review Board of Seoul National University
Hospital.
DATA ACQUISITION
All image data were acquired using a 1.5-T scanner (Siemens
Avanto, Germany). High-resolution anatomical images of the
whole brain were acquired with T1-weighted 3-D magnetization-
prepared rapid-acquisition gradient-echo (MPRAGE) sequence
[repetition time (TR)/echo time (TE) = 1160/4.76 ms, flip
angle = 15◦, field of view (FOV) = 230 mm, matrix size = 256 ×
256]. rs-fMRI data were obtained via a gradient echo-planar
Table 1 | Demographic characteristics of experts and novices.
Experts (n = 17) Novices (n = 16) p-value
Sex (male/female)† 14/3 12/4 0.606
Age (years)‡ 17.177 (1.131) 16.938 (1.124) 0.547
Education (years)‡ 9.647 (2.805) 10.688 (1.302) 0.186
IQ‡ 93.118 (10.093) 100.750 (12.503) 0.062
Training duration (years) 12.471 (1.505) – –
IQ, intelligence quotient. Values are presented as mean (standard deviation). †χ2
test was used. ‡Independent t-test was used.
imaging pulse sequence (TR/TE = 2340/52 ms, flip angle = 90◦,
FOV = 220 mm, voxel size = 3.44 × 3.44 × 5 mm3), during
which subjects were instructed to relax with their eyes closed
without falling asleep. rs-fMRI scans were part of fMRI ses-
sions, during which participants performed working memory
tasks. Resting-state runs were performed for 4.68-min (120 vol-
umes) prior to administration of the working memory tasks.
Other image parameters (task-related fMRI and DTI) that are
not related to the present study are not described herein. Based
on visual inspection, a neuroradiologist (CHC) judged all scans
to be excellent, without obvious motion artifacts, signal loss, or
gross pathology.
VOXEL-BASED MORPHOMETRY ANALYSIS
T1 data were processed using VBM8 toolbox (http://dbm.
neuro.uni-jena.de/vbm.html) implemented in SPM8 (http://
www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm), with default parameters incorpo-
rating the DARTEL toolbox to produce a high-dimensional
normalization protocol (Ashburner, 2007). Images were cor-
rected for bias-field inhomogeneities, tissue-classified into gray
matter (GM), white matter (WM), and cerebrospinal fluid
(CSF) based on unified segmentation from SPM8, and spatially
normalized to the MNI space using linear (12-parameter affine)
and non-linear transformations (warping). The nonlinear trans-
formation parameters were calculated via the DARTEL algorithm
(Ashburner, 2007) with an existing standard template in VBM8.
The warped GM segments were modified to compensate for
volume changes during spatial normalization by multiplying
the intensity value in each voxel by the Jacobian determinants
(modulated GMVs). Finally, the resulting GM images were
smoothed with an 8-mm full-width at half maximum (FWHM)
isotropic Gaussian kernel. Voxel-wise comparisons of GMV in
the two groups were performed using two-sample t-tests. Total
intracranial volume (TIV) was modeled as a covariate of no
interest. TIV was calculated by summing the raw volumes of GM,
WM, and CSF, in which each tissue volume was automatically
generated as a text file for each subject (∗_seg8.txt) in VBM8
processing. The statistical significance of group differences was
set at p < 0.05 using AlphaSim correction (with a combination
of a threshold of p < 0.005 and a minimum cluster size of 340
voxels) (Cox, 1996). Based on previous research (Duan et al.,
2012), a looser p-threshold was chosen (p < 0.005 and expected
voxels per cluster k > 133) to detect the presence of group
differences in the HOC. To investigate associations between
the GMV of BEs and training duration, we employed SPM8 to
perform voxel-wise correlation analysis between these two values
using a multiple regression model.
FUNCTIONAL CONNECTIVITY ANALYSIS
rs-fMRI data preprocessing was performed using SPM8 and REST
V1.7 toolkit (http://www.restfmri.net/; Song et al., 2011). The
preprocessing procedures for rs-fMRI data were performed as
follows. After discarding the first four volumes to allow for sta-
bilization of the BOLD signal, each subject’s rs-fMRI data were
(i) corrected for slice-timing differences, (ii) realigned to their
first scan to correct for movement, (iii) spatially normalized to
the MNI echo-planar imaging template in SPM8 (voxels were
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resampled to 3 × 3 × 3 mm3), (iv) spatially smoothed with a
6-mm FWHM Gaussian kernel, (v) removed of the linear trend
of time courses, (vi) temporally band-pass filtered (0.01–0.08 Hz),
and (vii) conducted regression of nuisance signals (head-motion
profiles, global signal, WM, and CSF) to correct for physiologi-
cal noises. Regions showing significant group differences in GMV
according to the VBM results were defined as seed regions for
subsequent FC analysis [i.e., right AMY, right and left nucleus
accumbens (NA); Figure 1A]. FC maps were produced by extract-
ing the time series averaged across voxels within each seed region
and then computing the Pearson’s correlation between that time
series and those from all other brain voxels. Finally, correlation
coefficients for each voxel were converted into a normal distribu-
tion by Fischer’s z transform (Fox et al., 2005). For each group,
individual z-value maps were analyzed with a random-effect
one-sample t-test to identify voxels with a significant positive
correlation to the seed time series, which correlations threshold
at p < 0.001, uncorrected, and a topological false-discovery-rate
(FDR) correction threshold at p < 0.05 for multiple comparisons
(Figure 2A; Chumbley et al., 2010). For between-group compar-
isons, two-sample t-tests were used to compare z-value maps
between experts and novices using AlphaSim correction with sig-
nificance set at p < 0.05 (with a combination of a threshold of
p < 0.005 and a minimum cluster size of 13 voxels for each mask
map) (Table 2). This analysis was restricted to the voxels showing
significant positive correlation maps for either experts or novices
by using an explicit mask from the combined sets of the results of
the one-sample t-tests (p < 0.05, topological FDR corrected) of
the two groups.
NETWORK CONSTRUCTION AND ANALYSIS
In this study, brain networks were composed of nodes rep-
resenting brain regions and edges representing interregional
RSFC. To define network nodes, the Harvard–Oxford atlas
(HOA) was employed to divide the whole brain, excluding
the brainstem, into 110 (55 for each hemisphere) cortical and
subcortical regions-of-interest (ROIs) (Table 3). To define the
network edges, we calculated the Pearson correlations between
pairs of ROIs. Correlation matrices were thresholded into binary
networks, applying network sparsity (S) (the ratio of the number
of existing edges divided by the maximum number of possible
edges in a network). The sparsity threshold was normalized so
that each group network had the same number of nodes and
edges, allowing investigation of the relative network efficiency of
each group (Achard and Bullmore, 2007). Given the absence of a
gold standard for selecting a single threshold, based on previous
studies (Wang et al., 2010; Tian et al., 2011), a continuous range
of 0.10 ≤ S ≤ 0.42 with an interval of 0.01 was employed to
threshold the correlation matrices into a set of binary matrices.
This range of sparsity allows prominent small-world properties
of brain networks to be observed (Watts and Strogatz, 1998); that
is, the small-worldness of the thresholded networks was larger
than 1.1 for all participants (Zhang et al., 2011; Gao et al., 2013).
We calculated both global and regional network measures of
brain networks at each sparsity threshold (Figures 3A,B, 4A,B).
The global measures included (i) small-world parameters
(clustering coefficient CP, characteristic path length LP, and
small-worldness σ) and (ii) network efficiency (local effi-
ciency Eloc and global efficiency Eglob). The regional measures
included three nodal centrality metrics: degree, efficiency, and
betweenness (Rubinov and Sporns, 2010; Tian et al., 2011).
In this study, we calculated all these metrics using GRETNA
v1.0 (https://www.nitrc.org/projects/gretna/), which is a graph-
theoretical network analysis toolkit, with PSOM (Pipeline
System for Octave and Matlab, (http://code.google.com/p/psom)
and MatlabBGL package (http://www.cs.purdue.edu/homes/
dgleich/packages/matlab_bgl/). Mathematical explanations for
each network metric are provided in the following sub-sections.
FIGURE 1 | Brain regions showing significant group differences in gray
matter volume and showing a correlation with Baduk training years.
Relative to novices, Baduk experts showed significantly increased gray
matter volume in the bilateral caudate, particularly the nucleus accumbens,
and significantly decreased gray matter volume in the right amygdala
(panel A). Experts showed significantly negative correlations between gray
matter volume in the medial orbitofrontal cortex (mOFC) adjacent to the
gyrus rectus and their training years (panels B,C).
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FIGURE 2 | Results from within- and between-group analyses of
resting-state functional connectivity. These figures provide significantly
positive correlation maps for the right amygdala, right nucleus accumbens,
and left nucleus accumbens as seed regions in experts (the left column) and
novices (the right column) (panel A). Experts displayed significantly increased
functional connectivity between the right amygdala and left medial
orbitofrontal cortex, and significantly decreased connectivity between the
right nucleus accumbens and right medial prefrontal cortex (panel B).
Table 2 | Regions showing significant group differences in gray matter volume and functional connectivity.
Regions MNI coordinates Experts (n = 17)† Novices (n = 16)† t-value z-value
VOXEL-BASED MORPHOMETRY RESULTS
Experts > Novices
Right nucleus accumbens 9, 21, −6 0.428 (0.027) 0.382 (0.038) 3.47 3.16
Left nucleus accumbens −11, 20, −8 0.503 (0.030) 0.453 (0.041) 3.45 3.14
Experts < Novices
Right amygdala 21, 2, −24 0.541 (0.055) 0.573 (0.031) −3.53 3.20
Negative correlation between gray matter volumes and training duration
Right medial orbitofrontal cortex‡ 3, 20, −17 0.604 (0.061) – 5.26 3.84
RESTING-STATE FUNCTIONAL CONNECTIVITY RESULTS
Experts > Novices
Right amygdala seed
Left medial orbitofrontal cortex −9, 39, −21 0.276 (0.136) 0.078 (0.137) 3.68 3.32
Experts < Novices
Right nucleus accumbens seed
Right medial prefrontal cortex 12, 51, −6 0.102 (0.120) 0.321 (0.178) −3.95 3.53
†Values are presented as mean beta values (standard deviation) for each group; mean beta values for each subject were extracted from each region using MarsBaR
toolbox for SPM (http://marsbar.sourceforge.net/).
‡We performed a correlation analysis between beta value extracted from the region of and training duration of each subject using SPSS (p < 0.001, r = −0.802).
Global network parameters
To characterize the global topological organization of whole-
brain functional network, we considered five network met-
rics: clustering coefficient (CP), characteristic path length (LP),
small-worldness (σ), global efficiency (Eglob), and local effi-
ciency (Eloc). CP indicates how well neighbors of a node i
are connected (i.e., local interconnectivity of a network). LP
is the shortest path length (i.e., number of edges) required to
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Table 3 | Anatomic regions-of-interest included in the network analysis†.
Regions Abbreviation Classification‡ ROI index
Left hemisphere Right hemisphere
Frontal pole FP frontal 1 2
Insular cortex Insula frontal 3 4
Superior frontal gyrus SFG frontal 5 6
Middle frontal gyrus MFG frontal 7 8
Inferior frontal gyrus, pars triangularis IFG_PTR frontal 9 10
Inferior frontal gyrus, pars opercularis IFG_POP frontal 11 12
Precentral gyrus PrCG frontal 13 14
Temporal pole TP temporal 15 16
Superior temporal gyrus, anterior division aSTG temporal 17 18
Superior temporal gyrus, posterior division pSTG temporal 19 20
Middle temporal gyrus, anterior division aMTG temporal 21 22
Middle temporal gyrus, posterior division pMTG temporal 23 24
Middle temporal gyrus, temporooccipital part MTG_TOpart temporal 25 26
Inferior temporal gyrus, anterior division aITG temporal 27 28
Inferior temporal gyrus, posterior division pITG temporal 29 30
Inferior temporal gyrus, temporooccipital part ITG_TOpart temporal 31 32
Postcentral gyrus PoCG parietal 33 34
Superior parietal lobule SPL parietal 35 36
Supramarginal gyrus, anterior division aSMG parietal 37 38
Supramarginal gyrus, posterior division pSMG parietal 39 40
Angular gyrus AG parietal 41 42
Lateral occipital cortex, superior division sLO occipital 43 44
Lateral occipital cortex, inferior division iLO occipital 45 46
Intracalcarine cortex IntraCALC occipital 47 48
Frontal medial cortex FmC frontal 49 50
Supplementary motor cortex SMC frontal 51 52
Subcallosal cortex SubCC frontal 53 54
Paracingulate gyrus ParaCG frontal 55 56
Cingulate gyrus, anterior division ACG frontal 57 58
Cingulate gyrus, posterior division PCG parietal 59 60
Precuneous cortex PrCN parietal 61 62
Cuneal cortex CN occipital 63 64
Frontal orbital cortex OFC frontal 65 66
Parahippocampal gyrus, anterior division aPHG temporal 67 68
Parahippocampal gyrus, posterior division pPHG temporal 69 70
Lingual gyrus LG occipital 71 72
Temporal fusiform cortex, anterior division aTFC temporal 73 74
Temporal fusiform cortex, posterior division pTFC temporal 75 76
Temporal occipital fusiform cortex TOF temporal 77 78
Occipital fusiform gyrus OF occipital 79 80
Frontal operculum cortex FO frontal 81 82
Central opercular cortex CO frontal 83 84
Parietal operculum cortex PO parietal 85 86
Planum polare PP temporal 87 88
Heschl’s gyrus HG temporal 89 90
Planum temporale PT temporal 91 92
Supracalcarine cortex SupraCALC occipital 93 94
Occipital pole OP occipital 95 96
(Continued)
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Table 3 | Continued
Regions Abbreviation Classification‡ ROI index
Left hemisphere Right hemisphere
Thalamus Thalamus subcortical 97 98
Caudate Caudate subcortical 99 100
Putamen Putamen subcortical 101 102
Pallidum Pallidum subcortical 103 104
Hippocampus Hipp subcortical 105 106
Amygdala AMY subcortical 107 108
Nucleus accumbens NA subcortical 109 110
†To define network nodes, the Harvard-Oxford atlas (HOA) was employed to divide the whole brain into 110 (55 for each hemisphere) cortical and subcortical regions
of interest (ROIs), except the brainstem. ‡To facilitate data characterization and interpretation, we sorted nodes based on lobar (i.e., frontal, temporal, parietal,
occipital, and subcortical) classification.
FIGURE 3 | Normalized global network measures of the whole-brain
functional network in both groups. The global measures included
small-word parameters (panel A) and network efficiency (panel B). Asterisks
denote significant differences (permutation-based p-value < 0.05). Significant
differences were found in normalized path length λ (permutation-based
p-value = 0.018) and normalized global efficiency Eglob (permutation-based
p-value = 0.008) between experts and novices (panel C). Error bars denote
standard deviations. CP , clustering coefficient; LP , characteristic path length;
γ, normalized clustering coefficient; λ, normalized characteristic path length;
σ, small-worldness; Eloc, local efficiency; Eglob, global efficient.
transfer from one node to another averaged over all pairs of
nodes. Eglob is a measure of the capacity for parallel informa-
tion transfer over the network, and is inversely related to LP.
Eloc is a measure of the fault tolerance of the network, indi-
cating how well each subgraph exchanges information when
the index node is eliminated, and is related to CP. While
high Eloc and CP reflect a high local specialization (called
segregation) of information processing, high Eglob and low
LP express a great ability to integrate information from the
network.
For a given graph G with N nodes, the clustering coefficient is






Dnod(i)(Dnod(i) − 1)/2 ,
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FIGURE 4 | Regional network measures (i.e., nodal degree, nodal
efficiency, and nodal betweenness) for experts and novices. (Panel A)
shows values of each nodal metric over a range of thresholds in each group.
(Panel B) shows mean values for each nodal metric across a range of thresholds
in each group, which were superimposed on an inflated standard brain using
BrainNet Viewer (http://www.nitrc.org/projects/bnv/). (Panel C) shows a bar plot
of the AUC values of each nodal metric (red, frontal areas; green, temporal
areas; blue, parietal areas; sky, occipital areas; purple, subcortical areas).
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where Dnod(i) (see below) is the degree of a node i, and Ei
is the number of edges in Gi, the subgraph consisting of the
neighbors of a node i. The characteristic path length is defined





j = i ∈ G 1L ij
) ,
where Lij is the shortest path length between nodes i and j. To
examine the small-world properties, the values of CP and LP were
normalized as compared with those of 100 degree-matched ran-
dom networks (γ = CrealP /CrandP and λ = LrealP /LrandP , σ = γ/λ)
before statistical analysis (Maslov and Sneppen, 2002). Typically,
a small-world network should meet the following conditions:
γ > 1 and λ ≈ 1 (Watts and Strogatz, 1998), or σ = γ/λ > 1
(Humphries et al., 2006). The global efficiency of G is defined by















where Eglob(Gi)is the global efficiency of Gi, the subgraph com-
posed of the neighbors of a node i.
Regional nodal parameters
To investigate the regional characteristics of whole-brain func-
tional network, we considered three nodal metrics: the nodal
degree (Dnod), the nodal efficiency (Enod), and the nodal
betweenness (Bnod). All these nodal metrics detect the impor-
tance of individual nodes in the network. Dnod measures the
connectivity of a node i with all other nodes in the whole
brain. That is, nodes with high degree interact with many other
nodes in the network. Enod measures the information propaga-
tion ability of a node i with the all other nodes in the whole
brain. Bnod measures the influence of a node i over informa-
tion flow between all other nodes in the whole network. That
is, it is the fraction of all shortest paths in the network that




j = i ∈ G
eij,
where eij is the i th and j th column element of the obtained
binarized correlation matrix. The normal efficiency of a node i








The betweenness of a node i is defined as Freeman (1977):
Bnod(i) =
∑




where δjk is the number of shortest paths from a node j to a node
k, and δjk(i) is the number of shortest paths from a node j to a
node k that pass through a node i within graph G.
Statistical analysis in network parameters
For statistical comparisons of the two groups, we calculated
the area under the curve (AUC) for each network metric,
which yields a summarized scalar to integrate the topologi-
cal characteristics of brain networks over a range of thresholds
(Figures 3C, 4C). Between-group differences in each measure
were inferred by nonparametric permutation tests (5000 per-
mutations) for the AUC of each global and regional measure.
Based on a previous study (Zhang et al., 2011), we identified
the brain regions showing significant between-group differences
in at least one nodal metric (p < 0.05, permutation corrected).
We also performed the Pearson correlation analyses between the
AUC of each network metric and the duration of Baduk train-




Relative to novices, BEs exhibited decreased GMV in the right
AMY and increased GMV in the bilateral HOC, particularly the
NA (Table 2; Figure 1A). Significant negative correlations were
observed between the degree of GMV reduction in the mOFC
adjacent to the gyrus rectus and training duration in BEs (p <
0.001, r = −0.802) (Table 2; Figures 1B,C).
FUNCTIONAL CONNECTIVITY
BEs showed increased FC in the right AMY seed and left mOFC,
and decreased FC in the right NA seed and right mPFC com-
pared to novices (Table 2; Figure 2B). We found no significant
correlations between FC measures and training durations in BEs.
TOPOLOGICAL ORGANIZATION OF THE WHOLE-BRAIN NETWORK
Global network measures
Both BEs and novices showed small-world architecture in whole-
brain functional networks (i.e., σ > 1). Compared to novices,
BEs showed a lower normalized characteristic path length λ
and increased normalized global efficiency Eglob in the whole-
brain functional network (Table 4; Figure 3C). No significant
differences were found in any other global network measures.
Regional network measures
The groups differed with respect to nodal centrality measures
(i.e., nodal degree, nodal efficiency, and nodal betweenness) in
several brain regions (Table 4; Figure 5). Compared to novices,
nodal degree in BEs showed significant increases in the right post-
central gyrus (PocG), right inferior lateral occipital cortex (iLO),
right thalamus, and bilateral NA, but significant decreases in the
right superior frontal gyrus (SFG), bilateral inferior frontal gyrus
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Table 4 | Regions showing significant differences in nodal centrality metrics between experts and novices.
Brain regions Experts (n = 17)† Novices (n = 16)† p-value‡
GLOBAL NETWORK METRICS
Experts > Novices
Normalized global efficiency (Eglob) 0.312 (0.003) 0.310 (0.003) 0.008
Experts < Novices
Normalized characteristic path length (λ) 0.329 (0.003) 0.331 (0.004) 0.018
NODAL DEGREE*
Experts > Novices
Right postcentral gyrus 10.216 (2.768) 8.404 (2.969) 0.040
Right lateral occipital cortex, inferior division 9.637 (2.401) 7.288 (2.087) 0.002
Right thalamus 9.288 (2.842) 7.299 (2.812) 0.026
Left nucleus accumbens 8.458 (2.609) 6.117 (2.868) 0.011
Right nucleus accumbens 8.012 (2.469) 6.376 (2.653) 0.040
Experts < Novices
Right superior frontal gyrus 7.892 (2.966) 10.223 (3.530) 0.025
Left inferior frontal gyrus, pars triangularis 7.983 (2.952) 9.826 (3.044) 0.044
Right inferior frontal gyrus, pars triangularis 8.839 (2.566) 10.640 (3.499) 0.050
Right middle temporal gyrus, posterior division 7.092 (1.931) 8.706 (2.313) 0.021
Left lateral occipital cortex, superior division 8.413 (2.554) 10.481 (2.537) 0.013
Right amygdala 7.002 (2.240) 8.391 (2.232) 0.043
NODAL EFFICIENCY*
Experts > Novices
Right postcentral gyrus 0.201 (0.016) 0.188 (0.019) 0.028
Right lateral occipital cortex, inferior division 0.198 (0.014) 0.184 (0.012) 0.002
Right cingulate gyrus, posterior division 0.194 (0.024) 0.178 (0.030) 0.038
Left thalamus 0.191 (0.019) 0.179 (0.018) 0.030
Right thalamus 0.195 (0.018) 0.182 (0.017) 0.024
Left nucleus accumbens 0.190 (0.016) 0.171 (0.028) 0.008
Right nucleus accumbens 0.188 (0.015) 0.174 (0.026) 0.029
Experts < Novices
Right superior frontal gyrus 0.187 (0.019) 0.199 (0.022) 0.046
Right middle temporal gyrus, posterior division 0.184 (0.013) 0.192 (0.013) 0.048
Left lateral occipital cortex, superior division 0.191 (0.015) 0.201 (0.016) 0.043
NODAL BETWEENNESS*
Experts > Novices
Right postcentral gyrus 18.654 (9.765) 11.436 (7.248) 0.011
Right lateral occipital cortex, inferior division 17.396 (7.918) 11.238 (7.615) 0.015
Left intracalcarine cortex 12.856 (6.872) 8.879 (5.564) 0.044
Left parietal operculum cortex 22.417 (12.901) 15.055 (8.181) 0.025
Right thalamus 19.021 (14.113) 8.525 (4.291) p < 0.001
Experts < Novices
Right superior frontal gyrus 13.295 (7.365) 18.560 (9.814) 0.043
Right middle temporal gyrus, posterior division 12.337 (3.969) 15.264 (5.007) 0.035
Right middle temporal gyrus, temporooccipital part 10.113 (4.805) 15.355 (9.793) 0.030
Right supramarginal gyrus, posterior division 16.613 (7.972) 22.612 (9.574) 0.030
Left temporal fusiform cortex, anterior division 7.761 (6.532) 12.083 (7.511) 0.045
Left occipital fusiform gyrus 10.304 (5.000) 17.177 (13.525) 0.029
Right pallidum 8.257 (5.415) 14.800 (10.731) 0.014
Left amygdala 13.251 (8.945) 20.604 (13.487) 0.038
†Values are presented as mean AUC (standard deviation) for each group. ‡They are p-values based on nonparametric permutation tests. *Regions were considered
changed in experts if they exhibited significant between-group differences (p < 0.05, permutation-corrected) in at least one nodal metric.
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FIGURE 5 | Brain regions showing significant differences in each nodal
metric between experts and novices. Regions with significant group
differences, including nodal degree (panel A), nodal efficiency (panel B), and
nodal betweenness (panel C), were rendered using BrainNet Viewer
(http://www.nitrc.org/projects/bnv/). See Table 4 for detailed information. R,
right; L, left; Bi, bilateral; PoCG, postcentral gyrus; SFG, superior frontal
gyurs; IFG, inferior frontal gyrus; pMTG, posterior division of middle
temporal gyrus; sLO, superior division of lateral occipital cortex; iLO,
interior division of lateral occipital cortex; THAL, thalamus; AMY, amygdala;
NA, nucleus accumbens; PCG, posterior cingulate gyrus; pSMG, posterior
division of supramarginal gyrus; OF, occipital fusiform gyrus; aTFC, anterior
division of temporal fusiform cortex; PALL, pallidum; PO, parietal
operculum cortex; TO, temporooccipital part of middle temporal gyrus;
intraCALC, intracalcarine cortex.
(IFG), right posterior middle temporal gyrus (pMTG), left supe-
rior lateral occipital cortex (sLO), and right AMY (Figure 5A).
In comparison to novices, nodal efficiency in BEs was signif-
icantly increased in the right PocG, right iLO, right posterior
cingulate gyrus (PCG), bilateral thalamus, and bilateral NA, but
significantly decreased in the right SFG, right pMTG, and left
sLO (Figure 5B). Compared to novices, nodal betweenness in BEs
was significantly higher for the right PocG, right iLO, left intra-
calcarine cortex, left parietal operculum cortex (PO), and right
thalamus, while significantly lower for the right SFG, right pMTG,
temporooccipital part of right middle temporal gyrus (TO), right
posterior supramarginal gyrus (pSMG), left anterior temporal
fusiform cortex (aTFC), left occipital fusiform gyrus (OF), right
pallidum, and left AMY (Figure 5C).
Nodal network metrics in several regions were correlated with
training duration of BEs (p < 0.05; Figure 6), although there
were no correlations between brain regions showing significant
group difference in nodal network metrics and training dura-
tions of BEs. The duration of training in BEs was positively
correlated with nodal degree in the left SPL, but negatively cor-
related with nodal degree in the left CN and left pTFC. Nodal
efficiency in the bilateral SPL, right anterior supramarginal gyrus
(aSMG), and right pSMG was positively correlated with train-
ing duration. Training duration in BEs was positively correlated
with nodal betweenness in the left SPL, but negatively corre-
lated with nodal betweenness in the right CN, left pMTG, and
right PO. Figure 6 shows plots of the correlation between nodal
metrics and training duration in BEs. However, all of these cor-
relations did not withstand correction for multiple comparisons
(p < 0.05/110).
DISCUSSION
To our knowledge, this is the first study to combine structural
MRI and rs-fMRI to investigate the morphological differences
in the brain of BEs, the effect of such morphological differences
to functional circuits at rest, and the topological organization
of the whole-brain functional network in board-game experts,
who are treated as excellent examples of cognitive expertise.
Four main findings emerged from this study. First, relative to
novices, BEs showed increased GMV in the bilateral NA and
reduced GMV in the right AMY. Additionally, the GMV in
the mOFC was correlated with training duration. Second, BEs
showed higher FC between the right AMY and left mOFC, and
decreased FC between the right NA and right mPFC. Third,
BEs showed increased global efficiency and decreased charac-
teristic path length, implying an increase in the global integra-
tion of the whole-brain functional network. Fourth, BEs exhib-
ited differences in the nodal centrality metrics of many brain
regions related to the diverse cognitive functions utilized in Baduk
games.
INTUITIVE EXPERTISE IN BOARD-GAME EXPERTS AND ITS
IMPLICATION ON THE PRESENT FINDINGS
Board games have historically been the primary focus of research
on expertise (de Groot, 1965; Chase and Simon, 1973; Kahneman
and Klein, 2009). Specifically, interest in how board-game experts
make rapid and effective decisions and in the neural correlates
associated with these intuitive judgments has been increasing in
recent years (Duan et al., 2012; Wan et al., 2012). Such exper-
tise or unconscious processing and linked brain changes are the
products of prolonged experience within a domain and can-
not be obtained through shortcuts. As it was previously stated,
researchers have studied intuitive expertise in board-game experts
using the NDM approach, particularly the RPD model (de Groot,
1965; Klein, 1998, 2008; Kahneman and Klein, 2009). To describe
how experts can make extremely rapid and good decisions,
the RPD model combines intuitive pattern matching processes
based on past experience and deliberative mental simulation
processes (Klein, 2008; Kahneman and Klein, 2009). These two
processes correspond to System 1 and System 2, respectively,
in dual-process accounts of cognition (Hodgkinson et al., 2009;
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FIGURE 6 | Plots of the correlations between each nodal metric and
training duration of experts. The value of regional nodal measures
(red, nodal degree; green, nodal efficiency; blue, nodal betweenness)
for each BEs is shown on the x-axes and duration of Baduk training (in
years) on the y -axes. All these correlations did not survive multiple
comparisons correction.
Kahneman and Klein, 2009). Interestingly, in this study, brain
regions showing significant group difference in GMV, the NA
and AMY, correspond to theories of the psychological and neu-
robiological mechanisms underlying intuitive judgment. That is,
these regions belong to the X-system (System 1), which supports
reflexive cognitive processing in social cognition (Lieberman,
2007) and these regions, as expected, also belong to the somatic
marker circuitry based on the SMH. Compared with novices, BEs
showed reduced GMV in the AMY and increased GMV in the
NA. This finding is very interesting because of the inverse effect
(increase/decrease) on the GMV of these two regions. Previous
studies have reported specific correlations between regional cor-
tical thickness and each component of cognition (Westlye et al.,
2011), as well as a mixed pattern of increases and decreases
in regional cortical thickness in experts (Kang et al., 2013).
For example, meditation experts showed a thicker cortex in the
mOFC and temporal pole, areas associated with emotional pro-
cessing, and a thinner cortex in the parietal areas and PCG, areas
associated with attention and self-perception when compared
with novices (Kang et al., 2013). In addition, recent studies have
argued for the nonlinearity of training-induced GMV changes,
showing an initial increase followed by a decrease in regional
GMV (Boyke et al., 2008; Driemeyer et al., 2008), and suggested
that these changes are affected by training length and intensity
(Takeuchi et al., 2011). Based on such previous studies, a pos-
sible explanation for the inverse effect of the AMY and NA on
the GMV is that each component involved in Baduk expertise
affects a different part of the brain in a distinctive way (e.g.,
increase/decrease on GMV), or that specific processing related to
how the amygdala shows reduced GMV may be more strongly
involved in BEs.
Contrary to our expectations, BEs and novices did not
show any differences in the GMV of the occipitotemporal and
parietal areas associated with visuospatial processing and spatial
attention. However, we found significant group differences in
terms of regional nodal properties of the functional brain net-
work in these regions, particularly in the iLO, pSMG, TO, and
pMTG, as well as in the NA and AMY, showing morpho-
logical differences. Previous studies have reported that com-
pared with novices, long-term chess experts (over 10 years
of training) have morphological and functional differences in
the HOA, showing decreased GMV and increased FC in brain
regions known as the default-mode network (DMN) during
resting-state in the region (Duan et al., 2012), whereas indi-
viduals who trained for 15 weeks showed difference only in
the activity of anatomically identified HOA but not in mor-
phological differences in the region between before and after
training, exhibiting increased activity during chess play (Wan
et al., 2012). Based on previous studies and our present find-
ings, it is, thus, conceivable that changes in brain structure,
as well as those in brain function, through long-term train-
ing may be required to become experts (i.e., to reach a pro-
fessional level), and that BEs may primarily be involved in
intuitive decision-making, which is associated with the regions
showing both morphological and FC differences, and secon-
darily in visuospatial processing, which is associated with the
regions showing group differences only in the functional brain
network.
STRUCTURAL AND FUNCTIONAL DIFFERENCES IN THE AMYGDALA
The observed decrease in GMV of the AMY following train-
ing is consistent with results from previous studies that involved
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cognitive, motor, or mental training (Boyke et al., 2008; Takeuchi
et al., 2011; Kang et al., 2013), suggesting that a possible
mechanism underlying such structural changes is the use-
dependent selective elimination of synapses (Huttenlocher and
Dabholkar, 1997). The AMY is involved in configural/holistic
visual processing for both faces and emotional facial expressions
(Sato et al., 2011); it enables people to master facial affective pro-
cessing. More specifically, the right AMY is more relevant to the
unconscious (Morris et al., 1998) and rapid (Wright et al., 2001)
processing of facial expressions than the left AMY. Beyond its role
in emotional and facial processing, the AMY, in addition to the
VMPFC, has also been proposed as one of key structures in the
SMH and decision-making, as measured by the Iowa gambling
task (Bechara et al., 2005), a decision-making task that requires
implicit learning and executive function abilities. Additionally,
animal studies have found that the AMY may participate in the
recognition of visual patterns based on past experiences through
direct thalamo–amygdala projection (LeDoux et al., 1989), and
that lesions to this area may increase impulsivity in decision-
making (Winstanley et al., 2004). Human patients with AMY
damage have shown decreased decision-making performance
under conditions of ambiguity and risk (Brand et al., 2007).
Thus, GMV reduction in the AMY of BEs may be related to
intuitive decision-making that is based on feelings (a somatic
marker) rather than on reasoning and/or the enhanced cogni-
tive functioning (e.g., holistic visual processing) achieved through
long-term Baduk training. The results of our RSFC and corre-
lation analyses support this interpretation by showing increased
FC between the AMY and mOFC in BEs and a correlation
between the GMV in the mOFC and training duration. Previous
studies have demonstrated that interactions between the AMY
and mOFC are crucial for goal-directed behavior (Holland and
Gallagher, 2004) and emotional regulation (Banks et al., 2007).
Lee et al. (2010) recently reported differences in the WM tract,
the uncinate fasciculus, connecting these two regions in BEs. As
mentioned above, the mOFC/vmPFC is an important area that
generates somatic markers based on the SMH, and correlation
between the GMV in the region and training duration suggests
that morphological difference in the region may be contributed by
Baduk training rather than pre-existing differences before train-
ing. Contrary to this interpretation, an alternative one of the
present finding is that this opposing pattern (reduced GMV and
increased FC in the amygdala) may reflect a compensatory neu-
ral mechanism pre-existing in people who later become BEs. That
is, the observed pattern may be an endophenotype that enables
improved somatic-marker-based (automatic) decision-making,
and thus favorably influences (i.e., predicts) the development of
Baduk expertise.
STRUCTURAL AND FUNCTIONAL DIFFERENCES IN THE STRIATUM
In contrast to the GMV in the AMY, the GMV in the NA
was increased in BEs compared to novices. This is espe-
cially intriguing, as a recent study with chess experts using
the same method reported a GMV decrease in the dor-
sal part of HOC, which is known to be involved in the
quick generation of the best next move during chess play-
ing (Wan et al., 2011), while we found a GMV increase in
the ventral part of the HOC, the NA (Duan et al., 2012).
Whereas the dorsal striatum is associated with sensorimotor
experiences or reward-outcomes processing, the ventral stria-
tum is associated with emotional and motivational experi-
ences or reward-anticipation processing. Consistent with the
present finding, Boyke et al. (2008) found increased GMV
in the NA after juggling training. They suggested that learn-
ing to juggle may stimulate an increase in the size of this
region due to its role as an interface between the limbic
and motor systems rather than any role in motor control
(Mogenson et al., 1980).
We also found decreased FC between the NA and mPFC
in BEs compared with novices. Such connections are seen
in the anterior part of the DMN (Di Martino et al., 2008;
Duan et al., 2012; Jung et al., 2013), which is thought to
be involved in self-referential processing and theory of mind
(ToM) (Murdaugh et al., 2012; Reniers et al., 2012). ToM refers
to the ability to infer the thoughts or intentions of others.
Given the hyperconnectivity within the DMN of individuals
at high-risk for psychosis (Shim et al., 2010), who also suf-
fer from impaired ToM (Chung et al., 2008), a reverse pat-
tern (decreased FC) in BEs may be due to their capacity to
infer the opponent’s intention while playing Baduk. It is also
conceivable that the strength of this connection may reflect a
change in their sensitivity to feedback, given that these couplings
are thought to alter expectations in the face of negative feed-
back (van den Bos et al., 2012). However, these ideas are just
speculations, and additional neuroimaging studies with Baduk
tasks are necessary to identify the physiological mechanisms
that underlie these brain differences and to clarify the relation-
ship between their cognitive functions and brain structure and
function.
TOPOLOGICAL ALTERATION IN THE WHOLE-BRAIN FUNCTIONAL
NETWORK
The GTA results reveal increased global efficiency and decreased
characteristic path length in Bes compared with novices, implying
an increase in the global integration of the whole-brain network.
This can be reflective of effective integrity and rapid informa-
tion propagation between and among the remote regions of the
brain involved in the cognitive processing required for Baduk
play in BEs (Wang et al., 2010). Thus, this finding reflects a dif-
ference in the functional aspect of the whole-brain circuitry in
the service of achieving the most efficient network for playing
Baduk.
We also found the following differences between the two
groups in the regional nodal characteristics of many brain
regions: increased nodal centrality metrics in nine regions,
namely the right PocG, right iLO, right PCG, left intracal-
carine cortex, left PO, bilateral NA, and bilateral thalamus, and
decreased nodal centrality metrics in 12 regions, namely the right
SFG, right pMTG, right TO of MTG, right pSMG, right pal-
lidum, left sLO, left aTFC, left OF, bilateral IFG, and bilateral
AMY. Interestingly, whereas the brain regions showing increased
nodal centralities in BEs were involved primarily in implicit pro-
cessing, such as somatic sensation (PocG and thalamus), visual
expertise (iLO), and affective/motivational processing (NA), the
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brain regions showing decreased nodal centralities were related
to higher-order cognitive functions such as executive function
(SFG, IFG, and sLO), semantic memory processing (pMTG and
pSMG), and visual perception (TO and OF). It is speculated
that brain regions showing differences in nodal centralities are
important contributors in Baduk expertise, and may facilitate
efficient exchange of information. In this context, our findings
are consistent with the RPD model mentioned above (Klein,
2008) Therefore, Baduk is thought to involve diverse cogni-
tive functions with respect to both automatic and deliberative
processes.
Previous neuroimaging studies that focused on Baduk
reported enhanced activation in the occipitotemporal and
parietal cortices, during these games (Chen et al., 2003;
Ouchi et al., 2005), as well as learning-induced differ-
ences in activity in fronto–parietal and visual cortices (Itoh
et al., 2008), which corresponds to our findings of differ-
ences in the PocG and iLO. Correlation analyses between
each nodal metric and training duration of BEs showed
positive correlations between these two values in the pari-
etal areas, particularly more extensive in the right than left
hemisphere, although it did not remain significant after cor-
rection for multiple comparison. The right SPL in terms
of Baduk play, may contribute to spatial working memory
(Ungerleider et al., 1998) and/or spatial attention (Fink et al.,
1996).
Chess requires the recognition of the identity and function
of each piece (i.e., chess-specific object and function recogni-
tion, which is known to be associated with the occipito-parieto-
temporal junction, OTJ; Bilalić et al., 2011a,b), whereas this
is not needed in Baduk. This difference as a confounding fac-
tor makes it difficult to compare or interpret the results of the
present study with those of previous neuroimaging studies on
chess experts. However, both Baduk and chess involve pattern
recognition with respect to the spatial positioning of stones or
pieces, which is an essential component in improving both games.
Recently, Bilalić et al. (2010, 2011b) demonstrated that the CoS
and RSC, part of the parahippocampal place area, play an impor-
tant role in chess-specific pattern recognition. Intriguingly, we
found increased nodal centralities in the iLO, which corresponds
to the OTJ associated with chess-specific object and function
recognition in studies by Bilalić et al. (2011a,b), in BEs com-
pared to novices but not any differences in the Cos and RSC
between the two groups. This discrepancy in results between
the present study with BEs and previous studies with chess
experts may stem from differences between the basic aspect of
pattern recognition in these board games; pattern recognition
in Baduk is only based on the shapes the stones take, while
that in chess is based on object and function recognition of
chess pieces and their ability to rapidly access the information
of potential moves or move sequences for each piece. Thus, dif-
ferences in the iLO may be linked to the recognition of shapes
and integration of local features (Kourtzi et al., 2003) during
Baduk play.
Taken together, these GTA results provide such insight into
the topological organization of the functional brain networks of
BEs: increased functional integration across global brain regions
and increased nodal centralities in regions associated with spatial
attention and somatic sensation.
LIMITATIONS
The present study has some limitations. First, it is difficult
to accurately and quantitatively assess the skill level of BEs.
Although we used training duration (in years) as a proxy for
skill level in BEs, the validity of this proxy can be challenged.
Skill levels in BEs may be independent of training duration,
resulting in similar skill levels for any given pair of short- and
long-trained participants. Previous studies have described that
the lack of any significant correlation between brain imaging
data and the amount/intensity of training in experts may result
from the inaccuracy of the proxy chosen in determining the
actual extent/intensity of the individual training (Luders et al.,
2011; Kang et al., 2013). Second, as a result of the cross-sectional
nature of this study, our findings do not allow any unambiguous
definitive causality. Therefore, it is unclear whether the brain dif-
ferences we found result from acquiring Baduk expertise through
prolonged training, or if they simply reflect pre-existing differ-
ences in brain structure and function that predict later expertise.
Longitudinal studies will help to clarify this issue. Finally, the
present findings with respect to FC and GTA are based on rs-
fMRI data of BEs rather than on brain activity during game
performance. Thus, further functional imaging studies are nec-
essary to investigate the topological properties and FC within
the functional brain network while the individuals actually play
Baduk.
CONCLUSIONS
The current study demonstrates differences in the structure and
the functional circuits of the AMY and NA in BEs; compared
with novices, experts showed decreased GMV and increased FC
with the mOFC in the AMY as well as increased GMV and
decreased FC with the mPFC in the NA. As interfaces between
the cognitive and affective components of the limbic cortico–
striatal loop, the AMY and NA are involved in implicit processing
and goal-directed adaptive behavior under changing environ-
mental conditions. In particular, the AMY is critical for emo-
tional and holistic visual processing, as well as emotion-based
decision-making. Based on our hypothesis that long-term Baduk
training would influence the structure and functional circuits
of regions associated with the cognitive mechanisms underlying
Baduk expertise, our findings suggest that intuitive decision-
making, which is mediated by somatic marker circuitry such
as the AMY and NA, is a key cognitive component of Baduk
play. The current study also provides new evidence for differ-
ences in the topological organization of the whole-brain net-
work of BEs, showing increased global integration and altered
regional nodal centralities in the regions related to visuospatial
processing.
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Expert soccer players are able to utilize their opponents’ early body kinematics to
predict the direction in which the opponent will move. We have previously demonstrated
enhanced fMRI activation in experts in the motor components of an action observation
network (AON) during sports anticipation tasks. Soccer players often need to prevent
opponents from successfully predicting their line of attack, and consequently may try
to deceive them; for example, by performing a step-over. We examined how AON
activations and expertise effects are modified by the presence of deception. Three groups
of participants; higher-skilled males, lower-skilled males, and lower-skilled females, viewed
video clips in point-light format, from a defender’s perspective, of a player approaching
and turning with the ball. The observer’s task in the scanner was to determine whether
the move was normal or deceptive (involving a step-over), while whole-brain functional
images were acquired. In a second counterbalanced block with identical stimuli the
task was to predict the direction of the ball. Activations of AON for identification of
deception overlapped with activations from the direction identification task. Higher-skilled
players showed significantly greater activation than lower-skilled players in a subset of
AON areas; and lower-skilled males in turn showed greater activation than lower-skilled
females, but females showed more activation in visual cortex. Activation was greater for
deception identification than for direction identification in dorsolateral prefrontal cortex,
medial frontal cortex, anterior insula, cingulate gyrus, and premotor cortex. Conversely,
greater activation for direction than deception identification was found in anterior cingulate
cortex and caudate nucleus. Results are consistent with the view that explicit identification
of deceptive moves entails cognitive effort and also activates limbic structures associated
with social cognition and affective responses.
Keywords: fMRI, action observation, deception, expertise, soccer, football, mirror neuron system, sport
INTRODUCTION
Expert players in interceptive sports such as soccer react under
great time pressure and therefore, need to predict the actions
of their opponents and the direction of play (Reilly et al., 2000;
Abernethy et al., 2001; Savelsbergh et al., 2005; Williams et al.,
2011). Studies have shown that superior analysis of body kinemat-
ics underpins much anticipation skill in sport. In the temporal
occlusion paradigm, action is cut off at various time intervals
relative to a crucial event (such as point of direction change
in soccer), and the observer judges the direction of the shot.
Results consistently show that experts are able to detect the pre-
dictive information with greater accuracy and earlier than novices
(Abernethy and Russell, 1984, 1987; Abernethy et al., 2008). The
nature of the predictive information has also been identified using
techniques such as spatial occlusion, in which different parts of
the opponent’s body are systematically masked (Muller et al.,
2006; Jackson and Mogan, 2007). The reductive approach to
identifying the minimum visual information sufficient to sup-
port expert anticipation has been taken further with the use of
point-light video stimuli. Comparisons of performance based on
ball trajectory alone and studies using point-light stimuli indicate
the pre-eminence of body kinematics as a cue to future action
(Abernethy et al., 2001, 2008; Huys et al., 2008).
A general conclusion from this research is that experts are bet-
ter than novices at detecting predictive cues in opponents’ body
kinematics, and this gives them an advantage in speed and accu-
racy. Precisely for this reason, skilled players also need to develop
strategies to reduce the predictability of their own actions. The
effectiveness with which deceptive moves can thwart anticipa-
tion has been established in soccer (Dicks et al., 2011; Smeeton
and Williams, 2012; Bishop et al., 2013); rugby football (Jackson
et al., 2006; Brault et al., 2012; Mori and Shimada, 2013); bas-
ketball (Sebanz and Shiffrar, 2009; Kunde et al., 2011); handball
(Cañal-Bruland and Schmidt, 2009; Cañal-Bruland et al., 2010),
and tennis (Rowe et al., 2009). In these studies it was found that
experts are more accurate than novices in predicting the outcome
of deceptive moves, and that the expert-novice difference tends to
be greater for deceptive than for normal moves.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org December 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 851 |
HUMAN NEUROSCIENCE
36
Wright et al. Identification of direction and deception in soccer moves
Neuroimaging studies have provided some insights into the
neural structures that mediate anticipation skills. A substantial
literature has developed around functional imaging studies of
cortical networks that mediate the perception of, and the produc-
tion of responses to, others’ actions. Molenberghs et al. (2012)
conducted a meta-analysis of 125 fMRI studies of the human
“mirror neuron system” (MNS) and identified a core network
of brain areas including inferior frontal gyrus, dorsal and ven-
tral premotor cortex, and inferior and superior parietal lobule,
that were activated in studies involving the observation and/or
production of actions. Most fMRI experiments on the observa-
tion of actions do not include direct evidence for the presence
of mirror neurons, so we refer in the present paper to an action
observation network (AON: Grafton, 2009) rather than MNS.
The AON does nevertheless include the structures identified by
Molenberghs et al. (2012) as core elements of the MNS.
Research has demonstrated the importance of the AON in
sport, including structures traditionally interpreted as having
motor functions. Wright and Jackson (2007) measured cortical
fMRI activation in predicting the direction of a tennis serve from
temporally-occluded video clips. Relative to a passive, action-
observation control condition, action prediction activated the
anterior components of the AON, particularly the dorsal and
ventral premotor cortex. Aglioti et al. (2008) found that obser-
vation of basketball shots increased the strength of motor-evoked
potentials elicited by transcranial magnetic stimulation, and that
experts showed a time-specific motor activation for missed shots,
indicating a close and specific interaction between perceptual
and motor systems that is dependent on experiential learning.
Wright et al. (2010) found stronger activation for expert bad-
minton players while predicting the direction of badminton shots
in components of the AON, specifically, medial frontal cortex,
inferior frontal gyrus, anterior insula, and superior parietal lob-
ule. Wright et al. (2011) showed that low-resolution point-light
badminton video effectively supported judgments of the direction
of a shot, and elicited a corresponding full pattern of fMRI activa-
tions in these areas including expertise effects, thus, indicating the
sufficiency of body kinematics as input to the AON. Bishop et al.
(2013) studied neural correlates of direction prediction in soccer,
with temporally-occluded video stimuli that included deceptive
moves, and with randomized presentation that maximized uncer-
tainty. High-skilled observers showed stronger responses than
intermediates and novices not only in cortical AON structures
but also in subcortical structures, including cerebellum, lentiform
nucleus, and thalamus, that have been implicated in response
selection (Yarrow et al., 2009).
Correct direction prediction in a situation where an oppo-
nent can use deceptive moves, for example when an oncoming
rugby player executes a side-step, may involve attending to “hon-
est” movement cues and ignoring “deceptive” movement signals
(Brault et al., 2012). This is a complex skill that entails more
than simply being able to recognize a normal or a deceptive
move: the correct implication of that move in terms of outcome
(future direction of play) must also be perceived or compre-
hended. This is perhaps the reason that highly-skilled players
often take longer to react than novices in the presence of decep-
tion, and achieve greater accuracy as a result (Brault et al., 2012;
Mori and Shimada, 2013). In some studies, experts are found
to be significantly disadvantaged by deception, notwithstanding
they may be less disadvantaged than novices (Brault et al., 2012;
Bishop et al., 2013; Mori and Shimada, 2013). Possible reasons for
this include an increased cognitive load, perceptual uncertainty,
or misdirection of attention in the presence of deception.
The purpose of the present study was to analyze the neural and
behavioral responses of lower-skilled and higher-skilled players to
the task of identifying soccer moves as normal or deceptive, and
by comparison, measuring the neural and behavioral response to
identifying future direction of play in an identical (normal plus
deceptive) stimulus set. Most studies of deceptive moves in sport
have used identification of future direction of play as a mea-
sure (Jackson et al., 2006; Rowe et al., 2009; Dicks et al., 2011;
Kunde et al., 2011; Brault et al., 2012; Smeeton and Williams,
2012; Bishop et al., 2013; Mori and Shimada, 2013). A smaller
number have measured deception identification (Cañal-Bruland
and Schmidt, 2009; Sebanz and Shiffrar, 2009; Cañal-Bruland
et al., 2010). These tasks are not equivalent. Firstly, as Cañal-
Bruland and Williams (2010) found, the kinematic information
used when predicting the direction of a shot differs from that
used when discriminating between two different movement pat-
terns. Secondly, the consequences of the judgment are different.
Direction identification requires a directional or spatial judgment
with implications for the direction of an interceptive movement.
Equally, deception identification implies a more analytical judg-
ment of an observed action as having some goal or intent, but
without specifying direction. It was therefore, hypothesized that
both behavioral performance and cortical patterns of activation
for direction identification and deception identification may dif-
fer, and that there would be differences in the activation of
task-related regions, as identified by fMRI, in lower-skilled and
higher-skilled players. In view of the research reviewed above
showing the sufficiency of body kinematics in sport action pre-
diction tasks, and in order to eliminate irrelevant stimulation by
background stimuli, physical appearance and clothing of actors,
we utilized point-light stimuli for the tasks.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND PROCEDURE
In a block-design, fMRI study, participants in the scanner viewed
2-s video sequences of an opposing soccer player dribbling the
ball toward the viewer, and pressed a button to indicate which
direction the player would turn; that is, the leftmost button for
a turn to the observer’s left, and the rightmost button for a turn
to the observer’s right. There was an interstimulus interval of 2-s
during which a gray screen at mean luminance was present, and
instructions were to respond as accurately as possible during the
interstimulus interval. There were five video clips in each block.
Exactly half of the sequences of each type were based on deceptive
moves (step-over) and half on normal moves, both for direction
prediction and for control conditions. The type of move (nor-
mal or deceptive) was randomized within blocks. In addition to
fMRI data, button press responses were recorded and analyzed for
accuracy.
A second session of the experiment utilized exactly the same
stimulus material and block design but required a different action
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identification task: instead of predicting which direction the
player would turn, the observer had to indicate by a button press
whether a move was normal or deceptive. The order of sessions
was counterbalanced across participants.
For both action identification tasks, we used a control block:
a single static frame at the start of the point-light footballer’s
run was used, and it was slowly magnified (zoomed) over 2-s to
match the apparent motion of the footballer toward the observer.
However, as it was derived from a static frame, there was no
biological motion: that is, there was no relative motion between
the dots representing the movements of the footballer’s limbs
and trunk. We therefore, refer to this as a non-biological motion
(NBM) control. The required response for this type of video was
simply to press a middle button. Mean accuracy on this task was
99.9%. A further type of block required participants to respond
to an altered dot in the point-light footballer video (98.5% cor-
rect): but further analyses of the responses to this condition are
not within the scope of the present paper.
Before each block of 5 trials, a 5-s instruction screen appeared
specifying the task for the subsequent block. Blocks were pre-
sented in a fixed pseudorandom sequence. Altogether there were
eight repetitions of the three types of block: (1) soccer direction
identification with 0 ms occlusion; (2) soccer direction identi-
fication with −160 ms occlusion; (3) NBM control. The total
duration including instruction screens and blank intervals was
18 min.
The same control task and stimuli were used in the deception
identification session as in the direction identification session.
Thus, the only difference in the material for the two versions
of the experiment was in the on-screen instructions. The three
types of block were thus, (1) soccer deception identification with
0 ms occlusion; (2) soccer deception identification with −160 ms
occlusion; (3) NBM control. Participants undertook both ver-
sions of the experiment, and the order was counterbalanced
between experiments. The experiment as a whole comprised two
18-min sessions, plus an anatomical scan lasting 5 min.
After completing the pre-scan screening and informed consent
procedures, participants were instructed in the nature of the task
and shown examples of the stimuli. They were asked whether they
were familiar with the step-over as a deceptive move, and if not, a
brief verbal explanation was given.
PARTICIPANTS
The participants were 17 higher-skilled male soccer players (mean
age 22.6, SD 4.0, range 19–33 years), 17 lower-skilled male soccer
players (mean age 22.1, SD 3.7, range 19–31 years). Additionally
17 females (mean age 20.1, SD 1.1, range 19–23 years) were
included as a group with minimal soccer experience. Participants
were recruited by advertising on University notice-boards and
websites and by word of mouth and were offered £20 in expenses
to recompense for their time and inconvenience. All partici-
pants gave their written informed consent as part of a protocol
approved by the Brunel University Department of Psychology
Ethics Committee. Procedures for fMRI were conducted accord-
ing to the Rules of Operation of the Combined Universities
Brain Imaging Centre. All participants completed a question-
naire giving brief demographic details and providing information
on their soccer experience and expertise. Higher-skilled players
were defined as those playing currently or within the last year
in a league with regular fixtures and for a named club whose
provenance could be checked on the internet. They were drawn
from local leagues and University teams and did not include elite
or professional players. Lower-skilled players were nonplayers or
recreational players, but included some with previous experi-
ence (more than 1 year previous) of playing competitively for
local sports clubs or school teams. All but one participant in the
lower-skilled male group had played soccer in childhood. Table 1
compares the samples according to age and soccer experience.
Higher- and lower-skilled males differed significantly on a Mann-
Whitney U test in the highest level of competition achieved;
U = 29, p < 0.0005, the number of hours per week in training;
U = 50, p < 0.005; and the number of matches watched (live
or on television or other media) per month, U = 105, p < 0.05.
They did not differ significantly in age, in the age at which
they started playing, or in the skill level of other sports played.
The lower-skilled females differed significantly from the lower-
skilled males in the number of years playing, U = 82, p < 0.005;
competitive level, U = 116, p < 0.05; hours per week training,
U = 111, p < 0.05 and matches watched per month, U = 70,
p < 0.005. They did not differ significantly in the level of other
sports played. From the point of view of the research hypothe-
ses, the female lower-skilled group provides a baseline with a low
level of soccer experience: the possible influence of gender will be
addressed in the Discussion.
STIMULI
All experiments utilized 2-s point-light video clips of three junior
international male soccer players dribbling the ball toward a video
camera (NV GS400; Panasonic Corporation, Secaucus, NJ) placed
at a distance of 11.5 m from the start of the player’s run, in an
Table 1 | Comparison of the soccer experience of the participant groups.
Years
playing
Median competitive Hours training Matches watched Median level of main
level per week per month other sport played
Higher-skilled males M = 13.6
SD = 4.2





Lower-skilled males M = 8.9
SD = 7.6





Lower-skilled females M = 0.5
SD = 1.4
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indoor sports hall. The actors ran toward the camera, then at a
predetermined point, moved obliquely to the left or right as they
would in evading a defending player’s interception. They per-
formed a deceptive maneuver known as a step-over in 50% of
runs immediately prior to a direction change. The color video was
edited (Pinnacle Studio Pro v 11.0, Pinnacle Systems, CA) frame
by frame to produce sparse binary (black/white) point-light rep-
resentations consisting of 15 small disc markers on principal body
joints and extremities. The ball was represented in each frame by a
white disc. There was no representation of surface texture, depth,
orientation, or color, either that of the player or that of the back-
ground. To generate different levels of temporal occlusion, the
video was truncated at various time points relative to the passing
of the floor marker (0 ms). Two occlusion levels were used (−160
and 0 ms).
ACQUISITION AND ANALYSIS OF fMRI DATA
Functional and structural images were acquired on a
MAGNETOM Trio 3T MRI scanner (Siemens Medical Solutions;
Bracknell, UK) using Siemens’ parallel imaging technology (iPat),
which was deployed with a generalized auto calibrating partially
parallel acquisitions (GRAPPA) acceleration factor of two, via a
Siemens eight-channel array head coil. For each functional run,
an ultra-fast echo planar gradient-echo imaging sequence sensi-
tive to blood-oxygen-level dependent (BOLD) contrast was used
to acquire 41 transverse slices (3 mm thickness) per TR (3000 ms,
TE 31 ms, flip angle = 90◦). For each version of the experiment,
360 volumes were acquired in a 192 × 192 mm field of view
with a matrix size of 64 × 64 mm, giving an in-plane spatial
resolution of 3 mm (generating 3 mm3 voxels). Anatomical data
were collected in the same orientation and plane as the functional
data to enable localization, using an MP-RAGE T1-weighted
sequence, in which 176 one-mm slices alternated with a 0.5 mm
gap. The structural sequence incorporated 1830 ms TR, 4.43 ms
TE, FoV 256 mm and a GRAPPA acceleration factor of two.
Data acquisition and preprocessing
both sessions were spatially realigned by initially aligning the
first images of each session, and then aligning the images within
each session to the first image, to moderate the effects of partici-
pants’ head motion. Images were normalized using the SPM8 EPI
template to account for anatomical variability, and to facilitate
reporting of activation sites in the Montreal Neurological Institute
(MNI) standard space. Finally, data were smoothed using a
Gaussian kernel of 6 mm full-width half-maximum (FWHM) to
increase the signal-to-noise ratio according to the matched filter
theorem. The selected design matrix convolved the experimen-
tal design with a hemodynamic response function to model the
hemodynamic lag behind the neuronal response. This model was
estimated using proportional scaling over the session to remove
global effects, and with a high pass filter of 128 s.
Statistical analysis
Individual level whole-brain fMRI t-contrasts were computed
between experimental and control conditions as follows: (1) 0 ms
occlusion vs. NBM control, (2) −160 ms occlusion vs. NBM con-
trol. This analysis was repeated for both direction identification
and deception identification. Second-level, group data were ana-
lyzed using the SPM8 full factorial ANOVAs procedure. Two
ANOVAs were conducted: the first, within-group ANOVA was
based on the first level contrast between the experimental tasks
and the NBM control and it was carried out twice, once for each
group. The purpose of this analysis was to identify the within-
group patterns of activation for the two tasks, deception and
direction identification. Between-group differences were analyzed
in the main (3 × 2 × 2) mixed ANOVA; the three factors were
expertise (higher-skilled males, lower-skilled males, lower-skilled
females), task (deception identification, direction identification),
and occlusion (0, −160 ms). The input data to the ANOVA model
were the first-level t-contrasts for 0 ms and for −160 ms occlusion
vs. NBM control, for both the deception and direction identifica-
tion tasks. Family-wise error (FWE) correction was used for all
whole brain data. Identification of the location of peaks and clus-
ters and assignment of Brodmann area (BA) labels was carried
out in MNI space using WFU-Pickatlas (Maldjian et al., 2003).
Accuracy of behavioral responses in the scanner was also analyzed




The percentage of correct responses was measured for both direc-
tion identification and deception identification in the scanner,
and a mixed ANOVA was conducted with identification task
(deception, direction), trial type (normal, deceptive), and occlu-
sion (0, −160 ms) as within-participant variables and group
(higher-skilled male, lower-skilled male, lower-skilled female) as a
between-participant variable. There was a significant main effect
of trial type, F(1, 48) = 63.5, p < 0.0005, η2p = 0.59; with the
mean accuracy higher for normal, M = 75.8% than for decep-
tive trials, M = 53.6%. There was also a significant main effect
of occlusion, F(1, 48) = 64.5, p < 0.0005, η2p = 0.59, with higher
accuracy for late occlusion (M = 72.4%) than for early occlusion
(M = 57.6%). There was also a significant main effect of group,
F(2, 48) = 10.4, p < 0.005, η2p = 0.32. Tukey’s HSD showed that
higher-skilled males (M = 72.7) differed significantly in over-
all accuracy from lower-skilled males (M = 64.5%, p < 0.05)
and lower-skilled females (M = 57.9%, p < 0.001). Lower-skilled
males and females did not differ significantly from one another.
It was also expected that higher-skilled participants would be rel-
atively superior in their response to deceptive stimuli, and this
was confirmed; the interaction of expertise and trial type was sig-
nificant, F(2, 48) = 3.9, p =< 0.05, η2p = 0.15. These results are
broadly consistent with previous work on expertise and antic-
ipation skill. Additionally, normal and deceptive stimuli were
differentially affected by occlusion, thus, for trial type x occlusion,
F(1, 48) = 25.7, p < 0.0005, η2p = 0.39.
A novel aspect of the design was the comparison of two
different identification tasks. Overall, the two tasks had a simi-
lar level of difficulty: for deception identification (M = 65.7%)
and for direction identification (M = 64.3%) and the over-
all difference in accuracy was not significant. However, there
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org December 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 851 |
fMRI data were analyzed using the batch processing utilities of
SPM8 (http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/). Functional images for
39
Wright et al. Identification of direction and deception in soccer moves
was a significant two-way interaction between identification
task (deception, direction) and trial type (normal, deceptive),
F(1, 48) = 28.7, p < 0.0005, η2p = 0.39. As shown in Figure 1, on
normal moves, accuracy was significantly higher for direction
identification, but on deceptive moves, accuracy was significantly
higher for deception identification. There was also a significant
three-way interaction between identification task, trial type and
occlusion, F(1, 48) = 13.2, p < 0.005, η2p = 0.22, such that the
task difference on deceptive trials was greater on late-occluded
than early-occluded blocks. These interactions are of particular
interest and to aid their interpretation, the mean scores are shown
in Figure 1.
Figure 1 shows that for normal trial stimuli, mean accuracy
of identification was relatively high (66–86%), both for early and
late occlusion. For deceptive trial stimuli, the results were more
complex. Planned comparisons (within-participants t-tests) were
carried out for all comparisons of deception identification and
direction identification, and the significant results are shown in
Figure 1. Thus, for late occluded stimuli, participants performed
with 76% accuracy in identifying deceptive stimuli on decep-
tive trials, but on judging direction with the same stimuli their
accuracy (54%) was not significantly better than chance on a
one-sample t-test.
Signal detection theory analysis
Because the percentage correct accuracy values may be affected
by response bias, signal detection theory (SDT: Green and Swets,
1966) was applied. This method has been used previously to
analyze the identification of normal vs. deceptive movements by
Cañal-Bruland and Schmidt (2009). SDT calculates two variables,
d-prime (d′: perceptual sensitivity), and beta (β: likelihood ratio
or response bias). The d′ is a measure of the difference between
the signal and noise distributions, calculated as d′ = z(H) - z(F),
where H is “hits” or correct identifications, and F is false pos-
itives, expressed in terms of their common standard deviation
(z-units) (Macmillan and Creelman, 2005). Thus, for deception
FIGURE 1 | Mean percentage accuracy on normal and deceptive trials
in scanner sessions where the task was to identify of the type of move
(normal or deceptive) and in sessions where the task was to identify
the direction of play (left or right). Error bars are ±1 s.e.m. Difference
between deception identification and direction identification (bracketed
bars) is significant at ∗∗p < 0.005.
identification, H was taken to be the proportion of correct identi-
fications of normal moves, and F was taken to be the proportion
of deceptive moves incorrectly identified as normal. For direction
identification, H was taken to be the proportion of correct identi-
fications of direction on normal moves, and F was taken to be the
proportion of incorrect identifications of direction on deceptive
moves.
For deception identification, d′ was significantly greater for
late-occluded stimuli (M = 1.46) than for early-occluded stimuli
(M = 0.59). There was also a significant main effect of exper-
tise. Post-hoc contrasts (Tukey) showed that the higher-skilled
males were more sensitive to the difference between normal and
deceptive moves than the lower-skilled males, and lower-skilled
females.
For direction identification, d′ was significantly greater for
stimuli occluded at 0 ms (M = 1.07) than for stimuli occluded
at −160 ms (M = 0.39). There was also a significant main effect
of expertise and post-hoc contrasts (Tukey) showed that the
higher-skilled males were more sensitive to direction than the
lower-skilled males or females, taking into account the false
identifications of direction on deceptive moves. Although raw
accuracy scores on normal moves were higher for direction
identification (Figure 1), overall sensitivity to direction (d′) was
lower than for deception identification, because of the incorrect
responses on deceptive moves (Figure 2).
The criterion position c is the midpoint of the normalized
hits and false positives, c = −1/2[z(H) + z(F)]. A more gener-
ally accepted measure of response bias is the likelihood ratio (β)
which takes sensitivity (d′) into account, and is calculated as ecd′ ,
where cd′ = −1/2 [z(H)2− z(F)2] (Macmillan and Creelman,
2005; Cañal-Bruland and Schmidt, 2009). A neutral criterion
is c = 0, or β = 1. For deception identification, if an observer
were biased toward identifying moves as normal, then this would
increase both the hits and the false positives, and give β < 1, that
is, a liberal criterion. If the observer were biased toward identi-
fying moves as deceptive, it would decrease both the hits and the
false positives and give β > 1, that is, a conservative approach to
identifying a normal shot.
For deception identification ANOVA showed a significant
main effect of occlusion (Table 2), with larger β indicating a
conservative criterion for late-occluded (M = 1.7) but not for
early-occluded stimuli (M = 0.39). There was also a significant
main effect of expertise. Post-hoc comparison showed that higher-
skilled males set their criterion significantly further toward decep-
tion, relative to lower-skilled females. The interaction between
expertise and occlusion was also significant with the expertise
difference appearing on late-occluded stimuli (Figure 2).
For direction identification the interpretation of β is a lit-
tle more complex, as it represents a perceptual bias rather than
a response bias. A value of β < 1 implies incorrect identifica-
tion of direction on deceptive moves (designated false positives),
without a corresponding increase in errors on normal moves
(designated misses), that is, a tendency to analyze the direction
of all moves as if they were normal. This would arise if deceptive
cues that are incongruent with direction resemble normal cues
that are congruent with direction. A value of β > 1, conversely,
would represent a tendency to err on normal moves but not
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FIGURE 2 | Mean values for d-prime (d′); perceptual sensitivity,
and Beta (β); likelihood ratio or response bias, for all
experimental conditions. (A) d′, 0 ms occlusion; (B) d′, −160 ms
occlusion; (C) β, 0 ms occlusion (D) β, −160 ms occlusion. Error
bars are ±1 s.e.m. Asterisks for Beta values represent mean
values significantly different from 1 (one sample t-test, two-tailed
p < 0.5∗ < 0.005∗∗). All d′ were significantly different from zero
(one sample t-test, two-tailed).
Table 2 | Significant results from ANOVA conducted separately for deception identification and direction identification.
Condition F df p η2p Post-hoc (Tukey)
Deception identification d′ Occlusion 48.8 1,48 *** 50
Expertise 4.9 2,48 * 0.17 HSM > LSM, p < 0.05
HSM > LSF, p < 0.05
Deception identification β Occlusion 11.7 1,48 ** 0.20
Expertise 4.5 2,48 * 0.15 HSM > LSF, p < 0.05
Occ. × Exp. 4.5 2,48 * 0.15
Direction identification d′ Occlusion 36.3 1,48 *** 0.43
Expertise 4.1 2,48 * 0.15 HSM > LSM, p < 0.05
HSM > LSF, p < 0.05
Direction identification β Occlusion 6.0 1,48 * 0.11
Means and standard errors for every cell are shown in Figure 2. In each case, the independent variables were temporal occlusion (0 ms, −160 ms), and expertise
(HSM, higher-skilled males; LSM, lower-skilled males; LSF, lower-skilled females). p < 0.05 * < 0.005 ** < 0.0005***.
on deceptive moves; in effect, to treat appearances as deceptive.
Thus, some of the effect of deception is revealed on the criterion
measures. Figure 2 shows that all cell mean β values for direc-
tion identification were less than 1 and the planned comparisons
(one-sample t-tests) were significant separately for all experimen-
tal conditions except for higher-skilled players on late-occluded
stimuli: there was a general tendency to treat appearances as nor-
mal and to be fooled by deceptive moves. The main effect of
expertise on β was not significant: there was no evidence that
higher-skilled players adopted a different criterion from lower-
skilled players. The only significant ANOVA result for β in direc-
tion identification (Table 2) was a main effect of occlusion, with β
smaller for late-occluded (M = 0.70) than early occluded stimuli
(M = 0.86).
It can be concluded that higher skilled males were signifi-
cantly more sensitive to the cues that differentiate normal from
deceptive soccer moves. However, they also showed a bias toward
identifying moves as deceptive, and in this respect they resembled
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the skilled handball goalkeepers in the study of Cañal-Bruland
and Schmidt (2009). Results also showed that higher-skilled
males were significantly more sensitive overall than lower-skilled
observers to directional cues. However, observers on average
adopted a liberal criterion for direction identification (Figure 2),
which is a significant tendency to treat deceptive moves like
normal moves for the purposes of identifying direction, in other
words, to be fooled by the deceptive stimuli.
WHOLE-BRAIN ANALYSIS OF fMRI DATA
Within-groups analysis
Figures 3–5 show group data for the activations due to the first-
level contrast between the two soccer identification conditions
and the NBM control trials, superimposed on horizontal sections
of a normalized brain anatomy.
The data were entered into separate 2 × 2 ANOVAs, using the
factorial design options of SPM8, One ANOVA for each partic-
ipant group. Figures 3–5 show the responses in the deception
task colored cyan (light blue), and the responses in the direc-
tion task colored magenta (pink). Overlapping activations are
shown in a mixed color (purple). Both sets of data are based
on first-level t-contrasts measured relative to NBM control. The
second level data are displayed with a very conservative statis-
tical threshold (p < 0.0005, FWE corrected) for both occlusion
levels combined. Figure 2 shows results for higher-skilled males,
Figure 3 for lower-skilled males, and Figure 4 for lower-skilled
females. For all participant groups, the main anatomical areas
showing strong activations were similar for deception identifica-
tion and direction identification and included regions identified
as part of a human AON specifically the intraparietal sulcus
(BA40) and premotor cortex (BA6). The supplementary motor
area in medial frontal cortex (BA6) was also consistently activated,
along with the adjoining anterior cingulate cortex (ACC; BA32).
Consistent activations in the anterior insula (BA13) were also
present. The numerical data corresponding to Figures 3–5 are
available in Tables 3–5.
Areas showing stronger activation to deception than direc-
tion identification are shown in darker blue; and areas showing
stronger activation to direction than deception identification are
shown in red. These are displayed with a liberal statistical crite-
rion (p < 0.001 uncorrected, minimum cluster size = 5); some of
these clusters coincide with the principal task-sensitive areas but
some do not. A further analysis of task differences will be given in
the next section of the Results.
Analysis of differences between identification tasks and expertise
groups
To establish the significance of differences in between exper-
tise groups and tasks, fMRI data were combined in a facto-
rial ANOVA. There were three expertise groups (higher-skilled
males, lower-skilled males, and lower-skilled females), two lev-
els of task (deception identification, direction identification), and
FIGURE 3 | Higher-skilled males. Second-level fMRI activations
(p < 0.005, FWE corrected, 25 voxels minimum cluster size) to deception
identification (cyan) and direction identification (magenta) in point-light
soccer video clips, relative to stimulus-matched non-biological motion
(NBM) controls. Overlapping areas responding to both identification tasks
appear purple. Activations above threshold (blobs) are displayed in
co-registration with an individual normalized structural brain image and
sampled in horizontal sections 10 mm apart from z = 60 to z = −20. In
darker blue areas, activation to deception identification exceeds activation
to direction identification; and in red areas, activation to direction
identification exceeds activation to deception identification (at p < 0.001
uncorrected). Key: a: premotor, BA6; b: parietal, BA40; c: medial frontal,
BA6; d: anterior cingulate, BA32; e: posterior cingulate, BA23; f:
dorsolateral prefrontal, BA46; g: caudate nucleus; h: superior temporal
gyrus, BA37; i: anterior insula/frontal operculum, BA13/45; j: cerebellum;
k: superior parietal lobule, BA7.
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FIGURE 4 | Lower-skilled males. Second-level fMRI activations (p < 0.005,
FWE corrected, 25 voxels minimum cluster size) to deception
identification (cyan) and direction identification (magenta) in point-light
soccer video clips, relative to stimulus-matched non-biological motion
(NBM) controls. Overlapping areas responding to both identification tasks
appear purple. Activations above threshold (blobs) are displayed in
co-registration with an individual normalized structural brain image and
sampled in horizontal sections 10 mm apart from z = 60 to z = −20. In
darker blue areas, activation to deception identification exceeds activation
to direction identification; and in red areas, activation to direction
identification exceeds activation to deception identification (at p < 0.001
uncorrected). Key: a: premotor, BA6; b: parietal, BA40; c: medial frontal,
BA6; d: anterior cingulate, BA32; e: posterior cingulate, BA23; f:
dorsolateral prefrontal, BA46; g: caudate nucleus; h: superior temporal
gyrus, BA37; i: anterior insula/frontal operculum, BA13/45; j: cerebellum; k:
superior parietal lobule, BA7.
two levels of occlusion (0, −160 ms). The inputs to the sec-
ond level factorial model were the first-level t-contrasts between
the identification conditions and the NBM control condition.
There were significant main effects of expertise group, task, and
occlusion. No significant two- or three-way interactions were
found.
Differences between deception and direction identification.
Figure 6 shows areas responding differentially to the two tasks,
measured across all participants. Regions responding signifi-
cantly more strongly to deception than to direction identification
were identified in second-level SPM t-contrasts, at p < 0.05 with
whole-brain FWE correction and minimum cluster size of 5. As
identified in Table 6, these comprised the right dorsolateral pre-
frontal cortex (BA46), medial frontal cortex (BA6), right premo-
tor cortex (BA6), left and right anterior insula (BA13), posterior
cingulate cortex (BA23), and right intraparietal sulcus (BA40).
Regions responding more to direction than to deception identifi-
cation were limited to the (ACC: BA32) and caudate nucleus: the
peaks in these two structures were connected at the cluster level at
p < 0.05 FWE.
Additionally, there was a significant main effect of occlu-
sion that was represented by a single large cluster located in left
premotor cortex (BA6).
Expertise group differences. As shown in Table 7 and Figure 7,
significant differences between higher- and lower-skilled male
groups were restricted to task-sensitive AON regions: dorsal and
ventral premotor cortex and frontal operculum, together with
the left occipital-temporal junction, a region sensitive to visual
motion, and some differences in occipital cortex. There were no
significant voxels for greater activation in low- than in higher-
skilled male players. Differences between male and female low
skill participants were more extensive, principally comprising
AON regions, but not overlapping with the male skill-related
activations. The reversed t-contrast found areas in the temporal-
parietal junction (BA19) and visual cortex (BA18) responding
more strongly in female than male lower-skilled participants.
DISCUSSION
RESPONSES TO SOCCER ACTION IDENTIFICATION
The general pattern of activations found in the action identi-
fication tasks in the present study is consistent with previous
research on action identification in general (Decety and Grèzes,
1999; Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004; Filimon et al., 2007) and
in fMRI sport anticipation studies in particular (Wright and
Jackson, 2007; Wright et al., 2010, 2011).
The involvement of limbic and subcortical structures in soccer
action identification, specifically, anterior insula, ACC, cerebel-
lum, posterior cingulate cortex, caudate nucleus and thalamus,
extends previous findings and suggests that there is an affective
aspect to these tasks that is emphasized by the inclusion of decep-
tive stimuli (Grèzes et al., 2004; Molenberghs et al., 2012; Bishop
et al., 2013). There is a clear correspondence in present results
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FIGURE 5 | Lower-skilled females. Second-level fMRI activations
(p < 0.005, FWE corrected, 25 voxels minimum cluster size) to deception
identification (cyan) and direction identification (magenta) in point-light
soccer video clips, relative to stimulus-matched non-biological motion (NBM)
controls. Overlapping areas responding to both identification tasks appear
purple. Activations above threshold (blobs) are displayed in co-registration
with an individual normalized structural brain image and sampled in
horizontal sections 10 mm apart from z = 60 to z = −20. In darker blue
areas, activation to deception identification exceeds activation to direction
identification; and in red areas, activation to direction identification exceeds
activation to deception identification (at p < 0.001 uncorrected). Key: a:
premotor, BA6; b: parietal, BA40; c: medial frontal, BA6; d: anterior
cingulate, BA32; e: posterior cingulate, BA23; f: dorsolateral prefrontal,
BA46; g: caudate nucleus; h: superior temporal gyrus, BA37; i: anterior
insula/frontal operculum, BA13/45; j: cerebellum; k: superior parietal lobule,
BA7; m: medial occipital cortex, BA18; n: anterior cingulate.
with an extension of the action observation (AON) brain network
that has been identified as the “social network” (SN) (Grafton,
2009; Juan et al., 2013). It is evident from the within-groups anal-
ysis of fMRI data, employing control stimuli closely matched in
all respects, that the SN network is not simply an accessory to
AON but was strongly activated in both deception identification
and direction identification in the presence of deceptive stimuli
(Figures 3–5 and Tables 3–5). One of the largest and most con-
sistently activated clusters in both groups of male participants
and both tasks was in the anterior insula, and this area was also
implicated in the females’ data.
EXPERTISE AND GENDER DIFFERENCES
Expertise differences between the male lower- and higher-skilled
groups were reflected in substantial differences in accuracy across
all tasks and conditions. In the fMRI experiments, expertise
effects in the male groups were identified in a subset of the AON
regions that were activated by the experimental tasks, consistent
with previous research (Wright et al., 2010, 2011).
The male and female lower-skilled groups did not differ sig-
nificantly in accuracy on behavioral measures, but comparison
of male and female lower-skilled groups revealed significant dif-
ferences in fMRI activation in both AON and SN structures.
The female participants’ lower familiarity with soccer actions
and the very low level of soccer playing experience (Table 1)
clearly differentiates them from the lower-skilled male group.
This would arguably contribute to the observed expertise-related
group differences in fMRI when comparing the two lower-skilled
groups. An exception was found in visual cortex, including pre-
sumptive visual motion areas, where stronger activation was
found in females than in lower-skilled males. This however, is
consistent with Wright et al. (2011) where, in a badminton direc-
tion identification task, stronger activation in novice brains was
found, exceptionally, in visual cortex.
An interesting question is whether the gender-specificity of the
video material may be a factor. For females, the gender of viewer
and performer was always different, and the argument would be
that this may reduce AON activation. Calvo-Merino et al. (2006)
recorded fMRI while male and female dancers viewed videos of
both gender-specific and gender-nonspecific ballet moves. The
strength of activations depended both on motor expertise and
on the gender of the viewer relative to the gender of the per-
former. Separating these effects; they showed that motor expe-
rience of gender-specific movers increased activation in motor
components of AON (premotor cortex, parietal cortex, and cere-
bellum). The increased activation of visual cortex in females
relative to lower-skilled males does not contradict Calvo-Merino
et al. (2006) whose results applied specifically to motor-related
rather than visual areas of AON. In the present study, the effect
of viewing a performer of the same or different gender is likely to
have been reduced but not abolished by the point-light represen-
tation (Pollick et al., 2005; Calvo-Merino et al., 2010). The motor
expertise effect is moreover a plausible one for the interpretation
of the present results because the female group had substantially
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Table 3 | Locations of significant clusters as shown in Figure 3.
Higher-skilled males
Deception Direction
BA x y z Peak t Cluster BA x y z Peak t Cluster
L insula 13 −33 17 4 13.1 13 −30 17 4 9.8 108
R insula 13 33 20 −2 15.1 13 30 23 −2 11.3 96
medial frontal 6,8 3 17 49 11.6 306 6,8 3 17 49 8.2
anterior cingulate 32 6 23 34 10.7 32 12 17 40 8.3
32 9 17 40 9.9
L premotor 6 −24 −7 55 16.6 856 6 −21 −7 55 19.4 557
6 −39 −1 37 11.0
R premotor 6 30 −7 55 15.2 1760 6 30 −7 55 15.4 1646
6 42 5 40 12.8
L caudate −15 −7 19 7.7 −15 8 7 7.3
L thalamus VAN −12 −1 4 8.7 100 VAN −12 −1 4 7.7
VLN −12 −19 16 8.0
R thalamus LPN 15 −22 16 8.3 40
L parietal 40 −39 −46 58 13.0 957 40 −33 −46 55 11.6 688
40 −30 −49 55 40 −21 −49 55 11.4
40 −39 −43 43 40 −24 −58 55 10.4
R parietal 40 36 −43 49 15.6 1404 40 33 −43 49 13.5
40 45 −37 58 12.8 40 39 −34 55 12.3
40 36 −52 43 10.4
L fusiform 20 −42 −58 −23 11.3
R fusiform 20 45 −52 20 8.7
R mid temporal 21 54 −49 7 9.9
L temporal 19,39 −48 −70 13 16.1 355 19,39 −48 −70 13 18.6 321
39 −48 −58 10 11.6 39 −45 −61 10 12.1
R temporal 37,39 48 −61 7 13.5 589 37 51 −64 4 13.9 459
39 45 −58 10 12.0
L cerebellum 6 L −33 −58 −29 12.2 6 L −27 −55 −29 11.2 242
6 L −12 −73 −26 13.95 589 6 L −9 −70 −29 11.1
R cerebellum 6 R 6 −73 −26 8.0
R occipital 18 30 −91 7 7.9 39 18 30 −91 7 9.7 62
18 24 −91 −2 7.8 18 24 91 −2 9.1
VAN, ventral anterior nucleus; VLN, ventral lateral nucleus; LPN, lateral posterior nucleus.
less motor experience of soccer moves than the lower-skilled male
group.
Together with previous work, our results suggest that increas-
ing familiarity with observed actions as well as motor experience
of those actions is associated with increasing expertise and results
in a shift in brain activation away from visual brain areas and
toward AON motor areas and SN areas.
There are some general limitations of current fMRI research
into action observation in general and sporting expertise in par-
ticular (Mann et al., 2013). The whole-body sensory-motor cou-
pling, affordance-rich environment, and powerful contextual cues
in soccer field play greatly exceed what is available to an immobile
viewer of videos in a scanner. It is a challenge for future research
to study the neural basis of sporting expertise in more dynamic
and interactive scenarios. Despite this limitation, research to date
has shown a consistent relationship between anticipatory behav-
ioral responses to sports video and expertise in open-skill sports,
and this extends to the use of point-light video stimuli (Abernethy
et al., 2001, 2008; Huys et al., 2008). Moreover the present behav-
ioral results recorded in the scanner (section Signal Detection
Theory Analysis) have revealed expertise effects both in sensitiv-
ity (d′) and in response strategy (β). We would therefore, argue
that the present fMRI results reflect the brain’s processing of the
minimum visual information sufficient to support an anticipa-
tory response, and that our methods provide sufficient sensitivity
to detect and localize expertise effects in the brain.
TASK-RELATED DIFFERENCES IN fMRI
There were no significant interactions between the task (direc-
tion identification or deception identification) and the three
participant groups, either in the behavioral or in the fMRI
data, but there were significant task-related differences in fMRI
activations overall. Although AON and SN were activated
strongly in both deception and direction identification, there
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Table 4 | Locations of significant clusters as shown in Figure 4.
Lower-skilled males
Deception Direction
BA x y z Peak t Cluster BA x y z Peak t Cluster
L insula 13 −33 17 −2 10.8 118 13 −33 17 −2 10.1 78
R insula 13 30 23 4 12.6 806
Medial frontal 6 0 14 49 12.9 187 6 0 14 49 11.4 95
Anterior cingulate 32 6 23 31 6.7
L premotor 6 −24 −4 58 11.2 99 6 −24 −4 58 17.2 296
6 −36 −4 55 9.3 6 −33 −4 55 11.4
R premotor 6 33 −4 55 11.0 6 33 −4 55 14.0 756
9 45 5 31 12.5 6 24 −7 67 13.9
6,9 48 8 34 12.0
L parietal 40 −33 −52 58 11.6 434 40 −33 −52 58 14.3 757
40 −54 −40 37 11.1 40 −30 −43 46 12.7
40 −33 −43 46 9.9
R parietal 40 39 −49 40 12.4 40 36 −49 52 12.3 655
40 30 −49 40 11.0 469 39 −37 43 12.0
40 63 −34 31 7.7 27
R temporal 37,21 54 −58 4 14.5 359
L temporal 39 −27 −58 −29 8.5 38
39 −42 −61 −29 7.0
R temporal 37 54 −58 4 12.5 39 45 −67 7 13.0 231
37 48 −67 −5 11.6 37 45 −64 −5 12.1
39 39 −67 13 7.2
L sup parietal 7 −12 −73 49 8.0 32 7 −24 −52 64 11.1
7 −9 −67 58
R sup parietal 7 12 −73 55 10.9 7 12 −73 −23 10.7
Post. cingulate 23 −6 −55 −20 6.9
Medial occipital 18 −9 −76 −23 8.6 66
31 −18 −58 −23 6.7
Cerebellum 6 L −9 −73 −23 9.4 166
6 L −27 −55 −29 7.4
6 L −6 −55 −23 7.3
were also significant differences in the two conditions (sections
Within-Groups Analysis and Differences Between Deception and
Direction Identification). The SN network is engaged particu-
larly when participants are required to make inferences about
the intentions of other people’s behavior (Juan et al., 2013). This
was explicitly the case in the deception identification condition,
and in comparison with the direction identification condition,
where participants were not required to identify deception, there
was significantly greater activation in left and right insula and
posterior cingulate, which are part of SN. It must also be fully
recognized that despite the simplified and abstract nature of the
point-light stimuli, they were universally understood as meaning-
ful in a specific social context (the game of soccer).
The direct comparison of deception identification with direc-
tion identification in the present results provides further insights
into specialization within the AON/SN network. First of all, there
was significantly greater activation of ACC and caudate nucleus
in the direction identification task compared with the deception
identification task. The role of anterior cingulate has been estab-
lished in response conflict and suppression of incorrect response
tendencies (Carter and van Veen, 2007); and the caudate has been
implicated in the learning of associations between stimuli and
response tendencies (Melcher et al., 2013). This interpretation
is consistent with both previous and present results; for exam-
ple, Bishop et al. (2013) found ACC activity in higher-skilled
players in the presence of deception, at a very early occlusion
level, −160 ms. Bishop et al. (2013) also proposed that enhanced
caudate activation in experts when predicting direction at very
early occlusion (−160 ms), prior to an oncoming opponent’s
change of direction, indicated the learning of response contin-
gencies. In the present study, awareness that an automatic left
or right response tendency may need to be corrected, according
to whether the move appears normal or deceptive, would occur
only in the direction identification task. Thus, the greater cau-
date activation when predicting direction, may arise because the
close mapping of leftward and rightward movements to left or
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Table 5 | Locations of significant clusters as shown in Figure 5.
Lower-skilled females
Deception Direction
BA x y z Peak t Cluster BA x y z Peak t Cluster
L insula 13 −20 17 4 14.5 167 13 −33 20 1 8.9 53
R insula 13 33 20 7 12.3 13
Medial frontal 6 −6 8 52 14.5 287
6 0 20 46 10.9
Anterior cingulate 32 −9 20 34 8.3 32 −6 8 52 9.6 32
L premotor 6 −42 −1 46 12.0 252 6 −30 −7 52 13.2 153
6 −30 −7 52 11.7 6 −42 −1 46 8.5
R premotor 6 27 −10 55 14.1 1041 6 27 −13 55 13.9 191
6 45 5 31 12.9
R thalamus VLN 15 −16 7 6.7 43
R thalamus VPLN 24 −25 4 7.7
L midbrain S nigra −3 −28 −8 7.6
R midbrain S nigra 9 −25 −14 7.7 48
L parietal 40 −36 −43 46 14.1 377 40 −36 −43 46 10.6 207
R parietal 40 36 −40 49 23.6 673 40 36 −40 49 20.9 398
L occipital 19 −42 −67 13 11.9 293 19 −42 −67 13 13.0 470
19 −24 −91 7 8.3 19 −27 −91 10 8.5
R temporal 39 45 −58 10 16.5 641 39 51 −70 7 15.7 576
39 48 −70 7 15.8 39,22 45 −58 13 15.1
L cerebellum 6 L −9 −76 −20 13.0 555 6 L −12 −73 −17 9.8 83
6 L −30 −55 −29 11.5
R cerebellum 6 R 36 −58 −26 9.0 36
VLN, ventral lateral nucleus; VPLN, ventral posterior lateral nucleus.
FIGURE 6 | Blue colored voxels indicate regions where activation is
significantly greater for deception identification than for direction
identification, and red voxels indicate regions that respond more to
direction identification than deception identification. z = 50; medial
frontal, z = 28; dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and posterior cingulate cortex,
z = 1; blue: left and right anterior insula, red: left caudate nucleus. z = −2.4;
blue: left and right anterior insula; red: anterior cingulate cortex. Data are
combined across participant groups and occlusion levels.
right sided responses, respectively, is contingent upon whether
the move is deceptive or normal; conversely, the identification of
a move as deceptive or normal was not contingent on movement
direction.
There was relatively greater activation in deception identifica-
tion in right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, which has a strong
relationship with top-down cognitive and attentional control
(Fassbender et al., 2006). This would be consistent with an inter-
pretation that deception identification requires cognitive effort,
whereas direction prediction is a more automatic perceptual-
motor task (Kibele, 2006). The fMRI results are also consistent
with Ivanoff et al. (2008) who found increased activation in
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Table 6 | Peak activations at p < 0.05 FWE corrected.
BA Cluster Coordinates Peak t
DECEPTION > DIRECTION
Medial frontal 6 36 6, 11, 49 6.3
R dorsolateral prefrontal 46 62 45, 29, 25 5.8
L insula 13 21 −42, 14, 1 5.6
R insula 13 53 33, 20, 10 5.3
13 45, 14, −5 4.9
13 36, 17, 1 4.7
R premotor 6 42 42, −1, 31 5.3
Posterior cingulate 24 8 −3, −31, 28 5.0
R parietal 40 5 60, −37, 31 4.9
DIRECTION > DECEPTION
Anterior cingulate 32 53 −12, 20, −2 5.9
Caudate nucleus 53 −3, 20, 1 5.0
LATE > EARLY OCCLUSION
L premotor 6 151 −33, −22, 70 6.0
pre-SMA (medial frontal cortex, BA6) associated with criterion
(β) effects in a motion coherence task.
The behavioral data identified the strong influence of the trial
type (deceptive vs. normal) on accuracy, and found significant
interactions with task type. It may be possible in future to con-
duct a finer-grained analysis of fMRI responses to normal and
deceptive moves using single-trial blocks (Bishop et al., 2013) and
multi-voxel pattern analysis (Norman et al., 2006) in order to
study how normal and deceptive moves are classified, and how
this classification interacts with other variables such as temporal
occlusion and task type.
It is likely that for both higher- and lower-skilled players,
deception identification is a less practiced skill, requiring greater
cognitive effort, and that conversely, the ability to react to the
trajectory of someone’s body actions is to some extent based on
general as well as sport-specific experience, and therefore, likely
to have become somewhat automatic. Thus, for late-occluded
sequences, the direction of a normal move was determined at
significantly higher accuracy than identification of this move as
normal, suggesting that if the valid direction cues can be picked
Table 7 | Expertise group differences at p < 0.05 FWE corrected.
BA Coordinates Cluster Peak t Coordinates Cluster Peak t
Higher-skilled males > Lower-skilled males Lower-skilled males > Lower-skilled females
L premotor 6 −27, −7, 46 40 7.3 −15, −1, 73 48 6.0
9 −42, 2, 28 10 5.0 −21, −4, 61 48 5.7
R premotor 6 30, −1, 67 6 5.3
6 27, −10, 55 5 4.8 18, −7, 61 16 5.5
R prefrontal 10 33, 41, 13 21 5.8
R frontal operculum 44 39, 8, 22 5 5.0
R frontal operculum 45 39, 20, 16 10 5.0
L anterior cingulate 32 −21, 44, −2 80 5.1
R anterior cingulate 32 15, 47, 4 36 5.2
L Parietal 40 −60, −34, 31 37 5.3
L superior parietal lobule 7 −12, −73, 43 54 5.3
R superior parietal lobule 7 15, −76, 46 14 6.1
L ventrolateral temporal 21 66, −19, −14 17 5.1
L temporal occipital 19 −54, −67, 13 13 5.8 −27, −76, 22 27 6.1
37 −45, −67, −5 43 5.8
L occipital 18 −24, −94, 1 17 5.5
R occipital 18 27, −94, 7 6 5.0
L caudate nucleus −21, 26, −2 80) 5.8
R caudate nucleus 18, 26, −2 36 5.6
Cerebellum anterior lobe −21, −58, −29 6 5.0
Lower-skilled females > Lower-skilled males
L temporal 39 36, −64, 25 23 5.4
R temporal 39 45, −65, 16 70 6.2
L occipital 19 −15, −97, 19 31 5.8
18 −21, −91, −2 12 5.2
R occipital 18 15, −85, 16 18 5.8
18 24, −94, 7 5 5.1
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FIGURE 7 | Activation differences between higher- and lower-skilled
males (red) and between lower-skilled males and females
(green) in soccer action identification tasks at p < 0.05 FWE
corrected, minimum cluster size = 5 voxels. Data are combined
across task types (deception identification and direction identification)
and occlusion levels (0 ms, −160 ms). Second-level group analysis is
based on first-level contrasts between identification tasks and NBM
controls.
up, they readily prime the appropriate response. However, analy-
sis of the sensitivity (d′) which takes into account the proportion
of incorrect responses to deceptive moves, showed similar but
slightly lower overall sensitivity for direction identification com-
pared with deception identification, which would be consistent
with the similar global strength of fMRI activations seen across
tasks.
Likewise, early-occluded deceptive moves gave rise to signifi-
cantly worse than chance direction identification because lower-
skilled players especially were not simply responding randomly
but were misdirected by the deceptive cues. This was borne out by
analysis of likelihood ratio (β). In the direction identification task,
observers adopted a liberal criterion, that is, one which increases
both hits and false positives, and this was interpreted as a direct
response to directional cues—veridical cues in the case of normal
moves and false cues in the case of deceptive moves. Conversely,
in the deception detection task, male observers tended to adopt
a conservative criterion on late-occluded stimuli, which means
that they were biased toward judging such moves as deceptive,
and this inflated their correct detections of deceptive moves and
reduced their correct detections of normal moves. Their over-
all accuracy remained higher than that of the two lower-skilled
groups, as revealed by the d′ measure. The ability to identify a
move as deceptive however, does not guarantee that its true direc-
tion can be identified. Experts are known in some circumstances
to delay their responses (Brault et al., 2012; Mori and Shimada,
2013), perhaps so that they can inhibit and correct their initial
automatic reactions. This dissociation between performance on
deception and identification tasks is consistent with the differing
involvement of the components of the AON and SN observed in
the brain imaging data.
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INTRODUCTION
In everyday life, we continuously inter-
act with other individuals. Understanding
actions of other people, i.e., the ability to
distinguish between different actions, such
as passing over vs. threatening someone
with a knife, has been crucial for the sur-
vival of our species and is a fundamental
capability for our social interactions.
Neuroimaging studies investigated the
neural substrates subtending action per-
ception using a variety of techniques,
ranging from univariate analysis of fMRI
data (Brass et al., 2007; Gazzola et al.,
2007; De Lange et al., 2008; Gazzola and
Keysers, 2009; Turella et al., 2009a, 2012;
Wurm et al., 2011; Wurm and Schubotz,
2012; Wurm et al., 2012; Lingnau and
Petris, 2013), to fMRI repetition sup-
pression (Dinstein et al., 2007; Chong
et al., 2008; Lingnau et al., 2009; Kilner
et al., 2009) and multivoxel pattern
analysis (MVPA; Dinstein et al., 2008a;
Oosterhof et al., 2010, 2012). These stud-
ies reported the consistent recruitment of
a number of regions, generally assumed
as pertaining to two different networks,
typically referred to as the action obser-
vation network (AON) and the mental-
izing system (Figure 1A). Both networks
have been advocated to be involved in
action understanding (Brass et al., 2007;
De Lange et al., 2008; Van Overwalle,
2009; Van Overwalle and Baetens, 2009;
Wurm et al., 2011), but their precise
roles and their causal involvement are
strongly debated (Dinstein et al., 2008b;
Mahon and Caramazza, 2008; Hickok,
2009; Turella et al., 2009b; Rizzolatti and
Sinigaglia, 2010).
In homology with monkey neuro-
physiological studies, three regions have
been proposed to form the human AON
(Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004; Rizzolatti
and Sinigaglia, 2010; see Figure 1A). This
“core” AON was defined as comprising
(i) the ventral premotor cortex (PMV)
together with the posterior part of the
inferior frontal gyrus (pIFG), (ii) the ante-
rior inferior parietal lobule (aIPL) and
(iii) the superior temporal sulcus (STS).
Human neuroimaging studies suggested
the recruitment of several additional areas
that were incorporated in an “extended”
version of the AON (Gazzola and Keysers,
2009; Caspers et al., 2010; see Figure 1A).
The mentalizing system has been identi-
fied in human neuroimaging studies inves-
tigating social cognition tasks, such as
intention and beliefs attribution about the
self or others, while observing action-
related stimuli (Van Overwalle, 2009). The
regions consistently assigned to this net-
work are the medial prefrontal cortex
(mPFC) and the temporo-parietal junc-
tion (TPJ) (Figure 1A), and less often
also the precuneus and the posterior cin-
gulate cortex (Amodio and Frith, 2006;
Brass et al., 2007; De Lange et al., 2008;
Van Overwalle, 2009; Van Overwalle and
Baetens, 2009).
The first description of the involvement
of sensorimotor regions during action
perception started with the discovery of
mirror neurons in the ventral premotor
cortex in macaque monkeys (Di Pellegrino
et al., 1992). These visuomotor neurons
responded both while the monkey exe-
cuted or observed similar actions and
were later described also within the mon-
key inferior parietal lobule (Fogassi et al.,
2005). Note that both regions also contain
neurons with motor-only and visual-only
properties (Gallese et al., 1996, 2002).
Following their discovery, motor
theories of action understanding proposed
that mirror neurons might provide the
basis for a matching mechanism between
what we observe and what we can perform
allowing the understanding of observed
actions in motoric terms (Rizzolatti et al.,
2001). Even if this hypothesis is strongly
debated (Jacob and Jeannerod, 2005;
Mahon and Caramazza, 2008; Hickok,
2009, 2013), a similar homologue mech-
anism has been proposed to exist in
the human AON (Rizzolatti et al., 2001;
Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004; Rizzolatti
and Sinigaglia, 2010).
In this brief overview, we will first
describe previous fMRI studies that inves-
tigated how motor experience affects acti-
vation within the AON, and to which
degree these studies allow drawing con-
clusions about the role of this network in
action understanding. As the majority of
the studies investigated only the AON and
given the limited scope of this Opinion, we
will focus on this network, even if our con-
siderations might also hold true for other
areas. We will then try to delineate how
future studies might exploit motor exper-
tise as a tool for gaining insights into the
neural basis of action understanding.
RECENT NEUROIMAGING FINDINGS
ON MOTOR EXPERTISE IN ACTION
OBSERVATION
Following motor theories of action
understanding, changes in motor reper-
toire should modify the brain response
within the AON while observing these
newly acquired actions. Starting from
this assumption, most studies on exper-
tise investigated how the acquisition
of a skilled action, such as sport or
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org October 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 637 |
HUMAN NEUROSCIENCE
51
Turella et al. Expertise in action observation
FIGURE 1 | Continued
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FIGURE 1 | (A) Schematic representation of the core AON, extended AON
and mentalizing system. Three-dimensional representation of lateral and
medial brain surface. The regions assigned to the “core” AON, “extended”
AON and the “mentalizing” system are depicted. In red, the core AON is
presented comprising: the PMV/pIFG complex, the aIPL and the STS. In pale
red, the “extended” AON is presented comprising: the anterior part of the
inferior frontal gyrus, (aIFG), the dorsal premotor cortex (PMD), the
supplementary motor area (SMA), the superior parietal lobule (SPL), the
anterior intraparietal sulcus (AIP), the somatosensory cortex (S1) and the
occipito-temporal cortex (OTC), including also STS. The mentalizing system
(blue) is assumed to consist of the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) and the
temporo-parietal junction (TPJ). Note that the extension of these networks is
not representative of their real dimension or functional significance.
(B) Expertise effects. Three-dimensional representation of lateral and medial
brain surface with location of peaks for the comparisons of interest
superimposed. For Kim et al. (2011), we considered the comparison between
the two groups (Table 2). For Wright et al. (2010), we considered results from
ROI analysis (Table 2). For Wright et al. (2011), we plotted results for normal
video (Table 2). For Abreu et al. (2012), we used the peak of the significant
cluster within the temporal lobe in the group comparison (page 1649 of the
manuscript). For Calvo-Merino et al. (2005), we plotted the reported
interaction (see Table 1). For Calvo-Merino et al. (2006), we plotted the results
from Table S2. For Cross et al. (2006), we considered the main effect of the
contrast of interest (Table 2). For Cross et al. (2009a), we reported the
contrast for physical training (Danced > Untrained) (Table 1). For Cross et al.
(2009b), we considered the physical training results (Table 1) and the
observational training results (Table 1). We excluded the peaks located within
the cerebellum.
dance moves, affects AON activity while
observing the same movement.
Most of the contributions investigat-
ing motor expertise while observing sport
actions are limited to one or few studies
within the same domain, such as archery
(Kim et al., 2011), badminton (Wright
et al., 2010, 2011) or basketball (Abreu
et al., 2012). Typically, these studies com-
pare the blood-oxygen-level-dependent
(BOLD) response between experts and
novices. Although these studies consid-
ered different tasks and comparisons of
experimental conditions, they seem to
suggest a stronger activation for experts
in comparison to novices not limited
to the AON but recruiting also other
brain regions (see Figure 1B). However,
an interpretation of these results is dif-
ficult as, in addition to extensive prac-
tice of the observed movements, experts
also have a strong visual familiarity with
the observed stimuli which might affect
the BOLD effect within the very same
regions.
Beside these sparse investigations on
different sport actions, a more system-
atic investigation involved the effect of
dance expertise on activity within the
AON (Calvo-Merino et al., 2005, 2006;
Cross et al., 2006, 2009a,b, 2012, 2013;
Pilgramm et al., 2010). Calvo-Merino
et al. (2005) measured the BOLD effect
of ballet dancers, capoeira dancers, and
non-dancers watching two different types
of dance movements (ballet or capoeira
moves). They found a stronger recruit-
ment of several regions within the AON
(bilateral PMD, bilateral SPL and AIP, left
PMV and left STS) in ballet and capoeira
dancers for the observation of the trained
in comparison to the untrained dance
style, whereas they found no difference
between the two dance styles in the non-
dancers.
Calvo-Merino et al. argued that the
activation for the trained in compari-
son to the untrained dance style was
due to simulation of those actions that
were within the motor repertoire of the
dancer. Alternatively, as pointed out above,
dancers’ strong visual familiarity with the
observed stimuli might affect the mea-
sured difference in BOLD effect.
In a follow up study, Calvo-Merino
et al. (2006) investigated this issue
by trying to disentangle the different
contributions of visual familiarity and
motor practice on the BOLD effect within
the AON of expert dancers. They exploited
the fact that some ballet movements are
gender-specific while others are com-
monly performed by both male and female
dancers. Calvo-Merino et al. (2006) found
that activity within several regions of
the AON (left PMD, bilateral AIP) was
higher when observing actions within
the observer’s motor repertoire. However,
visual familiarity might have played a role
also in this study since dancers might
have gathered more visual experience with
those movements that are part of their
own motor repertoire.
Another series of studies by Cross
et al. (2006, 2009a,b) explored how
activity related to action observation is
modified after the acquisition of motor
(physical practice) and/or visual expe-
rience (visual practice) with specific
dance actions. These authors demon-
strated stronger activity within AON
regions during the observation and imag-
ination of observed actions which were
previously trained physically in com-
parison to actions that were not (Cross
et al., 2006). In a subsequent study
Cross et al. (2009a,b) showed that both
previous physical and visual practice
of dance sequences modulates activity
within the AON while observing dance
movements.
Figure 1B shows the peaks of activa-
tions for the different motor expertise
studies. It is evident that there seems to be
a consistent recruitment of premotor and
parietal nodes of the AON for observing
trained with respect to untrained moves,
but, at the same time, there is also a
widespread recruitment of other brain
regions.
These studies suggest an effect of
motor expertise on AON activation while
perceiving an action, but it is difficult
to assess the involvement of the AON
in action understanding as none of these
studies adopted a task directly investigat-
ing this process in a quantitative manner.
Action understanding is intended here as
the distinction between different actions
irrespective of the properties (e.g., kine-
matics, goal, environmental cues, etc.)
adopted to achieve such discrimination.
We will elaborate on this point in the final
section.
FUTURE PERSPECTIVE: USING MOTOR
EXPERTISE TO STUDY ACTION
UNDERSTANDING
In this section, we discuss possible ways
of testing the proposed role of the AON
in action understanding. If the ability to
understand actions depends on sensory-
motor representations of these actions,
then an experience-based modification
(either impairment or improvement) of
these representations should lead to a cor-
responding measurable modification in
the ability to understand these actions,
as in tasks involving action recognition.
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Crucially, it is also necessary to dis-
count the possible role of regions out-
side this network (e.g., the mentalizing
system).
Motor expertise might serve as an inter-
esting tool to test the involvement of
areas within and outside the AON in
action understanding. However, one of
the problems to overcome is making sure
that the learned movements were not pre-
viously experienced by the participants.
As most everyday actions are physically
or visually experienced during normal
development, the new acquisition of com-
plex movements, such as sport and dance
moves, allows to more easily control for
possible confounds related to previous
exposure or practice of the studied move-
ments. Another problem to face is that per-
formance might be close to ceiling in tasks
using natural stimuli (videos or pictures of
actions), making it difficult to find a mod-
ulation of performance as a function of
motor experience. One possibility to over-
come this issue could be to use point-light
display (Johansson, 1973). This stimula-
tion recruits part of the AON (Saygin et al.,
2004; Wright et al., 2011), and its per-
ception has been shown to be affected by
motor expertise (Casile and Giese, 2006).
Furthermore, the adoption of point-light
display might mitigate visual familiarity
confounds as they do not resemble a “nat-
ural” stimulation, and they can be easily
manipulated in order to disrupt the per-
ceived movement simply by adding noise.
A recent study (Lingnau and Petris, 2013)
adopted this approach and observed that
the ability to understand actions decreased
with increasing noise level.
This approach could be adopted
to investigate differences in action
understanding, using point-light display
with different level of noise, within the
same individual on trained and untrained
stimuli after different types of practice (as
in Cross et al., 2006, 2009a,b). In addition
to the possible effects of visual and physical
practice, a motor-only training could be
introduced where physical practice might
be performed blindfolded in order to elim-
inate potential visual confounds (as in
Casile and Giese, 2006). These different
types of training might affect common
or different parts of the brain during
action understanding. Crucially, motor
learning without visual feedback alone
could determine a modification in action
understanding performance and a related
functional modification within or outside
regions of the AON. This could demon-
strate that motor learning alone might
have an effect on visual recognition of
trained actions, avoiding interpretational
confounds induced by a concomitant
visual learning.
We have highlighted motor expertise
as an interesting experimental manipula-
tion to comprehend the role of the AON
in action understanding. Further, these
studies will profit strongly from the adop-
tion of new MVPA decoding techniques
(Kriegeskorte and Bandettini, 2007) as
they allow a more fine-grained distinction
(e.g., between different types of observed
or executed actions, see also Oosterhof
et al., 2013) that are not possible to
reveal with univariate methods. This could
be especially useful to assess decoding
accuracy modifications between different
actions (e.g., move A vs. move B) based on
the type of training (trained vs. untrained)
with different levels of noise. Further,
changes in decoding accuracy between dif-
ferent actions before and after training
might be also informative regarding the
regions affected by the different types of
training (physical, visual or motor-only).
To conclude, this Opinion focused on
describing neuroimaging investigations on
action perception/understanding, which
are correlational in nature. It is not pos-
sible to define a causal link between
such results and concomitant behavioral
changes. However, these studies might
provide interesting starting points for
future studies using TMS in healthy par-
ticipants or voxel-based lesion-symptom
mapping in brain damaged patients.
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Novel experience and learning new skills are known as modulators of brain function.
Advances in non-invasive brain imaging have provided new insight into structural and
functional reorganization associated with skill learning and expertise. Especially, significant
imaging evidences come from the domains of sports and music. Data from in vivo imaging
studies in sports and music have provided vital information on plausible neural substrates
contributing to brain reorganization underlying skill acquisition in humans. This mini review
will attempt to take a narrow snapshot of imaging findings demonstrating functional and
structural plasticity that mediate skill learning and expertise while identifying converging
areas of interest and possible avenues for future research.
Keywords: expertise, plasticity, reorganization, neuro imaging, skill learning
INTRODUCTION
Neuroplasticity, which refers to the brain’s ability to change
its structure and function, is not an occasional state of the
brain, but rather the normal ongoing state of the human brain
throughout the life span (Zilles, 1992; Pascual-Leone et al., 2005;
Kempermann, 2006; Jancke, 2009). Plastic changes in the human
brain lead to brain reorganization that might be demonstrable at
the level of behavior, anatomy, and function and down to the cel-
lular and even molecular levels (Kolb and Whishaw, 1998; Kelly
and Garavan, 2005; Kleim et al., 2006).
Intentional practice in sports and music has been shown to
contribute to acquisition of expertise (Schlaug, 2001; Baker et al.,
2003; Hutchinson et al., 2003; Lotze et al., 2003; Calvo-Merino
et al., 2005; Ericsson, 2005; Cross et al., 2006; Hung et al., 2007;
Nielsen and Cohen, 2008). Acquisition of expertise is accom-
panied by structural and functional changes of the brain and
the advent of brain imaging methods has bolstered the study of
these changes in the human brain. Understanding of the neu-
ral mechanisms underpinning expertise may provide a basis for
determining what types of practice or training are most likely
to be beneficial for performance enhancement. This knowledge
may also provide a clue as to why some people show improve-
ment at different rates than others or reach much higher levels of
achievement. Thus, the study of plastic changes associated with
skill learning and expertise in the human brain is one of the most
challenging areas of current neuroscience research.
This mini review provides a summary of the in vivo imaging
evidence of longitudinal and cross-sectional studies on structural
and functional plasticity of the human brain in skill learning and
expertise with emphasis on sports and music. In the literature, a
cross-sectional approach has been most widely used, and many
interesting findings have been reported. However, one of the crit-
icisms of cross-sectional studies is that the differences in brain
organization are possibly correlational, and, thus, caution should
be used in order not to draw overly strong causal inferences from
the cross-sectional data. The concept of plasticity can involve
many levels of organization involving molecular, neuronal, or
chemical events, and these molecular views of neuroplasticity are
beyond the scope of this mini review.
STRUCTURAL NEUROPLASTICITY IN SKILL LEARNING AND
EXPERTISE
CROSS-SECTIONAL STUDIES
Cross-sectional imaging studies have demonstrated structural
changes of the human brain as a result of experience and learn-
ing in sports and music (Amunts et al., 1997; Gaser and Schlaug,
2003; Bangert and Schlaug, 2006; Jacini et al., 2009; Jäncke et al.,
2009; Park et al., 2009; Hänggi et al., 2010; Wan and Schlaug,
2010; Wei et al., 2011; Di Paola et al., 2013). For example, Jacini
et al. (2009) reported that elite judo players had significantly
higher gray matter volume in the frontal lobe, related to motor
planning and execution and in regions of the prefrontal cortex,
related to working memory and cognitive processes, compared
to control subjects. Training induced enlargement in gray matter
structure was not limited to brain regions associated with motor
planning and execution. When compared to age-matched con-
trol subjects, world-class mountain climbers showed significantly
larger vermian lobule volumes, possibly associated with highly
dexterous hand movements and eye-hand coordination in detec-
tion of and correction of visuomotor errors (Di Paola et al., 2013).
In the music domain, with measurement of the length of the pos-
terior wall of the precentral gyrus as an estimate of the size of
the hand motor area, Amunts et al. (1997) identified substantial
structural differences in the hand motor area between profes-
sional musicians and non-musicians: in general, the hand motor
area was larger in professional musicians than in non-musicians.
More importantly, the authors also found that the measures of
hand motor area on both hemispheres showed correlation with
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the age of commencement of musical training, implying that ear-
lier musical training results in a stronger impact on structural
changes in the hand motor area.
In a study using the voxel-based morphometry (VBM) tech-
nique, it was found that skilled golfers (professional and low
handicap golfers) had larger gray matter volumes in a fronto-
parietal network, including premotor and parietal areas (Jäncke
et al., 2009). Using the VBM approach, Gaser and Schlaug (2003)
reported that professional keyboard players showed differences in
gray matter volume in motor, auditory, and visual-spatial brain
regions when compared with a matched group of amateur play-
ers and non-keyboard players. While the majority of studies on
structural neuroplasticity have reported increased gray matter
density or volume in expert brains, few studies have reported on
the inverse relationship, that is, decreased gray matter volume
(Draganski et al., 2006; Hänggi et al., 2010). The several possi-
ble reasons for discrepant findings were suggested (Hänggi et al.,
2010).
A handful of studies have investigated differences in white mat-
ter structure between experts and non-experts, using diffusion
tensor imaging (DTI); however, the results have been inconsis-
tent. Using DTI, Jäncke et al. (2009) demonstrated decreased
white matter volume and fractional anisotropy (FA) values in
several brain structures, including the corticospinal tract (CST),
in skilled golfers, compared with less-skilled golfers. Additional
evidence for decreased white matter volume and FA values was
reported in a study of professional ballet dancers (Hänggi et al.,
2010). Contrary to decreased FA values in white matter structures,
a very recent study on professional gymnasts showed increased FA
values in the bilateral CST in elite gymnasts, possibly in response
to long-term gymnastic training as compared to the control sub-
jects (Wang et al., 2013). Inconsistent results have also been
reported in the music domain. Imfeld et al. (2009) reported sig-
nificantly lower FA values in both the left and the right CST in
professional musicians compared to non-musicians. However, in
another study, pianists who practiced frequently showed higher
FA values (Han et al., 2009). Therefore, it appears that acquisition
of further evidence will be necessary in order to make a conclu-
sion with regard to whether specific structural changes in white
matter can be induced by extensive training.
LONGITUDINAL STUDIES
To date, only a small number of longitudinal studies have investi-
gated structural brain reorganization as a result of experience and
learning. Draganski et al. (2004) investigated the training effect of
juggling in inexperienced young jugglers. After a 3-month train-
ing period, subjects in the training group showed changes in gray
matter density in the intraparietal sulcus and the midtemporal
area of visual cortex. The intraparietal sulcus is involved in trans-
forming retinotopic into body centered information necessary
to visually control movements. The midtemporal area of visual
cortex is a highly specialized brain area for analyzing visual move-
ment information. Of particular interest, the authors also found
that after another 3 months without juggling practice, the increase
in gray matter density following practice had diminished in all
subjects in juggling practice, indicating that structural plasticity is
reversible. In a recent study of 60-year old elderly individuals who
were able to learn juggling, gray matter changes related to skill
acquisition were observed in the midtemporal area of visual cor-
tex similar to that found in young subjects, suggesting that age is
not in itself a limiting factor for structural brain plasticity driven
by skill learning (Boyke et al., 2008). In a more recent longitudinal
study using VBM, in golf novices between the ages of 40 and 60
years, 40 h of golf training showed an association with gray matter
increases in a task-relevant cortical network encompassing senso-
rimotor regions and areas belonging to the dorsal stream (Bezzola
et al., 2011). More importantly, in that study, a strong positive
relationship was observed between the increase in gray matter and
training intensity in the parieto-occipital junction (POJ), a critical
structure of the dorsal stream. A recent review provided evidence
of a close association of the POJ with visuomotor processes, par-
ticularly in the on-line control and on-line correction of visually
guided arm movements (Kravitz et al., 2011). For musical train-
ing, Hyde et al. (2009) found that 6-year-old children receiving
instrumental musical training for 15 months showed structural
change in brain areas such as the precentral gyrus, which is known
to be involved in control of playing a musical instrument. Most
of these brain areas are part of the cortical motor system; how-
ever, structural changes in the auditory system, such as the Heschl
gyrus and the corpus callosum, were also observed. These struc-
tural changes in the brain showed correlation with performance
on various auditory and motor tasks. In addition, in the music
domain, the evidence suggests that training-induced plasticity in
musicians appears to be most prominent in those who engaged
in practice early in childhood (for a review, see Wan and Schlaug,
2010).
FUNCTIONAL NEUROPLASTICITY IN SKILL LEARNING AND
EXPERTISE
CROSS-SECTIONAL STUDIES
In motor function, a common finding is the functional enlarge-
ment or focused activation of the motor area involved in con-
trol of that particular skill (Krings et al., 2000; Pearce et al.,
2000; Lotze et al., 2003; Haslinger et al., 2004; Meister et al.,
2005; Bangert and Schlaug, 2006). For example, Pearce et al.
(2000) reported that the cortical representation of the hand
used for playing is larger in professional racquet ball players
as compared with novices. In music, one study demonstrated
a differential brain adaptation depending on instrument played
(Bangert and Schlaug, 2006). More specifically, keyboard players
had the left motor area more pronounced as they predomi-
nantly use the right hand. In contrast, string players had the
right motor area pronounced as the left hand is crucially engaged
while playing.
Recent neuroimaging studies have attempted to elucidate the
neural activity during action observation in expert brain (Calvo-
Merino et al., 2006; Pilgramm et al., 2010; Kim et al., 2011).
For example, Calvo-Merino et al. (2006) demonstrated the neural
bases of motor influences on action observation in expert ballet
dancers. They have shown an effect of motor expertise on neural
activation within the ventral premotor area and also stronger acti-
vation in the inferior parietal and cerebellar regions when observ-
ing dance videos, suggesting that the action observation network
is more extended than previously suggested (Di Pellegrino et al.,
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Table 1 | Imaging evidences for structural and functional plasticity in sports and music.
Study Skill Design Method Main findings
STRUCTURAL PLASTICITY
Jacini et al., 2009 Sports Cross-sectional VBM Judo players showed larger GM volume in frontal and prefrontal
cortex
Jäncke et al., 2009 Sports Cross-sectional VBM, DTI Golfers showed Larger GM volumes in premotor and parietal
cortices; smaller FA along the internal and external capsule and
the parietal operculum
Di Paola et al., 2013 Sports Cross-sectional VBM Mountain climbers showed significantly larger vermian lobule
volumes
Draganski et al., 2004 Sports Longitudinal VBM Three months’ practice-induced GM expansion in mid-temporal
area and posterior intraparietal sulcus, followed by a decreased
to baseline levels after 3 months with no practice
Bezzola et al., 2011 Sports Longitudinal VBM Forty hours of golf training showed an association with gray
matter increases in a task-relevant cortical network
Amunts et al., 1997 Music Cross-sectional MRI Hand motor area was larger in professional musicians than in
non-musicians
Gaser and Schlaug, 2003 Music Cross-sectional VBM GM volume differences in sensorimotor cortex, premotor
cortex, and cerebellum
Han et al., 2009 Music Cross-sectional VBM, DTI Musician showed higher GM density in sensorimotor cortex
and cerebellum; higher FA in internal capsule
Hyde et al., 2009 Music Longitudinal DBM Fifteen months of musical training in early childhood showed
structural change in brain areas which are known to be involved
in control of playing a musical instrument
FUNCTIONAL PLASTICITY
Pearce et al., 2000 Sports Cross-sectional TMS Cortical representation of the hand used for playing is larger in
professional racquet ball players
Milton et al., 2007 Sports Cross-sectional fMRI Elite athletes showed neural efficiency in the cortical processes
during the specific challenge in which they are highly practiced
Sekiguchi et al., 2011 Sports Cross-sectional fMRI Elite rugby players differ in visuospatial abilities directly tied to
their domain of expertise
Doyon et al., 2002 Sports Longitudinal fMRI Shift of activation from the cerebellar cortex to the dentate
nucleus during early learning, and from a cerebellar–cortical to a
striatal–cortical network with extended practice
Cross et al., 2009 Sports Longitudinal fMRI Emergence of action resonance processes in the human brain
based on 5 day observational learning of dance sequence
without physical practice
Lotze et al., 2003 Music Cross-sectional EMG Professional violinists showed focused cerebral activations in
the motor network as compared to amateur violinists during the
imagination of violin-playing movements




Music Longitudinal EEG Auditory-sensorimotor co-activity occurred within only 20 min
and the effect was enhanced after 5-week training, contributing
elements of both perception and action to the mental
representation of the instrument
Herdener et al., 2010 Music Longitudinal fMRI Following the aural skills training, hippocampal responses to
temporal novelty in sounds were increased
MRI, magnetic resonance imaging; VBM, voxel-based morphometry; GM, gray matter; DTI, diffusion tensor imaging; FA, fractional anisotropy; DBM, Deformation
based morphometry; TMS, transcranial magnetic stimulation; fMRI, functional MRI; EMG, Electromyography; EEG, electroencephalography.
1992). For motor planning in expertise, an fMRI study using
motor imagery task, which refers to the mental rehearsal of motor
acts, demonstrated that the task-related neural networks of expert
golfers are focused and efficiently organized, whereas novices have
difficulty filtering out irrelevant information (Milton et al., 2007).
This finding is consistent with the notion of relative economy
(neural efficiency) in the cortical processes of elite athletes during
the specific challenge in which they are highly practiced. Similar
finding was also observed in professional musicians. Lotze et al.
(2003) reported that professional violinists showed focused cere-
bral activations in the contralateral primary sensorimotor cortex,
the bilateral superior parietal lobes, and the ipsilateral anterior
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FIGURE 1 | Advances in neuro imaging technique have provided new
insights into the neuroplastic changes underlying skill learning and
expertise at both structural and functional levels. At structural level, a
main finding is increased gray matter volume or density of brain areas
associated with skill learning. In functional reorganization, functional imaging
evidence has shown that functional neuroplasticity occurs not only in the
motor domain but also in cognitive and perceptual domains associated with
improved performances.
cerebellar hemisphere as compared to amateur violinists during
the imagination of violin-playing movements.
As for the visuospatial abilities in sport, evidences seem to
suggest that experts differ in visuospatial abilities directly tied
to their domain of expertise. For example, one study reported
that expert athletes did not differ in their visuospatial capac-
ity than novices as measured on the general visuospatial test
(Furley and Memmert, 2010). However, a recent study using
fMRI reported quantitative differences in brain activation during
visuospatial processing between elite rugby players and novices,
indicating the possible existence of a strategy (a bird’s eye view)
regarding visuospatial cognitive processing for elite rugby play-
ers that differs from that of novices (Sekiguchi et al., 2011). More
recently, Seo et al. (2012) investigated possible difference in cogni-
tive strategy between archery experts and novices in visuospatial
working memory processing. According to their results, archery
experts have increased activation in cortical regions important
for visuospatial attention and working memory, suggesting that
degree of expertise may modulate higher order brain function-
ing. Taken together, these studies therefore demonstrated that
the differences in visuospatial abilities are pronounced in specific
domain but those differences did not transfer outside the domain
to general visuospatial ability. The possible modulation on func-
tion of working memory and attention by expertise was also
recently demonstrated in music training. In their multilevel cross-
sectional study, Oechslin et al. (2013) found evidence for stepwise
modulation of brain responses according to level of music exper-
tise in a fronto-temporal network hosting functions of working
memory and attention.
LONGITUDINAL STUDIES
For motor skill acquisition, previous studies using fMRI demon-
strated that learning of sequential finger movements initially leads
to a functional expansion in the primary motor cortex (M1)
and this change in M1 follows more dynamic, rapid changes in
the cerebellum, striatum, and other motor-related cortical areas,
suggesting an experience-dependent shift of activation from a
cerebellar–cortical to a striatal–cortical network with extended
practice (Karni et al., 1995; Doyon et al., 2002). In addition,
repetition of movements has been suggested to result in motor
memories in the primary motor cortex and probably other cor-
tical areas that encode the kinematic details of the practiced
movements (Classen et al., 1998; Butefisch et al., 2000; Stefan
et al., 2005; Cross et al., 2009). Of particular interest, previ-
ous studies have demonstrated that motor memory can also be
encoded by action observation and this form of action obser-
vation can enhance the effects of motor training on memory
encoding, possibly through modulation of intracortical excitatory
mechanisms (Stefan et al., 2005; Celnik et al., 2006).
Formation of multisensory connection during motor learn-
ing has often been reported in music. In a longitudinal EEG
study (Bangert and Altenmüller, 2003), beginning pianists, who
had never played an instrument before, were trained on a
computer piano over a period of 5 weeks. They listened to
short piano melodies, and, after a brief pause, they were then
required to replay the melodies using their right hand. After 5
weeks of practice, listening to piano tunes produced additional
activity in the sensorimotor regions and in turn, playing on a
keyboard produced additional activity in the auditory regions.
Therefore, this study nicely demonstrates how dynamic brain
adaptations accompany these multisensorimotor learning pro-
cesses. In another longitudinal study using fMRI (Herdener et al.,
2010), the neural responses of musical students in acoustic nov-
elty detection were compared before and after two semesters of
intensive aural skills training. Following the training period, hip-
pocampal responses to temporal novelty in sounds were increased
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in music students. A previous study suggested involvement of the
hippocampus in various forms of novelty detection in addition to
its role in memory (Knight, 1996; Strange et al., 1999). Therefore,
this study provides evidence for functional plasticity in the adult
hippocampus related to musical training.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Over the past decades, advances in human brain imaging have
provided new insights into the neuroplastic changes under-
lying skill learning and expertise in both sports and music
(Table 1). These plastic changes can be seen at both structural
and functional levels (Figure 1). A main finding of struc-
tural plasticity is increased volume and gray matter den-
sity of brain areas involved in control of the practiced task.
Another major finding in structural plasticity is that experi-
ence dependent structural changes can disappear when prac-
ticing stops, indicating that structural plasticity is possible in
all directions. In musical expertise, one of the distinctive fea-
tures of structural neuroplasticity is that brain plasticity can be
found more clearly if practice starts at a young age. That is,
a period might exist, beyond which music-induced structural
changes and learning effects are less pronounced. Unfortunately,
such studies on a sensitive period are missing in the sport
domain.
In functional reorganization, a common finding is the func-
tional enlargement or focused activation of the motor area
involved in control of that particular skill. In addition, because
expert performance is mediated by cognitive and perceptual
motor skills, functional imaging evidence has shown that func-
tional neuroplasticity occurs not only in the motor domain
but also in cognitive and perceptual domains associated with
improved performances. Furthermore, in music, evidence has
demonstrated a strong coupling of sensorimotor and auditory
processing for music expertise. Practice in playing a music instru-
ment involves constant improvement of complex sensory-motor
coordination through repeated execution of motor activities
under the controlled monitoring of the auditory system.
Despite accumulation of significant imaging evidence, as
discussed in the current mini-review, understanding of mecha-
nisms underlying these plastic changes is still far from complete—
which opens a broad avenue for future research. For example,
neuroplasticity can be traced to cellular and molecular levels, and,
thus, one of the main challenges is linking human brain imag-
ing findings to the underlying molecular events. Because the poor
specificity of macroscopic MR imaging signals largely precludes
molecular information, other non-invasive approaches would be
needed. Of these methods, molecular imaging using positron
emission tomography (PET) is a good candidate. Although there
is still a lack of prospective studies on plasticity, integration
of PET into MRI with simultaneous recordings of molecular
and hemodynamic brain responses opens new and promising
prospects for the future (Judenhofer et al., 2008). Another chal-
lenge for the understanding of neural mechanisms underlying
plastic changes is time scale of neural activity, because the tem-
poral resolution of fMRI in the order of seconds is approximately
three orders of magnitude away from the time scale of neu-
ral events in milliseconds order. Therefore, for measurement
of brain activity on a time scale of neuronal activity and for
assessment of specific neurophysiological events in human, com-
bined fMRI with non-invasive electrophysiological methods such
as electroencephalography (EEG) would be beneficial for simul-
taneous measurement of neuronal and neural brain responses.
Combined EEG and fMRI studies can thus take advantage of
both, the good spatial resolution of fMRI and the good tem-
poral resolution of EEG (Thees et al., 2002; Debener et al.,
2005).
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Skill learning is the improvement in perceptual, cognitive, or motor performance following
practice. Expert performance levels can be achieved with well-organized knowledge, using
sophisticated and specific mental representations and cognitive processing, applying
automatic sequences quickly and efficiently, being able to deal with large amounts of infor-
mation, and many other challenging task demands and situations that otherwise paralyze
the performance of novices. The neural reorganizations that occur with expertise reflect
the optimization of the neurocognitive resources to deal with the complex computational
load needed to achieve peak performance. As such, capitalizing on neuronal plasticity,
brain modifications take place over time-practice and during the consolidation process.
One major challenge is to investigate the neural substrates and cognitive mechanisms
engaged in expertise, and to define “expertise” from its neural and cognitive underpinnings.
Recent insights showed that many brain structures are recruited during task performance,
but only activity in regions related to domain-specific knowledge distinguishes experts
from novices. The present review focuses on three expertise domains placed across a
motor to mental gradient of skill learning: sequential motor skill, mental simulation of the
movement (motor imagery), and meditation as a paradigmatic example of “pure” mental
training. We first describe results on each specific domain from the initial skill acquisition
to expert performance, including recent results on the corresponding underlying neural
mechanisms. We then discuss differences and similarities between these domains with
the aim to identify the highlights of the neurocognitive processes underpinning expertise,
and conclude with suggestions for future research.
Keywords: expertise, motor skill, motor imagery, meditation, motor consolidation, neural networks
Brain plasticity refers to the putative changes in neural orga-
nization that accounts for the diverse forms of short-lasting or
enduring behavioral modifiability. There is considerable evidence
that neuronal plasticity is not an occasional state, but rather allows
the human brain to adapt to environmental pressure, physiologic
changes, and experiences (Johansson, 2004). Interestingly, changes
in the input of any neural system, or in the trafficking of its effer-
ent connections, lead to reorganizations that are visible at the level
of behavior, anatomy, and physiology, encompassing cellular and
molecular levels (Pascual-Leone et al., 2005). Currently, the chal-
lenge is to explore in greater details the processes of neuroplasticity
and how to modulate them to achieve the best behavioral outcome.
Typically, the human brain undergoes constant changes triggered
by environmental stimulation or resulting from intrinsic remod-
eling activity (Johansson, 2011). Therefore, brain is the source of
behavior, but in turn is modified by the behavior itself.
Most of the prior studies that aimed to investigate the neu-
ral substrates underlying expertise compared the skill level of
novices and experts, which gives a snapshot of two endpoints
on the skill level continuum. So far, a growing number of
investigations rather test subjects at different occasions to assess
the gain of expertise throughout training period, hence the“novice
state” can be compared with the “expert state,” or additionally
in between (Guida et al., 2012). Using both approaches enables
to infer the neural reorganization that contributes to reach the
highest level of performance, which is impacted and reinforced
through the consolidation processes (Diekelmann et al., 2011).
This set of processes takes place automatically, without aware-
ness, and allows the conversion of the initial unstable memory
representation into a more stable and effective form, available
for continued reactivation and recall over extended periods of
time (Stickgold and Walker, 2007). Interestingly, processes of con-
solidation over time can also facilitate behavior, often through
offline memory reorganization (Stickgold and Walker, 2005).
Indeed, continued plasticity over time is crucial whenever newly
acquired information are integrated with old memories (Abra-
ham and Robins, 2005). Given this consolidation effect, some
investigations include follow-up tests (for example, Draganski
et al., 2004; Scholz et al., 2009). For all of these memory pro-
cesses, sleep has been shown to play a critical role in meeting
the demands of the organism (Walker and Stickgold, 2010; Rasch
and Born, 2013). At the functional level, the consolidation refers
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to processes in which reverberating activity in newly encoded
representations stimulate a redistribution of the neuronal rep-
resentations to other neuronal circuitries for long-term storage
(Dudai, 2004).
On the basis of several thousand years of education, along with
more recent laboratory research on learning and skill acquisition,
a number of conditions for optimal learning and improvement
of performance have been uncovered. The most common con-
dition for optimal learning and improvement of performance
concerns the extended periods of deliberate practice (Ericsson
et al., 1993). Four hours of physical/mental deliberate practice
daily for approximately 10 years purportedly leads, for exam-
ple, to expertise in chess, music composition, art, sport, and
science (the 10-year or 10,000-h rule; Ericsson, 2008). One of
the major interests for modern neuroscience is to investigate
the plastic changes that occur in brain structures when peo-
ple participate in such intensive motor and/or mental training.
Nowadays, skill acquisition and training in various domains, from
motor function to higher order cognitive skills, were shown to
elicit substantial changes in brain anatomy (Jäncke, 2009). Pre-
vious studies including cross-sectional and longitudinal designs
showed that skill acquisition and practice can induce changes
in the functional properties of specific brain regions involved
in the corresponding task (Buschkuehl et al., 2012; Guida et al.,
2012). Recent investigations further demonstrated that not only
brain activity, but also gray and white matter structures change
as a consequence of skill learning (Draganski et al., 2004; Scholz
et al., 2009). For instance, recent neuroimaging studies focusing
on the effects of motor or mental (meditation) training, last-
ing several weeks in previously untrained participants, showed
plastic changes in specific white matter regions (Scholz et al.,
2009; Tang et al., 2012). Overall, technological and methodological
advances in neuroimaging and non-invasive human brain stim-
ulation provided insights into the neuroplastic mechanisms that
underlie skill expertise. More generally, cross-sectional paradigms,
where highly skilled participants were compared with less-skilled
persons, showed a strong link between skill acquisition and neu-
ronal plasticity at both cortical and subcortical levels over time,
engaging different spatially distributed and interconnected brain
regions.
A fundamental ability of the human brain is to form and
retrieve memories enabling the individual to adapt its behavior
to the demands of an ever-changing environment, and appropri-
ately select and improve the behaviors of its given repertoire. The
distinction between expertise based on declarative (knowing that)
and procedural knowledge (knowing how) is directly related to the
real-world domains of expertise. Some domains are mostly char-
acterized by one type of knowledge, although experts may have
both and often need to rely on one type of knowledge rather than
the other (Dror, 2011). Practically, the most appropriate type of
expert knowledge depends on the situational demands and cogni-
tive mechanisms involved in operationalizing this knowledge (e.g.,
Beilock et al., 2004; Dror, 2011). Such kind of adaptation is a reli-
able marker of expertise. Interestingly, it has been shown that there
are both costs and benefits to expertise, so that the inflexibility of
experts might make them unable to adapt to new task demands, at
least in some occasions (Bilalic et al., 2008a,b) Typically, experts
may fail to develop successful patterns of thought by using a
less familiar, albeit more appropriate solution, when available.
Bilalic et al. (2008a,b, 2010a), however, demonstrated that individ-
uals with the highest degree of expertise remained more flexible
and more likely to find the optimal solution by memory retrieval
and/or by search.
The primary aim of the present paper is to review studies
showing how learning and experience induce structural and func-
tional brain plasticity that supports expertise, following a motor
to mental gradient of skill (Figure 1). We not only consider the
structural and functional organization that the brain shapes along
the course of gain in expertise, but also the brain’s potential to
reorganize its functional organization by modifying its structure
in response to practice. Meeting this challenge, this review inte-
grates available results from several neuroimaging approaches in
human populations and animal models. For the first time, we
address these issues in exploring three domains of expertise which
are usually disconnected (motor skill, mental simulation of move-
ment, and meditation). We first report and underline separately
the neuroanatomic correlates of expertise following a motor to
mental gradient, and then attempt to identify and link the com-
mon patterns of changes in the brain subserving expert-level
of performance within each domain. Practically, using such a
transversal approach, this review aims at providing new insights
about how brain plasticity occurs and supports the expert level of
performance.
WHEN MOTOR SKILLS EXPERTISE SUBSERVES BRAIN
OPTIMIZATION
Recent years have seen a significant growing of knowledge on the
neuroplasticity that underpins motor skill learning from its acqui-
sition to the expert level of performance (for review, see Patel et al.,
2013). Basically, compared to novices, highly trained individu-
als exhibit a number of differences including a reduction in the
variability of repeated movements (Milton et al., 2004), in muscle
activation (Lay et al., 2002), and a decrease in the overall volume
of brain activation together with a relative increased intensity of
activation in specific brain regions necessary for the execution of
the task (Jäncke et al., 2000; Munte et al., 2002; Lotze et al., 2003).
FIGURE 1 | Practice modes and consolidation processes leading to
expertise.
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In our attempt to understand such robust expertise-dependent
differences, we first report in this section the main data interesting
how motor skills are acquired and enhanced through the consoli-
dation process. Then, we review recent findings showing changes
in the pattern of brain activity as well as modifications in the neural
structures associated with expertise.
THE NEUROCOGNITIVE BASIS OF MOTOR SKILL LEARNING
Motor skill acquisition refers to the process by which a movement
is performed effortlessly through repeated practice and interac-
tions with the environment (Willingham, 1998). Accurate motor
performance is essential to almost everything we do, from typing
to driving, or playing sports. In cognitive psychology, theoret-
ical descriptions of changes in skilled performance were shown
to move from cognitive to automatic processing (Fitts, 1964).
The key concept is the increasing automaticity: controlled pro-
cesses are attention demanding, conscious and inefficient, whereas
automatic processes are rapid, smooth, effortless, require little
attentional capacity, and are difficult to be consciously disrupted
(Shiffrin and Schneider, 1977). Two experimental paradigms are
used to investigate the cognitive processes and the neural substrates
mediating our capacity to learn behaviors: the first measures
the incremental acquisition of movements into a well-executed
behavior (motor sequence learning), whereas the second tests
our capacity to compensate for environmental changes (motor
adaptation). Doyon and Benali (2005) proposed an integrated
view of the functional plasticity that such a motor memory trace
undergoes in each case. This model suggests that depending upon
the nature of the cognitive processes required during learning,
both motor sequence and motor adaptation tasks recruit simi-
lar cerebral structures early in the learning phase, including the
striatum, cerebellum, and motor cortical regions, in addition to
prefrontal, parietal and limbic areas. A shift of motor represen-
tation from the associative to the sensorimotor striatal territory
can be seen during sequence learning, whereas additional rep-
resentation of the skill can be observed in the cerebellar nuclei
after practice on motor adaptation tasks. When consolidation
has occurred, the participant has achieved asymptotic perfor-
mance. However, the neural representation of a new motor skill
is believed to be distributed in a network of structures involving
the cortico-striatal and/or cortico-cerebellar circuits depending
on the type of skill acquired. At this stage, the model suggests that
motor adaptation rather involves the cerebellum for the reten-
tion and future executions of the acquired skill. By contrast, a
reverse pattern of functional plasticity occurs in motor sequence
learning, where the cerebellum is no longer essential, and the
consolidation of the skill involves representational changes in the
striatum and associated motor cortical regions. New insights into
the neuroplastic mechanisms that underlie motor skill learning
corroborate that skill acquisition is subserved by multiple mech-
anisms that operate across different temporal scales (Dayan and
Cohen, 2011).
Practically, it is not automaticity per se that is indicative of
high proficiency, but rather the level of skill at which automatic-
ity is attained. Although the border between the automaticity
and the expertise concepts beg for clarification, one may con-
sider that most people fail to develop beyond a hobbyist level
of performance as they settle into automaticity at a given level
of skill that they find enjoyable, rather than continuing to
improve skills (Ericsson, 2007). Hence, automaticity is more
a false ceiling than a measure of excellence. Previous stud-
ies typically defined skill acquisition in terms of reduction in
the speed of movement execution or reaction times, increase
in accuracy, or decrease in movement variability. Yet, such
measurements are often interdependent, in that faster move-
ments can be performed at the cost of reduced accuracy and
vice versa, a phenomenon which has been often referred to the
speed-accuracy trade-off (Fitts, 1954). One solution to this issue
is through assessment of changes in speed-accuracy trade-off
functions, i.e., to defy the speed–accuracy tradeoff for a given
task (Krakauer, 2009; Krakauer and Mazzoni, 2011). In other
words, a skilled tennis player can serve both faster and more
accurately than a novice. Thus, sporting skill at the level of
motor execution can be considered as acquiring a new speed–
accuracy trade-off relationships for each sub-task of the motor
sequence.
FUNCTIONAL PLASTICITY CHARACTERIZING NOVICES AND EXPERTS
The existing longitudinal studies in healthy participants attached
great importance to controlled practice situations by keeping
training parameters as much constant as possible (e.g., training
duration per day, overall training duration, training schedule,
strategies, etc.). Movement automatization reflects high level of
motor skill performance and has been associated with increased
activation in the primary motor cortex (M1), primary somatosen-
sory cortex, supplementary motor area (SMA), and putamen,
as well as decreased activation in the lobule VI of the cerebel-
lum (Floyer-Lea and Matthews, 2005; Lehericy et al., 2005). Thus,
training-related automaticity decreases in the fronto-parietal and
dorsal attention networks, hence suggesting that progress from
acquisition to automatization stages of motor skill learning is char-
acterized by concomitant reduced demands on externally focused
attention and executive function (Kelly and Garavan, 2005). Such
pattern of activation is particularly elicited for motor sequence
learning, but one would hypothesize that forms of motor and
visuomotor learning which are more cognitive or associative in
nature (Parsons et al., 2005) may recruit slightly different cerebral
networks undergoing other patterns of plasticity with learning.
For example, the preparatory period has been most extensively
studied in athletes where it is called the “pre-shot routine.” Con-
sistency and reproducibility of pre-shot routines are suggested
to be among the most important differences that distinguish
experts from novices in sport such as Golf (Feltz and Landers,
1983), compared to some motor skills such as goal kicking in
rugby (Jackson, 2003) where no association between temporal
consistency of the pre-shot routine and performance has been
observed. In a recent study, Milton et al. (2007) found differ-
ent functional activations during the pre-shot routine in expert
and novice golfers. Especially, the posterior cingulate cortex, the
amygdala–forebrain complex, and the basal ganglia were active
only in novices, whereas experts yielded activation primarily in
the superior parietal lobule, the dorsal lateral premotor area,
and the occipital cortex. These results suggest that the dispar-
ity between the quality of the performance of novice and expert
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golfers lies at the level of the functional organization of neural net-
works during motor planning. More generally, Patel et al. (2013)
demonstrated that spatially distributed cortical networks and sub-
cortical striatal regions may serve as neural markers of practice
interventions.
The expertise stage of motor skill learning, both in humans
and animals, consistently reported either increased or decreased
M1 activation depending on both the time interval and task
complexity. On one hand, performing an explicit sequence of fin-
ger movements over several weeks showed a progressive increase
of activity in M1 (Karni, 1995; Hlustik et al., 2004; Floyer-Lea
and Matthews, 2005), hence reflecting recruitment of additional
M1 units into the local network that represents the acquired
sequence of movements (Ungerleider et al., 2002). Learning a
motor sequence over several days was also accompanied by an
increase in the size of motor maps and cortico-motoneuronal
excitability of the body parts involved in the task (Pascual-Leone
et al., 1995). Such plastic changes in M1 function linked with slow
stage of motor skill learning are well established in animal mod-
els as well. For example, functional reorganization of movement
representations in M1 has been documented in squirrel monkeys
(Nudo and Milliken, 1996) and rodents (Kleim et al., 2004). It
was found that an expansion in movement representations with
training, detectable only after substantial practice periods, paral-
leled behavioral gains. Such findings challenged theories of neural
efficiency proposing that optimized neural processing is associ-
ated with reduced activity in M1 (Jäncke et al., 2000; Krings et al.,
2000; Haslinger et al., 2004). Especially, an increased activity of
the motor network was reported, including M1, cerebellum, pre-
motor cortex, basal ganglia, pre-SMA, and SMA in the initial
acquisition of motor skills, with significant attenuation of activity
following consolidation of the motor skill (Steele and Penhune,
2010). Recently, Picard et al. (2013) examined the consequence
of practice-dependent motor learning on the metabolic and neu-
ral activity in M1 of monkeys who had extensive training (∼1–6
years) on sequential movement tasks. They found that practic-
ing a skilled movement and the development of expertise lead
to lower M1 metabolic activity, without a concomitant reduction
in neuron activity. In other term, they showed that less synaptic
activity was required to generate a given amount of neuronal activ-
ity. The authors suggested that this gain in M1 efficiency might
result from a number of factors such as more effective synapses,
greater synchrony in inputs and more finely tuned inputs. They
concluded that low activation in M1 elicited during extended prac-
tice might be a reflection of plastic mechanisms involved in the
development of expertise. Although there is no clear consensus
about M1 activation during the gain of expertise, it is more likely
that time interval might be one of the main factors that play a
role in brain modifications. This issue has been partially raised
by Hotermans et al. (2008) who investigated the role of M1 in
the different phases of motor memory consolidation by apply-
ing repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS) over M1
just after a training session involving a sequential finger-tapping
task. They showed that interfering with M1 attenuated the early
post-training performance without any detrimental consequences
on the long-term behavioral improvement tested 4 or 24 h after.
These results support that M1 is causally involved early after the
acquisition of a new motor-skill but is no longer mandatory fol-
lowing a consolidation-period. Overall, increased activity in M1
might correspond to the integration of the new sensory informa-
tion during the short period of training of a new skill, but when
the new learned skill becomes automatic, M1 activation is less
important. Table 1 summarizes the human studies reviewed in this
section with the brain areas showing early–late and expert-related
functional plasticity.
An alternative explanation for the modulation of M1 activity
has been suggested by Landau and D’Esposito (2006) who reported
that optimized motor system is capable of greater flexibility and
adaptability, depending on the nature of the task demands. Using
a complex sequential finger task, they found increased motor acti-
vations in pianists than non-pianists, and further argued that
the former may yield decreased activation when they were less
challenged. Further research is therefore needed to determine the
modulation of M1 activation in experts and novices using task
characteristics that vary across several degrees of difficulty either
early or late during the learning process.
EXPERIENCE-DEPENDENT STRUCTURAL CHANGES IN THE HUMAN
BRAIN
Besides to the functional reorganization of the brain motor
networks, current neuroimaging studies suggest that physical
practice is also reflected in macroscopic changes in motor-
related structures (Draganski and May, 2008). Practically, higher
gray matter volume in auditory, sensorimotor, and premotor
cortex, as well as in the cerebellum, was reported in musi-
cians compared to non-musicians (Gaser and Schlaug, 2003).
Related findings have been reported in many other specific
tasks, including typing (Cannonieri et al., 2007), basketball
(Park et al., 2009, 2011), or golf performance (Jäncke et al.,
2009; Bezzola et al., 2011). Although these findings tend to
follow the law “more skill, more gray matter,” there is new
evidence that training and ensuing expertise may induce local
decrease of cortical volume (Hänggi et al., 2010; Granert et al.,
2011). Controversial findings were also reported on training-
related plasticity in white matter microstructure in healthy adults,
although fewer studies dealing with this issue have been pub-
lished.
On the one side, numerous investigations reported a strong
association between specialized skill and structural changes in par-
ticular brain structures (Maguire et al., 2000; Hutchinson et al.,
2003; Mechelli et al., 2004; Park et al., 2009). In a longitudinal
study, Draganski et al. (2004) used a complex visuo-motor jug-
gling task where perception and anticipation of moving targets
determined the planning of the subsequent motor action. Young
volunteers were scanned before and after 3 months of a daily
training period. The results showed a transient bilateral expan-
sion in gray matter in the mid-temporal area (hMT/V5) and the
left inferior parietal sulcus. The authors concluded that juggling,
and consequently the perception and spatial anticipation of mov-
ing objects, is a stronger stimulus for structural plasticity in visual
areas than in motor areas. Similarly, cross-sectional neuroimag-
ing studies showed experience-dependent structural plasticity in
the cerebellum following training of complex motor skills (Park
et al., 2009; Scholz et al., 2009). For example, Park et al. (2012)
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Table 1 | Functional plasticity through longitudinal and cross-sectional approaches: focus on the motor network.
Study Task/method Design Main outcome
Longitudinal
Normal adults
Floyer-Lea and Matthews (2005) Tracking sequential task/fMRI Single training session vs.
15 min/session 5
weekdays/3 weeks
Early: ↘ activity DLPC, anterior cingulate, posterior
parietal, M1 and cerebellar cortex
Long-term: ↗ activity left S1, M1 and right putamen
Steele and Penhune (2010) FTT/fMRI 5 weekdays Early: ↗ cerebellum, PMC, basal ganglia, pre-SMA
and SMA
Long-term: ↘ in these regions
Karni (1995) FTT/fMRI 10–20 min daily session/3
weeks
Greater activation in M1 was significantly compared
to the extent of activation evoked by an untrained
sequence
Hlustik et al. (2004) FTT/fMRI 15 min daily session/3
weeks
Gradual expansion of M1 and S1 correlating with
performance
Hotermans et al. (2008) FTT/rTMS rTMS immediately before
testing at 30 min, 4 or 24 h
after practice
Early acquisition M1 supports performance, but is no
longer mandatory following consolidation
Parsons et al. (2005) FTT/fMRI 5 weekdays Early: ↗ activation in motor areas and ant/post CMA
Long-term: ↘ activation cerebellum, motor areas,
striatum, fronto-parietal cortices
Pascual-Leone et al. (1995) FTT/TMS 2 h daily training vs.
no-training control 5 days




Haslinger et al. (2004) FTT/fMRI Pianists recruited an extensive motor network but
with a lesser degree of activation than novices
Jäncke et al. (2000) FTT/fMRI Less activation in M1, SMA, pre-SMA, and CMA in
pianists
Krings et al. (2000) FTT/fMRI Pianists showed less activation in M1, SMA, and
PMC
FTT, finger tapping task; rTMS, repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation; fMRI, functional magnetic resonance imagery; ↗, increase; ↘, decrease; M1, primary
motor cortex; S1, primary somatosensory cortex; DLPC, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; SMA, supplementary motor area; pre-SMA, pre-supplementary motor area;
PMC, premotor cortex; CMA, cingulate motor areas.
found greater right- than left cerebellar volume asymmetry and
relatively larger volumes of right hemisphere and vermis lob-
ules VI–VII (declive, folium, and tuber) in short-track speed
skating players compared to matched controls. This finding sug-
gests that the specialized abilities of balance and coordination
are associated with structural plasticity of the right hemisphere
of cerebellum and vermis VI–VII, these regions playing a crit-
ical role in balance and coordination. Cannonieri et al. (2007)
further found that the volume of brain areas corresponding
to the motor skill increased proportionally to the duration of
the training period. Together, these findings demonstrate that
practice modulates brain anatomy specifically associated with
practice demands, albeit opposite structural neural correlates
reflecting stepwise increases in expertise have also been found.
For instance, Hänggi et al. (2010) found differences in structural
characteristics within the sensorimotor neural network between
professional women ballet dancers and novices. Especially, they
reported decreased gray matter volumes in the left premotor
cortex, the SMA, the putamen, and the superior frontal gyrus
anterior to the premotor cortex. More recently, James et al. (2014)
reported changes in gray matter as a function of musical train-
ing intensity in three groups of young adults (non-musicians,
amateurs, and professionals). Surprisingly, they observed a pro-
gressive increase of gray matter density with respect to the level
of expertise in several regions involved in higher-order cognitive
processing (e.g., right fusiform gyrus activated for visual pat-
tern recognition), whereas an opposite pattern of results were
found in sensorimotor areas. To summarize, the type of density
changes (increase or decrease) and the localization of struc-
tural plasticity in gray matter may be related to different factors
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such as the nature of the motor-skill, duration and stage of
practice.
Nowadays, investigations are designed to determine the time
scales of gray matter changes from novices to experts (Taubert
et al., 2010; Dayan and Cohen, 2011). So far, the process of gray
matter adaptation has been observed as early as following 7 days of
practice (Driemeyer et al., 2008) and as late as after 6 weeks (Scholz
et al., 2009), hence demonstrating a relatively fast and durable
structural gray matter plasticity. Although interpretation of such
striking results are premature, it has been proposed that processes
occurring both at the synapse level and larger scales (e.g., glial
hypertrophy), may play a contributory role (Draganski and May,
2008).
Recent longitudinal neuroimaging studies further focused on
the effects of motor training lasting several days or weeks in pre-
viously untrained participants, and showed specific structural
plasticity in white matter regions (Scholz et al., 2009; Taubert
et al., 2010). Scholz et al. (2009) reported experience-induced
changes in white matter architecture following a short period
of practice. Practically, it was found that 6 weeks of juggling
practice protracted an increased fractional anisotropy in a region
of white matter underlying the intraparietal sulcus. Interest-
ingly, Della-Maggiore et al. (2009) further demonstrated that the
speed in a visuomotor adaptation task might be partially deter-
mined by the variation of fractional anisotropy in the posterior
cerebellum and superior cerebellar peduncle. Together, these
findings show that rates of motor skill practice might correlate
with higher values of fractional anisotropy at a local level trig-
gered by the nature of the motor task. Cross-sectional studies,
primarily in highly trained musicians, also examined white mat-
ter correlates of skilled behavior (Schmithorst and Wilke, 2002;
Bengtsson et al., 2005; Han et al., 2009). Bengtsson et al. (2005)
found a correlation between fractional anisotropy in the pos-
terior limb of the internal capsule, which contains descending
corticospinal fibers from the primary sensorimotor and premo-
tor cortices, with number of practice hours during childhood in
skilled musicians. These results demonstrate that training dur-
ing a critical developmental period may induce local structural
plasticity. Rüber et al. (2013) further reported higher fractional
anisotropy values in musicians than non-musicians in descend-
ing motor tracts, with differences when practice was a fine finger
unimanual or bimanual motor skill. The matter tracts were mod-
ified to reflect specific motor demands, unimanual motor skill
primarily eliciting structural remodeling of right hemispheric
tracts, and bimanual motor skill leading to bilateral structural
tract remodeling. Accordingly, Roberts et al. (2012) compared the
behavior and brain structure of healthy controls with a group
of karate black belts, an expert group who are able to perform
rapid, complex movements that require years of training. As
expected, experts were more able than novices to coordinate the
timing of inter-segmental joint velocities, and data revealed sig-
nificant group differences in the microstructure of white matter
in the superior cerebellar peduncles and M1, these brain regions
participating to the voluntary control of the movement. Over-
all, as experts demonstrate optimal behavior on specific tasks,
differences in white matter structure relative to novices might
reflect a “fine-tuning” of the connectivity between specific brain
regions. Nevertheless, contrasting patterns of results shows lower
white matter values in experts than in non-experts. In order
to disentangle the unresolved question of whether sensorimo-
tor training leads to increased or decreased white matter density,
Imfeld et al. (2009) investigated the corticospinal tract of musi-
cians using different methods of analysis (fiber tractography,
voxelwise analysis, region of interest analysis, and detailed slice-
wise analysis of diffusion parameters). Data clearly demonstrated
that sensorimotor training leads to decreased white matter den-
sity. This finding is supported by Hänggi et al. (2010) who found
reduced white matter volume in dancers vs. non-dancers. Further
investigations are required to understand the cellular mecha-
nisms underlying learning-dependent changes in white matter
microstructure.
THE NEURAL CORRELATES OF MOTOR IMAGERY
Across a motor to mental gradient of skill learning, there is now
compelling evidence that motor imagery contributes to enhance
motor skill learning and motor performance (for reviews, see Feltz
and Landers, 1983; Driskell et al., 1994; Guillot and Collet, 2008;
Schuster et al., 2011). Motor imagery is a dynamic state during
which one simulates an action mentally without any concomi-
tant body movement. Since the last three decades, the advent
of functional brain mapping studies has allowed researchers to
investigate the neural correlates of motor imagery and to under-
stand in greater details the neural underpinnings of expertise in
imagery.
THE EFFECT OF EXPERTISE LEVEL
In previous sections, we reviewed a handful of experimental
studies providing clear evidence that individuals differ in their
ability to perform voluntary motor acts, and that advanced
motor learning is associated with functional brain plasticity (for
reviews, see Doyon and Benali, 2005; Doyon, 2008; Johans-
son, 2011). Practically, neuroimaging studies showed that the
neural networks activated by the execution of the motor task dif-
fered as a function of the individual expertise level. Although
there are few studies looking at this issue in motor imagery,
similar observations were reported in the neural activations
between novices and experts. For instance, by comparing the
neural substrate of judgment processing in amateurs and pro-
fessionals “Go players,” Ouchi et al. (2005) found that in the
checkmate-decision problems, the precuneus and cerebellum
were activated in the professionals, while the premotor and
parieto-occipital cortices were extensively activated in the ama-
teurs. Their results support that the precuneus and the cere-
bellum play a crucial role in processing of accurate judgment
by visual imagery. Likewise, brain imaging studies investigating
object and pattern identification, such as pieces on chess and
their respective prospective functions (e.g., imagining moving
a piece to capture another), revealed that expertise modu-
lates the activity of several regions. Accordingly, Bilalic et al.
(2010a,b, 2011) showed that chess-specific object recognition
was accompanied by bilateral activation of the occipito-temporal
junction, while chess-specific pattern recognition was related
to bilateral activations in the middle part of the collateral
sulci. More generally, Bilalic et al. (2012) provided evidence
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that experts not only engage the same regions as novices, but
also recruit additional regions including bilateral activation of
the retrosplenial cortex, the collateral sulcus, and the temporo-
parietal region (see also Rennig et al., 2013), hence suggesting
that the pattern of activation moves from frontal parts at the
beginning of the process to posterior parts responsible for
retrieval of domain specific knowledge around the final expertise
stage.
Several other studies were designed to investigate the neu-
ral networks mediating the phenomenological experience of
imagining music (Halpern and Zatorre, 1999; Halpern et al.,
2004; Zatorre et al., 2007; for reviews, see Zatorre and Halpern,
2005; Lotze, 2013). A nice study by Lotze et al. (2003) com-
pared the patterns of brain activation during auditory imagery
in experienced and novice musicians, with the formers report-
ing high vividness and frequent use of imagery. Interest-
ingly, they showed that experienced musicians overall recruited
fewer cerebral areas, while amateurs manifested a widely dis-
tributed activation map. In the professional group, however,
more activation was observed in regions assuming motor func-
tions including the SMA, the superior premotor cortex, and
the cerebellum, as well as in the superior parietal lobule. By
means of magnetoencephalography, Herholz et al. (2008) also
compared musicians and non-musicians during imagery of a
musical task. An early pre-attentive brain response (imagery
mismatch negative response) to unexpected continuations of
imagined melodies was observed only in musicians, hence
reflecting the neuroplasticity due to intense training for music
processing.
Similar experiments were conducted in the field of motor
imagery per se by comparing the neural networks mediating
the imagery experience in novices and elite athletes (e.g., Mil-
ton et al., 2008). Especially, Ross et al. (2003) compared the
brain activations of six participants during motor imagery of a
golf swing. They found an inverse relationship between brain
activity and skill level, i.e., decreased activations occurred with
increased golf skill level, especially in the SMA and cerebel-
lum. Also, imagined golf swing elicited little activation of basal
ganglia and cingulate gyri across all skill levels (see also Mil-
ton et al., 2007). Wei and Luo (2010) compared the pattern
of cerebral activations in professional divers and novices dur-
ing imagery of both professional (diving task) and simple (basic
gymnastics task) motor skills. Elite athletes yielded greater acti-
vation in the parahippocampus during imagery of professional
skills and a more focused activity of the prefrontal regions
in both tasks. In a comparable study in archers, Chang et al.
(2011) reported peaks of activation in premotor and SMA,
in the inferior frontal region, as well as in basal ganglia and
cerebellum, in novices. In contrast, elite archers involved pre-
dominantly the SMA, hence confirming a more focused pattern
of activity following intense training. The between-group analy-
sis revealed that novices exhibited significantly higher activation
in M1, premotor area, inferior parietal cortex, basal ganglia, and
cerebellum.
Overall, these data strongly support the existence of dis-
tinct neural mechanisms of motor expertise during imagery,
as a function of the individual skill level. Interestingly,
dynamic changes resulting from intense practice of a given
motor task tend to support a reduction of the general cor-
tical activation during motor imagery, with a more refined
and circumscribed pattern of activity in trained participants
(Figure 2).
Apart differences in terms of motor expertise, there is now
ample evidence that the expertise in the use of imagery, which
commonly refers to the individual imagery ability, also widely
varies across individuals. It is therefore possible distinguishing
good from poor imagers. Yet, very few experimental studies
investigated the functional neuroanatomical correlates of imagery
ability/expertise (Figure 3). Guillot et al. (2008) compared the
pattern of cerebral activations in 13 skilled and 15 unskilled
imagers, during both physical execution and imagery of a fin-
ger movement sequence. As expected, both groups manifested
similar peaks of activation in many cerebral regions (inferior
and superior parietal lobules, as well as motor-related regions
including the lateral and medial premotor cortex, the cerebel-
lum and putamen). Inter-group comparisons revealed, however,
that good imagers activated more the parietal and ventrolateral
premotor regions, known as playing a crucial role in the forma-
tion of the mental images. In contrast, poor imagers recruited
the cerebellum, the orbito-frontal and posterior cingulate cor-
tices. With reference to the motor sequence learning literature
(Doyon and Ungerleider, 2002; Doyon and Benali, 2005), these
findings strongly support that the neural networks mediating
expertise in motor imagery are not identical in high and low-
skilled individuals. Findings also suggested that compared to poor
imagers, good imagers have a more efficient recruitment of move-
ment engrams. In a recent study, van der Meulen et al. (2014)
investigated the effect of imagery ability/expertise on the neural
correlates of gait control. They confirmed that both good and
poor imagers groups activated a network of similar brain acti-
vations. Good imagers, however, showed greater activity in the
motor-related areas including the left M1, right thalamus and
bilateral cerebellum, as well as the left prefrontal cortex contribut-
ing to higher order gait control. A greater activation was also
found in the right SMA. Differences in the experimental designs
as well as the criteria for determining the individual imagery abil-
ity may explain the differences between the two latter studies
in terms of brain activations. Despite this, these studies pro-
vide a better understanding of the neural networks underlying
imagery ability/expertise and highlight the importance of assess-
ing the ability of participants to generate accurate mental images
in order to adjust and individualize the content of mental practice
programs.
BRAIN PLASTICITY FOLLOWING MOTOR IMAGERY PRACTICE
We provided evidence that the neural networks underlying motor
imagery in novices and elite athletes are not totally overlapping
but selectively depend upon the individual level of motor expertise
and imagery ability. Based on this assumption, one may postulate
that the pattern of cerebral activation recorded during imagery
in poor imagers and/or novices might improve and evolve close
to that observed in good imagers and/or experts with practice.
This might suggest that the expected changes in subcortical and
cortical activations during motor imagery would reflect those
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FIGURE 2 | Influence of the level of motor expertise on the functional
networks underlying motor imagery. 1 – frontal cortex (BA10), 2 –
pre-motor cortex, 3 – SMA, 4 – M1, 5 – primary somatosensory cortex, 6 –
inferior parietal cortex, 7 – precuneus, 8 – superior temporal lobe, 9 –
posterior cingulate cortex, 10 – anterior cingulate cortex, 11 –
parahippocampal gyrus (BA36), 12 – hippocampus, 13 – insula/inferior frontal
cortex, 14 – striatum, 15 – putamen, 16 – cerebellum (lobules IV/V region).
Data were extracted from Lafleur et al. (2002), Lacourse et al. (2005), Milton
et al. (2007), Olsson et al. (2008), Wei and Luo (2010), Chang et al. (2011),
Baeck et al. (2012), Bezzola et al. (2012).
elicited by the process of actual motor learning. In a pioneer-
ing series of experimental studies, Lacourse et al. (2004, 2005)
reported functional cerebral and cerebellar sensorimotor plastic-
ity following either physical or motor imagery practice. In line
with such hypothesis, Lafleur et al. (2002) and Jackson et al. (2003)
demonstrated that the functional plasticity occurring during the
incremental acquisition of a motor sequence was also reflected
during motor imagery. In other words, the patterns of dynamic
changes in cerebral activity were significantly different when com-
paring both early and more advanced learning phases of imagined
sequential foot movements. In particular, Lafleur et al. (2002)
observed significant differences medially in the rostral portion of
the anterior cingulate and orbito-frontal cortices, as well as in the
striatum, bilaterally. Jackson et al. (2003) also explored the func-
tional cerebral reorganization following motor imagery learning
of a similar task. They confirmed the robustness of Lafleur et al.’s
(2002) findings by a regression analysis, which showed a positive
correlation between the increase in cerebral blood flow within the
right medial orbito-frontal cortex and the individual performance
enhancement. Recently, Baeck et al. (2012) confirmed the neuro-
plasticity elicited by motor imagery practice, while Bezzola et al.
(2012) demonstrated that performing intensive physical training
influences subsequent motor imagery of the corresponding task.
CONCLUSION
The results reviewed in this section support the existence of dis-
tinct neural mechanisms for expertise in imagery. Accordingly, the
neural networks mediating the imagery experience in individuals
with poor imagery ability are not totally similar to those observed
in high imagers. As well, comparisons between expert athletes
and novices demonstrated different patterns of brain activation
during motor imagery of the corresponding task. At this stage,
one cannot totally rule out that the modulation in brain activity
might also arise from the visual familiarity by experts of the move-
ment to be imagined. Accordingly, higher activation might thus
arise by the fact that it’s easier to imagine an action either because
experts can perform the action or because they see/experience
this action extensively in daily life. Such comparisons between
expert and non-expert athletes, or between good and poor
imagers, thus suffer from a major limit related to the familiarity
with the movement to imagine, regardless the motor experience
per se.
An interesting result supporting the functional equivalence
between motor imagery and motor performance is that the func-
tional plasticity that occurs during mental practice was found to
closely mimic that observed after physical practice of the same
motor skill. Imagery training may thus result in dynamic plastic
changes so that the neural networks mediating imagery prac-
tice in poor imagers become closer to those observed in good
imagers. Along these lines, real-time image analyses in func-
tional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies may provide
to participants some objective information related to the vivid-
ness of their imagery content. This method might be particularly
useful during the imagery learning process, with regards to the
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FIGURE 3 | Influence of motor imagery ability on the functional
networks underlying motor imagery. 1 – precuneus, 2 – superior parietal
cortex, 3 – inferior parietal cortex, 4 – fusiform gyrus, 5 – lateral premotor
cortex, 6 – frontal cortex, 7 – dorsal premotor cortex, 8 – anterior cingulate
cortex, 9 – post-central gyrus, 10 – posterior cingulate cortex, 11 – thalamus,
12 – cerebellar cortex, 13 – cerebellar lobule IV, 14 – cerebellar lobules IV/V.
Data were extracted from Guillot et al. (2008), Lorey et al. (2009), Hasenkamp
et al. (2012).
potential modification of the mental images, when the pattern of
activation during mental simulation is not the one expected. In
other words, the participant may directly modulate his/her level
of motor imagery expertise.
A significant illustration of the strength of this methodology in
the field of motor imagery was offered by de Charms et al. (2004)
during imagery of a manual action task. In this study, participants
received feedback about the activation level in the somatomotor
cortex with a simple virtual reality interface. The results showed
that they enhanced the level of activation driven by motor imagery
in the somatomotor cortex through the course of training. More-
over, the activation of this region after imagery training was as
robust as that recorded during actual practice. Yoo et al. (2008)
later showed that real time fMRI might help individuals to learn
how to increase region-specific cortical activity associated with a
motor imagery task. Practically, the level of increased activation in
motor areas was consolidated after the 2-week self-practice period.
More recently, Xie et al. (2011) supported the effectiveness of deliv-
ering neurofeedback during motor imagery using real-time fMRI,
and further provided evidence that the SMA was controllable by
participants. These data strongly support that real-time fMRI is
a valuable technique to investigate whether participants are able
to use a cognitive strategy to control a target brain region in real-
time, and that motor imagery can reflect plastic changes of neural
correlates associated with intensive training (Baeck et al., 2012).
MENTAL TRAINING: MEDITATION AS A PARADIGMATIC
EXAMPLE
In this section, we discuss recent findings on the cognitive pro-
cesses and the neural underpinning supporting a pure mental
task, i.e., meditation. First, we briefly introduce the concept of
meditation and give some definition broadly diffused in the neu-
roscientific community, then we review findings on the cognitive
enhancement linked to different levels of meditative expertise.
Finally, we expose recent findings on the brain structural and
functional changes associated with long-term meditation prac-
tice and the neuronal underpinning of meditation. In the last two
sections, we mainly take into account data from functional and
structural neuroimaging studies without considering results from
the large body of researches using electroencephalography (we
address readers to some recent extensive reviews of this field, e.g.,
Cahn and Polich, 2006; Travis and Shear, 2010).
MEDITATION: BASIC CONCEPTS
Meditation is commonly used in the literature as an umbrella term
that covers different practices ranging from yoga, tai-chi, tran-
scendental meditation and different techniques derived from the
Buddhist tradition. Here we will mainly focus on the latter, since
they have received great attention in the last years, also due to their
clinical application (Rubia, 2009), and since they focus on the
training of well-defined cognitive processes. Indeed, a common
feature of these practices is the voluntary control of the atten-
tional focus. A distinction between focused attention (FA) and
open monitoring (OM) techniques has been proposed (Lutz et al.,
2008). FA practices are based on the concentration of attention on
a particular external, corporal, or mental object while ignoring all
irrelevant stimuli. At the opposite, OM techniques try to enlarge
the attentional focus to all incoming sensations, emotions, and
thoughts from moment to moment without focusing on any of
them with a non-judgmental attitude (Lutz et al., 2008).
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org May 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 280 | 71
Debarnot et al. Neural mechanisms of expertise
FA is thought to not only train sustained attention but also
to develop three attentional skills: the monitoring and vigilance to
distracting stimuli beyond the intended focus of attention, the dis-
engagement of attention from distracting stimuli once the mind
has wondered, and the redirection of FA on the intended object.
OM meditation involves more monitoring processes of one’s own
phenomenological experience and is thought to develop awareness
and non-reactive meta-cognitive monitoring (Lutz et al., 2008;
Slagter et al., 2011).
Expertise in other domains (e.g., sport, music) is defined as
the achievement of better performance compared to novices in
the particular activity that is trained. Following this definition it
is not clear what could be an objective measure of expertise in
meditation, since there are no clear assessments of “meditative
performance,” and the quality of meditation is at best measured
by subjective introspective reports. For this reason, the only con-
sensual measurable parameter of expertise is the extent of practice
reported in years or hours per week of practice. Nevertheless, an
indirect quantitative measure of expertise could be the improve-
ment of cognitive functions that are supposed to be trained during
meditation. Thus, in the following section, we start presenting
behavioral results that have highlighted cognitive improvements
in expert meditators.
COGNITIVE ENHANCEMENT INDUCED BY MEDITATION
Meditation training has been recently shown to improve different
cognitive abilities. One of the most investigated domains, not sur-
prisingly, is that of attentional improvement after either long- or
short-term meditative practice.
Following the distinction of attentional processes proposed by
Posner and Petersen (1990) in three subdivisions comprising alert-
ing (the ability to reach and maintain a vigilance state), orienting
(the capacity of focusing attention on a subset of stimuli) and
conflict resolution or executive attention (the ability to resolve
conflict or allocate limited resources between competing stim-
uli), different researchers have employed the Attentional Network
Task (Fan et al., 2002) to investigate the impact of meditation
on each subcomponent. Results on expert mindfulness medi-
tators showed better performance in the orienting component
and a trend to better executive attention (van den Hurk et al.,
2010). These findings are consistent with other studies report-
ing enhanced sustained attention in expert meditators (Valentine
and Sweet, 1999; Pagnoni and Cekic, 2007; Josefsson and Broberg,
2010).
In another study, Jha et al. (2007) compared performance on a
similar task between a group of expert meditators, a group that fol-
lowed a 5-week mindfulness training, and a control group. They
further compared the performance between the three groups at
baseline (T1) and after a 1-month meditative retreat for the med-
itators group, the 5-week training for the mindfulness group, and
no treatment for the control group (T2). Their findings showed
that at T1, experts had better performance in conflict monitoring
compared to the other two groups, while at T2 the mindful-
ness group showed enhanced orienting and the retreat group
performed better in the alerting component. In the same vein,
Tang et al. (2007) reported that a short 5-days meditation training
enhanced performance in conflict monitoring.
Other results in accordance with a benefit of meditation on the
executive component of attention come from a study investigating
the attentional blink effect. This effect consists on the fact that if
two target stimuli (t1 and t2) are presented in rapid succession,
normally the t2 is not detected (Raymond et al., 1992; Ward et al.,
1996). Slagter et al. (2007) reported that after 3 months the inten-
sive meditative practice the attentional blink was reduced as the
result of reduced neurocognitive resources allocated to t1, as evi-
denced by a reduced electrophysiological brain potential (the P3b)
normally associated with attentional resource allocation. These
results, using a similar paradigm, were also replicated in a sample
of more expert meditators (van Leeuwen et al., 2009).
Taken together, these findings suggest that the more affected
component of the attentional network would be the executive
one, even if some studies reported better performance on the ori-
enting or the alerting component (van den Hurk et al., 2010). It
should be noted, however, that participants in this study had a
much longer meditation experience (mean 14.5 years) than in the
others. This could suggest that the executive system is the first
attentional component to benefit from meditation training and
that longer practice is needed to achieve improvement in the other
systems.
Beyond attentional performance, preliminary findings have
shown that meditation could have a beneficial effect on other
cognitive functions. For example, some studies reported better
performance in participants assigned to a mindfulness meditation
group on several executive functions such as verbal fluency (Wenk-
Sormaz, 2005; Heeren et al., 2009; Zeidan et al., 2010), cognitive
inhibition (Heeren et al., 2009) and working memory (Chambers
et al., 2008; Zeidan et al., 2010; Mrazek et al., 2013).
Moreover, it has been shown that short-term meditation
training can have a positive effect on autobiographical memory
specificity in formerly depressed patients (Williams et al., 2000)
and also in non-clinical population (Heeren et al., 2009), but these
effects are largely mediated by enhanced performance in executive
functions (Heeren et al., 2009).
STATE-DEPENDENT FUNCTIONAL ACTIVATION DURING MEDITATION
In this section, we mainly focus on the ongoing brain activity
during the practice of meditation and in particular on the evo-
lution of this activity with the extent of practice. Before starting
reviewing existing data, we want to underline that since medita-
tion is a long-lasting state, in which different parallel cognitive
processes coexist, that could be achieved with a variable lapse
of time, it is a phenomenon that is difficultly suitable for cur-
rent neuroimaging investigation. Indeed, the temporal course for
entering the meditation state is unknown and variable across par-
ticipants. One interesting solution has been recently applied by
Hasenkamp et al. (2012). In their study, they asked participants
who performed FA meditation to press a button as soon as they
realize their attention was wandering. Using this stratagem the
authors were able to dissociate different aspects of the medita-
tive process: mind wandering, awareness of mind wandering,
shift of attention and FA. Moreover, in trying to adapt medita-
tion task to neuroimaging protocol, most of the previous studies
used blocked designs with short meditation period (i.e., from
30 s to several minutes); this methodology may not reflect the
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complexity of meditative processes. Thus, results from functional
neuroimaging studies on meditation should be taken with caution.
Nevertheless, several activated regions were constantly reported
across different studies and meditative techniques as pointed out
by two recent meta-analyses (Sperduti et al., 2012; Tomasino et al.,
2013).
Different studies have reported that meditation is supported
by a large set of brain areas encompassing lateral and medial
frontal regions, comprising the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC),
parietal structures, the insula, and medial temporal structures
such as the hippocampus and the parahippocampal formation,
and the basal ganglia (Brefczynski-Lewis et al., 2007; Hölzel et al.,
2007; Bærentsen et al., 2010; Engström et al., 2010; Manna et al.,
2010; Wang et al., 2011; Sperduti et al., 2012; Tomasino et al.,
2013). Frontal and parietal regions encompassing the ACC are
thought to reflect cognitive control and attentional monitoring
during meditation, while insula is known to be involved in inte-
roceptive awareness. On the contrary, the role of hippocampus
during meditation is still a matter of debate and could reflect mem-
ory consolidation, emotional regulation, or spontaneous thoughts
monitoring (Engström et al., 2010; Sperduti et al., 2012).
Nevertheless, establishing a unitary neural correlate of the com-
plex task of meditation is not without problems. Indeed, different
studies have shown that the neural underpinning of meditation
could differ depending on the specific meditative technique that
is investigated and the expertise of the participants. For example,
Manna et al. (2010) directly compared FA and OM meditation
in the same participants, and reported that OM more strongly
activated lateral prefrontal regions. In the same vein, Wang et al.
(2011) showed that a breath-based meditation (defined by the
authors as a non-FA technique), compared to mantra repeti-
tion (a form of FA meditation), activated to a greater extent
limbic structures (hippocampus, parahippocampus, and amyg-
dala), insula and lateral frontal areas, while mantra repetition was
more associated with activations in the precentral gyrus, pari-
etal cortex, and medial frontal gyrus. Moreover, the engagement
of certain structures, above all frontal regions, could vary with
the individual expertise. Indeed, Brefczynski-Lewis et al. (2007)
reported an inverted U-shaped relation between frontal activity
and meditators’ expertise. In other words, the more trained per-
sons showed a less frontal activity, suggesting a disengagement of
attentional control with training. These results are in line with a
recent meta-analysis by Sperduti et al. (2012) showing that pool-
ing together studies on expert meditators belonging to different
meditative techniques did not report frontal activity, but com-
mon activation in the basal ganglia, medial prefrontal cortex, and
parahippocampus. These data suggest that some brain regions,
in particular those involved in cognitive control, are necessary at
the initial and intermediary levels of expertise, while with prac-
tice meditation may be a highly automatic and effortless process
(Lutz et al., 2008). Moreover, while the neurocognitive underpin-
nings of different meditative practices would differ in novices, it
could eventually converge when expertise is attained, as suggested
by Newberg and Iversen (2003, p. 283): “Phenomenological anal-
ysis suggests that the end results of many practices of meditation
are similar, although these results might be described using different
characteristics depending on the culture and individual. Therefore,
it seems reasonable that while the initial neurophysiological activa-
tion occurring during any given practice may differ, there should
eventually be a convergence.”
TRAIT STABLE MODIFICATION OF BRAIN ORGANIZATION ASSOCIATED
WITH LONG-TERM MEDITATION
One of the first studies investigating long-term effect of medi-
tation on brain morphology is that of Lazar et al. (2005). The
authors reported greater cortical thickness in meditators than con-
trols in the prefrontal cortex, the insula, and the somatosensory
cortex. Moreover, they found a positive correlation between corti-
cal thickness and expertise in the occipito-temporal visual cortex.
Increase in gray matter concentration in the insula was further con-
firmed by Hölzel et al. (2008), who additionally reported greater
gray matter concentration in the right hippocampus and left infe-
rior temporal gyrus. In this latter region, the amount of gray
matter concentration positively correlated with that of meditation
training. Hippocampal alteration in expert meditators has also
been reported in several recent studies (Luders et al., 2009, 2013).
Another structure that has been found to be altered in meditators
is the putamen (Pagnoni and Cekic, 2007). Indeed, while in aging
this region normally shows a decrease in gray matter concentra-
tion, this was not the case for a group of expert meditators. This
result, together with findings suggesting a protective effect of long-
term meditation on the cognitive decline in aging (Prakash et al.,
2012), opens the interesting perspective of employing meditation
as a neurocognitive training technique in elderly.
There are also some studies reporting white matter changes
induced by meditation. Luders et al. (2011) observed widespread
increased of fractional anisotropy, a measure of fiber tracks
integrity through the brain in expert meditators compared to con-
trols. Similar results have been reported in a recent study by Kang
et al. (2013). Moreover, two interesting studies on novice med-
itators showed that only 11 h of meditation training increased
fractional anisotropy in the corona radiata (Tang et al., 2010,
2012), a tract connecting the ACC with other cortical struc-
tures. Increased fractional anisotropy could be interpreted as
an enhanced connectivity between large scale networks. Studies
reporting altered resting state functional connectivity in medita-
tors are compatible with this interpretation. Indeed, several studies
reported both increased connectivity within the default mode net-
work (Brewer et al., 2011; Jang et al., 2011) and the attentional
network (Hasenkamp and Barsalou, 2012), and between these two
networks (Brewer et al., 2011; Hasenkamp and Barsalou, 2012;
Taylor et al., 2013).
These findings confirm that long-, but also short-term med-
itative practice, could lead to stable alterations at the structural
level in gray and white matter, and in a functional rewiring of
large scale networks. Regions that are active during meditation are
the most affected by these structural changes, and in some cases,
expertise has been reported to correlate with the magnitude of
morphological changes.
DISCUSSION
In the previous sections, we reviewed findings showing that med-
itation is subserved by a widespread network of brain regions
involved in different processes such as cognitive control, attention,
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and interoceptive awareness. Moreover, the engagement of some
of these structures seems dependent on the degree of expertise,
with frontal regions being possibly involved at initial stages of
practice, while at more advanced stages, when meditation practice
eventually becomes“effortless,” basal ganglia seem to play a central
role. The continuous training in meditation, possibly resulting on
the repeated activation of this set of regions, produces long-term
structural and functional changes at the local level, but also in long
range brain connectivity.
At the behavioral level, meditation has been shown to produce
not only an enhancement in attentional performance that is sup-
posed to be directly trained during practice, but also to improve
different cognitive processes, such as executive functions, working
memory, and long-term autobiographical memory. These find-
ings are in line with the proposal of Slagter et al. (2011) stating
that meditation could promote “process-specific learning” that is
a kind of learning which is not confined to the enhancement of
performance in the trained task, but could transfer to other tasks
and domains.
Since most of the evidence about the relationship between med-
itative practice and cognitive, structural, and functional brain
alteration comes from cross-sectional studies, conclusion about
the causal role should be taken with caution. Nevertheless, the
correlations often reported between the degree of expertise and
the amount of performance or neural modifications, together with
some recent longitudinal studies on short-term meditative train-
ing, seem to corroborate this interpretation. Further efforts should
be done to carry out longitudinal studies that could shed light
on the progressive cognitive and brain reorganization induced by
different levels of meditative expertise.
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
Technological and methodological advances in neuroimaging and
non-invasive brain stimulation in humans, along with novel find-
ings stemming from animal studies, provide new insights into
the neuroplastic mechanisms underlying expert level of perfor-
mance, and suggest that multiple mechanisms operate across
different temporal scales from skill acquisition to expertise. In
this review, we attempted to identify such typical changes follow-
ing a motor to mental gradient of skills, which affects neuronal
processes.
We have seen, across each domain of expertise, that the
degree of functional brain plasticity reflecting an increased level
of expertise was task-dependent and followed extensive prac-
tice. Enhanced behavioral and cognitive performances involve
dynamic shifts in the strength of pre-existing neuronal con-
nections, including changes in task-related cortico-cortical and
cortico-subcortical coherence. In the motor domain, experts
usually yield a reduced pattern of brain activity in the cortico-
cerebellum pathway, despite a more focused activation in the
striatum (caudate nucleus/putamen), suggesting that this struc-
ture may be critical for long-term retention of well-learned motor
sequences. Likewise, in the cognitive domain, Dahlin et al. (2009)
demonstrated positive behavioral effects of training on working
memory which are associated by a decrease in cortical areas typi-
cally related to working memory along with fewer peaks of activity
in regions participating to attentional control processes (e.g.,
fronto-parietal regions) and increases in the striatum. Together,
these data suggest that following a motor to mental gradient,
there is lower involvement of control-related cortical areas (e.g.,
prefrontal cortex) and an increase in the recruitment of the stria-
tum along with practice. Accordingly, we also underlined in this
review the role of basal ganglia across the motor to mental gra-
dient. Yet, basal ganglia are not restricted to motoric aspects of
behavior, but rather involved most areas of cognitive and emo-
tional functioning (Seger, 2006), which is consistent with their
anatomical connections with all areas of the cortex (Alexander
et al., 1986). Briefly, basal ganglia interact with the cortex through
independent processing loops in which the cortex projects to the
striatum, the striatum to the pallidum, the pallidum to the tha-
lamus, and from there back to the cortex. These processing loops
have functions that complement those of the cortical areas they
interact with. Neuroimaging studies in humans have undoubt-
edly demonstrated that basal ganglia play a critical role in the
planning, learning, and the execution of a new motor skill, as
well as the long-lasting representation of the skilled behavior
(Doyon et al., 2009). In the same vein, and in addition to com-
mon activations in brain areas associated with generation and
maintenance of mental images in the working memory, basal
ganglia showed increased activity after intensive motor imagery
practice, and therefore demonstrate its involvement in the exper-
tise level of performance and reinforcement learning (Baeck et al.,
2012). Finally, the contribution of basal ganglia in meditation
has also been reported, albeit in a different way, in experienced
meditators. Indeed, meditative state starts by activation of frontal
regions that would successively activate, in cascade, different
cortico-thalamic-limbic-basal ganglia loops that would maintain
the meditative state. Ritskes et al. (2003) further demonstrated that
when experienced meditators switched from normal conscious-
ness to meditative state, increased activation in the prefrontal
cortex and basal ganglia occured along with decreased activa-
tion in the superior occipital gyrus and anterior cingulate. It
has been hypothesized that increased activations may be asso-
ciated with the gating of cortical–subcortical interactions that
leads to an overall decrease in readiness for action (Kjaer et al.,
2002).
As seen in this review, complex motor skills that involve proce-
dural learning, as well as purely mental skills, result in measurable
changes in brain structure. Recently, studies using MR-based mor-
phometry provided new insight to our understanding of brain
plasticity related to the expertise level. Accordingly, clear modi-
fications of the gray and white matter volumes are related to the
skill level, which in turn depends on training characteristics. More-
over, those structural changes have been shown to correlate with
behavioral improvements (for motor practice) and attentional and
emotional regulation (for meditation). This latter finding might
serve as a neural body of evidence for the common idea that longer
practice makes perfection. However, it remains unknown when
morphometric changes can first be detected and how long changes
last.
One of the main characteristic that entails neural functional
plasticity across a motor to mental gradient of expertise is that
experts achieve higher levels of performance with less cogni-
tive effort. Especially, using a quantitative ALE meta-analytic
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method, Patel et al. (2013) demonstrated common reduced acti-
vation for both motor and cognitive training in regions closely
overlapping with the fronto-parietal control and dorsal attention
networks. Indeed, it remains difficult and time-consuming to con-
trol multiple tasks concurrently (Miller, 1956; Just et al., 2001;
Rubinstein et al., 2001), so that any strategy that minimizes the
demands placed on intentional control is of great benefit. For
instance, the functional activation observed in premotor areas or
M1 during motor performance is reduced or more focused in
professional musicians compared to amateurs or non-musicians
(Hund-Georgiadis and von Cramon, 1999; Meister et al., 2005).
More generally, the reduced activation in highly skilled perform-
ers is often taken as evidence for “increased efficiency of the motor
system”and the need for a smaller number of active neurons to per-
form a given set of movements (Krings et al., 2000; Haslinger et al.,
2004), albeit others researchers argued that lower levels of activa-
tion result from reduced attention or task difficulty (Floyer-Lea
and Matthews, 2004; Landau and D’Esposito, 2006). As suggested
by Picard et al. (2013), low activation is not always a sign of low
neuronal activity, but it may rather be a reflection of plastic mecha-
nisms involved as expertise emerges. Connectivity studies provide
a definitive answer to this point by examining whether the reduc-
tion in activity of certain areas is followed by increased activity of
other brain regions when experts perform skilled and non-skilled
tasks.
FUTURE PERSPECTIVES
In this review, we attempted to provide an overview, although
not exhaustive, of structural and functional brain plasticity that
occurs while practicing at an expert level of performance. It is
worth acknowledging that the emphasis given on each specific,
albeit substantial, domain of research following a motor to mental
gradient, imposes limits given that each constitutes a currently very
active area of research in cognitive neuroscience. Nevertheless,
and despite these limitations, the main purpose of this review
was to select and consider the most relevant insights in the three
domains of expertise and to identify the common patterns of brain
changes.
As a postulate, changes in the functional or structural networks
may be expected to occur after long-term intensive skill train-
ing. Many studies exploited those changes through cross-sectional
designs to reveal group differences underpinning expert skills of
performance. However, the main issue using this approach is the
difference in individual anatomical networks before training that
could allow for predisposition in practicing a specific skill. A solu-
tion to this problem comes from longitudinal studies, which are
time-consuming and often nearly impossible if training occurs
over long time periods. Thus, in the future, the emphasis should
be the use of multimodal imaging approaches (e.g., DTI and high-
field MRI) to provide conjoint analyses of changes in activity
within specific regions and patterns of connectivity between dif-
ferent regions. Further work is still needed to better discriminate
the specific composition of training tasks that influence exper-
tise and how/when this is reflected in functional and structural
plasticity.
Although further research is needed to understand and iden-
tify the functional and structural changes protracted by expertise,
the current challenge to modulate neural plasticity for optimal
and long-term behavioral gains is now possible. The use of
real-time fMRI specifically opens a space to examine functional
changes associated with the acquisition of a motor or cogni-
tive skill, since participants have been educated to gain some
familiarity with the neuroanatomy before neurofeedback ses-
sions (Sulzer et al., 2013). Given that brain-activation patterns
and behavior are assumed to be closely linked, it seems likely
that learned control over brain activation would lead to changes
in cognition and behavior (Fetz, 2007). A growing research is
actually attempting to develop new types of task paradigms that
might benefit most from neurofeedback fMRI. This neuroimaging
technology has already demonstrated performance-enhancement
applications, such as boosting memory by increasing activation
in memory-related brain areas (Zhang et al., 2013), or improv-
ing motor imagery accuracy (de Charms et al., 2004). Likewise,
non-invasive brain stimulations such as transcranial magnetic
or direct current stimulation (TMS/tDCS) induce lasting effects
that can be used to explore the mechanisms of cortical plas-
ticity in the intact human cortex and determine therapeutic
potentials for behavioral and cognitive improvement. For exam-
ple, Marshall et al. (2004) showed that the application of tDCS
over frontal areas during slow-wave sleep contributed to improve
declarative memory consolidation. Thus, both approaches can
be applied to explore and enhance brain plasticity in the context
of expertise, and future research should certainly investigate the
synergist effects with sleep homeostatic functions. Enthusiastic
findings have already demonstrated that rTMS applied concomi-
tantly to daily motor training during 4 weeks might contribute
to improve motor performance, along with corresponding neural
plasticity in motor sequence learning networks (Narayana et al.,
2014).
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A corrigendum on
Experts bodies, experts minds: how
physical and mental training shape the
brain
by Debarnot, U., Sperduti, M., Di Rienzo,
F., and Guillot, A. (2014). Front. Hum.
Neurosci. 8:280. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2014.
00280
An important reference (Yarrow et al.,
2009) has been mistakenly omitted from
the published article.
The review uses the material of the
article by Yarrow et al. in three parts,
specifically in the section: The neurocog-
nitive basis of motor skill learning. The
sentences were, unfortunately, used and
cited verbatim without citing this impor-
tant reference. The passages concerned are
reproduced below.
“In cognitive psychology, theoretical
descriptions of changes in skilled per-
formance were shown to move from
cognitive to automatic processing (Fitts,
1964). The key concept is the increas-
ing automaticity: controlled processes
are attention demanding, conscious and
inefficient, whereas automatic processes
are rapid, smooth, effortless, require lit-
tle attentional capacity, and are difficult
to be consciously disrupted (Shiffrin and
Schneider, 1977).”
“Practically, it is not automaticity per se
that is indicative of high proficiency, but
rather the level of skill at which auto-
maticity is attained. Although the border
between the automaticity and the exper-
tise concepts beg for clarification, one
may consider that most people fail to
develop beyond a hobbyist level of per-
formance as they settle into automatic-
ity at a given level of skill that they
find enjoyable, rather than continuing to
improve skills (Ericsson, 2007). Hence,
automaticity is more a false ceiling than
a measure of excellence.”
“One solution to this issue is through
assessment of changes in speed-accuracy
trade-off functions, i.e., to defy the
speed–accuracy tradeoff for a given task
(Krakauer, 2009; Krakauer and Mazzoni,
2011). In other words, a skilled tennis
player can serve both faster and more
accurately than a novice. Thus, sport-
ing skill at the level of motor execu-
tion can be considered as acquiring a
new speed–accuracy trade-off relation-
ships for each sub-task of the motor
sequence.”
These sentences are lifted verbatim from
the study by Yarrow and collaborators
in their important review paper, which
should have therefore been cited explic-
itly. This is an individual error that
we collectively take responsibility for.
The authors apologize for their over-
sight and the unintentional inconvenience
caused.
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Musical expertise modulates preattentive neural sound discrimination. However, this
evidence up to great extent originates from paradigms using very simple stimulation. Here
we use a novel melody paradigm (revealing the auditory profile for six sound parameters
in parallel) to compare memory-related mismatch negativity (MMN) and attention-related
P3a responses recorded from non-musicians and Finnish Folk musicians. MMN emerged
in both groups of participants for all sound changes (except for rhythmic changes in
non-musicians). In Folk musicians, the MMN was enlarged for mistuned sounds when
compared with non-musicians. This is taken to reflect their familiarity with pitch information
which is in key position in Finnish folk music when compared with e.g., rhythmic
information. The MMN was followed by P3a after timbre changes, rhythm changes,
and melody transposition. The MMN and P3a topographies differentiated the groups for
all sound changes. Thus, the melody paradigm offers a fast and cost-effective means
for determining the auditory profile for music-sound encoding and also, importantly, for
probing the effects of musical expertise on it.
Keywords: musical expertise, auditory event-related potentials (ERPs), mismatch negativity (MMN), P3a, learning,
memory, involuntary attention
INTRODUCTION
Intensive music making modulates brain function and structure
quite dramatically. By comparing adult individuals with training
in music with those individuals who lack personal experience in
music making, various functional and anatomical differences have
been observed (for reviews, see Jäncke, 2009; Tervaniemi, 2009,
2012; Pantev and Herholz, 2011). In the auditory modality, these
findings indicate enhanced functions in cortical (e.g., Koelsch
et al., 1999; Pantev et al., 2001; Fujioka et al., 2004; Tervaniemi
et al., 2005; Kühnis et al., 2013) and subcortical (Musacchia et al.,
2007; Wong et al., 2007; Lee et al., 2009; Strait et al., 2009) brain
regions.
In the current context, several relevant findings have been
obtained by investigating how brain function can be adaptively
adjusted to perceive and encode musical information even when
the sounds are not in the focus of the selective attention of the
participants. Such a setting is particularly well suited for studies
on musicians since the differences in motivational background
or attentional abilities of the participants are less likely to con-
taminate the observations (Kujala et al., 2007). More specifically,
by recording the mismatch negativity (MMN) component of
the auditory event-related potentials (ERPs), we can determine
the accuracy of the auditory cortex to map the regularities of
the sound stream. The MMN is an index for the acoustical or
cognitive incongruity between various relatively constant sound
events (Näätänen et al., 2001). If the incongruity between the
most plausible sound and the encountered one is large, then the
MMN can be followed by a P3a response (Escera et al., 2000;
Friedman et al., 2001). Traditionally, it is assumed to reflect
the involuntary attention shift towards the sound input. More
recently, it has been suggested to reflect the multi-stage process
of sound evaluation which, in turn, leads into attention shift
(Schröger et al., 2013).
Originally, the MMN was first observed and extensively inves-
tigated in an oddball paradigm, consisting of two sounds with
different acoustical features (Näätänen, 1992). In other words,
within a sequence of frequent standard sounds (e.g., probability
of occurrence 0.9) infrequent deviant sounds are presented (e.g.,
with a probability of 0.1). They differ from the standard sounds,
for instance, in their frequency or in duration. However, more
recently, researchers have taken special efforts to render the stimu-
lus paradigms more ecologically valid to avoid artificially simpli-
fied paradigms. A more ecologically valid stimulation paradigm
in ERP research can, for instance, consist of short transposed
melodies with different contour or interval structure (Tervaniemi
et al., 2001; Fujioka et al., 2004; Seppänen et al., 2007), of
transposed chords differing in their mode (major/minor) (Virtala
et al., 2011, 2012, 2013), or of melodies composed for the experi-
ment (Brattico et al., 2006).
However, oddball paradigms were quite time-consuming. For
instance, to record brain responses to out-of-key and out-of-
scale stimuli subjects an EEG session of almost 1 h was required
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(Brattico et al., 2006). Most recently, MMN has been studied
using a so-called multi-feature paradigm in which deviant sounds
with different acoustic deviances alternate with standard sounds,
allowing recordings of several MMNs as fast as in 15 min
(Näätänen et al., 2004; Pakarinen et al., 2007; Partanen et al.,
2011; Vuust et al., 2011; Torppa et al., 2012). In that paradigm,
each standard sound is followed by a different deviant, sound
sequence being, for instance, Standard Deviant-Frequency Stan-
dard Deviant-Intensity Standard Deviant-Duration etc. These
sound sequences can consist of sinusoidal sound complexes
(Näätänen et al., 2004; Pakarinen et al., 2007), phonemes
(Partanen et al., 2011), or alternating piano tones (Vuust et al.,
2011; Torppa et al., 2012).
During the past 15 years, the MMN and P3a responses have
been found to differentiate musicians and non-musicians in
various acoustical and musical features such as pitch (Koelsch
et al., 1999; Brattico et al., 2001, 2009; Fujioka et al., 2004;
Marie et al., 2012), spatial sound origin (Nager et al., 2003;
Tervaniemi et al., 2006), sound omission (Rüsseler et al., 2001),
speech sound features (Kühnis et al., 2013), rhythm (Vuust et al.,
2005), and grouping (van Zuijen et al., 2004, 2005). In all these
cases, the MMN and/or P3a have been either larger and/or faster
in musicians than in non-musicians, this being considered as an
index of facilitated neural processing in musicians.
However, the majority of the studies on musical expertise are
suboptimal for two reasons. First, in these studies the sound
stimulation has lacked ecological validity. To have a full control
upon the sounds and their time of occurrence, they have been
presented one by one or as brief sound patterns. Spectrally,
they have also been relatively simple (e.g., sinusoidal tones or
chords composed of sinusoidal tones). Even the two multi-feature
paradigms utilized to study music-related brain functions have
not improved much in terms of ecological validity due to their
repetitive characteristics of the sound sequences. Thus, compared
to real music with its multitude of overlapping and temporally
successive sounds, the sound environment in the former ERP
experiments of music-related brain functions has been over-
simplified. Furthermore, the experiments have also been quite
long and thus quite demanding to some groups of participants,
particularly to children.
Second, in vast majority of the studies in the field of musical
expertise, the participating musicians have had training in West-
ern classical music (for exceptions, see Vuust et al., 2005, 2012;
Tervaniemi et al., 2006; Brattico et al., 2013). Investigating brain
basis of musical expertise in classical musicians was an excellent
starting point for the pioneering studies on musical expertise and
its brain basis. Musicians with classical orientation have relatively
well documented history in their training (e.g., amount of hours
spent in practicing) and most of them also have started their
playing quite early in age (e.g., before the age of 7). Thus it has
been feasible and fruitful to start tracing the neuroplastic effects of
musical expertise from classically trained musicians. One should
note, however, that in our current society, not all musical activities
occur in the formal training contexts of classical music. Neither
do all musicians have a musical history since their childhood. For
instance, many teenagers all over the world play in bands, some of
them even ending up to work and earn their livings as musicians
and as other professionals in the music industry, without any
formal training.
In the current paper, we wish to meet these two challenges
at once. Here we use a novel melodic multi-feature paradigm,
introduced by Putkinen et al. (2014). It is fast in practice and
has better ecological validity than previous MMN paradigms
(see below). Furthermore, because of the diversity of the current
musical scene, we broaden the selection of the musicians under
neuroscientific investigation. For us, of specific interest was to
investigate folk musicians in Finland who, in most cases, have
their first training in Western classical music but who later on turn
to highly original forms of music making. In most cases, the musi-
cal score is not very much utilized which makes the performance
include a different cognitive load within the auditory modality.
Additionally Finnish folk musicians usually perform with many
instruments, either within one instrumental family (e.g., different
types of flutes) or from several families (e.g., flutes, percussions,
string instruments with and/or without bowing with divergent
tuning systems). Thus, from the viewpoints of music perception,
cognition, and performance, the demands set by their music are
rather different from the classical orientation. As the first evi-
dence about their advanced neurocognitive processes, we recently
found that the early right anterior negativity (ERAN; triggered by
chord incongruities among Western cadences) (Koelsch, 2009) is
both quantitatively and qualitatively modulated in Finnish folk
musicians compared to previous data from musicians and non-
musicians (Brattico et al., 2013). More specifically, ERAN was
generally larger in amplitude in folk musicians compared with
non-musicians. Importantly, folk musicians showed a subsequent
P3a to the strongly-violating ending chord and their late ERAN
to mildly-violating ending tones was more prominent in folk
musicians than in non-musicians.
Here, we investigated the auditory profile of Finnish Folk
musicians using a novel melodic multi-feature paradigm lasting
less than 20 min (see Figure 1). To upgrade the traditions of
the ERP paradigms, it did not have any pauses even between
subsequent melody presentations but instead the melody was
presented in a looped manner. As introduced below, it had several
kinds of deviant sounds in terms of pitch, timbre, harmony,
and timing, ranging from low-level changes not affecting the
melody content to high-level changes modulating the course of
the successive melody. It was also transposed to 12 keys to prevent
fatigue, as well as to increase sound variation and hence ecological
validity.
METHODS
The experiment was approved by the Ethical committee of the
Faculty of Behavioural Sciences, University of Helsinki. All partic-
ipants signed an informed consent form and the study was con-
ducted according to the principles of the Declaration of Helsinki.
STIMULI
The stimuli consisted of brief melodies composed by the second
author. They are described in detail in Putkinen et al. (2014) and
briefly introduced in the following.
The sound parameters were selected on the basis of care-
ful listening of different combinations of deviances followed by
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FIGURE 1 | Stimulation paradigm. The melodies were presented while
the participants were watching a silenced movie. The upward arrows
indicate the changes in tuning (mistuning), timbre and timing (low-level
changes which did not modulate the melody). The downward arrows
indicate the changes in rhythm, melody, and key of the melody
(transposition) (high-level changes which modulated the continuation of
the melody). It was of specific interest to determine whether folk
musicians would differ from non-musicians in all of these musical features
or selectively in some of them (pitch/timbre/harmony/timing). In particular,
we hypothesized that folk musicians would show superior automatic
neural discrimination of low- and high-level features related to pitch, such
as mistuning, as a result of the emphasis given in Finnish folk music to
the melodic aspects over rhythmic ones (for details on Finnish folk music,
see Saha, 1996; Asplund et al., 2006; Brattico et al., 2013). This would
indicate that the specific features of each music genre can have their
imprints in the neural architecture of the musicians.
pilot EEG recordings. In the melodies, as the standard timbre,
digital piano tones (McGill University Master Samples) were
used to form a short melody pattern that was in accordance
with Western tonal rules and was recursively repeated. Short
melodies always started with a triad (300 ms), which was fol-
lowed by four tones of varying length and an ending tone.
There was a 50-ms gap between successive tones. The end-
ing tone was 575 ms in duration. There was also a 125 ms
gap between each melody. So, one melody lasted for 2100 ms.
The melody was presented in total for 15 min, in a looped
manner.
Six different deviant events (changes) were included in the
melodies. They are divided into low-level changes which do not
change the melody and into high-level changes which alter the
melodic contour. One melody could contain several changes. For
illustration, see Figure 1.
Low-level changes
1. Mistuning (half of a semitone upwards, 3% of the fundamental
frequency of the sound) could occur in the first, second or
fourth tone within the melody in 14% of the melodies.
2. Timbre deviant (flute instead of a piano) could occur in the
first, third or fourth tone of melodies (in 8% of the melodies).
In addition, some timbre changes occurred in the ending tone
(not analyzed here).
3. Timing delay (=100 ms silent gap) could occur in the first,
second or third tone (in 8% of the melodies). In addition, some
timing delays occurred in the ending tone (not analyzed here).
High-level changes
1. Melody modulation was presented as a pitch change of the
third or fourth tone within the melody in 12% of them. It
slightly changed the prevailing melody and endured until a
new melody modulation was introduced.
2. Rhythm modulation (=reversal of the duration of two sequen-
tial tones) could occur in the second or third tone (in 7% of
the melodies). There were thus two alternatives for rhythm
modulation, either long tone was replaced by a short one (tone
shortening) or short tone was replaced by a long tone (tone
lengthening).
3. Transposition (one semitone up or down) could occur in the
first triad (in 16% of melodies). After chord transposition
the following melodies retained the converted key until a new
chord transposition was introduced.
All high-level changes became the repeated form of the melody
in the subsequent presentations in the so-called roving-standard
fashion (Cowan et al., 1993). Thus, for example, after a mod-
ulation of the melody, the following melodies were repeated in
the modulated form. In addition, all high-level changes were
musically plausible, i.e., the resulting melody was in key and
consonant, very similar to the other variants of the melody. Corre-
spondingly, the rhythm modulations resulted in maintaining the
beat of the repeated melodies, and the melody modulations were
from 1 to 3 semitones such that they resulted in the new tones
belonging to the original key.
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PARTICIPANTS
In total, there were 28 healthy adult participants involved in EEG
recordings. Two of them were excluded from the EEG analyses,
one based on noisy EEG and another one based on unspecific
musical profile (this participant had some training in folk music
but not advanced enough to justify being a member of that group,
see below).
From the remaining 26 participants, 13 were active in learning
and performing Finnish folk music. Their mean age was 26.7 yrs
(range: 18–31 yrs, SD = 3.6), 10 of them were females. Currently
they were either actively performing artists or students of the
Sibelius Academy (Finnish university for music performance).
They had started to play, on average, at the age of 7.8 years (range:
4–25 yrs, SD = 5.8 yrs). Their instrumental choices are listed in
Table 1. Six of them named violin as the major instrument. The
rest listed kantele (2; Finnish traditional instrument resembling
Celtic harp), vocals (2), accordion, guitar, and wind instruments
as their major instrument. In total, they named 21 instruments as
their minor instruments. In this paper, these participants will be
called Folk musicians. From the remaining 13 participants, most
had not been involved in music lessons outside the school at all
(N = 10) while some had some extracurricular music activities
for 1–2 years prior to their puberty (N = 3). Their mean age was
25.1 yrs (range: 20–35 yrs, SD = 4.1), 11 of them were females. In
this paper, they will be called Non-musicians.
EXPERIMENT
Procedure
During the EEG recordings, the participants were sitting in
a dimly lit EEG chamber in a comfortable chair. They were
instructed to watch a silent nature documentary while stimuli
were presented via headphones. The EEG recording was preceded
by a 10 min session during which the participants were asked
to listen to three self-selected music samples. These data will be
reported elsewhere.
EEG recordings
The recordings were conducted in an acoustically and electromag-
netically shielded room (Euroshield Ltd., Finland) of the Institute
of Behavioural Sciences, University of Helsinki.
The EEG was recorded with BioSemi–system with a sam-
pling rate of 4096 Hz by using a 64-electrode EEG-cap and six
additional facial silver-chloride (Ag/AgCl) electrodes. They were
inserted on the mastoids, on the tip of the nose, under right eye
(for EOG monitoring) and two on EMG-related (electromyogra-
phy) sites on left cheek and over the left eyebrow. The mean value
of mastoid electrodes was used as a reference during the offline
analyses. The EOG electrode was used to extract artifacts from
the data due to eye blinks.
Hearing thresholds were determined by averaging five tests
of just-audible sounds. A volume level of 60 dB HL over the
individually determined hearing threshold was used. The sounds
were presented via headphones.
DATA ANALYSIS
In the first step of preprocessing, data were referenced to the
nose electrode, resampled to 256 Hz and, due to fast stimulation
Table 1 | Instrumental background of the Folk musicians.
Main instruments N of musicians Other instruments
Violin 6 Piano
Folk wind kantele 2 Harmonium
Vocals 2 Mandolin
Accordion 1 Guitar

















rate, filtered with 1-Hz high-pass cut-off. After this, data were
divided into epochs from −100 ms prestimulus to 600 ms post-
stimulus and individual data blocks were merged together as one
dataset. As recommended by Onton and Makeig (2006) before
independent component analysis (ICA), the removal of “non-
stereotyped” or “paroxysmal” noise, associated with non-fixed
(random) scalp projections, was obtained by rejecting epochs
based on voltage amplitudes. This voltage rejection was done with
a threshold of ±300 µV in most participants, of ±340 µV with
four participants and of ±370 µV in one participant, depending
on the quality of the data in those different experimental sessions.
This initial cleaning of the largest artifacts based on voltage
amplitudes was conducted to improve the performance of ICA
decomposition, which is known to be optimal for separating only
certain kinds of artifacts, and particularly those associated with
fixed scalp projections. The final rejection of extra-encephalic
artifacts was hence achieved with ICA, which was conducted with
the runica-algorithm of the EEGLab-software. The independent
components (IC’s) originating from eye blinks, ocular movements
and other muscle artifacts were removed manually from the data
of each individual subject. IC’s were identified based on their
topographical location, frequency power spectrum, and temporal
shape. After removing non-encephalic IC’s 25-Hz low-pass fil-
tering was done and ±100 µV voltage rejection was applied to
epochs to remove artifacts from ±100 to ±300 µV remaining
in data. Finally, all the qualified data of each single subject was
separately averaged according to the sound type (standard and the
several different deviance types).
The ERP amplitudes were quantified by first determining the
peak latencies from the grand-average difference waves separately
for each sound change (deviant) as the largest peak between
100–300 ms at Fz for MMN and between 300 and 400 ms
for P3a. After the peak definition, the amplitude values at the
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individual difference waveforms were integrated over a 40-ms
window centered at the ERP peak.
Statistical analysis
The group differences in the brain responses were tested
with separate three-way mixed-model ANOVAs with MMN/P3a
amplitudes as the dependent variables. Group (Folk/Non-
musicians) was used as a between-subject factor and Laterality
(left/midline/right) and Frontality (frontal/central/posterior) as
within-subject factors. Factor Frontality consisted of the ampli-
tude values obtained at three lines of electrodes: Frontal (F3, Fz,
F4), Central (C3, Cz, C4), Posterior (P3, Pz, P4). Factor Laterality
consisted of amplitude values as obtained at the Left (F3, C3, P3),
Middle (Fz, Cz, Pz), and Right (F4, C4, P4). Subsequently, paired
post hoc comparisons were conducted using Least Significant
Different–test.
RESULTS
Using a novel melodic multi-feature paradigm with six sound
changes (deviants) embedded within it, we show here that despite
the complexity of the stimulation both Folk musicians and Non-
musicians were able to neurally discriminate the changes from the
regular melody continuation. This was evidenced by the presence
of the MMN in both groups of participants to all other deviants
except the rhythmic modulation in non-musicians (see Table 2).
LOW-LEVEL CHANGES
Mistuning
As indicated in Figure 2, MMN to mistuning was significantly
larger in Folk musicians than in Non-musicians (Group: F(1,24) =
17.3, p < 0.0001). Moreover, it was frontally maximal and largest
at the midline (Frontality; F(2,48) = 24.1, p < 0.0001; Frontal
MMN > Posterior MMN, p < 0.0001; Laterality; F(2,48) = 5.1,
Table 2 | Two-tailed t-tests for verifying the significance of the MMN
amplitudes against the zero baseline.
Mean SD T -value df P-value
Folk musicians
Mistuning −2.7 1.1 −9.2 12 > 0.001
Timbre −3.2 1.6 −7.3 12 > 0.001
Timing delay −1.0/−1.2 1.0/2.2 −3.6/−1.9 12 = 0.003/= 0.08
Melody modulation −1.9 1.3 −5.3 12 > 0.001
Rhythm shortening −1.3 1.8 −2.4 12 = 0.03
Rhythm lengthening −1.7 1.5 −4.1 12 = 0.001
Transposition −0.7 1.0 −2.6 12 = 0.03
Non-musicians
Mistuning −0.7 0.9 −2.6 12 = 0.03
Timbre −2.6 2.0 −4.6 12 = 0.001
Timing delay −0.7/−1.4 1.4/1.5 −1.79/−3.6 12 = 0.09/= 0.004
Melody modulation −1.9 1.2 −5.9 12 < 0.001
Rhythm shortening −0.2 1.3 −0.6 12 = 0.6
Rhythm lengthening −0.7 1.3 −2.0 12 = 0.07
Transposition −0.8 0.8 −3.4 12 = 0.005
For timing delay two tests were conducted since there were two distinct peaks
observable.
FIGURE 2 | Brain responses (ERP to deviant melody subtracted from
the ERP evoked by the standard melody) in Folk musicians
(continuous line) and Non-musicians (dashed line) to Mistuning,
Timbre, and Timing delay. These changes were introduced in the melody
but they did not modulate the continuation of the melody.
p < 0.01; Midline MMN > Left MMN, p < 0.009, and Frontality
× Laterality: F(4,96) = 4.0, p = 0.01, ε = 0.7). Additionally, its
distribution was modulated by musical expertise (Frontality ×
Group; F(2,48) = 11.5, p < 0.0001), MMN being enhanced at the
frontocentral electrodes in Folk musicians (p< 0.0001).
Folk musicians were highly sensitive towards mistuning as
indicated by a significantly larger MMN when compared to that of
Non-musicians. Additionally about half of the deviants initiated
further evaluation and attentional processing of the participants
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Table 3 | Two-tailed t-tests for verifying the significance of the P3a
amplitudes against the zero baseline.
Mean SD T -value df P-value
Folk musicians
Timbre 1.4 1.8 2.8 12 = 0.02
Timing delay 1.8 1.5 4.2 12 = 0.001
Melody modulation 0.3 1.0 1.0 12 = 0.4
Rhythm lengthening 0.6 1.3 1.7 12 = 0.1
Transposition 1.5 0.9 5.8 12 < 0.001
Non-musicians
Timbre 1.9 1.7 4.1 12 = 0.001
Timing delay 3.0 1.5 7.2 12 < 0.001
Melody modulation −0.3 1.1 −1.0 12 = 0.3
Rhythm lengthening 0.2 1.0 0.8 12 = 0.4
Transposition 0.6 0.8 2.7 12 = 0.02
T-tests were not conducted for mistuning and rhythm shortening since no P3a
peaks were visible from the grand-average curves.
as evidenced by the P3a elicitation (Table 3). These and other
results are further specified below, first for low-level changes and
thereafter for high-level changes.
Timbre
MMN to timbre change was maximal at mid-central electrodes
(Frontality; F(2,48) = 16.7, p < 0.0001, ε = 0.6; central MMN >
frontal and posterior MMN, p < 0.006; Laterality: F(2,48) = 9.1,
p < 0.001; Midline MMN > Left and Right MMN, p < 0.004).
Additionally, its distribution was modulated by the musical exper-
tise (Frontality × Laterality × Group, F(4,96) = 5.2, p = 0.001).
According to post-hoc tests, in Folk musicians, the MMN over the
left hemisphere and midline electrodes was larger at frontal and
central electrodes than at posterior ones (p < 0.04). Over their
right hemisphere, the MMN was larger at central than at posterior
electrodes (p = 0.001). In contrast, in Non-musicians, the left
central MMN was larger than posterior MMN (p = 0.03), mid-
central MMN was larger than the frontal and posterior MMN
(p < 0.02 in both comparisons), and the right central MMN was
larger than the frontal MMN which, in turn, was larger than the
posterior MMN (p< 0.02 in all comparisons).
P3a to timbre change was frontally maximal and largest at the
midline (Frontality: F(2,48) = 19.9, p< 0.0001; frontal and central
P3a being larger than posterior P3a, p < 0.002 for all; Laterality:
F(2,48) = 17.5, p < 0.0001; midline P3a being larger than both left
P3a and right P3a, p < 0.0001; Laterality × Frontality: F(4,96) =
6.7, p < 0.0001). However, musical expertise did not significantly
modulate the P3a amplitude or its distribution above the scalp.
Timing delay
Timing delay elicited two subsequent MMN responses. The first
one was frontocentrally maximal (Frontality; F(2,48) = 9.0, p =
0.004, ε = 0.6, frontal and central MMN larger than posterior
MMN, p < 0.009 for all). Additionally, its distribution was mod-
ulated by the musical expertise (Laterality × Group, F(2,48) = 6.5,
p = 0.003; Frontality × Laterality × Group, F(4,96) = 4.5,
p = 0.002), with a tendency for a larger MMN in Folk musicians
over Non-musicians at the left posterior electrode site (p =
0.08). Moreover, in Folk musicians the MMN over the left
hemisphere was largest at frontal and central electrodes whereas
it was minimal at the posterior site (p = 0.006). At midline
electrodes their MMN was largest frontally and smallest pos-
teriorly (p < 0.02). Over the right hemisphere there were no
indications of frontality (p > 0.05). In Non-musicians the scalp
distribution followed a different pattern: they also showed the
MMN over the left hemisphere which was largest frontally and
smallest posteriorly (p < 0.03). Over the midline electrodes
there were no indications of frontality and, finally, over their
right hemisphere the MMN was largest centrally, smaller at the
frontal electrodes and smallest at the posterior electrodes (p <
0.05).
The second one was maximal at central electrodes (Frontality:
F(2,48) = 4.5, p = 0.04, ε = 0.7; central MMN being larger
than the frontal MMN and posterior MMN, p = 0.001 for all;
Laterality: F(2,48) = 4.7, p = 0.01; midline MMN being larger
than the left MMN, p = 0.005). Its distribution was modulated
by musical expertise (Frontality × Laterality × Group: F(4,96) =
3.3, p = 0.01), resulting from the varying pattern of frontality
between Folk musicians and Non-musicians. Folk musicians had
centrally and posteriorly larger MMN than their frontal MMN
at left and midline sites (p < 0.05 for all). Moreover, their
MMN over the right hemisphere had no indication of frontality
(p > 0.05). Non-musicians showed a broadly distributed MMN
at left sites and a central MMN which was larger than their
frontal MMN at midline sites (p = 0.01) and a central MMN
which was larger than their posterior MMN at right sites (p =
0.003).
The MMN to timing delay was followed by a P3a that was
maximal at central electrodes (Frontality: F(2,48) = 22.3, p <
0.0001; central P3a was larger than frontal P3a which, in turn,
was larger than Posterior P3a, p< 0.02 for all; Laterality: F(2,48) =
22.4, p< 0.0001; midline P3a being larger than left and right P3a,
p< 0.0001). Additionally, its scalp distribution was modulated by
musical expertise (Frontality × Laterality × Group: F(4,96) = 4.1,
p = 0.004), due to the larger P3a in Non-musicians compared to
Folk musicians over the right frontal region (p = 0.01) and left
posterior region (p< 0.05).
HIGH-LEVEL CHANGES
Melody modulation
MMN to melody modulation was maximal at mid-central elec-
trodes (see Figure 3; Frontality: F(2,48) = 21.1, p < 0.0001; frontal
and central MMN being larger than posterior MMN, p < 0.001;
Laterality: F(2,48) = 16.4, p < 0.0001; midline MMN being larger
than left and right MMN, p < 0.0001). Additionally, its distri-
bution was modulated by musical expertise (Laterality × Group:
F(2,48) = 3.9, p = 0.03). This was caused by the MMN amplitudes
which did not differ from each other between the left and right
site electrodes but which were largest at the midline region (p
< 0.05) for Folk musicians compared to other electrode sites.
For Non-musicians, the MMN was larger at the left electrodes
compared to the right ones (p = 0.02). Additionally, the left
and right MMNs were smaller than the MMN at the midline
(p < 0.006 for both comparisons). Also an interaction between
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FIGURE 3 | Brain responses to Rhythm modulation, Melody
modulation, and Transposition. These changes were introduced in the
melody and they modulated its continuation.
Laterality and Frontality was observed (F(4,96) = 5.0, p = 0.001),
deriving from larger MMN at the frontal and central electrodes
than at the posterior and lateral electrodes (p < 0.01 in all
comparisons).
Rhythm modulation: shortening of a long tone
MMN to rhythm modulation of tone shortening was maximal
at frontocentral midline electrodes (Frontality: F(2,48) = 7.5,
p = 0.007, ε = 0.6; frontal and central MMN being larger than
posterior MMN, p < 0.02; Laterality: F(2,48) = 6.4, p = 0.004;
midline MMN larger than left and right MMN, p< 0.002).
Rhythm modulation: lengthening of a short tone
MMN to rhythm modulation of tone lengthening was fronto-
centrally maximal (Frontality: F(2,48) = 4.0, p = 0.04, ε = 0.8;
Frontal and Central MMN > Posterior MMN) and modulated
by musical expertise (Frontality × Group: F(2,48) = 7.4, p =
0.002). This resulted from larger MMN above the frontal and
central electrodes (vs. posterior ones) in Folk musicians only
(p < 0.002 for both) and small uniformly distributed MMN in
Non-musicians (p > 0.05 in all comparisons).
Transposition
In both groups, MMN to transposition was maximal at the
frontal electrodes (Frontality; F(2,48) = 12.1, p < 0.0001, ε = 0.7;
frontal and central MMN being larger than posterior MMN, p <
0.001). P3a to transposition was maximal at frontocentral midline
electrodes (Frontality: F(2,48) = 25.6, p < 0.0001, ε = 0.8; frontal
and central P3a larger than posterior P3a, p < 0.0001; Laterality:
F(2,48) = 3.4, p = 0.04; midline P3a larger than left and right P3a,
p < 0.03). It was modulated by musical expertise (Frontality ×
Group: F(2,48) = 7.5, p = 0.001; Frontality × Laterality × Group:
F(4,96) = 3.0, p = 0.02): In post-hoc analyses, Folk musicians
showed a larger P3a overall at frontal electrodes (p = 0.008)
and at the left central electrode (p = 0.03) when compared with
Non-musicians.
DISCUSSION
In the present study, we use the novel melodic multi-feature
paradigm for investigating the brain basis of early musical sound
encoding using the MMN and P3a components of the audi-
tory ERPs. We composed a short melody with several changes
embedded in it (Figure 1). “Low-level” changes in timbre, tun-
ing, and timing interspersed the regular melody content, but
were not included in the continued melody. In contrast, “high-
level” changes in melody contour, rhythm, and key modified
the continuation of the melody. The melody was presented in
a looped fashion without any pauses between the subsequent
melodies. Half of our participants were professional musicians
with professional-level expertise in current Finnish folk music.
According to the present results, the training in folk music is
especially reflected in the brain encoding of pitch, as evidenced
by larger MMN for mistuning observed in Folk musicians than
in Non-musicians. Moreover, all changes evoked MMN or P3a
responses with different scalp distributions in Folk musicians
than in Non-musicians implying that the brain dynamics can be
relatively broadly modulated by the music activities. Importantly,
we also show here that this novel melodic multi-feature paradigm
provides an excellent tool for revealing the auditory neurocogni-
tive profile of musically non-trained adults.
To specify the results further, the MMN and P3a responses
were enhanced or generated with slightly different brain archi-
tectures in Folk musicians and in non-musicians. These effects
of musical expertise were most obvious for pitch information in
terms of enhanced MMN specifically to mistuning in Folk musi-
cians. This finding coincides and upgrades our previous results
which indicated that Folk musicians encode chord cadences in a
very unique manner (Brattico et al., 2013): in addition to gener-
ally enhanced early anterior negativity (ERAN) around 200 ms,
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Folk musicians had subsequent late ERAN and P3a responses
as a function of the given inappropriate chord position. More
specifically, Folk musicians showed a subsequent P3a only to the
strongly-violating ending chord and a late ERAN in response to
the milder chord violation at the fifth position (where it violated
less the expectations of the listeners). Since in Brattico et al. (2013)
the ERAN was recorded in a semiattentive paradigm when the
participants were instructed to detect timbre-deviant chords (but
not inappropriate chord functions), those results, however, leave
it open as to whether the auditory sensitivity of Folk musicians
exists already at the pre-attentive stage of processing. Even if
the current study does not allow us to completely rule out the
involvement of involuntary attentional functions either (espe-
cially for deviances in timbre, timing, and transposition as they
were followed by P3a responses) particularly mistuned sounds
seem to be encoded without the triggering of involuntary atten-
tion. This further strengthens the conclusion about a parameter
(pitch, harmony) specific enhancement of sound processing in
Folk musicians.
Notably, pitch is a pivotal dimension in Finnish folk music.
Similarly to folk music in other parts of the world, Finnish folk
music stresses the importance of improvisation and variation
of a motif by adding grace notes or various kinds of auxiliary
notes (Saha, 1996). These pitch-based features are partly a con-
sequence of the independence of folk music from musical scores:
most folk tunes are transmitted from generation to generation
through performance practice and memory rather than written
scores. Moreover, Finnish folk music is often monophonic or
heterophonic, with contemporary variations of the same lines of
music played according to the idiomatic characteristics associated
with the performance of a particular instrument (Asplund et al.,
2006). For instance, music played by the kantele is repeated and
varied particularly in the melody and harmony dimensions (Saha,
1996). Hence, our findings of pitch-specific enhancements of
ERP responses contribute to the growing literature on auditory
neuroplasticity specific to the idiosyncratic practices of a musical
style (see below).
Previously, parameter-specific pre-attentive enhancement of
sound processing has been evidenced among classical musicians
for timbre (trumpet vs. violin players) (Pantev et al., 2001) and
spatial sound origin (conductors vs. pianists) (Nager et al., 2003).
It was also shown for pitch (Koelsch et al., 1999) in violin
players without being generalizable for other instrumentalists
(Tervaniemi et al., 2005). Correspondingly, it was shown for
spatial sound origin and intensity in rock musicians (Tervaniemi
et al., 2006) and, among other sound features, also for rhythmic
changes and pitch glides in jazz musicians (Vuust et al., 2005,
2012). Together with the current MMN data and previously
introduced ERAN evidence (Brattico et al., 2013), we are tempted
to conclude that the sound parameters which are of most impor-
tance in a given musical genre or which became most familiar
during the training history (e.g., timbre of one’s own instrument)
become particularly sensitively processed during the course of the
musicians’ training history. This line of reasoning is supported by
the current finding with regard to the rhythm MMN which, in
contrast to pitch MMN, was enhanced in Folk musicians when
compared with non-musicians only when tones were lengthened
but not when they were shortened. In other words, rhythmic
modulation was not encoded by Folk musicians in great detail.
This is not a surprise when keeping in mind the special char-
acteristics of Finnish folk music as described above. In contrast,
rhythm MMN did differentiate jazz musicians and non-musicians
in a pioneering MMNm study (Vuust et al., 2005). In jazz, very
fine-grained modulations in the timing of the performance carry
high importance in expressivity of music.
Yet, without a large cross-sectional study systematically com-
paring musicians from several genres (e.g., classical, jazz, rock,
folk) using a same stimulation paradigm such a conclusion should
be considered only as a tentative one. By such a laborious pro-
cedure one would obtain reliable information only about the
current functionality of the auditory encoding in these musicians.
It is noteworthy that even then the outcome of such a cross-
sectional study conducted in adult musicians would not reveal
whether the resulting auditory profile reflects the auditory encod-
ing abilities as they were prior to commencement of play, or
their maturation, and enhanced development due to training in
music, or their combination. Therefore, there is an urgent need
for longitudinal projects on children who are either involved in
musical programs (musically active children) or in other training
programs of comparative intensity and content but without a
musical aspect (control children). Only those can reveal the rela-
tionship between the original auditory encoding accuracy and its
further development, for instance, in terms of sound parameters
that are unequally important in musical genres and instrument
families. First of study along these lines was recently conducted
by Putkinen et al. (2014). According to those results, the children
actively training to play classical music displayed larger MMNs
than control children for the melody modulations by the age 13
and for the rhythm modulations, timbre deviants and slightly
mistuned tones already at the age of 11. At the onset of the study
when children were 9 years old, there were no group differences.
Thus, the current paradigm is also sensitive with regard to the
development of the neural sound discrimination during musical
training.
Methodologically, the current paradigm provides a
novel means for determining the integrity of the auditory
neurocognition simultaneously for six acoustical and musical
parameters. It thus updates the tradition initiated by the
multi-feature paradigm, which used isolated sinusoidal or
speech-sound stimulation (Näätänen et al., 2004; Pakarinen et al.,
2007; Partanen et al., 2011). Recently, the multi-feature paradigm
was also successfully extended into fast musical MMN paradigm
using instrumental sounds in a harmonic accompaniment setting
(Vuust et al., 2011, 2012). The current paradigm is an upgrade of
that since it includes both low- and high-level deviances, which
either preserve or modify the melody. In parallel, one should not
ignore previous initiatives to use more ecologically valid music-
like stimuli in MMN studies (see, e.g., Tervaniemi et al., 2001;
Fujioka et al., 2004, 2005; van Zuijen et al., 2004; Brattico et al.,
2006; Virtala et al., 2012, 2013). Even if those included a more
limited number of deviances than the more recent multi-feature
paradigms, they were able to reveal novel information regarding
preattentive encoding of musically relevant sound-attributes both
in musically trained and in non-trained groups of participants.
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Highly promisingly, we show here that despite the complexity
of the melodic multi-feature paradigm, the MMN could also be
observed at the group level in non-musicians for all deviances
except rhythm modulation. Moreover, the paradigm has been
successfully used also in child recordings (Putkinen et al., 2014).
Thus, in the future, auditory profiles of child and adult partic-
ipants can be probed during the whole life span with various
multi-features paradigms using sinusoidal, linguistic, and musical
stimulation entities approaching natural sound environments as
present in everyday life.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We thank Ms. Tiina Tupala, M.A. (Psych) for the data acquisition
and Mr. Hannu Loimo, M.Sc. (Tech.) for help with the data
analyses. Technical assistance provided by Mr. Tommi Makkonen,
M.Sc. (Tech.), is also warmly acknowledged.
REFERENCES
Asplund, A., Hoppu, P., Laitinen, H., Leisiö, T., Saha, H., and Westerholm, S.
(2006). Suomen Musiikin Historia. Kansanmusiikki. Porvoo: WSOY.
Brattico, E., Näätänen, R., and Tervaniemi, M. (2001). Context effects on pitch per-
ception in musicians and nonmusicians: evidence from event-related potential
recordings. Music Percept. 19, 1–24. doi: 10.1525/mp.2001.19.2.199
Brattico, E., Pallesen, K. J., Varyagina, O., Bailey, C., Anourova, I., Järvenpää, M.,
et al. (2009). Neural discrimination of nonprototypical chords in music experts
and laymen: an MEG study. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 21, 2230–2244. doi: 10.1162/jocn.
2008.21144
Brattico, E., Tervaniemi, M., Näätänen, R., and Peretz, I. (2006). Musical scale
properties are automatically processed in the human auditory cortex. Brain Res.
1117, 162–174. doi: 10.1016/j.brainres.2006.08.023
Brattico, E., Tupala, T., Glerean, E., and Tervaniemi, M. (2013). Modulated brain
processing of Western harmony in folk musicians. Psychophysiology 50, 653–663.
doi: 10.1111/psyp.12049
Cowan, N., Winkler, I., Teder, W., and Näätänen, R. (1993). Memory prerequisites
of the mismatch negativity in the auditory event-related potential (ERP).
J. Exp. Psychol. Learn. Mem. Cogn. 19, 909–921. doi: 10.1037//0278-7393.
19.4.909
Escera, C., Alho, K., Schröger, E., and Winkler, I. (2000). Involuntary attention and
distractibility as evaluated with event-related potentials. Audiol. Neurootol. 5,
151–166. doi: 10.1159/000013877
Friedman, D., Cycowicz, Y. M., and Gaeta, H. (2001). The novelty P3: an event-
related brain potential (ERP) sign of the brain’s evaluation of novelty. Neurosci.
Biobehav. Rev. 25, 355–373. doi: 10.1016/s0149-7634(01)00019-7
Fujioka, T., Trainor, L., Ross, B., Kakigi, R., and Pantev, C. (2004). Musical training
enhances automatic encoding of melodic contour and interval structure. J. Cogn.
Neurosci. 16, 1010–1021. doi: 10.1162/0898929041502706
Fujioka, T., Trainor, L. J., Ross, B., Kakigi, R., and Pantev, C. (2005). Automatic
encoding of polyphonic melodies in musicians and nonmusicians. J. Cogn.
Neurosci. 17, 1578–1592. doi: 10.1162/089892905774597263
Jäncke, L. (2009). The plastic human brain. Restor. Neurol. Neurosci. 27, 521–538.
doi: 10.3233/RNN-2009-0519
Koelsch, S. (2009). Music-syntactic processing and auditory memory: similari-
ties and differences between ERAN and MMN. Psychophysiology 46, 179–190.
doi: 10.1111/j.1469-8986.2008.00752.x
Koelsch, S., Schröger, E., and Tervaniemi, M. (1999). Superior attentive and pre-
attentive auditory processing in musicians. Neuroreport 10, 1309–1313. doi: 10.
1097/00001756-199904260-00029
Kühnis, J., Elmer, S., Meyer, M., and Jäncke, L. (2013). The encoding of vowels and
temporal speech cues in the auditory cortex of professional musicians: an EEG
study. Neuropsychologia 51, 1608–1618. doi: 10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2013.
04.007
Kujala, T., Tervaniemi, M., and Schröger, E. (2007). The mismatch negativity in
cognitive and clinical neuroscience: theoretical and methodological considera-
tions. Biol. Psychol. 74, 1–19. doi: 10.1016/j.biopsycho.2006.06.001
Lee, K. M., Skoe, E., Kraus, N., and Ashley, R. (2009). Selective subcortical
enhancement of musical intervals in musicians. J. Neurosci. 29, 5832–5840.
doi: 10.1523/jneurosci.6133-08.2009
Marie, C., Kujala, T., and Besson, M. (2012). Musical and linguistic expertise
influence pre-attentive and attentive processing of non-speech sounds. Cortex
48, 447–457. doi: 10.1016/j.cortex.2010.11.006
Musacchia, G., Sams, M., Skoe, E., and Kraus, N. (2007). Musicians have enhanced
subcortical auditory and audiovisual processing of speech and music. Proc. Natl.
Acad. Sci. U S A 104, 15894–15898. doi: 10.1073/pnas.0701498104
Näätänen, R. (1992). Attention and Brain Function. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence
Erlbaum Associates.
Näätänen, R., Pakarinen, S., Rinne, T., and Takegata, R. (2004). The mismatch
negativity (MMN): towards the optimal paradigm. Clin. Neurophysiol. 115, 140–
144. doi: 10.1016/j.clinph.2003.04.001
Näätänen, R., Tervaniemi, M., Sussman, E., Paavilainen, P., and Winkler, I. (2001).
‘Primitive intelligence’ in the auditory cortex. Trends Neurosci. 24, 283–288.
doi: 10.1016/s0166-2236(00)01790-2
Nager, W., Kohlmetz, C., Altenmüller, E., Rodriguez-Fornells, A., and Münte, T.
(2003). The fate of sounds in conductor’s brains: an ERP study. Cogn. Brain Res.
17, 83–93. doi: 10.1016/s0926-6410(03)00083-1
Onton, J., and Makeig, S. (2006). Information-based modeling of event-
related brain dynamics. Prog. Brain Res. 159, 99–120. doi: 10.1016/s0079-
6123(06)59007-7
Pakarinen, S., Takegata, R., Rinne, T., Huotilainen, M., and Näätänen, R. (2007).
Measurement of extensive auditory discrimination profiles using the mismatch
negativity (MMN) of the auditory event-related potential (ERP). Clin. Neuro-
physiol. 118, 177–185. doi: 10.1016/j.clinph.2006.09.001
Pantev, C., and Herholz, S. C. (2011). Plasticity of the human auditory cortex
related to musical training. Neurosci. Biobehav. Rev. 35, 2140–2154. doi: 10.
1016/j.neubiorev.2011.06.010
Pantev, C., Roberts, L., Schulz, M., Engelien, A., and Ross, B. (2001). Timbre-
specific enhancement of auditory cortical representations in musicians. Neu-
roreport 12, 169–174. doi: 10.1097/00001756-200101220-00041
Partanen, E., Vainio, M., Kujala, T., and Huotilainen, M. (2011). Linguistic
multifeature MMN paradigm for extensive recording of auditory discrimina-
tion profiles. Psychophysiology 48, 1372–1380. doi: 10.1111/j.1469-8986.2011.
01214.x
Putkinen, V., Tervaniemi, M., Saarikivi, K., de Vent, N., and Huotilainen, M. (2014).
Investigating the effects of musical training on functional brain development
with a novel melodic MMN paradigm. Neurobiol. Learn. Mem. 110, 8–15.
doi: 10.1016/j.nlm.2014.01.007
Rüsseler, J., Altenmüller, E., Nager, W., Kohlmetz, C., and Münte, T. F. (2001).
Event-related brain potentials to sound omissions differ in musicians and non-
musicians. Neurosci. Lett. 308, 33–36. doi: 10.1016/s0304-3940(01)01977-2
Saha, H. (1996). Kansanmusiikin Tyyli ja Muuntelu. Kaustinen: Kansanmusiikki-
instituutin julkaisuja.
Schröger, E., Bendixen, A., Denham, S. L., Mill, R. W., Bohm, T. M., and Winkler, I.
(2013). Predictive regularity representations in violation detection and auditory
stream segregation: from conceptual to computational models. Brain Topogr.
doi: 10.1007/s10548-013-0334-6. [Epub ahead of print].
Seppänen, M., Brattico, E., and Tervaniemi, M. (2007). Practice strategies of
musicians modulate neural processing and the learning of sound-patterns.
Neurobiol. Learn. Mem. 87, 236–247. doi: 10.1016/j.nlm.2006.08.011
Strait, D. L., Kraus, N., Skoe, E., and Ashley, R. (2009). Musical experience
and neural efficiency: effects of training on subcortical processing of vocal
expressions of emotion. Eur. J. Neurosci. 29, 661–668. doi: 10.1111/j.1460-9568.
2009.06617.x
Tervaniemi, M. (2009). Musicians – same or different? Ann. N Y Acad. Sci. 1169,
151–156. doi: 10.1111/j.1749-6632.2009.04591.x
Tervaniemi, M. (2012). “Musicianship – how and where in the brain?” in Musi-
cal Imaginations: Multidisciplinary Perspectives on Creativity, Performance and
Perception, eds D. Hargreaves, D. Miell and R. MacDonald (Oxford: Oxford
University Press), 285–295.
Tervaniemi, M., Castaneda, A., Knoll, M., and Uther, M. (2006). Sound processing
in amateur musicians and nonmusicians – event-related potential and behav-
ioral indices. Neuroreport 17, 1225–1228. doi: 10.1097/01.wnr.0000230510.
55596.8b
Tervaniemi, M., Just, V., Koelsch, S., Widmann, A., and Schröger, E. (2005).
Pitch-discrimination accuracy in musicians vs. non-musicians: an event-related
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org July 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 496 | 89
Tervaniemi et al. Auditory profile of musical expertise
potential and behavioral study. Exp. Brain Res. 161, 1–10. doi: 10.1007/s00221-
004-2044-5
Tervaniemi, M., Rytkönen, M., Schröger, E., Ilmoniemi, R. J., and Näätänen, R.
(2001). Superior formation of cortical memory traces for melodic patterns in
musicians. Learn. Mem. 8, 295–300. doi: 10.1101/lm.39501
Torppa, R., Salo, E., Makkonen, T., Loimo, H., Pykäläinen, J., Lipsanen, J.,
et al. (2012). Cortical processing of musical sounds in children with cochlear
implants. Clin. Neurophysiol. 123, 1966–1979. doi: 10.1016/j.clinph.2012.03.008
van Zuijen, T., Sussman, E., Winkler, I., Näätänen, R., and Tervaniemi, M.
(2004). Grouping of sequential sounds–an event-related potential study com-
paring musicians and nonmusicians. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 16, 331–338. doi: 10.
1162/089892904322984607
van Zuijen, T., Sussman, E., Winkler, I., Näätänen, R., and Tervaniemi, M. (2005).
Auditory organization of sound sequences by a temporal or numerical regularity
– a mismatch negativity study sounds comparing musicians and non-musicians.
Brain Res. Cogn. Brain Res. 23, 270–276. doi: 10.1016/j.cogbrainres.2004.10.007
Virtala, P., Berg, V., Kivioja, M., Purhonen, J., Salmenkivi, M., Paavilainen, P., et al.
(2011). The preattentive processing of major vs. minor chords in the human
brain. An event-related potential study. Neurosci. Lett. 487, 406–410. doi: 10.
1016/j.neulet.2010.10.066
Virtala, P., Huotilainen, M., Partanen, E., Fellman, V., and Tervaniemi, M. (2013).
Newborn infants’ auditory system is sensitive to Western music chord categories.
Front. Psychol. 4:492. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00492
Virtala, P., Putkinen, V., Huotilainen, M., Makkonen, T., and Tervaniemi, M.
(2012). Musical training facilitates the neural discrimination of major versus
minor chords in 13-year-old children. Psychophysiology 49, 1125–1132. doi: 10.
1111/j.1469-8986.2012.01386.x
Vuust, P., Brattico, E., Glerean, E., Seppänen, M., Pakarinen, S., Tervaniemi, M.,
et al. (2011). New fast MMN paradigm for determining the neural prerequisites
for musical ability. Cortex 47, 1091–1098. doi: 10.1016/j.cortex.2011.
04.026
Vuust, P., Brattico, E., Seppänen, M., Näätänen, R., and Tervaniemi, M. (2012).
The sound of music: differentiating musicians using a fast, musical multi-feature
mismatch negativity paradigm. Neuropsychologia 50, 1432–1443. doi: 10.1016/j.
neuropsychologia.2012.02.028
Vuust, P., Pallesen, K. J., Bailey, C., van Zuijen, T., Gjedde, A., Roepstorff, A., et al.
(2005). To musicians, the message is in the meter. Neuroimage 24, 560–564.
doi: 10.1016/j.neuroimage.2004.08.039
Wong, P. C., Skoe, E., Russo, N. M., Dees, T., and Kraus, N. (2007). Musical
experience shapes human brainstem encoding of linguistic pitch patterns. Nat.
Neurosci. 10, 420–422. doi: 10.1038/nn1872
Conflict of Interest Statement: The authors declare that the research was conducted
in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed
as a potential conflict of interest.
Received: 03 April 2014; paper pending published: 09 May 2014; accepted: 18 June
2014; published online: 07 July 2014.
Citation: Tervaniemi M, Huotilainen M and Brattico E (2014) Melodic multi-feature
paradigm reveals auditory profiles in music-sound encoding. Front. Hum. Neurosci.
8:496. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2014.00496
This article was submitted to the journal Frontiers in Human Neuroscience.
Copyright © 2014 Tervaniemi, Huotilainen and Brattico. This is an open-access article
distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY).
The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the
original author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original publication in this
journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution
or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org July 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 496 | 90
“fnhum-07-00926” — 2014/1/7 — 11:07 — page 1 — #1
ORIGINAL RESEARCH ARTICLE
published: 07 January 2014
doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2013.00926
Music practice is associated with development of working
memory during childhood and adolescence
Sissela Bergman Nutley*, Fahimeh Darki andTorkel Klingberg
Neuroscience Department, Developmental Cognitive Neuroscience, Karolinska Institutet, Stockholm, Sweden
Edited by:
Merim Bilalic, University Tübingen –
University Clinic, Germany
Reviewed by:
E. Glenn Schellenberg, University of
Toronto, Canada







SE-171 77 Stockholm, Sweden
e-mail: sisselanutley@gmail.com
Practicing a musical instrument is associated with cognitive benefits and structural brain
changes in correlational and interventional trials; however, the effect of musical training on
cognition during childhood is still unclear. In this longitudinal study of child development
we analyzed the association between musical practice and performance on reasoning,
processing speed and working memory (WM) during development. Subjects (n = 352)
between the ages of 6 and 25 years participated in neuropsychological assessments and
neuroimaging investigations (n = 64) on two or three occasions, 2 years apart. Mixed
model regression showed that musical practice had an overall positive association with
WM capacity (visuo-spatial WM, F = 4.59, p = 0.033, verbal WM, F = 9.69, p = 0.002),
processing speed, (F = 4.91, p = 0.027) and reasoning (Raven’s progressive matrices,
F = 28.34, p < 0.001) across all three time points, after correcting for the effect of parental
education and other after school activities. Music players also had larger gray matter volume
in the temporo-occipital and insular cortex (p = 0.008), areas previously reported to be
related to musical notation reading. The change in WM between the time points was
proportional to the weekly hours spent on music practice for both WM tests (VSWM,
β = 0.351, p = 0.003, verbal WM, β = 0.261, p = 0.006) but this was not significant
for reasoning ability (β = 0.021, p = 0.090). These effects remained when controlling for
parental education and other after school activities. In conclusion, these results indicate
that music practice positively affects WM development and support the importance of
practice for the development of WM during childhood and adolescence.
Keywords: musical practice, working memory, reasoning, cognitive development, gray matter volume
INTRODUCTION
Previous research on practice on specific skills demonstrates
domain specific expertise, whether it be within the field of chess,
memorizing numbers, or dance, with little or no transfer evident of
this superiority to other tasks (Ericsson and Lehmann, 1996). This
is explained by the use of material specific strategies, schemas, and
automatization of the procedures being performed (Ericsson et al.,
2006). However, the development of such strategies requires abili-
ties considered to be executive functions such as working memory
(WM), updating, monitoring of performance, etc. In the emerg-
ing field of cognitive training, targeted interventions aim to train
these types of cognitive abilities, with WM being the most stud-
ied to date. The most effective of these paradigms often shows
large effects on the trained ability and moderate effects on closely
related abilities after as little as 5 weeks of computerized train-
ing (for a review, see Klingberg, 2010). This is of importance for
theoretical and clinical reasons where a particular ability is defi-
cient. A different way of achieving cognitive enhancement may be
to target the entire bodily system through physical training where
such effects have been observed (Hillman et al., 2008; Hotting and
Roder, 2013). Yet another way to achieve this may be to regularly
engage in a complex activity that requires one to use higher order
thinking, such as playing a musical instrument.
Formal music practice involves several cognitively challeng-
ing elements, e.g., long periods of controlled attention, keeping
musical passages in WM or encoding them into long-term mem-
ory, decoding music scores, and translating the product into
corresponding motor commands. This type of activity taxes com-
plex cognitive functions as seen in brain imaging research (Schon
et al., 2002; Stewart et al., 2003). Other investigations suggest that
music practice is associated with cognitive benefits (for a review,
see Schellenberg and Weiss, 2013).
Associations between formal music training and cognitive abil-
ity have mostly been reported in retrospective studies of musicians
and non-musicians (Schellenberg, 2006; Forgeard et al., 2008;
Ruthsatz et al., 2008). Individuals practicing music demonstrate
higher performance in tasks requiring visuo-spatial reasoning
(Hurwitz et al., 1975; Rauscher et al., 1997; Bilhartz et al., 1999;
Costa-Giomi, 1999; Schellenberg, 2004, 2006; Forgeard et al., 2008;
Ruthsatz et al., 2008), processing speed (Schellenberg, 2006; Bugos
et al., 2007) as well as WM (Schellenberg, 2006; Bugos et al., 2007;
Pallesen et al., 2010). These effects point to a quite general cognitive
advantage for music players compared with non-music players.
There are also reports of associations between the number of
months of music practice and academic performance in math,
reading and spelling after controlling for general intelligence and
parental education (Schellenberg, 2006), although these findings
are not always consistent (Forgeard et al., 2008). A recent study
also reported a positive association between music practice and
grades in practically all school subjects in three separate grades
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(Cabanac et al., 2013). A reoccurring question in retrospective
correlation studies is whether the differences reported in musi-
cally trained individuals predate their music training or appear as
a consequence of it. There are however, a few prospective random-
ized controlled studies suggesting a causal relation between music
and cognitive ability demonstrated with measures of processing
speed and WM (Bugos et al., 2007) as well as on full scale IQ
(Schellenberg, 2004).
Extensive music training is known to affect the anatomy of
the brain, with greater gray matter volumes observed in motor-
related areas (Elbert et al., 1995; Pascual-Leone, 2001; Hyde et al.,
2009), auditory discrimination areas (Gaser and Schlaug, 2003;
Hyde et al., 2009) as well as greater white matter volumes in motor
tracts (Bengtsson et al., 2005) in professional musicians. Whilst
few studies have been carried out to understand the neurophysio-
logical effects of music training on cognitive abilities there is some
evidence to suggest an absence of pre-existing difference in music-
related brain functions prior to learning an instrument (Norton
et al., 2005), with differences emerging approximately 1 year after
music training has commenced (Schlaug et al., 2005; Hyde et al.,
2009).
Over the past decade, it has been clearly demonstrated
that certain cognitive abilities are susceptible to targeted train-
ing. For instance, WM capacity has been shown to improve
with as little as 5 weeks of cognitive training (Klingberg et al.,
2002, 2005; Westerberg et al., 2007; Holmes et al., 2009; Thorell
et al., 2009; Bergman Nutley et al., 2011; Brehmer et al., 2012;
Green et al., 2012). The neural effects of this type of training
have been studied with functional magnetic resonance imag-
ing (fMRI), revealing increased prefrontal and parietal activity
(Hempel et al., 2004; Olesen et al., 2004; Jolles et al., 2010). Other
studies have reported gains in fluid intelligence after training WM
(Klingberg et al., 2002, 2005; Jaeggi et al., 2008) or non-verbal rea-
soning (Bergman Nutley et al., 2011; Mackey et al., 2011), although
the transfer effects from WM to reasoning tests are smaller
and inconsistent across studies compared to the effect on WM
(Holmes et al., 2009; Thorell et al., 2009). Studies also show that
processing speed is susceptible to computerized training improve-
ments (Mackey et al., 2011; Wolinsky et al., 2013). There is also
emerging evidence, although with mixed results thus far, that
WM training may affect academic performance with improve-
ments in mathematical problem solving (Holmes et al., 2009) and
reading comprehension reported (Dahlin, 2010; Egeland et al.,
2013). If causality can be established between music training
and its association with cognitive and academic benefits, then
music training should perhaps be considered a type of cognitive
training.
To date, the specific aspects of musical training that affect
cognitive improvements have not been identified. One candidate
factor is the practice of sight reading. The complexity of sight
reading requires rapid (and for some instruments dual) informa-
tion processing, visuo-spatial decoding, and constant updating of
notes to come while playing current notes. In other words, sight
reading requires visuo-spatial WM abilities. Sight reading shows
correlations with both IQ (r = 0.6; Salis, 1978) and with WM
(r = 0.3–0.4; Salis, 1978; Meinz and Hambrick, 2010). Brain acti-
vation studies during sight reading have shown occipito-temporal
and parietal activations (Nakada et al., 1998; Schon et al., 2002;
Stewart et al., 2003; Bengtsson and Ullen, 2006), areas typically
involved in visuo-spatial abilities (dorsal-stream) and pattern
recognition.
While data suggest that there is a link between music prac-
tice and cognitive ability, it has not been ascertained how music
training affects cognitive abilities during development. One fac-
tor expected to be of importance for the effect is the time spent
training (Schellenberg, 2006; Forgeard et al., 2008), although some
studies have failed to find a relation between the number of music
lessons and cognitive ability (Ruthsatz et al., 2008; Meinz and
Hambrick, 2010).
Most studies have thus far either had small sample sizes
(Rauscher et al., 1997; Gromko and Poorman, 1998; Bilhartz
et al., 1999; Schlaug et al., 2005; Bugos et al., 2007) or have sim-
ply correlated music and cognitive ability in natural samples
at one time point providing no information about causality
(Schellenberg, 2006; Forgeard et al., 2008; Ruthsatz et al., 2008).
To test if music training is associated with differential trajectories
of the development of different cognitive functions, longitudinal
designs on developing populations could be useful. This study
aimed to investigate the effects of music training on WM, process-
ing speed, and reasoning ability in a longitudinal developmental
sample.
By using a longitudinal approach we can study the change in
cognitive ability related to musical practice, controlling for initial
cognitive performance, age, and other possible confounders. More
specifically we hypothesize that music training will be associated
with: (1) over all positive cognitive effects as seen in perfor-
mance on neuropsychological tests of WM, processing speed and
reasoning ability (primary outcomes) as well as on tests of math-
ematical and reading ability (secondary outcomes) across time
points, (2) a dose-related development of cognitive and academic
ability (as seen with the same outcomes as in hypothesis 1) between
time points, i.e., a positive linear relation between the amount of
practice and the magnitude of the cognitive and academic benefits,
(3) structural differences in the brain between music players and
non-music players across the three time points.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
This study used a longitudinal design with three completed mea-
surement points, T1, T2, and T3 collected in 2007, 2009, and
2011, respectively. Participants between the ages of 6 and 25 were
randomly chosen from the population registry in the town of
Nynäshamn, Sweden. At each time point, information regard-
ing the study was sent out to the parents together with a consent
form to be returned to the researchers upon agreement. Parents
were then contacted by telephone and given an opportunity to
ask questions. Participants aged 18 years and older were con-
tacted directly. At T1, 339 subjects participated in the study, out
of which 273 also participated at T2 and 65 at T3. Exclusion cri-
teria were: a first language other than Swedish, any diagnosis of
psychiatric or neurological disorder (with exception to ADHD or
dyslexia), any vision or hearing impairment considered to affect
the test-performance. The study was approved by the local ethics
committee in Stockholm. A subset of the sample where also asked
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to participate in neuroimaging data collection (see Table 1 for
sample sizes).
COGNITIVE TESTS
Neuropsychological assessment and questionnaires were adminis-
tered at T1, T2, and T3. The tests were administered individually
in different schools in a separate, quiet room. The questionnaire
was sent to the participant’s homes, covering information regard-
ing after school activities and socio-economic background. Raw
data from the assessments are found in Table 1.
In order to assess visuo-spatial WM, the Dot matrix from the
Automated Working Memory Assessment (AWMA) battery was
used (Alloway, 2007). This is a simple WM task and involves
remembering the location and order of dots displayed sequen-
tially in a grid on a computer screen. The dots were displayed in
red in a four-by-four grid on a white background. Each dot was
presented for 1000 ms, with an intra-stimulus interval of 500 ms.
Each level consisted of six trials, with four correct trials as the min-
imum required for moving to the next level, where the number of
dots to be remembered increased by one item. The test terminated
after three errors were committed on one level. The Dot matrix
test was performed on a HP Compaq nc6320 laptop with a 15-in
screen.
Backward digit recall was used to assess verbal WM (Alloway,
2007). This test requires the participant to repeat a list of numbers
read out loud in reverse order and started with two digits. Dif-
ficulty level increased until the participant failed to pass a level.
Each level consisted of six trials. Four correct trials were required
to move on to the next level.
Speed of processing was measured using a letter–digit
substitution task. In this task, the participants were shown a row
with nine consonants, each paired with a number. Underneath,
nine additional rows of 15 letters were presented with the num-
bers absent. The task was to pair as many numbers with their
corresponding letter as possible during a 1 min period.
Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices (Raven, 2003) was used
to assess non-verbal reasoning. The test consists of matrices in
black and white distributed over sets A–D for the 6-year-olds and
A–E for the rest, with 12 items in each set. The task was to identify
the completing piece to a matrix, having a choice of 6 in sets
A–B and a choice of 8 in sets C–E. Because the items performed
differed between individuals in the sample the outcome underwent
item response theory modeling where the performance of each
participant was converted into a standardized score which was
used as the outcome measure.
ACADEMIC TESTS (AGES 8–25)
The arithmetical assessment was based on the Trends in Mathe-
matics and Science Study (Martin et al., 2004) and Basic Number
Screening Test (Gillham and Hesse, 2001), having been designed
for four school-grade-dependent versions (grades 2, 4, 6, and 8,
suitable for 14–27-year-olds). Grades 2 and 4 problems included
magnitude judgments, questions about the number sequence, as
well as elementary arithmetic (addition, subtraction, division,
multiplication, and fractions). Grades 6 and 8 problems included
elementary arithmetic and elementary algebra (simple equations
with variables).
Narrative and expository texts from the Progress in Inter-
national Reading Literacy Trend Study (PIRLS 2001 T) and
The International Association for the Evaluation of Educa-
tional Achievement Reading Literacy Study 1991 (Gustafsson
and Rosén, 2004) were used to measure reading comprehension.
Table 1 | Sample sizes and descriptive data for the variables included for each time point, with standard deviations in parenthesis.
Time 1 2 3
Group No music Music No music Music No music Music
Total (N ) 280 59 225 48 48 17
Females (N ) 135 33 110 30 22 10
Neuroimaging (N ) 64 0 56 9 48 13
Music (h/week) 0 3.66 (4.98) 0 4.29 (4.35) 0 5.06 (4.98)
Physical activity (h/week) 1.00 (2.17) 1.42 (2.25) 1.41 (2.46) 1.29 (2.13) 1.71 (2.76) 1.18 (2.56)
TV/online/gaming (h/week) 20.14 (15.61) 20.29 (13.61) 26.34 (17.09) 24.31 (19.73) 33.48 (21.78) 23.47 (17.58)
Mother edu (years) 12.79 (2.39) 12.78 (2.26) 12.83 (2.28) 13.52 (2.52) 12.59 (2.47) 14.00 (2.82)
Father edu (years) 12.03 (1.92) 12.11 (2.28) 12.09 (2.15) 12.71 (2.75) 12.34 (2.52) 12.89 (3.65)
Age (years) 12.01 (4.49) 13.39 (4.38) 13.68 (4.05) 13.59 (3.92) 16.8 (4.69) 15.64 (5.76)
Dot matrix (raw score) 25.38 (7.44) 28.22 (5.95) 27.93 (7.31) 29.60 (6.55) 30.44 (6.46) 33.53 (6.88)
Digit recall (raw score) 13.98 (5.61) 16.50 (6.61) 15.99 (5.64) 16.81 (5.58) 17.94 (5.14) 20.53 (7.81)
Letters digit (raw score) 22.37 (12.16) 26.73 (11.87) 27.81 (10.77) 28.65 (11.50) 32.64 (9.45) 31.35 (10.87)
Raven (standardized) −0.13 (0.87) 0.44 (1.02) 0.18 (0.80) 0.42 (0.82) 0.50 (0.71) 0.70 (1.06)
Math (standardized)* −0.31 (0.91) 0.22 (0.92) −0.19 (0.99) −0.02 (0.97) 0.41 (0.71) 0.49 (0.81)
Reading (standardized)* −0.15 (0.97) 0.23 (0.86) −0.05 (1.01) 0.16 (0.87) 0.49 (0.57) 0.46 (0.55)
*The academic tests were assessed through ages 8–25 and thus the Ns for the table do not encompass these two variables but had a total of 273 at T1.
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Seventy-seven items were used to form four age-adapted reading
comprehension tests for 8–25 years olds.
LIFE STYLE QUESTIONNAIRE
The questionnaire included questions on musical practice
(yes/no), the instrument played, and the number of hours per
week of practice. It also included questions on the highest level
of education for each parent (total years of education used as a
continuous variable), time spent online, gaming and watching
TV (summed together in analyses) and time spent doing physical
activity outside of physical education.
For the first hypothesis the music practice was coded as a binary
variable (0/1) in order to investigate the relation between music
practice and cognitive and academic performance overall (across
the time points). The second hypothesis was investigated using
the number of weekly hours reported spent on music practice for
the time point previous to the predicted one as an explanatory
variable (for individuals who had reported playing for two of the
time points) for cognitive and academic development.
NEUROIMAGING
Three-dimensional structural T1-weighted imaging (magnetization-
prepared rapid gradient echo sequence, repetition time 2300 msec,
echo time 2.92 msec) with a 256 mm × 256 mm field of
view, 176 sagittal slices, and 1 mm3 voxel size was carried out
with a 1.5T Siemens Avanto scanner on 64 participants and
repeated after 2 and 4 years. GRAPPA parallel imaging technique
with an acceleration factor of two was also employed to speed
up the acquisition. Gray matter segmentation was performed
on the structural data with a voxel-based morphometry tool
available via SPM5 (www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/software/spm5)
and followed by an alignment technique performed with the
Diffeomorphic Anatomical Registration with Exponentiated Lie
algebra (DARTEL) toolbox in SPM. This method iteratively
aligned the gray matter images from all three time points
to their common average template. The modulated images
were then spatially smoothed with a Gaussian kernel size of
8 mm and registered to Montreal Neurological Institute space.
Because the DARTEL morphing was applied to tissue segmented
images, output images were the tissue probability maps in which
each voxel shows the probability of being locally expanded or
contracted.
RESULTS
Descriptive information regarding the demographics of the sam-
ple is included in Table 1. There was a significant difference
between groups (music vs. non-music) in age (t = 1.98, p = 0.048)
at time point 1, and trends for maternal and paternal educa-
tion levels [t = 1.91, p = 0.061 (T3) and t = 1.77, p = 0.077
(T2)], and time spent online/gaming/TV viewing at T3 (t = 1.89,
p = 0.067; as tested with t-tests of independent samples at each
time point). There was neither a difference between the music
and non-music players in weekly hours spent on physical exercise
(t < 1.36, p > 0.17), nor on any of the other covariates at the
remaining time points (all ts < 0.71, p > 0.48).
In order to investigate the first hypothesis: whether music
practice was associated with a different performance level on
the four cognitive tests across all three time points, we ran
mixed linear regression models with time as the repeated vari-
able (unstructured repeated covariance type) performance on
the four tests, respectively, as the dependent variables with
sex, time, and music practice (yes/no) as the factors and age
(inverse), father’s and mother’s education levels (total years), hours
spent on gaming/internet/TV viewing and on physical activity as
covariates.
There was a significant main effect of music on visuo-spatial
WM [F(1,333) = 4.59, p = 0.033], verbal WM performance
[F(1,333) = 9.69, p = 0.002] processing speed [F(1,333) = 4.91,
p = 0.027], and reasoning ability [F(1,332) = 28.34, p < 0.001].
There was also a significant positive association between music
practice and math performance [F(1,317) = 12.91, p < 0.001]
but not with reading comprehension [F(1,317) = 1.42, p = 0.23].
The residuals from corresponding mixed models excluding the
music factor are plotted for the primary outcomes according to
music category (thus removing the effect of age, sex, time, parental
education, and hobbies) in Figure 1.
Next, we evaluated hypothesis number two: the expected dose-
related development of cognitive ability between time points. This
was done by running a mixed linear regression model (unstruc-
tured repeated covariance type) with a variable for later time
points (e.g., visuo-spatial WM Late, which could be either data
from T2 or T3 or both if the subject participated at all three time
points) as the dependent variable and a variable for earlier time
points (e.g., visuo-spatial WM Early, which could be T1 or T2
or both) as independent variables so that data from individuals
participating in two or three time points could be included as
repeated measures. The models also included music hours/week,
age (inverse), sex, father’s education level, mother’s education
level, TV/online/gaming hours/week, and exercise hours/week as
independent variables.
The results showed a significant effect of music practice
hours/week on the outcome measures visuo-spatial WM, verbal
WM with a trend for reasoning ability (see Table 2 for regression
coefficients). There was no significant effect of music prac-
tice hours/week on the development of processing speed, math,
or reading performance (all βs for the music variable <0.151,
p > 0.17).
We investigated the presence of developmental windows where
music practice would lead to larger cognitive effects by adding
interaction terms of music practice by age to the models listed
in Table 2 but found no evidence of such an effect (with
ps > 0.16).
The third hypothesis was that there would be a difference
detected between music and non-music players in the brain. In
order to find gray matter structural differences between music
and non-music groups, we entered the music group as the
main factor in a flexible factorial design analysis using SPM. All
three time points of data were included in the analysis consid-
ering the subjects and time as factors, to take into account the
repeated measures. The analysis was corrected for the effects of
age, sex, handedness, and total gray matter volume. We also
added an interaction term for age by group in order to detect
age sensitive periods for music practice in the brain. The sig-
nificant level was set at the cluster level with the threshold of
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FIGURE 1 | Cognitive performance across the three time points with the
residuals from mixed models (with age, sex, time, parental education
level, time spent on physical activity, gaming/internet/TV viewing as
independent variables) for the primary outcomes plotted according to
music training category. Error bars represent standard error of the mean
(SEM).
Table 2 | Regression coefficients for the models investigating the amount of change in cognitive performance on the three outcomes that could
be explained by music hours/week and other possible factors.
Dependent variables and model summaries
Visuo-spatial WM (late) Verbal WM (late) Reasoning (late)
Independent variables β P β P β P
Constant – 0.002 – 0.032 – 0.171
Sex −0.568 0.242 0.300 0.422 −0.025 0.612
Age (Inverse) −150.70 0.241 57.692 0.517 −20.47 0.145
Mother Edu (years) 0.048 0.680 −0.107 0.242 0.018 0.139
Father Edu (years) 0.185 0.138 0.043 0.653 −0.010 0.423
Outcome (Early) 0.715 <0.001 0.773 <0.001 0.668 <0.001
Online/gaming/TV(h/w) −0.002 0.907 0.043 0.004 0.001 0.436
Exercise (h/w) −0.229 0.078 0.157 0.110 −0.005 0.712
Music (h/w) 0.351 0.003 0.261 0.006 0.021 0.090
p < 0.05 (corrected for the multiple comparisons of all voxels
within gray matter volume). We found two clusters significantly
showing differences in gray matter volume. One in the tem-
poral lobe (p = 0.008, see Figure 2A) situated mainly in the
inferior temporal and temporal-occipital fusiform gyri, based
on the MNI structural and Harvard-Oxford Cortical Structural
atlases (see Table 3 for coordinates and cluster sizes), and the
other cluster was in the insula, caudate, and putamen (p = 0.002
see Figure 2B). The interaction of age by group was not
significant.
DISCUSSION
In this study, the effect of musical practice on cognitive abil-
ity was investigated in a developmental longitudinal study. The
results showed that practicing a musical instrument was associ-
ated with higher performance on tests of reasoning, processing
speed, and WM, as well as mathematics but not reading com-
prehension. Importantly, the development between time points
was related to the time spent on music practice per week
for both WM tests. The effect was also seen after correcting
for baseline performance, parental education, and other after
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org January 2014 | Volume 7 | Article 926 | 95
“fnhum-07-00926” — 2014/1/7 — 11:07 — page 6 — #6
Bergman Nutley et al. Music practice and development of working memory
FIGURE 2 |The main effect of playing a musical instrument on gray
matter volume; (A) effects in temporal cortex, occipito-temporal area,
and the insula; (B) effects in caudate nucleus shown in sagittal section
from both left and right hemispheres.
school activities, including physical activity, TV-watching, and
gaming. These results confirm previously reported associations
between musical practice and cognitive ability (Hurwitz et al.,
1975; Schellenberg, 2006; Forgeard et al., 2008; Ruthsatz et al.,
2008). The dose-response relation also supports the previously
reported causal relation between the two (Schellenberg, 2004;
Bugos et al., 2007).
We did not find a dose-response relation between music prac-
tice and the development of processing speed and only found a
trend for the development of reasoning ability. The positive effects
on the secondary outcome of mathematics did not point to a causal
effect of music on academic development, and was only seen as an
association with music practice across the time points. This is in
line with previous findings of associations from correlational stud-
ies between music practice and grades in mathematics (Schellen-
berg, 2006; Cabanac et al., 2013) and mathematical performance
(Schellenberg, 2006). As most of the music players in our sam-
ple were already practicing an instrument at the beginning of the
study, it is possible that potential pre-study music-related changes
in the development of WM underlie the learning advantages seen
for mathematics, given its strong relation to visuo-spatial WM
in particular (Bull et al., 2008). We did not see an association
between music practice and reading comprehension, a finding
previously reported in a correlational study (Schellenberg, 2006).
The reason for this is unclear and should be further
studied.
Differences were also seen in the gray matter volume of the
brain between music players and non-players in the temporo-
occipital and insular cortex across the time points. One could
argue that since the music group outperformed the non-music
group on cognitive measures at the beginning of the study that
these differences should be controlled for in the brain imaging
analysis. However, it is not certain and perhaps, given the liter-
ature (e.g., Schlaug et al., 2005), even unlikely that the cognitive
differences are independent of music, thus controlling for them
would also remove cognitive differences associated with music in
the brain. The differences observed in the brain are consistent with
previous findings showing higher gray matter volume for musi-
cians in the fusiform gyrus (James et al., 2013), an area typically
involved in visual pattern recognition. Specifically, this area has
been identified through fMRI investigations as important dur-
ing musical notation decoding (Schon et al., 2002; Stewart et al.,
2003). These regions do not include the fronto-parietal networks
involved in top-down attention and WM (Olesen et al., 2004).
However, the effect was seen in the caudate nucleus which also has
been implicated in WM training (Olesen et al., 2004; Dahlin et al.,
2008; Backman et al., 2011). This demonstrates certain similari-
ties between the neural correlates of cognitive training and music
practice.
Over the past decade, research has shown that WM capacity is
subject to training-induced improvements (Klingberg et al., 2002,
2005; Holmes et al., 2009; Thorell et al., 2009; Brehmer et al., 2012;
Green et al., 2012) and that the size of the transfer effects are lin-
early related to practice time (Jaeggi et al., 2008; Bergman Nutley
et al., 2011). It is therefore likely that the time spent on other
WM taxing activities may affect WM capacity and other abili-
ties partly depending on the same brain regions. Reasoning has
also previously reported to improve by training on WM tasks
(Klingberg et al., 2002, 2005; Jaeggi et al., 2008), non-verbal rea-
soning tasks (Bergman Nutley et al., 2011; Mackey et al., 2011),
as well as in strategy training studies (Klauer et al., 2002; Hamers
et al., 1998). These types of interventions target different aspects
of reasoning and the performance improvements reported proba-
bly have different origins. Interestingly, it has been shown that
it is possible to improve test performance in a single practice
session by learning to, e.g., attend to one stimulus dimension at a
Table 3 | Significant association between playing a musical instrument and gray matter volume.




Z score x, y, z (MNI) for
the peak voxel
Temporo-occipital fusiform gyrus, Inferior temporal gyrus 0.008 4408 3.96 34, −51, −9
Insula, caudate, and putamen 0.002 5337 3.64 20, 18, 17
*The labeling is based on both MNI structural and Harvard-Oxford Cortical Structural atlases provided by FMRIB Software Library (FSL)
(http://fsl.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl/fslwiki/Atlases).
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time (Denney and Heidrich, 1990). This indicates an immediate
effect, based on learned strategies, on how to best approach the
visuo-spatial structure of the task and is independent of practice
time.
The decoding of musical notation is one factor that may explain
the effect of music on cognitive functioning as it requires abil-
ities such as spatial–temporal reasoning and visual perception
(Gromko, 2004). Given that the results indicate linear effects of
music practice on WM and that previous studies have demon-
strated effects of music practice on reasoning after as little as 1 year
of practice (Rauscher et al., 1997; Schellenberg, 2004), it may be
that the music-related processes taxing reasoning are trained while
learning the musical notation code, whereas the processes taxing
WM are trained while reading the code, keeping sections of code
in WM and in control of attention. This would thus explain the
linear relation with time practiced between WM and music, as two
more years of music reading would further support development
of WM. The effect of music training on reasoning development,
on the other hand, may occur as quickly as the foundation of
the musical systems are understood rather than linearly and grad-
ual. That being said, regardless of beneficial strategies or basic
understanding of the task, WM is required to solve reasoning
problems (Carpenter et al., 1990) and to read musical notation
(which could explain the trend to linear effects on reasoning
development).
Since the music players in this study showed superior per-
formance on cognitive measures already at time point one it is
not possible to conclude that music practice caused the cogni-
tive effects, although the dose-response relation indicates that this
could be the case. Given that the groups differed in age and that
the natural development of the cognitive functions assessed in this
study are not linear throughout the age span of the sample, it
was not possible to simply test an interaction between time and
music in the mixed model. In order to address this, case-control
matched analyses were attempted but resulted in too few control
cases to enable the analyses at sufficient statistical power. Hence,
we instead performed linear regressions with the outcome at later
time points as the dependent variable while controlling for the out-
come at earlier time points to inform about the change in cognitive
ability related to music practice between time points.
Although prior research has suggested positive cognitive effects
of physical activity (Hillman et al., 2008; Hotting and Roder, 2013)
as well as from playing computer games (Green and Bavelier,
2012), we only found a positive effect for verbal WM development
related to time spent on TV viewing/online and gaming activities.
The reasons for a lack of a general effect on all cognitive tests are
unclear, however, could be due to the crude measures of the covari-
ates (combined score for the gaming/online/TV viewing variable,
with no distinction made between verbal and more visuo-spatial
activities and no quantification of aerobic fitness or activity type).
It may be that the combined score for gaming/online and TV view-
ing represented activities relying on the use of verbal information
processing to a larger extent than taxing the visuo-spatial domain.
There may be alternative explanations to the different tra-
jectories of WM development that in this study appear to be
music-related, such as differences in personality. A recent study
showed that personality type predicted the duration of music
training (along with parental education) to a larger degree than
IQ (Corrigall et al., 2013). This could be of importance as our
results suggest that time spent on music practice is predictive
of WM development and could perhaps partly be explained
by the fact that certain personality types of high-functioning
individuals tend to show longer durations of practice and may,
independently of music, have a different trajectory of their WM
development. Another possibility is that there could be an inter-
action between personality type and the cognitive training effects
associated with music practice. This will be for future studies to
investigate.
It is likely that part of the sample in our study is musically
trained in the vocal domain, which is not accounted for. However,
this should hardly affect the interpretation of the results as it is
likely to add noise to the data, underestimating the strength of
the effects, if anything. Future studies should continue to pursue
the question of causality, the mechanism through which music
improves cognitive ability as well as potential effects on academic
outcome. Ideally, detailed information on musical notation read-
ing skills should be recorded along with personality dimensions
and compared with performance on cognitive tests to further
investigate the mechanisms involved in music practice and its
effects on cognitive ability.
CONCLUSION
The results from this study show that music training is associ-
ated with cognitive and mathematical benefits. This was made
apparent through the superior level of performance across time
for music players compared with non-players. There was also a
difference in the gray matter density within brain in areas related
to music notation decoding. Furthermore, the data suggest that
music players show a steeper development of both visuo-spatial
and verbal WM over time, supporting previously reported causal
effects between music practice and cognitive performance. Time
spent on music practice predicted both visuo-spatial WM and ver-
bal WM development. More generally, these findings support the
importance of practice and learning for the development of WM
during childhood and adolescence.
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Brain plasticity allows the central nervous system of a given organism to cope with
environmental demands. Therefore, the quality of mental processes relies partly on the
interaction between the brain’s physiological maturation and individual daily experiences.
In this review, we focus on the neural implementation of musical expertise at both an
anatomical and a functional level. We then discuss how this neural implementation can
explain transfers from musical learning to a broad range of non-musical cognitive functions,
including language, especially during child development. Finally, given that brain plasticity
is still present in aging, we gather arguments to propose that musical practice could be
a good environmental enrichment to promote cerebral and cognitive reserves, thereby
reducing the deleterious effect of aging on cognitive functions.
Keywords: musical training, expertise, brain plasticity, cognitive transfer, aging, brain reserve
INTRODUCTION
To adapt to changing environmental requirements, the brain
has structural and functional dynamic properties that allow reg-
ularities to be encoded and skills to be learned and refined
through regular practice (Draganski and May, 2008). In return,
the efficiency of the cognitive system is partly influenced by envi-
ronmental features and individual daily experiences (Plomin et al.,
1999).
Mastering a musical instrument is a particularly complex mul-
timodal and multiprocesses behavior because it requires a theoret-
ical learning of the solfeggios rules, as well as a repeated training
for translating visual codes (the written scores) into precise motor
sequences and auditory events (Wan and Schlaug, 2010). Musical
training and musicians have therefore been often used in studies
focusing on practice-related brain plasticity. Interestingly, these
investigations have brought some empirical evidences arguing that
the regular commitment in musical activities does not only lead
to behavioral improvements in perceptivo-motor skills, but also
in a wide range of non-specific cognitive functions (Schellenberg,
2006).
In this article, we review (1) the structural plasticity effects
induced by musical practice, to point out that they can be
located in general cognitive related-areas outside the auditory-
motor domain; (2) the functional differences that exist between
musically naïve and musically trained subject when they perform
auditory-motor tasks, to show that trained subjects can rely on
general cognitive processes when the task become harder; (3) the
transfers effect that occur from musical practice toward other
cognitive functions, because it justify the use of music, notably
in rehabilitation program for developmental disorders or brain
injuries. Finally, (4) we present works and arguments to suggest
that musical practice could also be encourage as a particularly
good environmental enrichment to promote a successful brain
aging.
NEURAL IMPLEMENTATION OF MUSICAL EXPERTISE
STRUCTURAL PLASTICITY INDUCED BY MUSICAL PRACTICE
Structural brain plasticity phenomenon (i.e., changes in cells
anatomy and connections) can be longitudinally and cross-
sectionally recorded in human using morphometric method of
MRI data analysis (Draganski and May, 2008). In a longitudi-
nal MRI study conducted by Hyde et al. (2009), 31 children aged
around 6 years were scanned before being assigned to 15 months
of either individual keyboard lessons or a non-instrumental music
class. Whereas no structural differences were observed before the
experiment, those children who had learned to play the keyboard
exhibited significantly greater increases in gray matter volume after
the lessons within the primary motor cortex (right pre-central
gyrus) and motor-related areas (part of the corpus callosum), as
well as within the primary auditory cortex (right Heschl’s gyrus).
The extent of the rearrangements in these motor and auditory
areas was correlated with improvements in finger tapping and
auditory frequency discrimination tasks, respectively. Interest-
ingly, the authors also found a greater increase in gray matter
volume in brain regions dedicated to the integration of multi-
modal information (bilateral frontal areas and left pericingulate
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gyrus). In the context of musical practice, these regions may sus-
tain the translation of the visual score into motor sequences and
auditory-induced emotional events (Hyde et al., 2009).
Cross-sectional studies conducted with adult expert musicians
have confirmed this anatomical brain shaping on several occa-
sions. Adult violinists have a more highly elaborated topographic
representation of their left hand in the right somatosensory cortex
(Elbert et al., 1995). Moreover, the gray matter volume of the pri-
mary motor cortex (pre-central gyri) has been shown to increase in
relation with the degree of musical expertise (Gaser and Schlaug,
2003), with a left-hemisphere advantage for pianists and a right-
hemisphere one for string players (Bangert and Schlaug, 2006),
illustrating the close link between anatomical changes and training
demands. Regarding the auditory cortex, Bermudez and Zatorre
(2005) found greater gray matter volume in the right superior tem-
poral gyrus of 43 adult musicians compared with non-musicians.
Beyond the motor and auditory cortices, other local gray matter
increases, possibly induced by score reading, have been found in
the visuospatial and visuomotor areas (right fusiform gyrus, left
intraparietal sulcus; James et al., 2013) and left inferior temporal
gyrus (Gaser and Schlaug, 2003), as well as in multimodal asso-
ciation areas (right superior parietal gyrus; Gaser and Schlaug,
2003), and general cognitive-related areas (left inferior frontal
gyrus; James et al., 2013).
Structural brain plasticity phenomenon also appears to take
place in white matter tracts. The corpus callosum exhibits enlarge-
ment in musicians because they engage more frequently in
bimanual behavior (Öztürk et al., 2002; Hyde et al., 2009), and
possibly because this structure is involved in visuoauditory pro-
cesses too (Bengtsson et al., 2005). Bengtsson and colleagues also
found an increase in the diffusivity value of the internal capsule of
the corticospinal tract, and a positive correlation between hours
of musical practice and fiber tract diffusivity in frontal areas and
the right arcuate fasciculus, which are crucial for language pro-
cessing, and have been shown to be larger and more structured in
musicians, especially singers (Halwani et al., 2011).
To resume, performing music involves elaborated, coordinated,
and rules-based motor, auditory, and visual skills. Regular musi-
cal training therefore leads to an anatomical shaping of auditory,
motor and visual-related areas, but some results showed that
brain regions involved in more general non-musical cognitive pro-
cesses, such as language, attention, or executive functions, are also
affected by musical training-related structural plasticity (Hyde
et al., 2009; James et al., 2013). This indirectly argues that these
later functions could also play a crucial role in musical expertise
achievement.
FUNCTIONAL PLASTICITY INDUCED BY MUSICAL PRACTICE
The impressive auditory skills and manual dexterity of musicians
are not solely explained by the anatomical remodeling of audi-
tory and motor-related areas, as they also exhibit functional brain
differences with non-musicians when they perform tasks similar
to music exercises (e.g., finger tapping tasks, tonal, or temporal
auditory discrimination tasks).
fMRI studies have shown that when professional pianists and
violinists are asked to perform complex uni- or bi-manual tapping
tasks, they exhibit reduced activation of the primary and secondary
motor areas (Jäncke et al., 2000; Lotze et al., 2003) as well as
the supplementary and pre-motor areas (Krings et al., 2000),
compared with matched controls. The authors of these studies
concluded that motor skills are more automatized, and thus less
costly for musicians, who need therefore to recruit fewer neurons
for performing as well as controls subjects do. This automatization
frees up resources that allow for better spontaneity and flexibil-
ity, as reflected in the greater activation of bilateral pre-frontal
and parietal areas (Lotze et al., 2003; Landau and D’Esposito,
2006).
Regarding auditory skills, once again, besides the structural
shaping of the auditory areas, particularities in neural responses
have been recorded when expert musicians process musically
relevant auditory stimuli. They have an enhanced cortical rep-
resentation of the musical scale tones in the tonotopic map of
the auditory cortex (Pantev et al., 1998) that leads them to exhibit
greater expectancy and more effective attentional processes for
musical sounds. Indeed, when they have to identify a sound with
a deviant frequency (pitch) or rhythm embedded in a sequence
of standard sounds, they display shorter latencies and/or higher
amplitudes of the electrophysiological components known to
reflect conscious sound discrimination and target detection [N2b
and P3; Tervaniemi et al., 2005; Late Positive Component (LPC);
Besson et al., 1994; P3, Ungan et al., 2013].
Musicians’ enhanced cortical representations of musical rules
turn also in a pre-attentive memory-based processing for musi-
cal sound encoding, maybe through the auditory corticofugal
pathway. Indeed, modulations in both cortical and subcortical
electrophysiological responses to the perception of musical irreg-
ularities have even been recorded when musicians’ attention is
diverted away from the stimuli. It is reflected in the appearance or
increase of the MisMatch Negativity (MMN) component in the
auditory cortex of musicians versus non-musicians when they are
exposed to a melodic contour or interval change (Koelsch et al.,
1999; Fujioka et al., 2004), and in the modulation of the Early
Right Anterior Negative (ERAN) component when the changes
consist of more complex musical irregularities (e.g., unexpected
chords; Koelsch et al., 2002).
Concerning the subcortical level, musicians display faster neu-
ral synchronization and stronger brainstem encoding of chord
arpeggios in both in tune and out of tune conditions. Interestingly,
the magnitude of the brainstem response is predictive of the par-
ticipants’ performances in a pitch discrimination task (Bidelman
et al., 2011).
Neuroimaging studies using fMRI have also been designed to
explore whether musically trained individuals process the audi-
tory aspects of music differently from non-musicians. When they
are passively exposed to music or have to judge whether chords
are consonant or dissonant, musically trained participants dis-
play a right to left shift in the activation of auditory temporal
areas (Ohnishi et al., 2001) and frontal and inferior parietal areas
(Minati et al., 2009). According to the authors, this suggests the
use of more abstract and analytical strategies by the experts.
Studies featuring pitch comparison tasks that involve greater
working memory load (Gaab and Schlaug, 2003) or cognitive
control and updating in working memory (Pallesen et al., 2010)
report that, compared with non-musicians, musically trained
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participants recruit fewer early perceptual areas, and more audi-
tory working memory-related areas (right posterior temporal and
supramarginal gyri and bilateral superior parietal areas) or asso-
ciative areas (right pre-frontal, parietal lateral, anterior cingulated,
and dorsolateral frontal cortices). The more difficult the task is,
the more the experienced musicians resort to these areas and the
more their performances are better compared with those of con-
trols (Oechslin et al., 2012). Finally, regarding musical semantic
memory, a study conducted in our laboratory revealed that when
musicians have to rate their familiarity with a melody, several auto-
biographical episodic memory-related areas are activated more
strongly compared with non-musicians (bilateral hippocampus,
visual primary cortex, cingulate cortex, and bilateral superior tem-
poral areas; Groussard et al., 2010). This suggests that, owing to
their musical experience, musicians engage self-referential pro-
cesses to perform the task and gain access to richer and more vivid
sensory details.
Moreover, musical expertise also leads to an auditory-motor
coupling, as reflected by the activity displayed within the primary
motor cortex when musicians hear a piece they have learned to
play (Haueisen and Knösche, 2001; Bangert et al., 2006). Con-
versely, when they tinkle on a mute keyboard, the temporal areas
dedicated to hearing are activated. In the same way, musical exper-
tise is also built on auditory-visual and visuomotor associations.
Indeed, it has been shown that when an atonal event (a wrong note)
is written on a score, musicians are able to anticipate it, as reflected
in their behavioral performance and physiological response to
this event (Schön and Besson, 2005). Finally, when motionless
pianists imagine themselves playing a piece from a score, they
display the same pattern of neural activity within the secondary
and associative motor areas as they do during an actual instru-
mental performance, although the degree of activation is reduced
and does not concern the primary motor cortex (Meister et al.,
2004).
To sum up so far, the expert auditory and motor performances
of musicians are sustained by the functional reorganization of
typical underlying neural processes, due to automation and bet-
ter memory-based (top-down) processing. This makes the basic
auditory and motor skills less costly for musicians, thereby allow-
ing them to allocate resources to strategic processes when tasks
become harder. Similar effects have also been observed for expert
performance in other activities such as object and pattern recog-
nition by chess master players (Bilalic et al., 2012) or working
memory-related tasks (Guida et al., 2012).
COGNITIVE TRANSFER OF MUSICAL TRAINING
Musical hearing and practice seem not to be sustained by specific
brain areas, but involve rather general pre-existing skills and cog-
nitive functions. As musical learning put a high demand on it, it
can result in transfers of improvements from one activity (music
making) to others (e.g., language skills, executive functions).
LANGUAGE SKILLS
There is a longstanding debate about the division or sharing
of the brain substrates of language and music. Although some
famous neuropsychological cases of double dissociation have been
reported (Stewart et al., 2006), we know that music and language
perception and production share a lot of features, ranging from the
basic sensorimotor level to auditory-cognitive processes. Indeed,
it appears that humans perceive these two auditory stimuli using
the same acoustic cues (rhythm, pitch, and timbre) and relying on
similar resources for syntactic integration processing or memory.
Furthermore, both language and music have a visual form of nota-
tion that allows them to be red or written, and producing either of
these two behaviors involves auditory-motor coupling. According
to Patel’s OPERA hypothesis, transfers from musical training to
language skills occur because (i) there is an anatomical overlap
in their brain networks, (ii) musical practice implies more preci-
sion in processing features shared with language, (iii) this practice
takes place in a repeated manner, and is associated with (iv) more
focused attention, and (v) emotion (Patel, 2011).
Although they are less central to language than to music, pitch
modulations are still important for speech in order to convey emo-
tion. Cross-sectional (Magne et al., 2006), and longitudinal studies
(Moreno and Besson, 2005) found that musically trained children
were better at detecting pitch violations in a foreign or native
language than their musically untrained counterparts. Moreover,
the authors reported a cortical Late Positive Component (LPC) in
response to pitch violations that was far less pronounced, or even
absent, in the untrained children. Rather similar results have been
reported for adults, with musicians displaying a shorter latency
of this LPC when exposed to prosodic incongruities in foreign
sentences (Schön et al., 2004; Marques et al., 2007).
Musicians also process the temporal features of speech sounds
differently than non-musicians. Faster cortical neural responses
to voice onset time, as well as to vowel or syllable duration, have
been attested both attentively and pre-attentively for children who
take part in music lessons (Chobert et al., 2012). As electrophysi-
ological modulations have also been found at the brainstem level
(Musacchia et al., 2007; Wong et al., 2007), Kraus and Chan-
drasekaran (2010) suggest that transfer effects from processing
acoustic cues in a musical context to processing them in a speech
context are mostly due to the reinforcement of the auditory
corticofugal pathways (as in the reverse theory hypothesis that
states that long-term cortically stored representations guide early
perceptual encoding via descending pathways and top-down pro-
cesses). The overtraining of musicians to detect, sequence, and
encode relevant aspects of musical sound patterns shared with
speech endows them with heightened phonological awareness.
Apart from the benefit of perceiving prosody in native and for-
eign languages, phonological awareness is also crucial for learning
tone languages (Milovanov and Tervaniemi, 2011), hearing speech
in noise, and reading skills (Strait and Kraus, 2011). This make
music lessons potentially well suited to the rehabilitation of chil-
dren with reading impairments such as dyslexia (Strait and Kraus,
2011).
Another point that music and language have in common is that
they consist of auditory elements that unfold over time accord-
ing to complex rules referred to collectively as syntax. Although
the neural representations of these regularities are stored in differ-
ent parts of the brain, their processing requires the same limited
neural resources, allowing for transfer effects (Patel, 2011). When
exposed to syntactic incongruities in speech, musicians have dif-
ferent Event-Related Potential (ERP) responses compared with
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non-musicians. These responses are more bilateral in adult musi-
cians (Fitzroy and Sanders, 2013), and appear earlier during
the development in children who participate to music lessons
(Jentschke and Koelsch, 2009).
We have seen that regular musical training results in the rein-
forcement of auditory-motor coupling. This coupling is also
essential for speech, and its stimulation through musical prac-
tice seems to contribute to the rehabilitation of stroke patients
with language impairments (Rodriguez-Fornelis et al., 2012).
Finally, it seems that the short-term storage and manipulation
of speech relies partly on the same neural networks and cog-
nitive mechanisms in working memory as music (Besson et al.,
2011; Schulze et al., 2011; Strait and Kraus, 2011). Regarding long-
term episodic storage, a study conducted in our laboratory showed
that the brain areas engaged in musical episodic retrieval match
those known to be activated for the retrieval of non-musical stim-
uli (bilateral middle and superior frontal gyri and pre-cuneus;
Platel, 2005). This could explain why musicians, who frequently
use short- and long-term memory resources for processing music,
often perform better than non-musicians on verbal working mem-
ory tasks (Bialystok and DePape, 2009), and sometimes on verbal
episodic memory tasks, too (Chan et al., 1998).
To conclude, it appears that the brain areas thought to be
dedicated to language and speech processing are rather involved
whenever a behavior calls for fine-grained auditory analysis and
implies an auditory motor coupling. Because musical experts rely
on these brain mechanisms to process and play music, it turns to
implications of language-related areas for processing music and to
transfers from musical practice to language processes.
EXECUTIVE FUNCTIONS AND IQ
The positive effects of musical practice on cognition are not
restricted to auditory and language skills. Considering literature,
it seems that playing or learning music is linked to better perfor-
mances on an astonishing range of cognitive measures. Even after
taking the effects of potential confounding variables (e.g., fam-
ily income, parents’ education, and involvement in non-musical
activities) into account, Schellenberg (2006) observed a positive
association between the duration of music lessons in childhood
and full-scale IQ results, as well as academic achievement. No evi-
dence was highlighted for a particular strong correlation between
musical training and one specific IQ subtests. Moreover, all the cor-
relations disappeared when the IQ score was held constant, arguing
for a homogenous and non-specific effect of musical training on
intelligence. To certify a little the causal link, the authors replicated
their findings in a follow-up study where children were assigned
either to music, drama, or no lessons groups (Schellenberg, 2004).
After the lessons, the improvement in IQ performances was signifi-
cantly greater in the groups that had taken music lessons than in the
other groups. Given that Schellenberg (2006) subsequently failed
to find any effect on IQ test results when full-time music students
were compared with non-musicians studying psychology, law, or
physics, he concluded that musical learning is an extra-scholar, but
scholar-like activity that requires more concentration, attention,
and discipline than other everyday leisure activities. Therefore,
according to this theory, music lessons could enhance the abil-
ity to plan and make decisions, correct errors, ignore irrelevant or
distracting information, produce novel responses and avoid habit-
ual ones, and cope well in difficult situations. These skills, referred
to as executive functions, serve all the other cognitive domains and
all kinds of learning. Accordingly, just like school learning does,
taking music lessons as an out-of-school activity should enhance
IQ in a non-specific manner (Hannon and Trainor, 2007).
To conclude, according to some authors, taking music lessons
during childhood seem to act as a particularly powerful envi-
ronmental enrichment to potentiate all cognitive development
through the potentiation of general cognitive resources such as
executive functions.
MUSICAL PRACTICE AS A SHIELD AGAINST AGING
CEREBRAL PLASTICITY AND COGNITIVE AGING
With the ongoing increase of life expectancy in industrialized
countries, cognitive and brain aging have become key issues
in neuropsychology. It is known that interindividual differ-
ences regarding cognitive performances increase with aging and
that clinical consequences of aging-related cerebral atrophy dif-
fer consistently from one individual to another (Villeneuve and
Belleville, 2010). This has led researchers to come up with
the concepts of brain and cognitive reserve. Brain reserve is
based on the brain’s anatomical characteristics and the fact that
a higher gray matter volume counteracts atrophy and delays
the appearance of the first clinical symptoms. Cognitive reserve
refers to neurocognitive mechanisms, such as enhancing the
efficiency of the brain networks engaged to carry out a task,
or using either supplementary or entirely alternative networks,
reflecting recourse to compensatory strategies. These functional
changes must allow maintaining efficient cognitive performances
in the face of age-related physiological disturbances (Stern, 2009).
Researchers have shown that the quality of such reserves is
partly determined by early environmental features such as edu-
cational level, but also actual environmental variables, such as
occupational level. In this framework, we think that musical
activities could be a particularly suited occupation to promote
brain and cognitive reserves. Indeed, (1) as we have seen, results
from children and adults subjects indicate that musical prac-
tice is both a multimodal and a multiprocess activity, leading to
wide cerebral plasticity phenomenon and putting heavy demands
on executive functions that might help in this way to pro-
mote cognitive development (Schellenberg, 2006; Hannon and
Trainor, 2007). It is not obvious that researcher will find simi-
lar results in elderly subjects (Strobach et al., 2012a,b), but there
is good hopes that musical activities could be appropriate in
the field of normal cognitive aging, where deterioration mostly
affects executive functions (Verhaeghen, 2011), partly because
of the neural disconnection that disrupts the functional inte-
gration of multiple systems (Madden et al., 2011). (2) Music
(as other leisure activities) owns implicitly several characteris-
tics of rehabilitative paradigms (e.g., gradual increment in task
difficulty, motivation and arousal states elicited by the exer-
cise, useful performance-related feedback and rewards; Green
and Bavelier, 2008) that greatly increase training efficacy, gen-
eralization, and flexibility. Moreover, (3) music is not only
a cognitively costly activity, but also an artistic occupation,
a new field of research try now to demonstrate that musical
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enjoyment and chills are sustained by the release of chemical
neurotransmitters (Blood and Zatorre, 2001: Salimpoor et al.,
2011) and regulate some hormones level (Boso et al., 2006; Fukui
and Toyoshima, 2008). Interestingly, some of these neurochem-
icals mechanisms could influence brain healing in positive way
by partly controlling neurogenesis (Fukui and Toyoshima, 2008)
and synaptogenesis (Kuo et al., 2008), as well as blood pres-
sure level (Ramchandra et al., 2005). But the speculation that
music could favor brain healing through its esthetic experience-
related neuroendocrine mediators remains to be well empirically
established.
At this moment, to our knowledge, only two studies have
focused on the influence of musical practice on cognitive aging
quality. One study, comparing professional musicians with ama-
teur musicians and control participants aged from 60 to 83 years
old, revealed that performances on the deferred recall of a geo-
metrical shape, verbal denomination, and executive function tasks
differed significantly in favor of professional musicians, with the
amateur musicians’ performances lying midway between those of
the professional musicians and the controls (Hanna-Pladdy and
MacKay, 2011). As it has been proposed for child development,
the authors argued that musical practice has a strong effect on
executive functions, indirectly improving a wide range of mental
processes. In the other study, individualized piano lessons were
given to non-musicians aged from 60 to 85 years (Bugos et al.,
2007). After 6 months of lessons, those participants who had been
assigned to piano lessons exhibited significant improvements in
executive tasks (Trail Making Test and WAIS codes).
To resume, among others determinants, socio-cognitive
lifestyle behavior influences the quality of cognitive aging, through
brain and cognitive reserve potentiation. We think that theoretical
arguments (e.g., ecological nature of musical training and “chem-
ical substrate” of musical experiences) as well as empirical results
from studies conducted with children and adults subjects must
encourage works aiming at validate its use in the field of aging
[as done by Hanna-Pladdy and MacKay (2011) and Bugos et al.
(2007)].
CONCLUSION
To conclude, music is built on and constrained by the human brain
and its cognitive capacities. Becoming a musician places a heavy
demand on these capacities, in engaging them simultaneously and
in a coordinated manner. Through regular practice, behavioral
improvements are sustained by anatomical and functional brain
changes, as well as by the application of strategic processes. Trans-
fers occur from regular musical practice to non-musical skills,
such as language, that rely upon the same neural resources and
cognitive mechanisms. Moreover, during childhood, some authors
argue that music lessons act as a particularly comprehensive source
of environmental enrichment for promoting general cognitive
development, perhaps through executive functions potentiation.
During aging, the main cognitive difficulties seems to deal with
executive processes (Verhaeghen, 2011), therefore, there is a good
reason to speculate that musical practice could also have a positive
influence on cognition in this period of life. In fact, prelimi-
nary studies focusing on musical practice and cognition in elderly
subjects tend to confirm this assumption (Bugos et al., 2007;
Hanna-Pladdy and MacKay, 2011), but others well-controlled and
comparative studies are needed to (1) confirm that musical activ-
ities engagement during life has a positive influence on cognitive
efficiency during aging, (2) specify when, how, and under which
conditions this influence occurs, (3) confront this influence with
those of other leisure activities or cognitive intervention programs.
If these investigations are conclusive, it would validate a little more
the status of music as a “transformative technology of the mind”
that benefits the very brain which created it (Patel, 2010).
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Several current computational models of eye-movement control in reading posit a tight link
between the eye and mind, with lexical processing directly triggering most “decisions”
about when to start programming a saccade to move the eyes from one word to the next.
One potential problem with this theoretical assumption, however, is that it may violate
neurophysiological constraints imposed by the time required to encode visual information,
complete some amount of lexical processing, and then program a saccade. In this article,
we review what has been learned about these timing constraints from studies using ERP
and MEG. On the basis of this review, it would appear that the temporal constraints are
too severe to permit direct lexical control of eye movements without a significant amount
of parafoveal processing (i.e., pre-processing of word n + 1 from word n). This conclusion
underscores the degree to which the perceptual, cognitive, and motor processes involved
in reading must be highly coordinated to support skilled reading, a par excellence example
of a task requiring visual-cognitive expertise.
Keywords: ERP, MEG, computational models, reading, saccades
INTRODUCTION
Reading is one of the most complex tasks that we routinely per-
form. Part of this complexity reflects the fact that the visual acuity
needed to identify the features of printed text seems to be largely
limited to a 2◦ region of the central visual field, the fovea. Because
of this limitation, readers must direct their eyes to the majority
of words in a text (Rayner, 1998). And although the eyes nor-
mally move through the text so rapidly as to make the “task” of
moving the eyes appear effortless, this impression is misleading
because individual eye movements, called saccades, require time
to program and execute (Becker and Jürgens, 1979) and are sub-
ject to both random and systematic motor error (McConkie et al.,
1988). For those reasons, the programming and execution of sac-
cades during reading is itself a highly skilled activity. Adding to
this complexity is the fact that the “decisions” about when to
move the eyes must be coordinated with the other cognitive pro-
cesses involved in reading, such as the identification of words
and the allocation of covert attention. Attempts to better under-
stand these interactions have produced computational models
that describe how lexical processing and attention are coordinated
with the programming and execution of saccades to produce the
patterns of eye movements that are observed with skilled readers
(see Reichle et al., 2003).
Although the assumptions of these models are complex and
varied, the two most successful of these models, E-Z Reader
(Reichle et al., 1998, 2009) and SWIFT (Engbert et al., 2002,
2005), posit that the eyes are tightly coupled to the mind, with
moment-to-moment “decisions” about when to move the eyes
being controlled by lexical processing. For example, according
to E-Z Reader, the completion of a preliminary stage of lexical
processing (called the familiarity check) on a word initiates the
programming of a saccade to move the eyes to the next word.
And according to the SWIFT model, a saccadic program to move
the eyes off of a word is initiated by an autonomous (random)
timer that can be inhibited if the fixated word is difficult to pro-
cess. In this way, both models can explain the ubiquitous finding
that difficult (e.g., low frequency) words tend to be the recip-
ients of longer fixations than easy (e.g., high frequency) words
(Just and Carpenter, 1980; Inhoff and Rayner, 1986; Rayner and
Duffy, 1986; Schilling et al., 1998; Rayner et al., 2004; Kliegl et al.,
2006).
Because models of eye-movement control have been used to
both simulate the “benchmark” findings related to eye move-
ments in reading and examine various theoretical issues related to
reading (e.g., how aging affects readers’ eye movements; Laubrock
et al., 2006; Rayner et al., 2006), the models represent serious
attempts to explain the eye-mind link, or interface between lexi-
cal processing, on one hand, and eye-movement control, on the
other. To the extent that they are successful in this capacity, how-
ever, the models raise an important question: How can something
as slow as lexical processing mediate the decisions about when
to move the eyes? To fully appreciate the paradoxical nature of
this question, consider that, although fixation durations are quite
variable during reading, occasionally being as short as 50 ms or as
long as 800 ms, most are 200–250 ms in duration (Rayner, 1998).
Because of this, and because of the fact that some non-trivial
amount of time is required to program a saccade (Becker and
Jürgens, 1979), it is not immediately obvious how there can be
enough time available during each fixation to allow lexical pro-
cessing to intervene in the decisions about when to move the
eyes.
In the remainder of this article, we will attempt to resolve
this paradox by reviewing what has been learned from neuro-
physiology studies about the time course of those processes that
are known to play important functional roles in reading and—
according to models like E-Z Reader and SWIFT—eye-movement
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control during reading. The studies that will be reviewed (see
Table 1) employ two basic methods, event-related potentials
(ERPs) and megnetoencephalography (MEG), to examine the
times required to propagate visual information from the eyes
to the brain, and to then visually encode and engage in lexi-
cal processing of printed words. It is important to note, how-
ever, that although these studies provide estimates of the times
required to complete these processes, these estimates are inher-
ently conservative because they correspond to the first statistically
reliable effects of, for example, some variable (e.g., word fre-
quency) on ERP markers of lexical processing. We will therefore




The retina-brain lag is the time required for visual information to
propagate from the eyes to the earliest cortical areas of the brain.
The duration of this lag has been estimated using ERPs by having
subjects attend to a visual stimulus (e.g., checkerboard pattern)
that is suddenly displayed on a computer monitor and measuring
when a visual-evoked potential (VEP) occurs relative to the onset
of the stimulus. Because early cortical areas maintain a retinotopic
mapping between spatial locations in the visual field and cortex
(Courtney and Ungerleider, 1997), it is possible to localize the
neural generators of the VEP and thereby confirm that it reflects
early visual processing.
Using this procedure, Clark et al. (1995) found that the VEP
had a mean latency of 40–45 ms post-stimulus onset. Using a
similar paradigm but having subjects make recognition deci-
sions about images of faces, George et al. (1997) found that
VEPs differentiate previously seen versus novel faces as early as
50 ms post-stimulus onset, with these repetition effects peaking
at around 80 ms. This finding has been replicated (Mouchetant-
Rostaing et al., 2000; Seeck et al., 1997), providing additional
evidence that 45–50 ms is sufficient for visual information to
reach the brain. Finally, in an experiment designed to examine
the time course of both early and late visual processing, Foxe
and Simpson (2002) observed a 50–63 ms VEP onset latency
when subjects viewed pairs of bilaterally displayed disks with the
task of indicating whenever one was displaced from the other.
Thus, as Table 1 indicates, estimates of the retina-brain lag range
from 47–73 ms across the studies that were reviewed, with a
mean of 60 ms.
Table 1 | Studies (listed chronologically) examining the time course the retina-brain lag, visual encoding, and lexical processing, including
their method, task and stimuli, and estimates (in ms) of when the processes occur.
Process Study Method Task and Stimuli Mean Estimates [Min, Max] (ms)
Retina-Brain Lag Clark et al. (1995) ERP viewing checkerboard patterns 42.5 [40–45]
George et al. (1997) ERP recognition of face images 65 [50–80]
Seeck et al. (1997) ERP recognition of face images 70 [50–90]
Mouchetant-Rostaing et al. (2000) ERP recognition of face images 65 [45–85]
Foxe and Simpson (2002) ERP detecting displaced visual disks 57.5 [50–63]
Mean Estimates 60 [47–73]
Visual Encoding Van Rullen and Thorpe (2001) ERP categorizing vehicles vs. animals 77.5 [75–80]
Foxe and Simpson (2002) ERP detecting displaced visual disks 77.5 [70–85]
Assadollahi and Pulvermüller (2001) MEG detecting novel words 105 [90–120]
Assadollahi and Pulvermüller (2003) MEG detecting novel words 90 [60–120]
Hauk and Pulvermüller (2004) ERP lexical decision of letter strings 102.5 [80–125]
Hauk et al. (2006) ERP lexical decision of letter strings 95 [90–100]
Mean Estimates 91.3 [77.5–105]
Lexical Processing Sereno et al. (1998) ERP lexical decision of letter strings 148 [132–164]
Assadollahi and Pulvermüller (2001) MEG detecting novel words 145 [120–170]
Assadollahi and Pulvermüller (2003) MEG detecting novel words 145 [120–170]
Sereno et al. (2003) ERP word-by-word reading 162 [132–192]
Hauk and Pulvermüller (2004) ERP lexical decision of letter strings 170 [150–190]
Proverbio et al. (2004) ERP phoneme detection in words 155 [135–175]
Baccino and Manunta (2005) ERP semantic relatedness judgment 167 [119–215]
Dambacher et al. (2006) ERP natural sentence reading 170 [140–200]
Hauk et al. (2006) ERP lexical decision of letter strings 110 [100–120]
Penolazzi et al. (2007) ERP word-by-word reading 120 [110–130]
Reichle et al. (2011) ERP lexical decision of letter strings 132 [102–162]
Mean Estimates 147.6 [126.6–171.8]
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VISUAL ENCODING
As with the retina-brain lag, the minimal time required to engage
in visual encoding has been estimated by examining when differ-
ential effects related to the visual properties of stimuli that are
suddenly displayed on a computer monitor are first discernable
in the ERP record. For example, Van Rullen and Thorpe (2001)
had subjects make categorization decisions about photographs
of vehicles versus animals and found category-related differ-
ences in ERP components as early as 75–80 ms post-stimulus
onset. Similarly, Foxe and Simpson (2002) found ERP compo-
nents that could be localized to the infero-temporal, parietal,
and dorsolateral-prefrontal regions (which have been implicated
in high-level visual processing; Van Essen and DeYoe, 1995)
were active by 70–85 ms post-stimulus onset, suggesting that
these higher-level visual-processing regions can modulate visual
processing in earlier regions via feedback in as little as 30 ms after
processing begins in those earlier regions.
Similar estimates of the time course of visual encoding have
also been reported in tasks involving (more global aspects of)
lexical processing. For example, Hauk and Pulvermüller (2004)
observed effects of word length on ERP components after
80–125 ms when subjects made lexical decisions about short and
long letter strings. And using a similar methodology, Hauk et al.
(2006) observed word-length effects within 90–100 ms. Two other
studies (Assadollahi and Pulvermüller, 2001, 2003) demonstrated
the generality of these results by examining the time course of
visual encoding of printed words using MEG. In these studies,
subjects first memorized a list of short and long high- and low-
frequency words and then viewed a random sequence comprised
of those words and new words with instructions to press a but-
ton whenever they saw a new word. The key finding related to
visual encoding were effects of word length, which were evident
after 90–120 ms in the first study and after 60–120 ms in the sec-
ond, indicating that visual properties of the words (i.e., their
length) are encoded in as little as 10–40 ms after visual infor-
mation had been propagated from the eyes to the brain. Thus,
as Table 1 shows, the studies reviewed in this section collectively
suggest that visual encoding occurs within 77.5–105 ms, with a
mean of 91.3 ms.
LEXICAL PROCESSING
For the purposes of this review, lexical processing will refer to
mental operations that convert the visual representation of a
word into its (abstract) orthographic form so that that infor-
mation can be used to access that word’s pronunciation and/or
meaning. Unfortunately, attempts to determine the time course
of lexical processing using neurophysiological methods have pro-
duced somewhat inconsistent results. For example, Sereno et al.
(1998) conducted a seminal ERP experiment in which sub-
jects made lexical decisions about letter strings that included
high- and low-frequency words. (Because the frequency with
which a word is encountered in text affects how rapidly its form
and meaning can be accessed from memory, word-frequency
effects are indicators that lexical processing is well underway;
Hudson and Bergman, 1985) Sereno et al. found that word
frequency modulated ERP components after only 132–164 ms,
suggesting that lexical processing occurs very rapidly. Similarly,
Hauk et al. (2006) observed word-frequency effects even earlier,
by 100–120 ms.
This conclusion was bolstered by similar findings using both
ERP and MEG. For example, the two MEG studies mentioned ear-
lier (in relation to visual encoding) found a word-frequency effect
(Assadollahi and Pulvermüller, 2001) and interaction between
word frequency and length (Assadollahi and Pulvermüller, 2003)
after 120–170 ms. Early lexical effects have also been observed
in ERP experiments in which subjects read sentences that were
displayed one word at a time: Penolazzi et al. (2007) observed
a Frequency × Length interaction after 110–130 ms, and Sereno
et al. (2003) observed a frequency effect after 132–192 ms.
And similarly, Proverbio et al. (2004) observed word-frequency
effects after 135–175 ms in an ERP experiment in which sub-
jects detected target phonemes embedded in visually displayed
words.
This evidence for rapid lexical processing must, however, be
reconciled with results suggesting that such processing can be
much less rapid. For example, Hauk and Pulvermüller (2004) had
subjects make lexical decisions about letter strings that contained
short and long high- and low-frequency words and found that
ERP components were modulated by frequency after 150–190 ms.
Similarly, Dambacher et al. (2006) recorded ERPs from sub-
jects who read sentences and found word-frequency effects after
140–200 ms. Consequently, an important challenge for future
investigations of the time course of lexical processing would be
to isolate the methodological differences that produced the mixed
pattern of results in the literature.
Because our goal is to better characterize the relationship
between lexical processing and saccadic programming, the final
two studies that will be reviewed are particularly important
because they were explicitly designed to examine this relation-
ship using ERP. In the first, Baccino and Manunta (2005) had
subjects move their eyes to two peripherally-displayed words to
make semantic-related judgments about those words. The key
finding was that the frequency of the second word modulated
ERP components after only 119–215 ms when the data were time-
locked to the fixation on the first word, which was interpreted
as evidence for rapid parafoveal lexical processing of the second
word. In the second study, Reichle et al. (2011) had subjects move
their eyes from centrally- to peripherally-displayed letter strings
to indicate whether either was a non-word. The key finding was
that the frequency of the central word modulated ERP compo-
nents after only 102–162 ms when the data were time-locked to
the onset of the saccade to the peripheral word, which was inter-
preted as evidence that an early stage of lexical processing initiates
saccadic programming. These results, in combination with those
of the other studies reviewed in this section, suggest that lexical
processing is well under way by 126.6–171.8 ms, with a mean of
147.6 ms. However, it is important to note that, with the excep-
tion of Dambacher et al.’s (2006) experiment, these estimates were
obtained using non-reading tasks that preclude normal parafoveal
processing of upcoming words.
DISCUSSION
To better understand the theoretical implications of this review,
it is instructive to superimpose the estimated process durations
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(Table 1) on a time-line corresponding to the amount of time
available for cognitive processing during a single fixation of read-
ing. Figure 1A thus shows the time course of the retina-brain lag,
visual encoding, and lexical processing are aligned to the onset
of a single 240-ms fixation. (Although this particular duration is
arbitrary and ignores the issue of variability, it corresponds to the
mean single-fixation duration observed on low-frequency words
and is therefore a conservative estimate of the time available for
lexical processing during most fixations; Reingold et al., 2012.)
As Figure 1A shows, the neurophysiological estimates suggest
that, on average, 148 ms is required to visually encode a printed
word and then complete some amount of lexical processing of
that word. However, because the fixation is only 240 ms in dura-
tion, there is seemingly little time to complete all of the operations
that are necessary to move the eyes off of the word 92 ms later.
These operations (at a minimum) include the transmission of a
signal to the oculomotor system to start programming a saccade,
the actual programming of that saccade, and whatever affer-
ent delay occurs in the brainstem circuitry prior to moving the
eyes. The conclusion that so little time is available to complete
these operations is seemingly at odds with eye-movement exper-
iments suggesting that saccades require 125–200 ms to program
FIGURE 1 | The time course of processing during a single, 240-ms
fixation on a word, including: (1) the propagation of information from
the retina to brain (green); (2) visual encoding of the word features
(blue); (3) lexical processing (purple); (4) saccadic programming (red);
and (5) shifting attention from one word to the next (orange). (Panel
A) Neurophysiological estimates for the times required for the retina-brain
lag, visual encoding, and lexical processing are indicated by the colored
bars superimposed on the time line that is shown at the bottom of the
panel, with the three numbers above each colored bar indicating the
estimated minimum, mean, and maximal times to complete each
respective process (e.g., the estimated minimal time needed for the
retina-brain lag is 43 ms). Based on these estimates, there should be little
time (92 ms) available for saccadic programming and whatever
transmission delays are necessary, e.g., to transmit a signal about the
state of lexical processing to the oculomotor system. (Panel B) If some
amount of lexical processing of the fixated word is actually completed
parafoveally, from the previously fixated word, then the amount of (foveal)
lexical processing of the word being fixated is reduced (e.g., to 25 ms) and
can thereby accommodate more realistic estimates of the time required to
program saccades (e.g., approximately 124 ms). (Panel C) The time course
of processing if one assumes direct lexical control of saccadic
programming and the strict serial allocation of attention (e.g., see Reichle,
2011); as shown, the termination of whatever foveal lexical processing is
necessary to initiate saccadic programming causes attention to shift to the
next word, so that parafoveal lexical processing of that word can begin
using visual information acquired from the fixated word. (Note that
(Panel C) is meant to be theoretically neutral with respect to specific
serial-attention models of eye-movement control, and lexical processing is
thus shown as a single stage rather than, e.g., being divided into the two
stages posited by E-Z Reader. However, the depicted time course maps
onto the assumptions of E-Z Reader if: (a) the model’s first stage of lexical
processing corresponds to whatever lexical processing is completed prior
to the initiation of a saccade, and (b) the model’s second stage of lexical
processing is subsumed in the time required to shift attention.)
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(Becker and Jürgens, 1979; Rayner et al., 1983; Reingold et al.,
2012). It is also at odds with models of eye-movement control in
reading, which posit that lexical processing is the “engine” that
cause the eyes to progress through the text (Reichle et al., 1998,
2009; Engbert et al., 2002, 2005). Our analysis of the time course
of lexical processing thus poses a paradox if one is to maintain the
position that the completion of some amount of lexical processing
is what determines when the eyes move during reading.
The solution to this paradox is that a significant portion of the
lexical processing of a word that must be completed to “trigger”
saccadic programming is actually completed from the preced-
ing word, using visual information that was acquired from the
parafovea. How this happens is illustrated in Figure 1B, which
is similar to Figure 1A except that lexical processing of the cur-
rently fixated word begins from the previously fixated word,
so that only 25 ms of lexical processing of the fixated word is
actually completed from that word. (Again, this precise value is
arbitrary, ignores variability, and is only meant to provide an
example.) Under this assumption, there is ample time (∼124 ms)
for whatever neural transmission is required to signal the ocu-
lomotor system to program and then initiate a saccade. This
hypothesis about the importance of parafoveal processing is con-
sistent with survival analyses of fixation durations on high- and
low-frequency words with versus without parafoveal preview:
Word-frequency effects were discernable more than 110 ms earlier
with than without preview (Reingold et al., 2012).
Finally, to make this hypothesis more concrete, Figure 1C
shows the typical sequence of events that are posited to occur by
eye-movement models in which attention is allocated to support
the lexical processing of exactly one word at any given time (e.g.,
E-Z Reader or EMMA; see Reichle, 2011). As shown, the lexical
processing of any given word is completed from two locations—
from the previously fixated word and from a fixation on the word
itself. Then, upon completing whatever lexical processing is nec-
essary to initiate saccadic programming, attention shifts to the
next word so that lexical processing of that word can begin using
information acquired from the current fixation location. (Note
that, according to the E-Z Reader model, the time required to
shift attention also includes whatever additional time is needed
to complete lexical access of the fixated word.)
Of course, the manner in which E-Z Reader instantiates eye-
movement control places the most severe temporal constraints
on lexical processing and its coordination with the oculomo-
tor system because only one word is processed at a time. These
constraints are significantly relaxed to the extent that multi-
ple words are processed in parallel, as posited by the SWIFT
model (Engbert et al., 2002, 2005). According to this alternative
theoretical perspective, difficulty associated with processing the
fixated word can inhibit the autonomous timer that otherwise
initiates a saccadic program to move the eyes to a new view-
ing location. Recent studies on saccadic inhibition (Reingold and
Stampe, 1999, 2000, 2002, 2003, 2004) and prior neurophysio-
logical findings (Munoz et al., 1996) suggest that this type of
hypothesized mechanism might produce a very rapid inhibitory
effect in as little as 20–30 ms. Consequently, there seems to be
ample time for an inhibitory mechanism to intervene in the deci-
sions about when to move the eyes during reading (e.g., see
Reingold et al., 2012 for a proposal of a hybrid eye-movement
control mechanism incorporating both facilitatory and inhibitory
lexical influences).
This review thus indicates that lexical processing is sufficiently
rapid to permit direct control of the decisions about when to
move the eyes during reading, but that such control also requires
a substantial amount of lexical processing from the parafovea—
perhaps more that has been acknowledged by reading researchers.
This latter conclusion underscores the more basic claim about
eye-movement control during reading being a highly skilled
activity—one that requires a tremendous degree of coordination
between the systems that support attention, word identification,
and the programming and execution of saccades.
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According to the Perceptual Assimilation Model (PAM), articulatory similarity/dissimilarity
between sounds of the second language (L2) and the native language (L1) governs
L2 learnability in adulthood and predicts L2 sound perception by naïve listeners. We
performed behavioral and neurophysiological experiments on two groups of university
students at the first and fifth years of the English language curriculum and on a group of
naïve listeners. Categorization and discrimination tests, as well as the mismatch negativity
(MMN) brain response to L2 sound changes, showed that the discriminatory capabilities
of the students did not significantly differ from those of the naïve subjects. In line with
the PAM model, we extend the findings of previous behavioral studies showing that, at
the neural level, classroom instruction in adulthood relies on assimilation of L2 vowels to
L1 phoneme categories and does not trigger improvement in L2 phonetic discrimination.
Implications for L2 classroom teaching practices are discussed.
Keywords: adult phoneme perception, mismatch negativity (MMN), foreign language acquisition, L2 classroom
learning, event-related potentials, vowel perception
INTRODUCTION
Learning a second language (L2) in adulthood challenges our
brains. As mother tongue phoneme representations are formed in
the brains of 6–12 months old children (Werker and Tees, 1983;
Kuhl et al., 1992; Cheour et al., 1998; Kuhl, 2008) non-native
speech sounds become increasingly difficult to discriminate and
L2 perception generally turns into a demanding task for learn-
ers (Iverson et al., 2003). This loss of sensitivity does not prevent
L2 learning in adulthood (Flege, 1995). The extent of success
may depend nonetheless on numerous variables: i.e., age of L2
learning, length of residence in an L2-speaking country, gender,
formal instruction, motivation, language learning aptitude and
amount of native language (L1) use (see Piske et al., 2001 for an
overview). When L2 learners are immersed in an L2 environment,
the contribution of age toward learning to perceive and produce
L2 sounds occurs primarily through interactions with the amount
of L1 use and the amount of L2 native speaker input received
(Flege et al., 1995, 1997, 1999; Flege and Liu, 2001; Flege and
MacKay, 2004; Tsukada et al., 2005; see Piske, 2007 for a critical
review). However, when learners are immersed in an L1 environ-
ment and have a reduced L2 exposure, primarily in a restricted
setting (namely, with little or unsystematic conversational experi-
ence with native speakers) learning of L2 phonemes at the native
speaker level becomes very difficult if not impossible. According
to Best and Tyler (2007: 16), the perception of L2 in these individ-
uals receiving only formal instruction in adulthood may resemble
that of L2 naïve listeners. In other words, they are functional
monolinguals, not actively learning or using L2 when compared
with L2-learning listeners, i.e., learners who are in the process
of actively learning an L2 to achieve functional, communicative
goals within natural L2 context.
Cross-linguistic and L2 speech perception studies have shown
that adult learners of L2 have difficulty with both the perception
and production of non-native phonological segments, i.e., con-
sonants and vowels that either do not occur or are phonetically
different in their L1 (see Flege, 2003 for a discussion). Indeed,
it is commonly thought that a major determinant of L2 foreign
accent is the underlying problem associated with the perception
of L2 phonological structures. In turn, acquisition of phonetic
contrasts involves not only the detection of differences in the
acoustic signal but also the accessing of internalized categories,
which in the brain are most likely associated with definite neu-
ral representations. Within the behavioral literature, there are two
major theoretical frameworks on L2 speech learning in adult-
hood, the Speech Learning Model (SLM, Flege, 1995) and the
Perceptual Assimilation Model (PAM, Best, 1995). The SLM has
been primarily concerned with the ultimate attainment of L2 pro-
duction and perception and mainly deals with highly experienced
L2 learners immersed in an L2 environment, whereas the PAM
is mainly interested in explaining the initial L2 perception of L2
learners through the non-native perception of naïve listeners, who
are in fact functional monolinguals (but see Best and Tyler, 2007,
for an extension to L2 learning). Both SLM and PAM posit that
the degree of success listeners will have in perceiving non-native
L2 sounds depends on the perceived relationship between pho-
netic elements found in the L1 and the L2 systems. These models
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make predictions about performance in non-native segmental
perception based on the perceived distance between L1 and L2
sounds (Guion et al., 2000).
This study investigated the thus far little studied L2 percep-
tion in functional monolinguals, by behaviorally and neurally
testing the predictions posed by the PAM framework. The PAM
predicts that if two non-native sounds are perceived as accept-
able exemplars of two distinct native phonemes (Two-Category
assimilation), their discrimination will be easy, while if both non-
native sounds are perceived to be equally poor/good exemplars
of the same native phoneme (Single-Category assimilation), their
discrimination will be difficult. An intermediate discrimination is
predicted when the two non-native sounds are both perceived as
the same native sound but differ in goodness rating (Category-
Goodness assimilation). Finally, when an L2 category is perceived
as more than one L1 phoneme and the other L2 category is
perceived as a single native phoneme, a good discrimination
is predicted (Uncategorized-Categorized assimilation). For pre-
dictions to be generated by PAM (or the SLM), cross-language
phonetic distance data need to be obtained by means of behav-
ioral experiments. The degree of perceptual distance between
phonemes is usually examined using an identification and rat-
ing methodology. The foreign (or L2) sounds are first classified as
instances of a phonetic category(s) in the listener’s L1, then rated
for goodness-of-fit to the L1 category.
Whereas the studies on L2 and non-native phoneme percep-
tion discussed above have used only behavioral techniques to
address this question, we chose to adopt both behavioral (cat-
egorization and discrimination tests) and electrophysiological
(event-related potential, ERP) techniques to examine the L2 per-
ceptual abilities of our subjects. The ERP technique provides not
only a millisecond precise measurement of information process-
ing in the brain but also, depending upon the task, can allow one
to disentangle automatic detection from attentional processes.
ERP studies on L2 phoneme processing have used the odd-
ball paradigm, alternating repetitive (standard) and infrequent
(deviant) sounds (80–20% of occurrence respectively) while sub-
jects are distracted from listening by a primary task (e.g., watching
a silent movie), to measure the so-called mismatch negativity
(MMN) response to L2 contrasts. The MMN is an ERP com-
ponent, elicited by stimulus change at ≈100–250 ms, mainly
generated in the auditory cortex and with additional generators
in the inferior frontal cortex, reflecting the neural detection of
a change in a constant property of the auditory environment
(Picton et al., 2000; Näätänen et al., 2007). A large body of evi-
dence supports the notion that the discriminative MMN process
relies both on auditory sensory and categorical phonetic represen-
tations of speech stimuli and that these two codes are utilized in
parallel by the pre-attentive change detection process reflected in
the MMN component (Näätänen et al., 2001, 2011; Pulvermüller
and Shtyrov, 2006). The MMN results from prediction violations
on the basis of the repetitive standard presentation (Winkler and
Czigler, 2012). It has been proposed that the standard presen-
tation resembles perceptual learning during which hierarchical
sensory levels of processing receive bottom-up sensory input from
lower levels and receive top-down predictions from higher lev-
els (Garrido et al., 2009). As a result of the repetition of the
standard presentation, prediction errors are reduced by repetitive
suppression or adaptation (Friston, 2005). A deviant presentation
then leads to a violation of bottom-up prediction that is reflected
in MMN generation (see also the discussion in Scharinger et al.,
2012). Furthermore, the amplitude and peak latency of the MMN
is directly correlated with the magnitude of the perceived change
and, hence, it is considered a measure of individual discrimina-
tion accuracy (see Amenedo and Escera, 2000; Näätänen, 2001;
Sussman et al., 2013 for a critical discussion).
The results of MMN studies, mainly focused on L2-learning
listeners, are mixed. For instance, Winkler et al. (1999a) found
that Hungarian adult late L2 learners who had been immersed
for several years in the L2 context perceived non-native contrasts
(in Finnish) as well as native speakers, as evidenced by compa-
rable MMN amplitudes elicited by both native Finns and fluent
Hungarians in response to a Finnish across category-boundary
vowel contrast, when opposed to naïve Hungarians. The results
by Winkler et al. (1999a) were not replicated in a population of
advanced adult L2 learners (of English) who were not immersed,
since advanced Finnish students of English did not show MMN to
English phonemes that would be comparable to the one elicited
by native Finnish phonemes, hence suggesting that learning in
the classroom environment may not lead to the formation of new
long-term native-like memory traces (Peltola et al., 2003). These
brain responses to new phonemes probably develop in children
at a very fast pace: i.e., within three months of intensive expo-
sure, as evidenced by MMN to L2 phoneme contrasts in Finnish
children participating in French language immersion education
(Cheour et al., 2002; Shestakova et al., 2003; Peltola et al., 2005).
Again, however, subsequent works did not confirm these findings
when the L2 was English both for Finnish listeners (Peltola et al.,
2007) and Japanese listeners (Bomba et al., 2011). Finally, Rinker
et al. (2010) for bilingual Turkish–German kindergarten children
growing up in Germany have shown that the MMN response is
less robust in Turkish–German children to the German vowel,
when compared to a German control group. Thus, immersion
education and natural acquisition contexts did not guarantee
native-like L2 vowel discrimination. Also, native-like L2 vowel
discrimination is not guaranteed after a short training (50 min on
5 consecutive days) via associative/statistical learning: as showed
by Dobel et al. (2009), who neurally investigates the perceptual
acquisition of an L2 consonant (/φ/) in a group of adult German
speakers using the MEG methodology. Instead of establishing a
novel category the subjects integrated /φ/ into the native category
/f/, demonstrating that native categories are powerful attractors
hampering the mastery of non-native contrasts. None of these
studies, though, have tried to explain the L2 perceptual processes
according to any of the well-established models for L2 learning.
Hence they left open the question of which mechanisms govern
the acquisition of L2 phonemes in adult learners from formal
instruction and with restricted L2 exposure.
The present study aims at studying the behavioral and neu-
ral (MMN) correlates of L2 learning in adulthood while directly
testing the hypotheses that these correlates would index the per-
ceptual mechanisms posed by the PAM model. Specifically, our
study addressed two questions: (i) Do the predictions generated
by the PAM through behavioral methods hold when they are
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neurophysiologically investigated, namely can the discrimination
patterns predicted by the PAM for L2 naïve listeners be also mir-
rored in MMN amplitudes or latencies? (ii) Is L2 classroom learn-
ing associated with the typology of L2 naïve listeners, as recently
suggested by Best and Tyler (2007)? To answer these questions,
we measured the behavioral and electrophysiological data of two
groups of Salento Italian (SI) undergraduate students of British
English (BE) attending the first and the fifth year of the Foreign
Languages and Literatures Faculty. Crucially, SI, the Italian variety
spoken in Southern Apulia, presents a five stressed vowel sys-
tem (i.e., /i, ε, a, c, u/; Grimaldi, 2009; Grimaldi et al., 2010)
contrary to the richer vowel system of BE that shows, excluding
diphthongs, eleven stressed vowels (see Stimuli). Therefore, for
SI speakers, it could be relatively difficult to learn a complex L2
vowel system, supporting the idea that the L1 plays an important
role and enables one to predict the relative difficulty of acquisition
of a given L2 contrast (Iverson and Evans, 2007). Firstly, we behav-
iorally tested the two groups of students by means of an identi-
fication test. On the basis of the results of this test, the contrasts
/i:/-/u:/ and /æ/-/ v/ (for which the PAM’s framework predicted an
excellent and a good discrimination, respectively) were selected
for a behavioral discrimination test. In the ERPs experiment, the
groups of students were compared with a control group of listen-
ers who were much more linguistically inexperienced of the L2, as
their knowledge of English derived only from compulsory school
studies. Moreover, as a control condition we introduced the L1
within-category contrast /ε/-[e], for which poor discrimination
is predicted (cf. Phillips et al., 1995; Dehaene-Lambertz, 1997;
Winkler et al., 1999b; see also Miglietta et al., 2013). These two
vowels are phonologically contrastive in standard Italian and they
are used to create lexical contrast (i.e., /"pεska/ “peach” vs. /"peska/
“fishing”) whereas SI has the phoneme /ε/ only. Consequently, for
SI speakers these stimuli belong to the same category, as /ε/ is the
underlying phoneme and [e] represents an allophone (generally
transcribed between brackets), namely a within-category variant




Two groups of 10 normal-hearing (tested prior to the experi-
ment), right-handed, undergraduate male students of the Foreign
Languages and Literatures Faculty voluntarily participated in the
experiments. One group was enrolled in its first year (age 21.4 ±
1.71; 9.4 ± 1.34 years of English studies in formal context),
whereas the other was in its fifth year (age 25.6 ± 1.98; 14.3 ±
2.11 years of English studies in formal context). As assessed by
a questionnaire of language use, all the subjects neither partici-
pated in Erasmus programs in England nor have had L2 native
teachers prior to attending university. English instruction uni-
versity classes are taught by Italian native-speakers prevalently,
although for at least 6 months per year (3–5 h per week) these
students had been attending lessons also with native English lec-
turers. However, in the last case, language classes are only a few
hours per week and are just based on lexical and morphosyn-
tactic formal instructions; no systematic and explicit phonetic
instruction or training is administered.
Stimuli
The stimuli consisted of the 11 BE monophthong vowels, i.e., /i:/,
/I/, /ε/, /æ/, / v/, /A:/, / A/, / ε:/, / c:/, /U/ and /u:/ (Ladefoged, 2001).
These sounds were produced by three male native BE speakers
(age 47.3 ± 4.9; years in Italy: 22.3 ± 5.13), two of them coming
from London, one coming from Birmingham. The speakers read
a list of monosyllabic words with the phonemes /i:/, /I/, /ε/, /æ/,
/ v/, /A:/, / A/ and / ε:/ placed in a /p_t/ context and the phonemes
/i:/, / c:/, /U/ and /u:/ in an /s_t/ context, for a total of 36 stim-
uli (3 speakers × 12 phonemes). Given that /i:/-/u:/ and /u:/-/U/
were part of the discrimination task as control and target con-
trasts, respectively, /i:, U and u:/ needed to be recorded in the
same consonant context. Thus, the extra context /s_t/ was used
for these three vowels because there is no English word with /u:/
in the /p_t/ context. These stimuli were recorded in the CRIL
soundproof room by a CSL 4500 at a sampling rate of 22.05 kHz
and were segmented and normalized in peak amplitude using the
software Praat 4.2. Each of the student groups performed two
perceptual tests: the identification and the oddity discrimination
test. All subjects were individually tested in the CRIL soundproof
room using a computer and with sounds (set at a comfortable
sound level) delivered via headphones, for a total duration of
approximately 40 min.
Identification test
The aim of the identification test was to examine the perceived
phonetic distance between the L1 and L2 sounds: i.e., to detect
which L2 sounds are more similar/dissimilar to the L1 sounds
and, consequently, are more difficult/easy to discriminate by per-
ception (Flege and MacKay, 2004). The 36 stimuli were randomly
presented 3 times, and subjects identified each of them in terms of
one of the 5 SI vowels /i, ε, a, c/ or /u/ by clicking on the computer
screen. Students could not rehear a stimulus, but they were told
to guess if they were unsure. Before performing the test, students
received instructions orally and a training test of 10 stimuli was
administered in the presence of the experimenter to ensure that
the students understood the task. No subject was rejected on the
basis of the training test because they all found the task easy to
perform.
Oddity discrimination test
The purpose of the oddity discrimination test was to measure the
ability of listeners to discriminate L2 sounds. For each of the two
contrasts, 8 change trials and 8 catch trials (32 total trials per stu-
dent) were executed. The change trials were made up of 3 items,
each one produced by one of the three BE speakers, with an odd
item belonging to a different phonological category that subjects
had to detect. The odd item was alternatively placed in the first,
second or third position in a nearly balanced way (Tsukada et al.,
2005) to avoid response bias (Bion et al., 2006). Additionally, the
three native English speakers produced the catch trials, where all
of the items contained the same phonological category. These
kinds of trials test subjects’ ability to ignore the acoustical dif-
ferences among the stimuli belonging to the same phonological
category. For instance, to test the contrast /i:/-/u:/ the change
trials were /i:/-/i:/-/u:/ − /i:/-/u:/-/i:/ − /u:/-/i:/-/i:/ − /u:/-/u:/-
/i:/ − /u:/-/i:/-/u:/ − /i:/-/u:/-/u:/, and the catch trials were
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/i:/-/i:/-/i:/ − /u:/-/u:/-/u:/. Subjects clicked the computer screen
on “1,” “2,” “3,” corresponding to the position of the item they
perceived as different or to “none” if they perceived all items as
equal. The results of this test, i.e., A′ scores, were calculated for
each contrast by applying the formula of Snodgrass et al. (1985).
These scores reduce the effects of response bias by calculating the
proportion of hits (i.e., the number of correct selections of the
odd item in the change trials) and the proportion of false alarms
(i.e., the number of incorrect selections of an odd item in the
catch trials). An A′ score of 1.0 indicates perfect discrimination
and an A′ score of 0.5 indicates a null discrimination. Subjects
were first given the instructions and then administered a train-
ing test in the presence of the experimenter to verify that they
had understood the task. No subject was rejected on the basis of
the training test because they all found the task easy to perform.
This test was also executed by a control group of 10 male BE lis-
teners (mean age: 20.5 ± 1.95), native speakers of the London
variety.
Statistical analysis of oddity discrimination test results.
Discrimination accuracy (A′ score) was analyzed in repeated-
measures ANOVA with “contrast” (/æ/-/ v/ and /i:/-/u:/) as the
within-subject factor and “group” (first and fifth year) as the
between-subject factor. In all of the statistical analyses, the alpha
level was set to p < 0.05, and type I errors were controlled for by
decreasing the degrees of freedom with the Greenhouse–Geisser




The two groups of students involved in the behavioral experi-
ments participated in the ERP sessions. Additionally, a third con-
trol group of normally hearing (tested prior to the experiment),
right-handed subjects with only compulsory school education
(10 subjects; age 25 ± 4.26; years of English studies in formal
context 5 ± 2.9) performed the electrophysiological test. The
control group was primarily composed of carpenters, plasterers,
or unemployed, and each participant received a small monetary
compensation for participating in the experiment. If one con-
siders that in Italy a foreign language is usually taught starting
from the last two years of primary school (when children are
normally 8 years old), we can suppose that the student groups
and the control group have a similar starting age of L2 expo-
sure. However, the student groups have more formal exposure
to the L2, particularly the fifth year group. In contrast, the con-
trol group’s L2 exposure was limited to compulsory school, where
they passively received impoverished lexical or morphosyntactic
inputs by non-native L2 teachers for approximately 3 h per week.
Additionally, in Italy foreign programs are dubbed, so that the
exposure to foreign languages in informal contexts is very low. We
also excluded that the ordinary listening of English music could
represent an involuntary L2 training, as the acquisition of L2 in
adulthood presupposes a strong motivation and a continuous use
of L2 in different conversational contexts (cf. Gardner, 1991). All
of the subjects signed the informed consent form. The local Ethics
Committee approved the experimental procedure.
Stimuli and procedure
We used the same contrast pairs as in the oddity discrimination
test but the stimuli consisted of synthetic vowels whose duration
was 350 ms (edited with Praat 4.2). Thus the contrasts tested were
/i/-/u/ and /æ/-/ v/. A third contrast was added as control, i.e.,
/ε/-[e] where the former is a mid-opened vowel and the latter a
mid-closed one. This is a within-category contrast for SI speakers
and poor discrimination is predicted. In Table 1, we provide the
acoustic characteristics of stimuli. First formant frequency (F1)
and second formant frequency (F2) are given in Hz.
To avoid confounding the effects of acoustic variations in
natural utterances with the ERP responses, the stimuli for the
ERP experiment were created using the Semisynthetic Speech
Generation method (SSG, Alku et al., 1999), which mathemat-
ically models the functioning of the human voice production
mechanism. To obtain raw material for the SSG synthesis for
the ERP experiment, short words produced by a native male BE
speaker (44 years old coming from London) and by a native male
speaker of Standard Italian (45 years old, coming from Florence)
were recorded in a soundproof room using a Sennheiser MKH
20 P48 high-frequency condenser, omnidirectional microphone,
and a response frequency of 20–20,000 Hz, and further processed
with a sampling frequency of 22050 Hz and a resolution of 16 bits.
Signal sections corresponding to the desired vowels to be syn-
thesized were cut from the recorded words. From these selected
sections, the corresponding vocal tract filters were computed
with SSG using digital all-pole filtering (Oppenheim and Schafer,
1989) of 22.
The three contrasts /æ/-/ v/, /i/-/u/ and /ε/-[e] were presented
in separate blocks lasting 15 min each, and each with 86% fre-
quency of occurrence (582 trials) for the standard stimulus (the
first vowel of each above listed pair) and 14% frequency (114 tri-
als) for the deviant stimulus (the second vowel of each pair). The
order of presentation was pseudo-randomized, since a deviant
stimulus was never presented before three standards. The inter-
stimulus interval was 750 ms. During the EEG recording, partici-
pants sat in a comfortable armchair and were instructed to watch
a silent movie while paying no attention to the stimuli, which were
binaurally presented in a soundproof room through loudspeakers
at 65/70 dB.
Electrophysiological recordings
The EEG was recorded from the scalp using a 64 Ag/AgCl elec-
trode cap (BrainCap, Brain Products) with a sampling frequency
of 500 Hz. Eye movements were monitored with electrodes
attached at the top and the bottom of the left eye and at the top
Table 1 | Values of the first formant (F1) and the second formant (F2)
given in Hz and Euclidean distances of the stimulus contrasts utilized
in the ERP experiment.
Formants /i/ /u/ /æ/ / v/ /ε/ [e] Contrast Euclidean
distance
F1 Hz 322 347 823 678 563 435 /i/-/u/ 1209 Mel
F2 Hz 2363 1015 1535 1090 1712 1986 /æ/-/ v/ 581 Mel
/ε/-[e] 404 Mel
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of the right eye. The reference electrodes were attached on the ear
lobes. Impedance was kept under 15 k. The signal was off-line
filtered (0.5–50 Hz, 24 dB), and the threshold for artifact rejec-
tion was set at > ±125 μV. The numbers of trials accepted after
artifact rejection are reported in Table 2. Each standard follow-
ing a deviant was removed from the averaging. The ERP epochs
included a pre-stimulus interval of 100 ms, used for baseline
correction, and lasted until 450 ms.
Statistical analysis of ERP data
To quantify the MMN, we first identified the most negative
peaks at Fz around the time interval 120–300 ms for each con-
trast and group from the grand-average difference waveforms.
Subsequently, the individual MMN amplitudes were calculated by
taking the mean values from the same 40-ms interval around the
grand-average MMN peaks for each contrast and group obtained
as described above. The significance of the individual MMN
amplitudes at Fz was verified by paired t-tests against the zero
baseline. To test our hypotheses on the effects of contrast types
and language exposure on the MMN amplitudes measured at F3,
F4, C3, C4, P3, and P4, we used repeated-measures ANOVAs
and linear mixed-effect models with the between-subject fac-
tor Group (first year, fifth year students and control group)
and the within-factors Language (the within-category contrast
/ε/-[e] and the English pairs /i/-/u/ and /æ/-/ v/), Contrast (/i/-
/u/, /æ/-/ v/, and /ε/-[e]), Frontality (frontal, central, and parietal
electrodes) and Laterality (right or left hemisphere). We also
extracted the individual peak latencies of the MMN response
recorded at Fz by searching for the most negative peak within
the time interval 120–300 ms per each subject and each condi-
tion. For testing the hypotheses on the MMN peak latencies, a
similar ANOVA as above (with Group, Language and Contrast
as factors) was conducted but without the two electrode factors.
For all statistical tests, the alpha level was chosen to correspond
to p < 0.05. Type I errors were controlled for by decreasing the
degrees of freedom with the Greenhouse–Geisser epsilon (orig-
inal degrees of freedom are reported) or by adding subjects as
random effect including it as intercept or random slopes, when
appropriate as assessed by the Bayesian information criteria in a
linear mixed-effect model. The difference threshold for accept-
ing or rejecting a more complex model was set to 4. Post-hoc
tests were conducted by Fisher’s least-significant difference (LSD)
comparisons.
Table 2 | The average number of accepted standard (stand) and
deviant (dev) trials for each contrast and each group (control group,
first year students, fifth year students).
Contrasts Control First year Fifth year
stand dev stand dev stand dev
/æ/-/
v
/ 496 (85%) 97 (85%) 510 (88%) 99 (87%) 491 (85%) 98 (86%)
/i/-/u/ 472 (86%) 93 (86%) 500 (86%) 98 (86%) 512 (88%) 101 (89%)
/ε/-[e] 501 (86%) 98 (86%) 495 (85%) 99 (86%) 491 (84%) 98 (86%)




The identification test results were considered in terms of the per-
centage of identification of BE phonemes with respect to the SI
ones. The percentages indicate the frequency with which L1 SI
vowels were used to classify the L2 BE vowels. The percentages of
identification obtained by first (I) and fifth (V) year students are
summarized in Table 3.
The percentages of identification of the L2 phonemes to the
L1 phonemes are very useful for understanding how the former
are perceived and categorized with respect to the latter. The L2
phonemes associated with an L1 phoneme with an identifica-
tion percentage ≥ 80% were considered consistently identified
to the L1 and only that identification was taken into account.
Conversely, those L2 phonemes associated with two or more L1
phonemes (identification percentage < 80%) were considered as
not consistently assimilated, and the first two identifications were
taken into account.
The data summarized in Table 3 show that both the first
and the fifth year students adopted the same assimilation strate-
gies, albeit with slightly different percentages. According to the
identification consistency threshold identified above, the results
depict the following scenario: /æ/ was consistently assimilated
with the native phoneme /a/; / v/ was identified to /a/ or /o/, so was
not assimilated to either of these two native phonemes. Finally,
/i:/ and /u:/ were each consistently identified with the native
phonemes, /i/ and /u/, respectively. In fact, BE /i:/ and /u:/ (see
Table 1) share some formant features with SI /i/ (F1 326, F2 2244)
and /u/ (F1 368, F2 867) (Grimaldi, 2009) and consequently are
perceived by SI listeners as their native counterpart.
According to the PAM typologies of assimilation, the vow-
els /æ/, / v/, /i:/ and /u:/, can be grouped into two contrasts of
L2 vowels (see Table 3): (i) the contrast /æ/-/ v/ falls into the
Uncategorized-Categorized assimilation, for which good discrim-
ination is predicted, as the non-native vowel /æ/ is consistently
assimilated to a native phoneme (/a/), whereas the other vowel
/ v/ is not categorized with any native phoneme; (ii) the contrast
/i:/-/u:/ falls into the two-category assimilation, for which excel-
lent discrimination is predicted, as they have been consistently
Table 3 | Mean percentage of identification of L2 vs. L1 vowels by first
(I) and fifth (V) year students.
L2
L1 /i/ /ε/ /a/ /
c
/ /u/
I (%) V (%) I (%) V (%) I (%) V (%) I (%) V (%) I (%) V (%)
/i:/ 99 100
/I/ 84 83 15 17
/ε/ 99 100
/æ/ 19 19 81 81
/ v/ 1 67 79 33 20
/A:/ 73 91 26 9
/ A/ 2 13 98 87
/ c:/ 6 94 97 3
/ ε:/ 33 52 23 18 32 27 11 3
/u:/ 2 98 100
/U/ 3 53 36 47 61
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identified with two different native phonemes: i.e., /i/ and /u/.
The discrimination ability by the two groups of students for these
contrasts was further tested with the oddity discrimination test.
ODDITY DISCRIMINATION TEST
The repeated-measures ANOVA on A′ scores (Table 4 and
Figure 1) did not yield differences between the two groups,
[F(1, 18) = 0.40, p > 0.05, η2p = 0.02] but it yielded a significant
effect for the contrasts [F(1, 18) = 18.24, p = 0.000, η2p = 0.50].
The post-hoc analysis revealed that the contrast /i:/-/u:/ was dis-
criminated with a higher A′ with regard to the contrast /æ/-/ v/.
The interaction Group × Contrast was not significant [F(1, 18) =
0.26, p > 0.05, η2p = 0.01].
ERPs
Figures 2–4 show the grand-average difference waveforms for all
groups and for each stimulus contrast (see also Figure S1 in the
Supplementary Material). The mean MMN amplitudes and peak
latencies are displayed in Table 5 and Figure 5.
For all conditions and for all groups, we obtained a sig-
nificant MMN response. In the ANOVA, the MMN amplitude
was slightly significantly modulated by Contrast [F(2, 52) = 3.02,
p = 0.05, η2p = 0.10; this result corresponded to an only marginal
significance in the linear mixed-effects model with by-subjects
random intercepts where by-stimulus random intercepts and
by-subject random slopes for Contrast were tested for inclu-
sion: F(2, 54) = 2.9, p = 0.07]. The post-hoc tests showed that
there was a significant difference between the L2 /æ/-/ v/ and the
within-category contrast /ε/-[e] (p < 0.05) and a tendency toward
a significant difference between /i/-/u/ and the within-category
Table 4 | The A′ scores obtained by the first year group (I) and the
fifth year group (V).
Contrasts I year group V year group
/æ/-/ v/ 0.69 (0.23) 0.67 (0.27)
/i:/-/u:/ 0.95 (0.04) 0.87 (0.15)
Standard deviations are in parentheses.
FIGURE 1 | The A′ score obtained by the first year group (dotted bar)
and the fifth year group (striped bar).
contrast /ε/-[e] (p = 0.06). Namely, the within-category contrast
/ε/-[e] had the lowest amplitude, while the L2 contrasts /i/-/u/ and
/æ/-/ v/ showed similar amplitudes. The MMN amplitude was also
modulated by Frontality [F(2, 52) = 112.16, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.81;
also replicated in the linear mixed-effects model: F(2, 400) = 2.4,
p < 0.0001] and the post-hoc showed that the amplitudes were
highest in the frontal area, then in the central and finally in the
parietal area. Additionally, we found a modulation of the frontal
MMN amplitudes by group expertise with the significant interac-
tion Group × Frontality [F(4, 52) = 4.56, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.26;
confirmed also in the linear mixed-effects model: F(4, 400) = 10.7,
p < 0.001]. This interaction derived from the larger MMN ampli-
tudes at frontal electrodes to any stimulus found in the control
students as compared with the fifth year students (p = 0.06).
Moreover, the significant interaction Contrast × Frontality
[F(4, 104) = 3.38, p < 0.05, η2p = 0.15; this result was replicated
in the linear mixed-effects model: F(4, 400) = 4, p = 0.004] con-
firmed that in the frontal area the within-category contrast /ε/-[e]
had lower amplitudes than /i/-/u/ and /æ/-/ v/ (/i/-/u/ vs. /ε/-
[e]: p < 0.05; /æ/-/ v/ vs. /ε/-[e]: p = 0.01; /i/-/u/ vs. /æ/-/ v/: p >
0.05). The typical fronto-central MMN scalp distribution was also
confirmed by the significant interaction Frontality × Laterality
[F(2, 52) = 4.48, p = 0.01, η2p = 0.14; this result was not repli-
cated though in the linear mixed-effect model: F(2, 400) = 1.6,
p = 0.2] and the post-hoc showed that this pattern was present in
both the right and left hemispheres. The amplitude of the MMN
presented a difference in the frontal area only, where it was larger
over the right than the left hemisphere (cf. Table 6 for the repeated
measures ANOVA results).
The MMN peak latency differed according to the vowel con-
trasts, as testified by the significant main effect of Contrast
[F(2, 52) = 10.35, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.28] (cf. Table 7 for all statis-
tical results).
This effect obtained with a general linear model with fixed
effects was confirmed also in a linear mixed-effects model of
MMN peak latency as a function of Contrast with by-subjects
random intercepts where by-stimulus random intercepts for
Contrast were tested for inclusion (by-subject random slopes
were not included instead, since they did not improve the
model fit according to the Bayesian information criteria). Also
in this more generalizable mixed-effects model the main effect
of Contrast reached significance [F(2, 52) = 11.2, p < 0.001]. In
post-hoc tests, the contrasts /i/-/u/ evoked a faster MMN than the
contrast /æ/-/ v/ (p = 0.01) and the within-category contrast /ε/-
[e] (p = 0.000), and in turn the contrast /æ/-/ v/ evoked a faster
MMN than the contrast /ε/-[e] (p < 0.05).
DISCUSSION
This study tested whether the L2 discrimination patterns pre-
dicted by the PAM for L2 contrasts are mirrored in the MMN
amplitudes and peak latencies to the same contrasts. The behav-
ioral findings suggest that the first and the fifth year students
did not differ in their discrimination processes, notwithstand-
ing the different classroom and educational backgrounds. In
particular, these two groups of subjects exhibited excellent dis-
crimination of /i:/-/u:/ (belonging to Two-Category assimilation)
and moderate to good discrimination of /æ/-/ v/ (belonging to
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FIGURE 2 | (A) Grand-average difference waveforms for the first (blue pointed
line) and fifth (red dashed line) year students and the control group (black solid
line) in response to the contrast /i/-/u/; (B) The grand-average difference
waveforms for the three groups at the frontal electrode (Fz) are enlarged; (C)
Voltage maps for the groups are plotted at the MMN peaks of the grand-
average waveforms, referenced to the algebraic mean of the electrodes.
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FIGURE 3 | (A) Grand-average difference waveforms for the first (blue pointed
line) and fifth (red dashed line) year students and the control group (black solid
line) in response to the contrast /æ/-/ v/; (B) The grand-average difference
waveforms for the three groups at the frontal electrode (Fz) are enlarged; (C)
Voltage maps for the groups are plotted at the MMN peaks of the grand-
average waveforms, referenced to the algebraic mean of the electrodes.
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FIGURE 4 | (A) Grand-average difference waveforms for the first (blue pointed
line) and fifth (red dashed line) year students and the control group (black solid
line) in response to the contrast /ε/-[e]; (B) The grand-average difference
waveforms for the three groups at the frontal electrode (Fz) are enlarged; (C)
Voltage maps for the groups are plotted at the MMN peaks of the grand-
average waveforms, referenced to the algebraic mean of the electrodes.
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Table 5 | The mean MMN amplitudes and peak latencies at Fz.
Vowel contrasts I year group V year group Control group
Amplitude Latency Amplitude Latency Amplitude Latency
/i/-/u/ 3.37 (1.58) 187 (34) −2.62 (1.45) 176 (13) −4.26 (1.78) 182 (18)
/æ/-/ v/ −2.88 (1.00) 185 (21) −2.73 (1.87) 207 (38) −3.97 (1.28) 202 (18)
/ε/-[e] −2.29 (1.36) 230 (35) −2.39 (1.45) 212 (49) −3.09 (2.45) 209 (51)
Standard deviations are given in parentheses.
FIGURE 5 | (A) The average amplitude (μV) for each contrast. The results
are merged since there were no significant differences among the groups.
(B) The average latency (ms) for each contrast. The results are merged
since there were no significant differences among the groups.
Uncategorized-Categorized assimilation). The findings obtained
in the behavioral experiments are in accordance with the PAM
predictions, as the PAM framework foresees excellent discrimina-
tion of /i:/-/u:/ and moderate-to-good discrimination of /æ/-/ v/.
Notably, PAM assimilation types describe the possible per-
ceptive outcomes of first contact with an unfamiliar phonolog-
ical system and its phonetic patterns. Hence, PAM assimilation
types predict how naïve listeners will identify and discriminate
non-native phonological contrasts. When a good or an excellent
discrimination is predicted, this does not mean that L2 listen-
ers are able to differentiate phonetic and phonological patterns
in non-native stimuli, but that they can only easily recognize
the acoustic deviations of the unfamiliar phones from their L1
phonemes (Best and Tyler, 2007). According to (Best and Tyler,
2007), this is a starting condition that may or not evolve in
the formation of L2 phonetic and phonological categories dur-
ing the acquisition process, depending on numerous variables:
i.e., age of L2 learning, length of residence in an L2-speaking
country, gender, formal instruction, motivation, language learn-
ing aptitude and amount of native language (L1) use (Piske et al.,
2001). The current behavioral findings from both the identifi-
cation and discrimination tests confirmed in perception those
obtained in production by Suter’s (1976) seminal work, accord-
ing to which formal instruction was a factor which did not greatly
contribute to the improvement of pronunciation. Suter’s study
showed that the pronunciation of students does not necessarily
improve during their university education. Within the PAM and
the SLM framework, supportive evidence, concerning both per-
ception and production, was also behaviorally provided by Simon
and D’Hulster (2012). Indeed, L2 university experience in Dutch-
speaking learners of English did not have an important effect on
Table 6 | Degrees of freedom (df ), F and p values of the repeated
measures ANOVA performed for the MMN amplitudes.
Factor df F p-Value
Contrast 2, 52 3.02 0.05
Contrast × group 4, 52 0.21 0.93
Frontality 2, 52 112.16 <0.001
Frontality × group 4, 52 4.56 <0.001
Laterality 1, 26 0.06 0.80
Laterality × group 2, 26 0.97 0.39
Contrast × frontality 4, 104 3.38 <0.001
Contrast × frontality × group 8, 104 0.83 0.57
Contrast × laterality 2, 52 0.58 0.56
Contrast × laterality × group 4, 52 0.39 0.81
Frontality × laterality 2, 52 4.48 0.01
Frontality × laterality × group 4, 52 1.36 0.26
Contrast × frontality × laterality 4, 104 0.47 0.75
Contrast × frontality × laterality × group 8, 104 1.68 0.11
Table 7 | Degrees of freedom (df ), F and p values of the repeated
measures ANOVA performed for the MMN latencies.
Term df F p-Value
Contrast 2, 52 10.35 <0.001
Contrast × group 4, 52 1.57 0.19
their production performance. That is, learners who were almost
at the end of their university studies did not produce the English
vowel contrast /ε/-/æ/ significantly more native-likely than learn-
ers who had only just begun their university studies in English. In
parallel, according to PAM, Simon and D’Hulster (2012) found
that in perception both inexperienced and experienced learners
were able to discriminate the vowel contrast /ε/-/æ/ similarly,
since they displayed a Category-Goodness assimilation for which
intermediate discrimination is predicted (Best and Tyler, 2007).
In the ERP experiment we introduced a control group of lis-
teners with English knowledge derived only from compulsory
school, thus much more inexperienced than the students groups.
Furthermore, we introduced a third contrast as control, i.e., the
L1 within-category contrast /ε/-[e]. Based on the vowel space
of SI, spoken by our subjects (cf. Grimaldi, 2009 and Table 1),
we predicted that those two vowels should be perceived as good
exemplars of the same native phoneme /ε/. Hence, we expected
difficult discrimination for that contrast (Phillips et al., 1995;
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Dehaene-Lambertz, 1997; Winkler et al., 1999b). Indeed, our
electrophysiological results confirmed that in all subjects the two
L2 contrasts, /i/-/u/ and /æ/-/ v/, elicited larger MMN ampli-
tudes than the L1 within-category contrast /ε/-[e] (cf. Table 6).
According to PAM predictions, this finding indicates that our
subjects discriminated well the two non-native contrasts.
MMN peak latencies, on the other hands, were modulated
by the contrast type: the contrast /i/-/u/ elicited a faster MMN
than the contrast /æ/-/ v/ and the within-category contrast /ε/-
[e]; in turn, the contrast /æ/-/ v/ evoked a faster MMN than
the contrast /ε/-[e]. This result reflected the acoustic distances
between the stimuli (see Table 1), i.e., the smallest between the
within-category contrast /ε/-[e] and the largest between the L2
contrast /i/-/u/. As a consequence, the MMN peak latency steadily
decreased with increasing acoustic deviation (cf. Näätänen et al.,
1997). Actually, the behavioral findings showed that the /i/-/u/
contrast is better discriminated than the /æ/-/ v/ contrast. So, such
fine mirroring of the MMN peak latencies to the behavioral dis-
crimination performances suggests that the perceptual processes
manifested by our subjects are influenced by stimulus representa-
tions containing mainly auditory (sensory) information.
Furthermore, the MMN peaked at frontal electrodes, was min-
imal over supra-temporal regions, and was right lateralized. This
can shed further light on the nature of the perceptual pro-
cesses of our subjects (cf. Näätänen et al., 1993; Rinne et al.,
2000; Deouell, 2007). Indeed, the MMN generators are usually
left lateralized over supra-temporal regions for speech stimuli,
whereas the acoustical MMN is bilaterally generated, suggesting
that the neural phoneme traces are located in the left auditory
cortex (Näätänen et al., 1997; Rinne et al., 1997; Shestakova
et al., 2002; Pulvermüller et al., 2003; Shtyrov et al., 2005; see
Näätänen et al., 2007 for a discussion). Consequently, the similar-
ity in MMN amplitudes between the groups and the predominant
frontal right hemispheric activation suggest a discrimination of
auditory sensory information rather than permanent phoneme
traces.
Overall, these results confirmed our view based on PAM pre-
dictions, namely that both our student groups responded to L2
contrasts as they assimilate them to L1 phonemes, similarly to
L2 naïve listeners. If native L2 perceptual abilities had emerged,
we would have found significant differences in the MMN ampli-
tude and peak latency responses between the three groups, which
was not the case. However, we did find a slight difference in
the MMN topography between the groups, although irrespec-
tive of the stimulus category: in the frontal electrodes the control
group showed more negative MMN amplitudes than the fifth
year group of students (Figures 2–4). This effect is most likely
deriving from the overlap of the attention-related N2b compo-
nent on the MMN response (Näätänen, 1992; Escera et al., 1998,
2000), so that the alternating effect of the L2 standard and deviant
stimuli produced an attention-modulated neural processing in
the less experienced subjects than in the ones more experienced
with those speech sounds in general (Näätänen, 1990; Sussman
et al., 1998). However, this effect was observed for all stimuli and
not modulated by the sound category; hence, is not alone suf-
ficient to claim for neuroplasticity to L2 sounds in the student
groups.
Our findings suggest that the amount and the quality of class-
room inputs received by our students might be insufficient to
form long-term traces of the L2 sounds in their auditory cortex, as
indexed by the MMN. This picture is consistent with earlier stud-
ies on Finnish children participating in English immersion educa-
tion and on advanced adult classroom Finnish learners of English
(Peltola et al., 2003, 2007) where no MMN traces were found
for the development of a new L2 vowel category. Also, the same
scenario emerged in studies on limited passive training (Dobel
et al., 2009) where MEG data showed that L1 phonemic cate-
gories are powerful attractors in that they absorb the non-native
stimulus, which is a considerable stumbling block on the path to
the mastery of non-native contrasts. Based on these findings, the
authors proposed that the maturation of new native-like memory
traces is associated with the authenticity of the learning context.
However, none of these studies have tested these processes within
a theoretical framework on L2 speech learning in adulthood.
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE WORKS
Our study for the first time provides an electrophysiological
confirmation of the PAM predictions. Specifically, our results
confirm that the PAM framework is able to make predictions
on non-native speech perception by L2 listeners who have not
actively learned an L2 to achieve functional, communicative goals
and that within this typology of learners one has to include L2
classroom learners (Best and Tyler, 2007: 16). Actually, foreign
language acquisition usually happens in a pervasive L1 setting
(where L2 pronunciation receives little attention) and does not
extend much outside the classroom: it often employs formal
instruction on lexical and grammatical information and lacks
intensive perceptual and pronunciation training (Best and Tyler,
2007). When spoken in the classroom, the L2 is often uttered
by L1-accented teachers or, at best, by speakers from diverse
L2 varieties, which interferes with perception even for native
listeners of the L2 (Bundgaard-Nielsen and Bohn, 2004). Thus,
foreign language acquisition is a fairly impoverished context
for L2 learning. Indeed, starting from the Suter’s (1976) work,
behavioral studies examining the influence of formal instruction
on the acquisition of L2 foreign perception and production skills
have not produced favorable results for language teachers (Flege
et al., 1995). The amount of formal inputs received by L2 students
has been shown to have a rather limited or null influence, except
for the case in which specific training in the perception and
production of L2 sounds or a substantial amount of high-quality
input over a period of many years is administered (see Piske
et al., 2001; Simon and D’Hulster, 2012, and the literature within
cited). Thereby, we confirmed and extended the findings of
previous behavioral studies (Flege and Fletcher, 1992; Flege,
1995; Flege et al., 1999) in neurally showing that long-term L2
language classroom has no influence on degree of L2 perception
and foreign accent. Further studies might, however, utilize novel
methods of signal processing to investigate whether differences
in neural processing depending on classroom learning might
be hidden in narrow EEG frequency bands or in trial-to-trial
variations or in corticocortical transfer of information (e.g., Choi
et al., 2013; Lieder et al., 2013), which could not be detected with
the conventional approach adopted here.
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Overall, this and earlier studies support the hypothesis that
students in a foreign language classroom should particularly
benefit from learning environments only where: (i) receive a
focused amount of high-quality input from L2 native teachers;
(ii) use pervasively the L2 to achieve functional and communica-
tive goals; and (iii) receive intensive training in the perception
and production of L2 sounds in order to reactivate neuroplas-
ticity of auditory cortex (see the issues and studies discussed in
Piske, 2007). In fact, recent behavioral and neurophysiological
studies (Kraus et al., 1995; Pisoni and Lively, 1995; Tremblay
et al., 1997, 1998; Tremblay and Kraus, 2002; Iverson et al., 2005;
Ylinen et al., 2009; Zhang et al., 2009) suggest that the sensory
resolution of phonetic features can be improved by targeted
training, even in adults, and new phonetic representations may
be stably developed.
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Individuals suffering from vision loss of a peripheral origin may learn to understand
spoken language at a rate of up to about 22 syllables (syl) per seconds (s)—exceeding
by far the maximum performance level of untrained listeners (ca. 8 syl/s). Previous
findings indicate the central-visual system to contribute to the processing of accelerated
speech in blind subjects. As an extension, the present training study addresses the
issue whether acquisition of ultra-fast (18 syl/s) speech perception skills induces de novo
central-visual hemodynamic activation in late-blind participants. Furthermore, we asked
to what extent subjects with normal or residual vision can improve understanding of
accelerated verbal utterances by means of specific training measures. To these ends,
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) was performed while subjects were
listening to forward and reversed sentence utterances of moderately fast and ultra-fast
syllable rates (8 or 18 syl/s) prior to and after a training period of ca. 6 months. Four
of six participants showed—independently from residual visual functions—considerable
enhancement of ultra-fast speech perception (about 70% points correctly repeated words)
whereas behavioral performance did not change in the two remaining participants. Only
subjects with very low visual acuity displayed training-induced hemodynamic activation
of the central-visual system. By contrast, participants with moderately impaired or even
normal visual acuity showed, instead, increased right-hemispheric frontal or bilateral
anterior temporal lobe responses after training. All subjects with significant training effects
displayed a concomitant increase of hemodynamic activation of left-hemispheric SMA. In
spite of similar behavioral performance, trained “experts” appear to use distinct strategies
of ultra-fast speech processing depending on whether the occipital cortex is still deployed
for visual processing.
Keywords: cross-modal plasticity, speech perception, residual vision, strategies, blindness
INTRODUCTION
The acquisition of sensorimotor or perceptual skills is associated
with functional brain reorganization, and these processes may
emerge within a single or extend across several modality-specific
cortical regions. For example, training-induced neuroplasticity of
auditory association areas has been observed in normal-sighted
subjects who learned to understand time-compressed speech
(Adank and Devlin, 2010). By contrast, cross-modal mechanisms
appear to contribute to the processing of non-visual (tactile or
auditory) stimuli or language-related tasks in blind individuals.
Striate cortex, e.g., has been found to show significant hemody-
namic activation during Braille reading (e.g., Büchel et al., 1998;
Sadato et al., 1998; Gizewski et al., 2003; Sadato, 2005; Burton
et al., 2006), auditory motion detection (Poirier et al., 2006),
syntactic and semantic speech processing (Röder et al., 2002),
verb generation, production of mental images based upon ani-
mal names, and verbal episodic memory retrieval (Amedi et al.,
2003; Lambert et al., 2004; Raz et al., 2005). As a further example,
vision-impaired individuals may learn to understand accelerated
spoken language at a rate of up to about 22 syllables (syl) per
second (s)—exceeding by far the capacities of normal sighted lis-
teners whose upper limit is at ca. 8 syl/s (Moos and Trouvain,
2007). This exceptional skill allows for the processing of large
amounts of written materials using screen-reading text-to-speech
devices and may help, e.g., to better cope with the demands of
college or university education. As a first approach to the eluci-
dation of the cerebral mechanisms underlying these intriguing
perceptual/cognitive capacities, a previous fMRI study of our
group (Dietrich et al., 2013) delineated the hemodynamic activa-
tion pattern of late-blind and sighted individuals while listening
to sentence utterances of a moderately fast (8 syl/s) or ultra-
fast (16 syl/s) syllable rate. The proficiency of the blind subjects
extended from low to high comprehension capabilities (up to
>90%—in terms of the percentage of syllables in correctly repro-
duced words in a sentence repetition task) at 16 syl/s, whereas
the performance level of sighted subjects fell consistently below
20%. Besides the classical perisylvian “language zones” of the
left hemisphere [inferior frontal gyrus (IFG)/superior temporal
cortex] and the supplementary motor area (SMA), blind people
highly skilled in ultra-fast speech perception showed significant
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hemodynamic activation of right-hemispheric primary visual
cortex (V1), contralateral fusiform gyrus (FG), and bilateral pul-
vinar (Pv) (Dietrich et al., 2013). In a recent Hypothesis and
Theory paper (Hertrich et al., 2013b), an expanded model of
speech perception was introduced to describe how blind subjects
might use their visual system for ultra-fast speech perception.
Thereby, right visual cortex enhances time-critical speech pro-
cessing due to its cross-links to (i) the afferent auditory pathway
(e.g., via Pv) and (ii) to frontal action-related representations
(e.g., SMA, IFG). Experimental data have shown that the visual
system can impact auditory perception at basic computational
stages such as temporal signal resolution. For instance, magne-
toencephalographic measurements revealed an early field compo-
nent in right occipital cortex phase-locked to the syllable onsets of
accelerated speech (Hertrich et al., 2013a). In normal sighted peo-
ple, the “bottleneck” for understanding time-compressed speech
seems related to higher demands on the buffering of phonologi-
cal materials and is presumably linked to frontal brain structures.
Thus, occipito-frontal interaction via SMA might be an impor-
tant factor for overcoming this bottleneck.
Moos and Trouvain (2007) as well as our previous group
study (Dietrich et al., 2013) used as participants a group of
blind performers and normal sighted non-performers and, thus,
the factors blindness and performance were confounded. Thus,
the question whether vision might be a limitation for ultra-
fast speech comprehension is not yet answered. Training studies
can be expected to further elucidate the relationship between
neuroimaging data and behavioral performance during ultra-
fast speech perception. More specifically, we hypothesized—based
upon our preceding work—that, first, the acquisition of ultra-
fast speech comprehension skills translates into hemodynamic
activation of the visual system, indicating that enhanced spo-
ken language processing might be associated with the recruit-
ment of occipital cortex. Second, the strength of training-induced
responses of the visual system was expected to parallel the extent
of vision impairment. Third, activation of left IFG and SMA—
as components of inner speech representations—might reflect
speech understanding. In particular, left SMA is hypothesized to
play a role in coordinating prosodic features such as the timing of
syllable onsets with phonetic representations in IFG which is also
assumed to strongly interact with the mental lexicon. The data,
furthermore, will be interpreted in terms of different neuroplas-
ticity patterns as suggested by Kelly and Garavan (2005), i.e., the
distinction between reorganization and redistribution during the
acquisition of a new skill. Thereby, functional reorganization—
in terms of recruiting an additional area with training associated
with the shift in the cognitive processes underlying performance
(see also Guida et al., 2012)—is expected in blind subjects with
strongly reduced vision. By contrast, subjects with residual vision
after training may just increase activation within the already
existing classical language network.
As a first and still preliminary test of these suggestions, five
late-blind subjects varying in residual vision capacities and one
normal sighted individual—all of them never exposed to acceler-
ated spoken language before—were instructed to train ultra-fast
speech comprehension capacities over a period of ca. 6 months.
The participants underwent behavioral performance tests as well
as fMRI measurements prior to and after the training sessions
while listening to sentence utterances of a moderately fast (8 syl/s)
and ultra-fast (18 syl/s) speaking rate. As a control condition, the
same test materials were applied as time-reversed events to the
participants, representing unintelligible signals of a matched dis-
tribution of spectral energy. Given the relatively small sample size
of the training study, each of the six individuals (differing in their
residual vision) was evaluated based on whole-brain analyses as
a single case. Furthermore, the “activation spots” of our previous
group study (Dietrich et al., 2013) which displayed a significant
covariance between BOLD responses and ultra-fast speech per-
ception capabilities (right V1, ipsilateral Pv, left SMA, and left
IFG) were considered regions-of-interest (ROI) and analyzed in
more detail at the group level.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Five blind subjects and a single normal-sighted individual (3
males; mean age = 34.3 years, SD = 11.99) participated in this
functional imaging experiment (Table 1). All of them were right-
handed (Edinburgh handedness inventory) native German speak-
ers without a history of neurological problems or hearing deficits
as determined by means of an audiogram. The study design
had been approved by the ethics committee of the University of
Tübingen. All blind participants received a set of written infor-
mation (MRI guidelines, data protection, and consent form) as
pdf-files by email. Prior to fMRI measurements, the experimenter
read, in addition, the materials aloud to each blind individual,
and the consent form was signed in the presence of a sighted wit-
ness. Since the blind participants were recruited from community
organizations, a detailed clinical data bank was not available to the
authors and, thus, information on etiology and follow-up of the
ophthalmological disorders had to be drawn from personal inter-
views and previous medical records. In all instances, a peripheral
origin of blindness could be established, but the participants rep-
resented a rather heterogeneous group with respect to residual
vision capabilities, i.e., peripheral visual field and visual acu-
ity (see Table 1). The evaluation of the hemodynamic response
patterns of each participant, therefore, had to take into account
his/her individual profile of visual functions. Three of the six par-
ticipants (see Table 1) showed no or low visual capabilities (nos.
147, 151, 150), residual or normal functions (nos. 144, 146, 142).
TRAINING PROCEDURE
After a baseline session (behavioral testing and fMRI mea-
surements), the participants were instructed to use the screen-
reader JAWS (male voice, synthesizer “Eloquence,” http://www.
freedomsci.de) for at least 1 h per day. They received digital news-
papers on a regular basis, but might also “read” other texts, e.g.,
e-books. Furthermore, the subjects were encouraged to speed up
more and more the syllable rate according to their actual training
level. When they themselves had the impression to understand
more than 80% of the texts at a level of 13 syl/s, they were invited
to a second series of fMRI measurements (i.e., first training tar-
get). A third functional imaging session was conducted as soon as
a syllable rate of 18 syl/s (final training target) could be mastered.
The time span between the recording sessions amounted to ca. 3
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org October 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 701 | 128
Dietrich et al. Training of ultra-fast speech comprehension
Table 1 | Clinical and behavioral data of the vision-impaired and healthy subjects.
Subject Behavioral performance (%) Etiology
Pre-training Post-training Visual acuity (%) Peripheral
visual field
Cause of blindness
8 syl/s 13 syl/s 18 syl/s 8 syl/s 13 syl/s 18 syl/s Left Right
147 100 89 0 83 97 68 <2 <2 None Retinitis pigmentosa since
age of 7, severely deteriorated
after the age of 36 years
151 100 56 0 100 82 36 <2 <2 Intact Macular degeneration
(dystrophy of rods and cones)
since age of 29
150 100 62 0 100 97 70 2 10 Reduced Myopia (short-sightedness)
severely deteriorated after
the age of 45 years
144 100 69 8 100 93 79 20 5 Reduced Retinitis pigmentosa since
age of 13
146 100 80 14 100 92 14 50 50 Reduced Retinitis pigmentosa since
age of 3
142 100 56 0 100 96 67 Normal-sighted
months, but could ultimately be determined by the subjects them-
selves. The present study primarily compares the pre- (baseline)
and post-training (trained at 18 syl/s) measurements, whereas the
results of the intermediate session (trained at 13 syl/s), includ-
ing complex de-/activation patterns, are not in the focus of the
discussion.
STIMULI OF THE fMRI EXPERIMENT
Three sets (to be used at different sessions) of 90 different
text passages comprising one or two sentences each were col-
lected from newspapers. All these test items had a duration of
ca. 4 s after text-to-speech conversion (formant synthesizer “elo-
quence” implemented in the synthesizer JAWS), at the three
speaking rates considered (30 stimuli each at 8, 13, or 18 syl/s;
see Supplementary files 1, 2 for examples). Thus, the faster test
sentences encompassed more text than the slower ones. In a
calibration experiment prior to the training study, the relation-
ship between the internal speed parameters of the JAWS system
and the respective mean syllable rate was determined. In addi-
tion, all stimuli were converted into time-reversed speech signals,
serving as spectrally matched, but unintelligible control items
(Supplementary files 3, 4). Altogether, thus, each stimulus set
contained 30 (items) × 3 (rates) × 2 (forward/backward) = 180
stimuli that were presented in pseudo-randomized order within
one session.
BEHAVIORAL DATA ACQUISITION AND ANALYSIS
To obtain a quantitative behavioral measure of an individual’s
capability to understand time-compressed speech, each sub-
ject performed—outside the scanner and prior to the fMRI
measurements—a sentence repetition task, encompassing a set of
33 sentences of a length of 18 syllables each. These verbal utter-
ances were played to the participants at different speaking rates
amounting from 6 syl/s up to 22 syl/s, using a manual staircase
procedure in order to determine the actual syllable rate at which
repetition performance amounted to about 80% (total percent-
age of syllables across all correctly repeated words). The stimulus
materials were presented to the participants via a loudspeaker
(Fostex, 6301B) within a sound-attenuated room, subjects being
asked to repeat them “as good as possible,” even when they
failed to “grasp” all words (see Supplementary file 5 for an exam-
ple). The subjects’ repetitions were digitally recorded (M-audio
Microtrack 2496) and underwent subsequent quantitative eval-
uation of speech comprehension (percentage of correctly repro-
duced syllables (see above), ignoring minor errors such as plural
endings). Admittedly, this repetition task has a memory com-
ponent that might interfere with spoken language intelligibility.
However, in a previous study (Dietrich et al., 2013) we observed
a strong ceiling effect for moderately fast speech, indicating that
memory is not the limiting factor in the subjects’ performance.
fMRI—DATA ACQUISITION
Based upon an event-related design, the set of 180 stimuli of each
functional imaging session (30 items at three speaking rates plus
the respective backward signals) as well as 40 silent baseline events
(scanner noise only) were applied in a randomized order, sub-
divided into five runs of 44 stimuli each as binaural-symmetric
signals to the participants via headphones (Sennheiser HD 570;
modified by removal of the permanent magnet, see Baumgart
et al., 1998). Since these headphones show sufficient dampen-
ing of environmental noise, it was not necessary to provide
additional earplugs during the experiments. The inter-stimulus
interval amounted to 9.6 s (jitter ± 1.4 s, steps of 0.2 s). Since
the design did not allow for an explicit control of speech com-
prehension during the fMRI experiment, behavioral performance
was evaluated offline, and during scanning subjects were just
instructed to listen carefully to the applied auditory stimuli and
to try to understand them. Thus, the design did not allow for
an explicit control of speech comprehension during the fMRI
experiment. However, the brain structures sensitive to speech
intelligibility have been found to “light up” even under listening-
only conditions (Scott et al., 2000). And activation of language
processing areas such as IFG has been considered an indicator
of actual speech comprehension (Poldrack et al., 2001). Subjects
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were asked to close their eyes during scanning and to report to
the experimenters whether they could adequately hear the test
materials in the presence of scanner noise, otherwise the sound
amplitude of the stimuli was further adjusted.
The experiment was run on a 3 Tesla MRI system (Magnetom
TRIO; Siemens, Erlangen, Germany), using an echo-planar imag-
ing sequence (echo-time = 30 ms, 64 × 64 matrix with a res-
olution of 3 × 3 mm2, 27 axial slices across the whole brain
volume, TR = 1.6 s, slice thickness = 4 mm, flip angle = 90◦,
270 scans per run). The scanner generated a constant back-
ground noise throughout fMRI measurements, serving as the
baseline condition of the experimental design during the null
events. Anatomical images required for the localization of the
hemodynamic responses were obtained by means of a MDEFT
sequence (T1-weighted images, TR = 2.3 s, TE = 2.92 ms, flip
angle = 8◦, slice thickness = 1 mm, resolution = 1 × 1 mm2) of
a bi-commissural (AC-PC) orientation.
fMRI—DATA ANALYSES
Preprocessing of the data encompassed slice time and motion
correction, normalization to the Montreal Neurological Institute
(MNI) template space, and smoothing by means of an 8 mm
full-width half-maximum Gaussian kernel (SPM5 software pack-
age; http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). For the sake of statistical
analysis, the blood oxygen level-dependent (BOLD) responses
were modeled by means of a prototypical hemodynamic func-
tion within the context of a general linear model, event durations
being specified as 4 s epochs. Any low-frequency temporal drifts
were removed using a 128 s high-pass filter.
The evaluation of the functional imaging data encompassed
the following steps of signal analysis:
(1) In order to delineate the brain regions engaged in the process-
ing of moderately fast (=8 syl/s) and ultra-fast (=18 syl/s)
verbal utterances before and after the learning interval,
pre- and post-training runs were analyzed in a concate-
nated sequence (1st level SPM analysis). First, the SPM
T-contrast of hemodynamic activation vs. baseline (and
vice versa) was computed separately for each subject (the
SPM coordinates resulting from the contrasts are listed
in Supplementary files 6, 7). Second, direct comparisons
between post- and pre-training fMRI data during the ultra-
fast speech condition (not vs. baseline) as well as during the
baseline (=null-event) were additionally analyzed separately
for each subject (the SPM coordinates resulting from the con-
trasts are listed in Supplementary files 8, 9). Whole-brain
SPM T-contrasts were threshold at p < 0.005 uncorrected at
voxel level with an extent threshold k = 10 voxels.
(2) For the evaluation of the interaction of the experimental
conditions considered (vs. baseline), a whole-brain ANOVA
including the factors Mode (forward/backward speech),
Speech rate (8/18 syl/s), and Training (pre-/post-training) was
conducted within two single subjects—no. 147 with no resid-
ual vision and no. 142 normal sighted both with significant
training effects (whole-brain full factorial ANOVA, thresh-
old p < 0.005 uncorrected at voxel level, extent threshold
k = 10 voxels; the SPM coordinates resulting from the three-
way interaction Mode × Speech rate × Training are listed in
Supplementary file 10).
(3) Additionally, it was hypothesized that primary visual cortex
activation depends on low residual vision. Thus, a whole-
brain covariance analysis was performed with residual vision
as a rank covariate (SPM T-contrast “post- minus pre-
training” regarding the forward ultra-fast speech condition,
calculated across the six subjects; whole-brain one-sample T-
test, threshold p < 0.005 uncorrected at voxel level, extent
threshold k = 10 voxels).
(4) In order to obtain quantitative data for a comparison of
the six participants with each other, four activation clusters
(see Figure 4) hypothesized to be strongly related to ultra-
fast speech comprehension capabilities were selected from
our previous group study of late-blind subjects (Dietrich
et al., 2013): Right V1 activation was considered an index of
visual system recruitment (peak coordinates = 15, −102, 6;
cluster size = 368 voxels), ipsilateral Pv (18, −30, 6; 23 vox-
els) had emerged as an input region projecting toward right
V1 via the secondary visual pathway, left-hemispheric SMA
(−6, 9, 60; 112 voxels) may serve as a potential interface
between syllabic event timing and inner speech representa-
tions, and left-hemispheric IFG (−48, 18, 18; 162 voxels)
seems to be involved in the phonological encoding of inner
speech representations. Against the background of our model
of ultra-fast speech understanding derived from previous
work (Hertrich et al., 2013b), only blind, but not sighted
subjects were expected to recruit the central-visual system
whereas, by contrast, participants with residual or normal
vision should deactivate the visual-system during listening
to speech. As concerns SMA, already identified as a “bot-
tleneck” of time-compressed spoken language perception
(Vagharchakian et al., 2012), hemodynamic activation was
expected (i) to reflect gains in behavioral performance and
(ii) to increase with speech rate in high-performing subjects.
As a control, hemodynamic IFG activation during ultra-
fast speech perception is also hypothesized to increase with
training state, but will not show comparable effects that are
directly related to speech rate. Spearman’s rank correlation
analysis (coefficient ρ) was applied to test for the impact
of residual vision upon BOLD responses (rank 1–6, 1 =
no residual vision, 6 = normal sighted) as well as Pearson’s
correlation (coefficient r) to evaluate the relation between
individual behavioral performance and BOLD responses pre-
and post-training. Spearman’s rank correlation was chosen
because the relationship between residual vision and BOLD
responses of the visual system is not expected to be linear
(compared to a more linear relationship between behav-
ioral performance and IFG/SMA activation). Furthermore, T
statistic was used testing individual de- or activation patterns,
differences between forward and reversed speech conditions,
and differences between the slopes of regression lines corre-
sponding to pre- vs. post-training data. Since our hypotheses
make predictions regarding the direction of effects, one-sided
statistical tests were applied.
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RESULTS
BEHAVIORAL PERFORMANCE AFTER THE TRAINING
Prior to the training procedure, none of the subjects was able
to understand ultra-fast speech at a level of 18 syl/s. More
specifically, the percentage of correctly reproduced syllables fell
below 14% in all instances. At (the second) follow-up exami-
nation, four subjects (nos. 147, 150, 144, and 142) showed an
improved behavioral performance of up to ca. 70% points (mean
= 71%, SE = 2.74%). This subgroup included participants with
low or high residual or even normal vision. A single partici-
pant (no. 146) failed to show any learning effects, and another
one (no. 151) achieved only modest accomplishments amount-
ing to about 36% points (Table 1). Regarding moderately fast
(8 syl/s) and accelerated speech at 13 syl/s, after training all sub-
jects performed with >80% (8 syl/s: mean = 97%, SE = 6.94%;
13 syl/s: mean = 93%, SE = 5.71%) correctly reproduced sylla-
bles (Table 1).
WHOLE-BRAIN ANALYSES
Ultra-fast speech vs. baseline pre-training
Prior to the training period, hemodynamic responses to ultra-fast
verbal utterances emerged within primary auditory areas of either
hemisphere as well as adjacent structures of the superior/middle
temporal cortex in all subjects (SPM T-contrast “forward
ultra-fast speech vs. baseline,” p < 0.005 uncorrected with an
extent threshold k = 10 voxels; Figure 1; Supplementary file 6).
Additionally, some participants showed activation within left-
and right-hemispheric frontal, and parietal regions, the left cere-
bellum, and subcortical supratentorial areas such as the hip-
pocampus, thalamus, or pallidum (Supplementary file 6).
Ultra-fast speech vs. baseline post-training
After completion of the training, all subjects displayed significant
responses within primary auditory areas of either hemisphere as
well as adjacent structures of the superior/middle temporal cortex
FIGURE 1 | Whole-brain analyses from six single subjects differing in
residual vision, based upon the SPM T -contrasts for forward ultra-fast
speech vs. baseline pre- and post-training (red = condition vs. baseline,
green = baseline vs. condition), the direct contrast post- vs. pre-training
with respect to the ultra-fast condition as well as the training-induced
baseline shift in the null-event (red = post- vs. pre-training, green = pre-
vs. post-training). Threshold at p < 0.005 uncorrected with an extent
threshold k = 10 voxels (for peak coordinates see Supplementary files 6–9).
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(Figure 1; Supplementary file 6). Regarding well-trained partic-
ipants (nos. 147, 150, 144, and 142), visual inspection of the
activation clusters within the temporal lobe showed less exten-
sion toward the anterior part of the superior temporal gyrus
(STG) and sulcus (STS) in subjects with no or low residual
vision (nos. 147, 150) as compared to the others (nos. 144,
142). Particularly, the normal-sighted subject (no. 142) displayed
strong anterior temporal lobe activation (Figure 1). Furthermore,
participants with low residual vision (nos. 147, 151, 150) acti-
vated the occipital lobe, e.g., primary and secondary visual areas
(BA 17/18) (Figures 1, 2; Supplementary file 6). The FG was
found to “light up” in the subject with no residual vision (no.
147), whereas in other participants (nos. 151, 144, 142) BOLD
signal changes were restricted to the inferior temporal gyrus
(Supplementary file 6). All subjects showed activation within the
left-hemispheric inferior frontal gyrus (IFG). Under the applied
threshold, left IFG activation occurred sometimes as a secondary
peak linked to the temporal cluster (Supplementary file 6). All
well-trained subjects displayed hemodynamic responses of left
SMA (Figure 1; Supplementary file 6), however, in subject no.
147 SMA activation fell below the applied threshold (x, y, z = −3,
6, 69, T = 2.24). One subject with high residual vision (no.
144) showed, obviously, BOLD responses within the left- and
right-hemispheric frontal cortex, i.e., precentral gyrus (PrCG),
middle frontal gyrus (MFG), orbital gyrus (OrbG), and IFG
(Figure 1; Supplementary file 6). Some participants presented
with additional activation clusters within the parietal lobe and
subcortical areas such as thalamus and caudate nucleus. In all sub-
jects, left and/or right cerebellar activation was noted (Figure 1;
Supplementary file 6).
Regarding the SPM T-contrast vice versa (baseline vs. ultra-
fast speech condition), a widespread pattern concerning the
parietal, occipital, and frontal lobe occurred, primarily in sub-
jects with normal or residual vision (nos. 144, 146, 142)
and predominantly after the training period (Figures 1, 2;
Supplementary file 7; for occipital clusters).
Post- minus pre-training regarding the ultra-fast speech condition
Regarding the training effect on hemodynamic activation dur-
ing ultra-fast speech perception, the six subjects showed different
individual response patterns:
Direct comparison of hemodynamic activation after and
before the learning procedure (SPM T-contrast post- vs. pre-
training; Figure 1; Supplementary file 8) revealed only in the
sole subject (no. 147) with no residual vision and a high train-
ing effect significant BOLD signal changes at the level of the
occipital lobe, i.e., right primary and bilateral secondary visual
cortex (BA 17/18), and the cerebellum. Additionally, this partic-
ipant displayed significant hemodynamic responses within the
bilateral temporal lobe (STG, middle temporal gyrus = MTG,
inferior temporal gyrus = ITG, temporal pole = Tp), and to
a lesser extent within the frontal (bilateral PrCG, left IFG) and
left parietal lobe (postcentral gyrus = PoCG, supramarginal
gyrus = SmG). By contrast, subject no. 151, also afflicted with
significantly reduced visual acuity, who, nevertheless, had only
moderate training success (36% points), did not show enhanced
occipital and cerebellar activation after training. An increase of
BOLD responses in this subject occurred predominantly within
parietal (left PoCG, bilateral angular gyrus = AG, bilateral
inferior parietal lobule = IPL), frontal (left PrCG, left IFG,
FIGURE 2 | Special location of the right-hemispheric visual cluster
(fixation cross) overlaid on lateral and medial brain structures
in each subject (T1 MNI template) based upon the SPM
T -contrast for forward ultra-fast speech vs. baseline
post-training (red = condition vs. baseline, green = baseline
vs. condition). Threshold at p < 0.005 uncorrected at voxel level
with an extent threshold k = 10 (for peak coordinates see
Supplementary files 6, 7).
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bilateral MFG), and left temporal (STG, Tp) regions. Subject no.
144—with residual vision—displayed increased hemodynamic
responses (from pre- to post-training runs) during the forward
ultra-fast condition primarily within right frontal areas (right
PrcG, bilateral IFG, bilateral MFG, bilateral SMA, right SFG)
and left temporal regions (MTG, STG, Tp). The normal sighted
individual (no. 142) showed a positive training effect within
bilateral MTG, left PrCG and SMA, bilateral IFG, and left pari-
etal lobe (SmG, IPL). Two further subjects (nos. 150, 146) did
not display any significant response differences between pre-
and post-training measurements. Most of the subjects (except
for subject no. 147) showed a training-induced decrease in
activation of temporal regions (MTG, STG; see Figure 1 and
Supplementary file 8).
Post- minus pre-training regarding the null-event (baseline)
Considering pre- and post-training runs in a concatenated
sequence, the subject with no residual vision and a significant
training effect (no. 147) showed also a baseline shift (regarding
the null-event) in hemodynamic activity between post- and pre-
training runs (SPM T-contrast, Figure 1; Supplementary file 9
“post- vs. pre-training regarding the null-event (=baseline)”).
Thereby, increased activation affected similar regions as described
for the forward ultra-fast speech condition (see above paragraph:
Post- minus pre-training regarding the ultra-fast speech condi-
tion): bilateral occipital cortex and cerebellum, distinct clusters
within the bilateral temporal and frontal lobe. In the remaining
subjects (nos. 151, 150, 144, 146, 142) an increase of base-
line activation was found only within some small clusters: right
STG/MTG, PrCG, SmG, IFG, and subcortical regions.
Decreased baseline activity after training was observed in sub-
ject no. 151 (weak training effect, low residual vision) within
some regions of the occipital lobe whereas the remaining subjects
showed such a decrease only in small frontal clusters (Figure 1;
Supplementary file 9).
Interaction of the experimental conditions (ANOVA)
In order to delineate the network used (i) by a participant with no
residual vision as well as (ii) a normal-sighted person during pro-
cessing of ultra-fast speech (18 syl/s) after the training period, the
three-way interaction Mode × Speech rate × Training was com-
puted and found to achieve significance in both cases (Figure 3A;
Supplementary file 10).
In subject no. 147 (no residual vision), bilateral occipital acti-
vation clusters emerged, i.e., left secondary visual areas (BA18)
and a right primary visual area (BA17). Further, left temporal
(MTG), bilateral fronto-parietal (PrCG, PoCG, paracentral lobule
= Pcl), and right frontal (superior frontal gyrus = SFG, OrbG)
FIGURE 3 | (A) Three-Way interaction of an ANOVA (conditions vs. baseline),
including the factors Mode (forward/backward speech), Speech rate
(8/18 syl/s), and Training (pre-/post-training) exemplified for two single
subjects—the one with no residual vision and the normal sighted, both with
comparable training success [p < 0.005 uncorrected, k = 10 voxels]. Variance
was calculated across five runs per subject and training stage. (B)
Hemodynamic effects within one selected cluster from the ANOVA regarding
each session (pre-, post-training as well as the intermediate measurement): (i)
the right primary visual area (V1) of the blind individual and (ii) the right temporal
pole (Tp) of the sighted subject. Values of percent signal change are shown
separately for the moderately fast (8 syl/s) and ultra-fast (18 syl/s) condition vs.
baseline (left plot) as well as separately for the conditions and the null-event vs.
the implicit baseline each (right plot). In the blind subject, right V1 activation
during the ultra-fast speech condition increased after the training, whereas the
reversed condition showed a decrease (note that also the null-event increased).
Since no V1 activation or deactivation was found at pre-training measurements,
functional reorganization is suggested. By contrast, since the Tp activation of
the sighted person already existed in the pre-training stage during moderately
fast speech processing and increased post-training during ultra-fast speech
perception, redistribution is assumed to be the neuro-plastic mechanism.
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areas were found to be activated. Considering post-hoc hemody-
namic effects (values of percentage signal change) of the forward
and reversed moderately fast (8 syl/s) and ultra-fast (18 syl/s) con-
ditions (vs. baseline) within the right-hemispheric primary visual
area, BOLD response increased after the training (compared
with pre-training) during the forward ultra-fast—but not mod-
erately fast—condition, whereas both reversed speech conditions
remained at the level of zero or showed deactivation (Figure 3B,
left plot).
In the sighted participant (no. 142), bilateral temporal (MTG,
Tp), bilateral cerebellar (Cb), left frontal (SMA, IFG, PrCG),
and parietal regions (left SmG, right Pcl) showed a signifi-
cant three-way interaction. Post-hoc analysis found increased
right temporal pole activation after training during the for-
ward ultra-fast speech condition, but revealed this area also
to be activated before training during the moderately fast
speech condition. Additionally, this region showed selectivity
to forward (compared with reversed) speech (Figure 3B,
left plot).
Regarding the training-induced baseline shift (null-event;
Figure 3B, right plot), hemodynamic activity during the null-
event was stronger after the training period in the blind individual
whereas the normal-sighted participant showed an opposite ten-
dency. The baseline shift in the blind subject was even stronger
during the intermediate measurement at a training stage of
13 syl/s (not included in the ANOVA).
REGIONS-OF-INTEREST (ROI) ANALYSES
Right-hemispheric visual cortex
Concerning right V1 (Figure 4A), the tests of percent sig-
nal changes addressed the difference of the values from zero
and the differences between conditions. Only subject no. 147
(no residual vision) showed significantly positive values under
the forward ultra-fast speech condition following the training
sessions (T = 2.870, p < 0.05) and, additionally, higher val-
ues under the forward as compared to the reversed ultra-fast
speech condition post-training (T = 2.479, p < 0.05). Subject
no. 151 (low residual vision) achieved positive values under
FIGURE 4 | Regions-of-interest (ROI) analyses, (A) right primary visual
area (V1) and (B) right pulvinar (Pv), (C) left supplementary motor area
(SMA) as well as the (D) left inferior frontal gyrus (IFG)—all clusters derived
from Dietrich et al. (2013), overlaid on an anatomical T1 template. Upper
plot (red): Behavioral performance of understanding ultra-fast speech (18 syl/s)
pre- and post-training. Participants are arranged according to their visual acuity.
Lower plots (blue): Percent signal change during forward (left) and reversed
(middle) ultra-fast speech (18 syl/s) as well as forward moderately fast (8 syl/s)
speech (right) pre- and post-training (vs. baseline). Significant differences from
zero (one sample T -tests): ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∼ p < 0.1.
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the reversed ultra-fast condition post-training (T = 2.248, p <
0.05), whereby forward ultra-fast speech not did yield any sig-
nificant differences as compared to reversed utterances. Subject
no. 150 (low residual vision) displayed neither significant posi-
tive/negative values nor significant differences between forward
and reversed speech under the ultra-fast speech condition after
the training sessions. Subjects nos. 144 (T = −3.123, p < 0.05),
146 (T = −1.637, p = 0.09), and 142 (T = −0.598, p = 0.291)
showed negative values or did not differ from zero during the
forward ultra-fast speech condition post-training. Furthermore,
these latter subjects did not show any differences between for-
ward and reversed ultra-fast speech post-training. In addition,
significantly positive values under the moderately fast speech con-
dition pre-training (T = 3.735, p <.05) and selectivity to forward
compared with reversed speech (T = 1.944, p < 0.05) could be
observed exclusively in subject no. 144.
Furthermore, a significant negative correlation between resid-
ual vision and the percent signal change during the forward
ultra-fast speech condition (vs. baseline) could be detected
before (ρ = −0.77, p < 0.05) and after the training sessions
(ρ = −0.83, p < 0.05), with a tendency toward a steeper regres-
sion line at the post-training examination (T = −1.569, p < 0.1)
(Figure 5A). By contrast, no significant correlations emerged dur-
ing application of moderately fast speech or during the reversed
ultra-fast speech condition—neither at pre- nor post-training
measurements.
All three subjects with no/low residual vision (rank 1, 2, 3)
showed positive values of percent signal change compared to
subjects with residual vision (rank 4, 5, 6) with respect to the
post- and pre-training stages (Figure 5A). Therefore, a whole-
brain covariance analysis was performed with the residual vision
as non-linear covariate (rank 1, 2, 3, 4, 4, 4), based on the
hypothesis that training-induced enhancement of primary visual
activation occurs only in subjects with no or low residual vision.
Indeed, the training effect for forward ultra-fast speech (SPM T-
contrast post- vs. pre-training) was associated with hemodynamic
responses of right V1 (Figure 5B) at a similar location as the acti-
vation cluster observed in our previous group study (Dietrich
et al., 2013; Figure 5C).
Right-hemispheric pulvinar
As concerns right Pv, neither pre- nor post-training fMRI eval-
uation yielded any percent signal change values which signifi-
cantly differed from zero (Figure 4B). Furthermore, no signifi-
cant differences emerged between forward and reversed ultra-fast
speech conditions post-training (Figure 4B). However, across the
entire group of participants, a significant negative correlation
between residual vision and percent signal change during for-
ward ultra-fast speech was found at post-training measurements
(ρ = −0.77, p < 0.05) in right Pv. Prior to the learning proce-
dure, the correlation also showed a negative trend (ρ = −0.71,
p = 0.055).
Left-hemispheric SMA and IFG
As concerns left-hemispheric SMA, all subjects with training
effects (= all except no. 146) showed a positive change in per-
cent signal change across follow-up under the forward ultra-fast
FIGURE 5 | (A) Correlations between BOLD responses during the forward
ultra-fast (18 syl/s) speech condition (vs. baseline) and the participants,
arranged according to their residual vision (given as ranks 1–6: 1 = no
residual vision and 6 = normally sighted within the right-hemispheric
primary visual activation cluster, drawn from Dietrich et al. (2013) (see panel
C). Values of percent signal changes refer to the pre- (blue) and post-training
(red) measurements of each subject. (B) Whole-brain covariance analysis
(SPM T -contrast “post- minus pre-training,” forward ultra-fast speech
condition) with residual vision as a non-linear covariate (rank 1, 2, 3, 4, 4,
4)—hypothesizing that primary visual activation will only change in subjects
with no or very low residual vision. The location of this effect in visual cortex
was similar to the activation cluster observed in Dietrich et al. (2013) (C).
speech condition (Figure 4C, left plot). By contrast, negative
changes from the pre- to the post-training values of this measure
could be observed at the level of SMA under the forward moder-
ately fast condition across most subjects (descriptive; Figure 4C,
right plot). Considering left IFG, significant positive values of per-
cent signal change were found during the forward moderately
fast speech condition across most subjects pre- as well as post-
training (Figure 4D). By contrast, only two subjects (nos. 151,
142) showed significant positive values of percent signal change
during the forward ultra-fast speech condition post-training,
whereas during the backward ultra-fast speech condition neg-
ative values could be observed within one subject (no. 144)
(Figure 4D).
Before training, a significant positive correlation between
BOLD responses and behavioral performance (Figure 6A) was
found across all three speech rates (8, 13, 18 syl/s) of the for-
ward speech conditions and across all subjects within left SMA
(r = 0.58, p < 0.05) as well as IFG (r = 0.72, p < 0.001). After
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FIGURE 6 | (A) Correlation between BOLD responses during forward speech
pre-training and individual behavioral performance within left SMA and inferior
frontal gyrus (IFG) across all three speech rates (8, 13, 18 syl/s) and across all
subjects. (B) BOLD responses during forward speech post-training for each
speech rate (8, 13, 18 syl/s) within left SMA and IFG. Only subjects with a
performance level of more than ca. 70% at speech rate (8 syl/s: n = 6; 13 syl/s:
n = 6; 18 syl/s: n = 4) are included. Significant differences (paired T -test)
emerged between moderately fast and ultra-fast speech within left SMA.
training, most subjects (except of nos. 151 and 146 with respect
to the ultra-fast speech condition) performed all speech rates (8,
13, 18 syl/s) up to a level of at least ca. 70% correctly repro-
duced syllables. However, post-training BOLD responses of these
subjects with at least ca. 70% performance during the ultra-
fast speech condition (vs. baseline, n = 4) were significantly
higher than during moderately fast speech (n = 6) within SMA
(T = −4.009, p < 0.05), but not within IFG (T = 1.639, p =
0.162) (Figure 6B). Expectedly, against the background that four
of the six subjects reached comparable training effects, their resid-
ual vision did not significantly correlate with BOLD responses in




Four of the six participants showed—independently of their
residual visual functions—a significant improvement of ultra-
fast (18 syl/s) speech comprehension, in terms of a performance
level of ca. 70% points after daily training sessions. And the three
vision-impaired subjects of this subgroup reported to benefit
during daily life from their ability to use screen-reading text-to-
speech devices. By contrast, poor (36% points) or no training
effects could be observed in the two remaining individuals. So
far, none of the participants achieved the pre-specified target of
more than 80 % correctly repeated words at a speech rate of
18 syl/s. Since the participants underwent fMRI measurements
as soon as they themselves had the impression to meet this cri-
terion, they lacked an external control over actual performance.
The sighted control subject of the present study reported that she
had “reached her limits” and that she feels additional training
would not yield further improvements of ultra-fast speech per-
ception. By contrast, a further extension of the training period
(so far ca. 6 months) might have been beneficial in case of vision
loss, since higher performance levels have been documented in
other blind individuals (Moos and Trouvain, 2007). Most note-
worthy, residual vision in terms of visual acuity in the four sub-
jects with a significant—and similar—increase of post-training
behavioral performance ranged from none to 100%. Thus, this
clinical parameter, obviously, did not constrain the acquisition of
ultra-fast speech perception capabilities. It cannot be excluded,
however, whether and in how far subjects with low residual vision
might be able to further enhance ultra-fast speech comprehension
in case of more expanded training procedures.
POST-TRAINING BRAIN NETWORKS OF ULTRA-FAST SPEECH
COMPREHENSION (WHOLE-BRAIN ANALYSES)
Common activation “nodes” across subjects
Clinical and functional imaging data indicate a contribution of
left IFG to speech perception—at least in case more demand-
ing segmentation processes and/or working memory operations
are involved (Burton et al., 2000). Furthermore, hemodynamic
activation of language processing areas such as IFG has been
assumed to represent an index of actual speech comprehension
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(Poldrack et al., 2001). The present study revealed post-training
left-hemispheric IFG responses across all subjects, indicating
intelligibility of ultra-fast spoken language even if the train-
ing effect was low (subject no. 146 showed no training effects,
nevertheless, performance level at baseline had amounted to
14%). Furthermore, left-hemispheric PrCG and the cerebellum
displayed significant BOLD signal changes during forward ultra-
fast speech post-training. These observations are in line with
clinical and functional imaging data pointing at a contribution
of those structures—under specific circumstances—to auditory
speech perception. For example, the cerebellum has been found
engaged in the encoding of specific temporal-linguistic informa-
tion during word identification tasks (Mathiak et al., 2002).
Descriptive analyses of individual response patterns
Four participants showed a significant—and similar—increase
of post-training behavioral performance (ca. 70% points), inde-
pendent of residual vision capabilities (<2, 10, 20, 100% visual
acuity). Most noteworthy, different individual hemodynamic
response patterns could be observed in these cases, indicating
processing strategies of ultra-fast speech understanding to vary
across these subjects.
Training of ultra-fast speech comprehension was found to
induce hemodynamic activation at the level of the occipital lobe
in three subjects with no or low residual vision. The strongest
effects (also significant in the post- minus pre-training com-
parison) emerged in subject no. 147, a participant lacking any
residual visual functions, and such responses to accelerated
spoken language could not be observed at the baseline exami-
nation. These findings provide tentative support for a relation-
ship between ultra-fast speech perception and right-hemispheric
V1 activation—in case the central-visual system is deprived of
modality-specific afferent input. Based on our previous studies,
it has been suggested that collaboration of right auditory cortex
and ipsilateral primary visual area allows for the implementation
of a signal-driven timing mechanism related to syllabic modu-
lation of the speech signal (Dietrich et al., 2013; Hertrich et al.,
2013a,b). More specifically, subjects able to recruit the visual cor-
tex during spoken language comprehension appear to install an
additional information channel conveying temporal cues on syl-
lable structure to the frontal lobe which then help to trigger
phonological encoding processes and, as a consequence, to sup-
port verbal working memory operations (Hertrich et al., 2013b).
Since the visual system seems to compensate for the temporal
limitations of the auditory system under these conditions, this
strategy might allow for a further increase in ultra-fast speech
comprehension capabilities beyond the level that was achieved in
the present training study.
Besides increased V1 activation during the ultra-fast speech
condition, subject 147 also showed significant changes in the null-
event if the runs across the pre- and post-training sessions were
concatenated for analysis. Interestingly, this increase was strongest
in the session at an intermediate training level when the ultra-fast
condition did not yet activate right V1 (vs. baseline). This “base-
line shift” might result from actual activity during the null event.
However, it could also reflect a discrepancy between the explicit
(null-event) and the implicit baseline, which might indicate that
the BOLD response in V1 is not strictly aligned with the stim-
uli across training stages. This inconsistency might be bound
to the emergence of reorganization processes—rather than just
redistribution of brain activity as reported by Kelly and Garavan
(2005)–since occipital cortex was not active prior to the pre-
training session and since a new area has been recruited during
the learning procedure.
Interestingly, subject no. 151 (with low visual acuity similar
to subject no. 147) showed a strong reduction of the null-event
activity within the occipital lobe at the post- as compared to
the pre-training session, but no increase of activation during the
ultra-fast speech condition. The low training effect of this subject
seems to be in line with the absence of significant V1 activa-
tion during the ultra-fast condition. However, the strong changes
of the null-event activity might indicate that also in this subject
training-induced reorganization is possible.
By contrast, subject no. 150 (10% visual acuity) did not show
any training-induced changes in occipital cortex activity and,
thus, visual system recruitment for the sake of ultra-fast speech
perception seems to be impossible.
It should be noted that the post-training hemodynamic
response pattern of subject no. 147, displaying the strongest
response of right visual cortex, encroaches, in addition, upon
left-hemispheric primary (BA17) and bilateral secondary (SOG,
MOG) visual areas. As an explanation, the recruitment of occipi-
tal areas at either side of the brain might reflect central-visual sup-
port of several linguistic functions during ultra-fast speech com-
prehension, e.g., both segmental (left hemisphere) and supraseg-
mental/prosodic (right hemisphere) processing. Against the back-
ground of previous findings (Dietrich et al., 2013; Hertrich
et al., 2013b), strong right-hemispheric lateralization of the
primary visual area seems to be associated with a prosodic
function, i.e., triggering syllable onsets within a metric pat-
tern. Thus, a somehow unfocused reorganization pattern might
be further stabilized after getting more experienced with ultra-
fast speech materials. Continuation of the training procedure at
high rates could result, conceivably, in a less distributed occip-
ital activation pattern centered around the right primary visual
area.
In line with our preceding single-case and group studies on
ultra-fast speech perception (Hertrich et al., 2009; Dietrich et al.,
2013), post-training fMRI revealed hemodynamic activation of
left FG in response to ultra-fast speech materials in subject
no. 147, characterized by the strongest engagement of right-
hemisphere visual cortex. FG is embedded into the so-called ven-
tral route of the central-visual system which, especially, supports
object recognition (e.g., Haxby et al., 1991), but may contribute to
phonological operations as well (e.g., Cone et al., 2008). Thus, left
FG as a secondary phonological area might expand the phonolog-
ical network and help to cope with the higher processing demands
during ultra-fast speech perception.
Presumably, right-hemispheric frontal lobe activation, includ-
ing PrCG, MFG, OrbG, and IFG as observed in subject no.
144, might reflect a network associated with phonological word
stress processing during ultra-fast speech comprehension. In
previous studies, neural correlates of word stress as compared
to vowel quality encoding (Klein et al., 2011) or auditory
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processing of bi-syllabic pseudo-words (Tervaniemi et al., 2009)
were found within a widespread fronto-temporal activation pat-
tern including, among others, right-hemispheric activation clus-
ters resembling the response pattern of subject no. 144. Against
this background, it may be assumed that a prosodic/metric
pattern was generated, predicting continuous word stress or
metrical stress sequences during listening to ultra-fast speech.
Such a focus on stressed syllables—ignoring more or less the
unstressed ones—might help to overcome the backward masking
effects of high speaking rates. However, this strategy of ultra-
fast speech comprehension, conceivably, poses higher demands
on the auditory system with regard to the processing of word
stress information, interpolation of unstressed syllables, and
the mapping of these patterns onto articulatory motor plans.
This assumption is in line with reports of increased activation
of the auditory association cortices and left ventral premotor
cortex after training to understand time-compressed speech in
sighted individuals (Adank and Devlin, 2010). Although such
a compensation strategy based upon prosodic/metric redun-
dancies of verbal utterances might facilitate ultra-fast speech
comprehension to a certain extent, it may not be able to really
enhance the temporal resolution at the level of the syllable and,
therefore, might require increased top-down effort of language
processing.
Distinct hemodynamic activation of the temporal pole at
either side was found after training of ultra-fast speech compre-
hension in the sighted subject no. 142. Combinatorial processes at
sentence-level (Hickok and Poeppel, 2007) and the evaluation of
affective semantics (Ethofer et al., 2006) have been associated with
hemodynamic responses of the anterior temporal lobe, indicat-
ing holistic rather than compositional (i.e., hierarchical analysis of
segments, syllables, and morphemes, and phrases) semantic pro-
cessing under these conditions. Such top-down mechanisms—
based upon contextual/semantic pre-information—may facilitate
sound-to-semantic mapping processes even in case of incomplete
phonological decoding. Although the use of this strategy should
overcome to a certain extent the backward masking effects of
ultra-fast speech signals, we may speculate that subjects applying
this strategy will have difficulty understanding the logical struc-
ture of more complex sentences. Moreover, the present (sighted)
subject who might have used this strategy did not recruit any new
area as in the case of the blind participant. Instead, activity exist-
ing pre-training during the moderately fast speech condition was
found increased post-training during the ultra-fast speech con-
dition. Thus, redistribution of activity as defined in Kelly and
Garavan (2005) is assumed to be the underlying mechanism for
plasticity.
Summarizing these descriptive analyses of distinct individ-
ual activation patterns, subjects appear to use different strate-
gies during ultra-fast speech perception depending, among other
things, on residual visual functions. In case of very low resid-
ual vision, the visual system seems to be recruited as a means
to enhance actual temporal resolution of the acoustic signal via
implementation of an extra-channel conveying information on
syllabic structure to verbal working memory buffers. This new
strategy concomitant with the recruitment of an additional area
can be considered a variant of functional reorganization. If the
visual system is not at a subject’s disposal for spoken language
comprehension, listeners may rely on already available semantic
top-down strategies facilitating lexical access, based upon, e.g.,
redundant aspects of verbal materials. Under these conditions, a
stronger engagement of (some components of) the classical lan-
guage network might help to speed up the encoding processes,
providing an example of neuroplasticity due to redistribution of
brain activity.
THE IMPACT OF RESIDUAL VISION AND BEHAVIORAL PERFORMANCE
ON THE RESPONSES OF THE VISUAL SYSTEM (ROI ANALYSES)
During forward ultra-fast speech perception, residual vision was
found to have a significant impact on the activation of the right-
hemispheric primary visual cortex (V1) and ipsilateral pulvinar
(Pv), a subcortical structure projecting to the occipital lobes.
More specifically, a negative correlation emerged in terms of
decreased hemodynamic activation concomitant with increased
residual vision. The respective regression line showed a trend
toward a steeper decline at the post-training measurements, indi-
cating a differential impact of residual vision on the training
effects. Thus, residual visual capacities appear to constrain the
resources of audiovisual reorganization during ultra-fast speech
perception. The critical threshold seems to be centered around
acuity values of 10 to 20%, whereas a more efficient use of the
visual cortex such as in subject no. 147 even may require residual
vision to fall below a level of only 2%.
A previous study investigating cross-modal reorganization in a
vision-impaired subject who had suffered from severe visual acu-
ity reduction with no evidence of visual field loss, reported popu-
lations of visual neurons not critical for a subject’s remaining low
vision to be recruited for tactile information processing (Cheung
et al., 2009). The observation of such a retinotopy-related func-
tional segregation of neurons bound to residual vision, on the one
hand, and cross-modal processing, on the other, might explain
why audiovisual plasticity did not occur in the subjects of our
group with normal or high residual vision. Furthermore, visual
acuity rather than the peripheral visual field seems to be the cru-
cial prerequisite of a recruitment of the visual system (Cheung
et al., 2009). The present data confirm this suggestion since, e.g.,
subject no. 151 with no visual acuity, but intact peripheral visual
fields showed increased hemodynamic activation of the visual sys-
tem at post-training measurements although the subject showed a
moderate training effect only. By contrast, participant no. 144 suf-
fering from a strongly reduced visual field did not activate right
visual cortex after the training sessions during the forward ultra-
fast speech condition, presumably, because visual acuity was not
markedly reduced. Consequently, the foveal representation within
the visual system seems to be the target of cross-modal reor-
ganization processes during the acquisition of ultra-fast speech
comprehension. In line with this hypothesis, training of ultra-fast
speech comprehension induced strong visual cortex activation in
a subject with no residual vision (no. 147). In spite of good train-
ing effects, only low hemodynamic responses within the visual
system could be observed in the subject suffering from residual
10% visual acuity (no. 150).
Interestingly, forward moderately fast speech did not induce
any distinct hemodynamic activation of visual cortex after
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training. It can be assumed, thus, that the speech task has to
be sufficiently challenging in order to induce significant acti-
vation in the visual system. In fact, passive listening to sounds
does not give rise to occipital activation in blind subjects (Arno
et al., 2001). Accordingly, visual areas in the blind were not
activated by the mere presence of sound, but were involved
in attentive perception of changes in the auditory environment
(Kujala et al., 2005). Attention is suggested to play an impor-
tant role during ultra-fast speech comprehension as well—in
terms of the detection of almost entirely masked syllable onsets
(Dietrich et al., 2013; Hertrich et al., 2013b). However, sig-
nificant visual cortex activation was also found at pre-training
examination during the moderately fast speech condition selec-
tively to forward (compared to reversed) speech in a subject
with high residual vision (no. 144). As an explanation, hemody-
namic responses of visual cortex during speech perception might
reflect actual visual imagery. The subjects’ high familiarity with
speech signals in association with speaking faces during language
acquisition might facilitate such effects also in late-blind sub-
jects. In a previous study, addressing the reverse relationship
of the two sensory modalities, perception of visual lip move-
ments during silent syllable production was found to evoke
primary auditory BOLD responses, indicating strong audio-
visual interactions during speech perception (Hertrich et al.,
2010).
Taken together, the highest activation levels of the visual sys-
tem were found in case of (i) absent residual vision and (ii)
good training effects. Only subject no. 147 met these two crite-
ria while the remaining subjects fell short to either one or both
characteristics. As concerns the latter participant, visual system
recruitment was selectively limited to forward—and, thus, prin-
cipally intelligible—utterances. As a rule, right Pv displayed a
profile of BOLD responses similar to right visual cortex. Again,
these findings point at a contribution of this subcortical struc-
ture to ultra-fast speech perception. Conceivably, the observed
interactions of Pv and visual cortex reflect the operation of an
audiovisual interface in that the secondary visual pathway pro-
vides the central-visual system with auditory input (see Hertrich
et al., 2013b, for more details).
VISION-INDEPENDENT AND PERFORMANCE-DEPENDENT
CHANGES OF HEMODYNAMIC ACTIVATION OF LEFT SMA AND IFG
(ROI ANALYSIS)
Pre-training BOLD responses within left IFG and SMA
were found to be significantly correlated—independently from
residual vision—with the percentage of correctly understood
speech materials, pooled across speech rates (8, 13, 18 syl/s).
Consequently, both left IFG and SMA activation are associated
with speech comprehension. More specifically, it is suggested that
left IFG is involved in the speech production-related phonolog-
ical reconstruction of perceived speech material (Burton et al.,
2000). However, not all participants with significant training
effect showed significant left IFG activation with respect to the
cluster resulting from Dietrich et al. (2013) after the train-
ing period. Therefore, some subjects seem not to reach the
threshold with respect to the relatively large cluster resulted
from (Dietrich et al., 2013). However, the whole-brain analyses
revealed post-training left-hemispheric IFG activation in subjects
with significant training effect.
Prior to training, hemodynamic activation within left SMA
during the “moderately fast condition” showed considerable vari-
ation across individuals. Recruitment of left SMA, thus, does
not seem to be a prerequisite to speech comprehension per se as
such. However, all subjects with training effects showed a positive
change in percent signal change across follow-up under the for-
ward ultra-fast speech condition. Moreover, left SMA, but not IFG
activation post-training was significantly higher during the ultra-
fast than the moderately fast speech condition in well-performing
subjects. Neither the pre- nor post-training responses of SMA and
IFG depended on residual vision, an observation supporting the
view of a supra-modal function of these frontal structures, irre-
spective of input modality. Several studies indicate SMA to engage
in the syllabic organization of verbal utterances during speech
production (Ziegler et al., 1997; Riecker et al., 2005; Brendel
et al., 2010). On a broader scale, this region appears to sup-
port timing processes across various sensorimotor and cognitive
domains (Rubia and Smith, 2004; Paz et al., 2005). Furthermore,
clinical as well as experimental data point at a contribution of
SMA to spoken language perception and verbal working mem-
ory operations as well (Schirmer et al., 2001; Smith et al., 2003;
Schirmer, 2004; Chung et al., 2005; Geiser et al., 2008). Given
that SMA might act as a platform for timing operations related
to verbal working memory functions, sensory systems might con-
vey temporal information on syllable structure via left SMA into
this short-term storage system. More specifically, the joint acti-
vation of auditory and visual areas with left SMA could reflect a
signal-driven timing mechanism facilitating the transformation
of the perceived acoustic signal into an active pre-articulatory
phonetic/phonological output structure in our speech generation
system under time-critical conditions (see Hertrich et al., 2013b,
for more details).
CONCLUSIONS
Several participants were found able to increase ultra-fast speech
(18 syl/s) comprehension up to a level of ca. 70% points, irre-
spective of residual vision, across a training session of about
6 months. However, subjects seem to deploy distinct patterns
of neuroplasticity in order to overcome the bottleneck of tem-
poral resolution associated with high speaking rates: In case
of very low residual vision, the right-hemispheric visual sys-
tem (V1, Pv) was, apparently, recruited indicating functional
reorganization at the level of the occipital lobes. By contrast,
participants with normal or high residual vision did not show
any training-induced responses of the central-visual system.
However, they displayed increased activation (redistribution) of
several parts of the classical speech processing network. Although
both patterns of neuroplasticity resulted in comparable train-
ing effects, the strategy of processing ultra-fast speech might
significantly differ: In case of a deployment of the visual sys-
tem, actual temporal resolution of the acoustic signal might
increase via the representation of a syllabic trigger cues. If, how-
ever, the visual system is not at a subject’s disposal for spoken
language processing, they may use, as an alternative, a strat-
egy based on informational redundancies of the speech signal.
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Independent of residual vision, left-hemispheric SMA and IFG
activation emerged as a common indicator of speech comprehen-
sion. In case of proficient ultra-fast speech comprehension, how-
ever, only SMA showed stronger activation during application of
ultra-fast as compared to moderately fast test materials, pointing
at a critical contribution to spoken language understanding under
time-critical conditions.
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Supplementary file 5 | An example of the repetition task for ultra-fast
speech of blind listeners with ca. 70% comprehension capability. “Die
Karten für das Konzert nächstes Jahr sind bereits jetzt ausverkauft.”
Supplementary file 6 | Coordinates describing the SPM T-contrasts
“forward ultra-fast speech condition versus baseline” pre- and
post-training separately.
Supplementary file 7 | Coordinates describing the SPM T-contrasts
“baseline versus forward ultra-fast speech condition” pre- and
post-training separately.
Supplementary file 8 | Coordinates describing the SPM T -contrasts “post-
versus pre-training” during the forward ultra-fast speech condition (and
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Supplementary file 9 | Coordinates describing the SPM T -contrasts “post-
versus pre-training” (and vice versa) during the null-event (=baseline).
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“Mode × Speech rate × Training” resulting from the ANOVA exemplified
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Neural characteristics of verbal creativity as assessed by word generation tasks have
been recently identified, but differences in resting-state functional connectivity (rFC)
between experts and non-experts in creative writing have not been reported yet. Previous
electroencephalography (EEG) coherence measures during rest demonstrated a decreased
cooperation between brain areas in association with creative thinking ability. Here, we
used resting-state functional magnetic resonance imaging to compare 20 experts in
creative writing and 23 age-matched non-experts with respect to rFC strengths within
a brain network previously found to be associated with creative writing. Decreased rFC for
experts was found between areas 44 of both hemispheres. Increased rFC for experts
was observed between right hemispheric caudate and intraparietal sulcus. Correlation
analysis of verbal creativity indices (VCIs) with rFC values in the expert group revealed
predominantly negative associations, particularly of rFC between left area 44 and left
temporal pole. Overall, our data support previous findings of reduced connectivity between
interhemispheric areas and increased right-hemispheric connectivity during rest in highly
verbally creative individuals.
Keywords: creativity, expertise, resting-state-fMRI, functional connectivity, temporal pole, interhemispheric con-
nectivity, basal ganglia, brain
INTRODUCTION
Creativity is considered as the ability to produce original and
unexpected work, which is appropriate for a given goal (Stein,
1953). Recent reviews (Dietrich, 2007; Abraham, 2013) empha-
sized the need for cognitive models that define different aspects
of creativity and specify the underlying cognitive processes. In
a preliminary framework to distinguish between branches of
creativity, Abraham (2013) grouped a problem-solving domain
and an expression domain. In that framework, creative expression
denotes the ability to express oneself in a unique manner. Within
the expression domain, there are subgroups depending on the
nature of the task (verbal, art, music, etc.). Referring to this frame-
work, the present study represents a between-group approach, in
which groups differ with regard to their ability to write creative
texts (verbal expression domain).
Two previous studies have investigated the neural correlates of
creative story writing. In a positron-emission-tomography study,
Bechtereva et al. (2004) found left parieto-temporal regions (BA
39, 40) active during a difficult story generation condition in
comparison to an easier one as well as conditions that controlled
for syntactic and memory related aspects of the task. The authors
concluded that these areas are required to provide the necessary
flexibility for creative thinking. In contrast, Howard-Jones et al.
(2005) using fMRI found right prefrontal areas as well as the ante-
rior cingulate cortex associated with creative versus uncreative
story generation. These activations were connected to episodic
retrieval, monitoring, and higher cognitive control. Neither of
the two studies investigating story generation, however, involved
actual writing in the scanner.
When using a text continuation task, we recently demonstrated
that creative writing involved bilateral hippocampi, temporal
poles (BA 38) and the cingulate cortex (CC; Shah et al., 2013).
These areas have been associated with episodic memory retrieval,
free-associative and spontaneous cognition and semantic integra-
tion. In addition, there were correlations of the verbal creativity
index (VCI; Schoppe, 1975) with activations in the left inferior
frontal gyrus (BA 44), the left middle frontal gyrus (BA 9/46)
and the left temporal pole (BA 38). In a recent study (Erhard
et al., 2014), we compared functional activation during creative
writing in groups of expert and non-expert writers using the same
paradigm. Experts showed increased left-hemispheric activation
in the caudate nucleus and superior medial prefrontal cortex.
Apart from task-related activation sites, studies on the inter-
action between brain areas in specific networks are informative,
especially in creativity research (Jung et al., 2013). Functional
connectivity is defined as the statistical association among two
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or more anatomically distinct time-series (Friston et al., 1993)
and can inter alia be assessed with electroencephalography (EEG)
coherence measures or fMRI resting state functional connectivity.
Generally, creative achievement has been connected to decreased
cortical arousal, as demonstrated by an increased EEG alpha
power (Martindale and Hines, 1975; Fink and Benedek, 2012) and
reduced scores on “latent inhibition”, the capacity to screen from
conscious awareness stimuli previously experienced as irrelevant
(Carson et al., 2003). EEG coherence measures determined during
rest have indicated less cooperation between brain areas in more
creative individuals. This decoupling of brain areas has been
found equally distributed over the right and left hemispheres,
showing also significant interhemispheric decoupling (Jausovec
and Jausovec, 2000). fMRI resting-state functional connectivity
(rFC) studies revealed that higher creativity scores were associated
with an increased rFC between the medial prefrontal cortex
(mPFC) and the posterior cingulate cortex (Takeuchi et al., 2012),
which was linked to a stronger interaction within the default
mode network (Raichle et al., 2001). Wei et al. (2014) found a pos-
itive correlation of rFC between the left mPFC and the left middle
temporal gyrus with creativity scores that was interpreted as rep-
resenting another hub associated with the default mode network.
Increased rFC between the mPFC and the posterior cingulate
cortex, however, was not confirmed. Taken together, the two exist-
ing studies on rFC and creativity were not consistent, but both
identified connections associated with the default mode network.
In contrast to the above-mentioned studies, in the present
study we investigated rFC in a group of experts in creative writing
and compared it to non-experts. rFC was not only correlated to
creativity scores assessed by normative creativity tests, but also to
the rating of the actual texts written inside the scanner. Seeds for
FC analysis were selected from activation maxima calculated dur-
ing a text continuation task performed by participants included in
two previous studies (Shah et al., 2013; Erhard et al., 2014). These
areas were the pars opercularis of the inferior frontal gyrus (area
44), the CC, the superior temporal gyrus (STG), the hippocam-
pus, the caudate nucleus (caudate), and the intraparietal sulcus
(IPS). According to the findings of EEG-resting state studies, we
hypothesized a decreased interhemispheric and left hemispheric
FC and a more right hemispheric FC in the expert writers.
METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
We investigated 43 native German participants. Twenty expert
students of Creative Writing and Culture Journalism from the
only two universities in Germany that offer academic courses
in creative writing: the Universities of Hildesheim and Leipzig
(8 females and 12 males; mean age: 25.2, standard deviation (±)
2.7; mean semester: 7.1 ± 3.9). These students can be considered
as well-selected and domain-specific talented people, because
the selection criteria for the programs are extremely competitive
and only 6% percent of applications are accepted. Twenty-three
students from the University of Greifswald (non-experts in cre-
ative writing; 11 female and 12 male; mean age: 24.0 ± 1.9)
formed the control group. For the non-expert group, we inves-
tigated 22 students of medicine, four students of the humanities
(psychology, history, english, philosophy), one student from the
faculty of law, and one student from the faculty of business. All
participants were right-handed (as assessed by the Edinburgh
Handedness Inventory; Oldfield, 1971) and reported no history of
neurological or psychiatric disorders. Written informed consent
was obtained from all participants before entering the study,
which was approved by the Ethics Committee of the Medical
Faculty of the University of Greifswald.
EXPERTISE MEASURES
All participants were asked about their experience and prac-
tice of creative writing. Experts reported writing experience of
11.7 ± 4.8 years on average, including their studies of creative
writing, whereas the non-experts claimed an average of 3.1 ± 5.2
years. Weekly writing practice during the last three months before
scanning amounted to 21.0 ± 10.2 h for the expert and 0.5 ± 0.8 h
for the non-expert group (t(19) = 9.0; p < 0.001). Likewise, experts
had more years of experience (t(46) = 5.80; p < 0.001). Adapting
a method commonly used in music research, we calculated an
individual “practice index” (PI) by multiplication of creative
writing experience with weekly writing practice [(semester + years
of writing practice) × practice of writing per week].
TASK
All participants continued a text of two different literary texts (text
A written by Ror Wolf; text B written by Durs Grünbein) over a
time of 2 min and 20 s, respectively. In accordance with the CAT
(Amabile, 1996), all produced texts were typewritten and sent in a
randomized order to four independent judges, who were generally
familiar with the domain (two professors and two lecturers from
the department of Creative Writing and Culture Journalism at the
University of Hildesheim). All judges rated the creativity of each
text on a 10-cm-long visual analog scale (VAS; from 0: not creative
at all, to 10: extremely creative). The creative writing performance
in the scanner (creative writing ranking; CR) was calculated for
every participant using the mean value of both texts A and B of
the “creativity” rating from all judges.
The verbal creativity test (Schoppe, 1975) yielding a summary
VCI, consisted of nine subtests analyzing the participants’ verbal
fluency and verbal production skills, whereas some subtests were
also including aspects of flexibility and originality. We evalu-
ated these verbal creativity tests according to its standardized
instructions.
DEFINITION OF THE SEED REGIONS RELATED TO CREATIVE WRITING
The regions of interest (“seeds”) for the present investigation
had previously been identified by fMRI observed during a text
continuation task (Shah et al., 2013; Erhard et al., 2014). The
main effects for both groups were calculated and thresholded
at p < 0.05 (false discovery rate (FDR)-corrected for multiple
comparisons across the whole brain). The following seeds showed
significance and were therefore tested in the present study: left
posterior area 44 (MNI coordinates: −57, 6, 27), right posterior
area 44 (54, 6, 33), medial cingulate cortex (−9, 12, 42), left IPS
(−36, −39, 48), right IPS (42, −33, 45), left hippocampus (−27,
−9, −24), left temporal pole (−48, 9, −18), left posterior superior
temporal sulcus (STS) (−54, −42, 6), left (−9, 3, 15), and right
(15, 21, 15) caudate nucleus. The peak activation foci of each
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cluster were taken as centers of spheres with 5 mm radius to define
the volumes of interest for the present analysis.
MAGNETIC RESONANCE IMAGING
Data were acquired at a 3T Siemens Magnetom Verio (Siemens,
Erlangen, Germany) with a 32-channel headcoil. Two-
dimensional echo-planar images (EPI) were acquired with
repetition time TR = 2000 ms, echo time TE = 30 ms, flip angle =
90◦, field of view = 192 × 192 mm2. Each volume consisted of
34 slices with a voxel size of 3 × 3 × 3 mm3 with a 1-mm gap
between them. The first two volumes of each run were discarded
to allow for T1 equilibration effects.
We used baseline scans interspersed in an experimental block
design alternating task-related activation and rest. Overall, each
of six different activation conditions was presented twice to
each participant. Experimental blocks between baseline periods
used for resting-state analysis were five blocks of 60 s duration
(experimental conditions: reading, copying, silent speech, brain-
storming, correcting) and one block of 140 s duration (creative
writing). Participants were presented instructions on a scanner-
adapted desk. A double mirror affixed on the headcoil enabled
the view on the in-scanner desk with the instruction sheets, the
text material, the writing sheet, and the fixation cross. During
rest, participants were instructed to stop thinking about the task
and fixate a fixation cross (eyes-open baseline). Rest periods had
a total duration of 20 s (10 volumes). The first three scans of each
baseline period were not used in order to reduce BOLD effects
from the activation period. The procedure for using baseline scans
from block design fMRI experiments was adapted for our purpose
from Fair et al. (2007). For rFC analysis, 90 volumes for each
participant were used (5 × 8 volumes before and between blocks,
plus five volumes at the end of each scanning session). Details on
fluctuations during baseline have been described more recently
by Garrett et al. (2010). In total, 90 baseline scans of resting state
data from two consecutive measurement runs were available for
analysis.
RESTING-STATE CONNECTIVITY ANALYSIS
Data were jointly preprocessed using SPM8 (Wellcome Depart-
ment of Cognitive Neuroscience, London, UK). Images were first
corrected for head movement by affine registration using a two-
pass procedure by which images were initially realigned to the first
image and subsequently to the mean of the realigned images. Each
participant’s mean image was then spatially normalized to the
Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) single-subject template
brain using the “unified segmentation” approach (Ashburner and
Friston, 2005), and the ensuing deformation was applied to the
individual EPI volumes. Hereby, volumes were resampled at 1.5 ×
1.5 × 1.5 × mm3 voxel size. Images were then smoothed by a 5-
mm full-width at half-maximum Gaussian kernel to increase the
signal-to-noise ratio and compensate for remaining differences in
individual anatomy.
rFC measures can be influenced by several confounds such as
head movements and physiological processes (e.g., fluctuations
due to cardiac and respiratory cycles; cf. Fox et al. (2009)).
In order to reduce spurious correlations, variance explained
by the following nuisance variables was removed from each
voxel’s BOLD signal time series (for a detailed evaluation of this
procedure see Satterthwaite et al. (2013)): (i) the six motion
parameters derived from the image realignment; (ii) the first
derivatives of the six motion parameters; (iii) mean tissue-class
specific signal intensity per time point (Cieslik et al., 2013). All
nuisance variables entered the regression model as first- and
second-order terms, resulting in a total of 30 nuisance regressors.
After confound removal, data were band-pass filtered preserving
frequencies between 0.01 and 0.08 Hz, as meaningful resting-state
correlations will predominantly be found in these frequencies
given that the BOLD response acts as a low-pass filter (Greicius
et al., 2003).
The time course of each seed region’s BOLD signal was then
extracted for each participant as the first eigenvariate of activity
in all gray-matter voxels located within the respective seed. For
each participant, the time-series data of each seed region were
correlated with each other, and the resulting Pearson correlation
coefficients were transformed into Fisher’s Z scores. Subsequently,
the influence of age and sex was partialled out of both the resting-
state correlations and the covariates of interest. Main effects of
rFC (across the entire sample) were tested by one-sample t-
tests, applying a significance threshold of p < 0.05 (adjusted for
multiple comparisons by FDR correction). Median rFC in experts
and non-experts was compared via a non-parametric approach
using 10,000 realizations of the null hypothesis (group-label
exchangeability) in a Monte-Carlo simulation to create an empir-
ical null distribution of group differences (posterior-probability
significance threshold: p > 0.95, uncorrected). Additionally, we
applied effect-size criteria: first, differences were only considered
potentially relevant if the rFC score in either group (or both)
corresponded at least to a small effect (i.e., r ≥ 0.10). Second, the
between-group difference in rFC itself needed to correspond to a
large effect (i.e., Cohen’s d ≥ 0.80) to be considered relevant here.
Finally, creativity-related changes in interregional coupling were
examined by rank-correlating participants’ Fisher-Z-transformed
rFC values with creativity scores across both the entire sample
and the expert subgroup alone. The results of these Spearman
correlation analyses were regarded significant if they passed a
threshold of p < 0.05 (uncorrected). Again, we applied an effect-
size criterion: accordingly, correlations were regarded as relevant
if they were of at least medium size according to Cohen’s effect-
size categorization (i.e., r ≥ 0.24).
RESULTS
CREATIVITY SCORES
Mean VCI (Schoppe, 1975) was 116.5 ± 9.9 for expert writers and
107.1 ± 8.8 for non-experts (t(46) = 3.42; p < 0.01). Creative per-
formance of experts (creativity rating; CR) was commonly judged
higher than those of non-experts (t(46) = 3.36, p < 0.01). We
observed a positive correlation between creative performance in
the scanner and individual verbal creativity scores (CR and VCI:
r = 0.38, p < 0.01). Expert writers had much more experience
in writing creative texts (PI) than non-experts (t(19) = 6.24; p <
0.001), and this correlated positively with performance (PI and
CR: r = 0.46, p < 0.01) and individual verbal creativity (PI and
VCI: r = 0.43, p < 0.01).
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BASIC RESTING-STATE FUNCTIONAL CONNECTIVITY (rFC)
Across both groups, there was significant positive rFC between
the following regions: bilateral IPS, area 44, and caudate nucleus,
respectively, were all highly interconnected between hemispheres
(IPS: z = 5.37; areas 44: z = 3.09; caudate nuclei: z = 3.19). IPS was
additionally coupled to ipsilateral areas 44 on both hemispheres
(right: z = 4.87, left: z = 5.14), and left IPS was coupled with right
area 44 (z = 4.91). The left hippocampus and the left temporal
pole also showed high rFC (z = 3.77; see Figure 1). In addition,
left area 44 was significantly interconnected with MCC (z = 2.82).
RESTING-STATE FC DIFFERENCES BETWEEN EXPERTS AND
NON-EXPERTS
Experts showed significantly increased rFC between right IPS
and right caudate nucleus (p > 0.99, d = 1.00; see Figure 2A).
Furthermore, experts showed reduced rFC between hemispheres
in bilateral area 44 (p > 0.99, d = 1.08; see Figure 2B), between
right area 44 and left IPS (p = 0.99, d = 1.12), as well as between
right area 44 and left caudate nucleus (p = 0.97, d = 0.83).
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN CREATIVITY SCORES AND rFC ACROSS ALL
PARTICIPANTS
We observed positive associations of the creativity ratings of the
texts (CR) with rFC between left IPS and right caudate (r = 0.31,
p = 0.041). Negative correlations of CR with rFC were found
between left area 44 and right IPS (r = −0.36; p = 0.018) as well
as rFC between left area 44 and left aSTG (r = −0.35; p = 0.022).
Furthermore, we observed several negative correlations between
the VCI and FC, specifically interhemispheric rFC between bilat-
eral area 44 (r = −0.43; p = 0.004) as well as rFC between left
temporal pole and left caudate (r = −0.37; p = 0.015), left IPS and
left hippocampus (r = −0.34; p = 0.03), and right IPS and MCC
(r = −0.31; p = 0.041).
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN CREATIVITY SCORES AND rFC IN EXPERTS
In experts, rFC between left area 44 and left temporal pole
correlated negatively with CR (r = −0.62; p = 0.004; Figure 3A),
while a positive correlation of CR was observed with rFC between
right area 44 and left posterior STS (r = 0.55; p = 0.013) as
well as rFC between left IPS and right caudate (r = 0.45; p =
0.0498). Furthermore, rFC between left temporal pole and left
caudate was negatively associated with VCI (r = −0.54; p =
0.014; Figure 3B). Conversely, rFC between left IPS and right
caudate were positively correlated with VCI (r = 0.44; p = 0.0496)
in experts. Comparisons of the correlations between creativity
scores and rFC in experts and non-experts yielded no significant
results.
DISCUSSION
We here compared rFC between experts and non-experts in the
field of creative writing. Experts showed considerable higher cre-
ativity scores in the verbal creativity tests and the creativity ratings
FIGURE 1 | Connectivity between seeds found to be relevant during rest
for all participants. Top: In the left (L) hemisphere area 44 (red) and the
intraparietal sulcus (green; IPS; z = 5.14) and hippocampus (yellow) and
temporal pole (yellow, TP; z = 3.77) were highly interconnected. On the right
(R) hemisphere the IPS and area 44 (z = 4.87). Interhemispheric connectivity
(bottom) was relevant for bilateral IPS (z = 5.37), left IPS and right area 44 (z =
4.91), between both caudate (orange; z = 3.19) and between both areas 44
(z = 3.09).
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FIGURE 2 | Functional connectivity differences between the subject groups. (A) Experts showed increased FC between right intraparietal sulcus (IPS) and
caudate. (B) Naive showed increased connectivity between area 44 of both hemispheres.
FIGURE 3 | Correlation of behavioral data and FC in the expert group. (A) Negative correlation between verbal creativity rating (Amabile, 1996) and
connectivity between left area 44 and left temporal pole (TP). (B) Negative correlation between creativity index (CI; Schoppe, 1975) and connectivity between
left TP and caudate.
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of their written texts. These differences in performance might
therefore well be associated with differential connectivity during
rest. For investigating rFC, we did not investigate the default mode
network as recently done by others (Wei et al., 2014), but used
seed regions based on our previous studies with the same story
generation task (Shah et al., 2013; Erhard et al., 2014). Across
both groups, interhemispheric rFC during rest was high between
the inferior parietal sulci, the caudate nuclei, and the areas 44.
Additionally, the IPS was significantly connected to the ipsilateral
area 44 on both hemispheres, as well as the left hippocampus to
the left temporal pole. In addition, left area 44 was significantly
interconnected with the MCC. Experts in creative writing differed
from non-experts by an increased rFC between right caudate and
right IPS and a reduced interhemispheric rFC between BA 44 and
IPS and caudate.
Across all participants, behavioral creativity scores were pre-
dominantly inversely correlated to interhemispheric and left-
intrahemispheric rFC. Only rFC between the left IPS and the
right caudate correlated positively with the creativity rating of
the text. The same pattern was observed in experts, since left-
hemispheric and interhemispheric rFC was negatively associated
with creativity, apart from positive correlations with the rFC of
the right caudate and left IPS and of the right area 44 and the
right posterior STS.
DECREASED LEFT- AND INTERHEMISPHERIC rFC IN EXPERTS OF
CREATIVE WRITING
rFC in experts was characterized by a reduced left- and inter-
hemipheric integration. These findings corroborate previous
results of EEG coherence measures that demonstrated less coop-
eration of brain areas related to creative thinking (Jausovec and
Jausovec, 2000). Here verbal creativity scores were negatively
associated with right hemispheric and interhemispheric con-
nectivity between cortical areas (Jausovec and Jausovec, 2000)
supporting previous suggestions (Petsche, 1996) that it is the
functional relations between brain regions, rather than the
localized power measures that prove to be better indicators of
individual differences. In a recent review, Jung et al. (2013)
described creative cognition as characterized by “blind vari-
ation” (idea generation) and “selective retention” (convergent
thinking) processes (Simonton, 2013). Within this framework,
the default mode network (Raichle et al., 2001) could serve as
a system operating disinhibitory mental simulation processes,
whereas specific associated cognitive control networks based
on excitatory processes would initiate selection processes and
refine ideas (Jung et al., 2013). Our data fit to this model
insofar as it provided evidence for a reduced left- and inter-
hemispheric integration of language areas (especially left area
44) that may lead to a more autonomous and less constraining
functioning of separate elements of the network. Previous rFC
data (Takeuchi et al., 2012; Wei et al., 2014) have stressed the
involvement of the default mode network in creative cogni-
tion.
THE ROLE OF THE LEFT CAUDATE IN VERBAL CREATIVITY TASKS
Concerning the role of the basal ganglia in creative cognition,
Abraham et al. (2012a) found better scores in a creativity task
that demands to overcome the constraining influences of salient
examples in a group of patients with basal ganglia lesions. The
fact that patients with lesions of the basal ganglia may perform
better in problem solving tasks requiring to ignore pieces of
information fits well with the literature on inhibitory control
operations that are considered a central function of the basal
ganglia. Basal ganglia lesions thus result in poor inhibitory con-
trol, inattention and increased distractibility (Aron et al., 2003),
which is advantageous in overcoming knowledge constraints. In
the present study, verbal creativity of experts was correlated to
reduced FC of the left caudate with left temporal pole, what
is in agreement with an enhanced verbal creativity going along
with a decreased inhibition. The left temporal pole is considered
a semantic “hub” in the brain (Patterson et al., 2007) and has
been found involved in verbal (Abraham et al., 2012b) and non-
verbal (Ellamil et al., 2012) creativity tasks, as well as in figurative
language comprehension, such as metaphors (Schmidt and Seger,
2009; Mihov et al., 2010). Disinhibition of the left temporal pole
may thus contribute to excellent verbal skills in experts of creative
writing.
INCREASED rFC BETWEEN INTRAPARIETAL SULCUS AND RIGHT
CAUDATE IN EXPERTS
Remarkably, in our study experts showed decreased cortico-
cortical left and interhemispheric connectivity but increased
right-hemispheric interactions of the caudate with the intrapari-
etal sulcus. Further, rFC between right caudate and left IPS were
positively correlated with creativity measures. The IPS is involved
in verbal short-term memory and functions as an attentional
modulator of distant neural networks which themselves are spe-
cialized in processing language representations (Majerus et al.,
2006). Bilateral caudate activation in turn has been observed
during an untrained working memory task (Moore et al., 2013)
as well as during long-term working memory training (Kühn
et al., 2013) and seems to mediate changes in underlying work-
ing memory ability. Increased rFC between the right caudate
and bilateral IPS in experts of creative writing may thus be
connected to their special expertise and practice with handling
verbal information and not be an expression for verbal creativity
per se.
Although rFC between two regions need not be based on
direct anatomical connectivity, the following white-matter fibers
interconnecting our seeds might be relevant here: all the inter-
hemispheric connections (commissural fibers) are passing the
corpus callosum. These connections have been identified between
the inferior parietal sulci, the caudate nuclei, and the areas 44.
As for intrahemispheric association fibers, the superior longi-
tudinal fascicle III (Schmahmann et al., 2007) might be most
relevant. This structure connects the IPS with ipsilateral area
44 on both hemispheres. Furthermore, the inferior longitudinal
fascicle might be the relevant association fiber connecting the
left hippocampus to the left temporal pole. Parts of the cingular
bundle (Schmahmann et al., 2007) might interconnect left area
44 with the MCC. In addition, the right caudate and right IPS,
whose functional interconnection was changed in the expert
group, might be connected by the fronto-occipital fasciculus
(Schmahmann et al., 2007).
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LIMITATIONS
There are several limitations for the approach used in this study.
One is that we selected baseline periods of a rest/activation
blocked design study instead of measuring a single continuous
resting-state period (cf. Fair et al., 2007). Since the number of
scans used for our analysis is lower than in comparable resting-
state analyses, our approach may have reduced statistical power,
potentially leading us to miss relevant but smaller expertise
effects. Therefore, further investigations of the effects of verbal
creativity on brain networks using longer, continuous resting-
state time series would be desirable.
In addition, it can not be excluded that there may be a carry-
over of the BOLD response from the previous block. Since we
did not investigate ROIs of the default mode networks, as did
others (Takeuchi et al., 2012; Wei et al., 2014), we are not able
to comment on their findings of increased medial prefrontal lobe
rFC for creativity. Therefore, future studies might take a more
exploratory approach to be able to encompass a wider set of
regions associated with verbal creativity.
Finally, it has to be kept in mind that verbal creativity scores
and practice in professional writing were associated in our par-
ticipants. This association is inherent in the expertise approach
chosen here to study neural correlates of verbal creativity. There-
fore, our approach does not allow for disentangling influences of
practice and innate predisposition (i.e., talent).
CONCLUSION
We here reported on the first comparison of rFC in an expert
group in creative writing relative to a closely matched control
group. Experts exhibited a reduced interhemispheric rFC and
negative correlations of creativity scores with rFC between left
caudate and left temporal pole which may indicate less inhibition
and more autonomous functioning of language areas. On the
other hand, rFC between the right caudate and IPS may reflect
long-term experience with verbal information processing. Future
studies might use modulation procedures to investigate changes
in cortical interaction for different phases of creative verbal
processes. In addition, a closer focus on basal ganglia cortical
interaction, for instance in patients with basal ganglia lesions,
could be an interesting direction for new research.
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We are typically more accurate at remembering own- than other-race faces. This
“own-race bias” has been suggested to result from enhanced expertise with and more
efficient perceptual processing of own-race than other-race faces. In line with this idea, the
N170, an event-related potential correlate of face perception, has been repeatedly found
to be larger for other-race faces. Other studies, however, found no difference in N170
amplitude for faces from diverse ethnic groups. The present study tested whether these
seemingly incongruent findings can be explained by varying task demands. European
participants were presented with upright and inverted European and Asian faces (as
well as European and Asian houses), and asked to either indicate the ethnicity or the
orientation of the stimuli. Larger N170s for other-race faces were observed in the ethnicity
but not in the orientation task, suggesting that the necessity to process facial category
information is a minimum prerequisite for the occurrence of the effect. In addition, N170
inversion effects, with larger amplitudes for inverted relative to upright stimuli, were more
pronounced for own- relative to other-race faces in both tasks. Overall, the present findings
suggest that the occurrence of ethnicity effects in N170 for upright faces depends on
the amount of facial detail required for the task at hand. At the same time, the larger
inversion effects for own- than other-race faces occur independent of task and may reflect
the fine-tuning of perceptual processing to faces of maximum expertise.
Keywords: faces, event-related potentials, N170, own-race bias, inversion
INTRODUCTION
Humans can typically recognize an immense number of previ-
ously seen faces and are therefore often considered to be experts
in face recognition. Importantly, however, such expertise con-
siderably varies depending on an individual’s experience with a
specific category of faces. The maybe best known example for this
claim is the so-called own-race1 bias (Malpass and Kravitz, 1969;
Meissner and Brigham, 2001), i.e., the finding that participants
are typically more accurate at recognizing faces from their own
compared to another ethnic group. This phenomenon has been
explained by the substantially larger experience that most peo-
ple have with faces from their own relative to other ethnic groups,
resulting in a fine-tuning of face perception mechanisms (Rossion
and Michel, 2011). For instance, it has been found that so-called
holistic face processing, i.e., the merging of facial features into a
single Gestalt-like representation, but also the processing of the
features themselves, is more efficient for own- relative to other-
race faces (Tanaka et al., 2004; Rhodes et al., 2006; Hayward et al.,
2008).
Neural correlates of face perception have been extensively
studied using event-related potentials (ERPs). Most researchers
agree that the first component with a high degree of selectively
1The term “race” is exclusively used to refer to visually distinct ethnic groups.
for faces is the N170 (Bentin et al., 1996; Rossion and Jacques,
2008), a negative component peaking at approximately 170 ms
at occipito-temporal scalp sites. The N170 is larger for faces
than for most objects (e.g., Rossion et al., 2000; Itier and Taylor,
2004), and it has been suggested to reflect the structural encoding
(Eimer, 2011) or detection of a face-like pattern (Schweinberger
and Burton, 2003; Amihai et al., 2011).
Following-up on the suggestion that the own-race bias results
from differences in perceptual face processing, a number of stud-
ies examined whether the ethnicity of a face affects the amplitude
of the N170. At first sight, the results of these studies are rather
discrepant, with roughly half of them reporting no significant dif-
ference in N170 for own- vs. other-race faces (James et al., 2001;
Caldara et al., 2003, 2004; Wiese et al., 2009; Vizioli et al., 2010a,b;
Herzmann et al., 2011; Ofan et al., 2011, 2013; Chen et al., 2013),
and the other half finding larger amplitudes for other- relative
to own-race faces (Herrmann et al., 2007; Gajewski et al., 2008;
Stahl et al., 2008, 2010; Walker et al., 2008; He et al., 2009; Balas
and Nelson, 2010; Brebner et al., 2011; Caharel et al., 2011; Wiese,
2012; Montalan et al., 2013; Wiese et al., 2013). Importantly, it
has been suggested that varying task demands may contribute to
these discrepant findings (e.g., Ito and Bartholow, 2009; Caharel
et al., 2011). A larger N170 for other-race faces might occur when
the identity of the face is relevant for the task, whereas N170
might be similar for own- and other-race faces when such detailed
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facial information is not task-relevant (as suggested by Ito and
Bartholow, 2009).
Broadly in line with this idea, the publications which I am
aware of to date can be roughly assigned to one of three categories
(see Table 1): (i) studies with tasks that are based on superficial
information in which specific facial detail was not directly task-
relevant (e.g., orientation tasks, detection of target objects etc.),
(ii) studies in which categorical information was task-relevant
(e.g., race categorization, gender categorization etc.), and (iii)
studies in which the encoding of identity information of individual
faces was necessary to perform the task (e.g., recognition mem-
ory, identity-repetition tasks etc.) 2 . As can be seen in Table 1,
when studies are split into these categories the results are relatively
consistent, with few exceptions from a clear-cut overall pattern:
Whereas seven out of nine studies examining identity informa-
tion reported an N170 ethnicity effect, with larger amplitudes for
other- relative to own-race faces, only two out of ten studies using
a task based on superficial information reported such an effect.
When the task was based on categorical information, four out of
six studies observed larger N170 amplitudes for other-race faces,
with the remaining two either showing no effect or larger ampli-
tudes for own-race faces. A crosstab χ2 test (with studies classified
by task category as dependent variables and coding a larger N170
for other-race faces as 1 and all other results as 0) resulted in a
significant effect (χ2 = 7.016, p = 0.030), suggesting a relevant
influence of task demands on the occurrence of the N170 ethnic-
ity effect. As is also evident from Table 1, other factors that might
potentially contribute to the presence vs. absence of an N170 eth-
nicity effect (e.g., the use of color vs. grayscale images, or the
specific other-race tested) do not offer a similarly straightforward
explanation.
In a recent study, Senholzi and Ito (2013) directly tested the
influence of task on the N170 ethnicity effect. In line with the
above-described pattern, they found that ethnicity effects were
absent in a butterfly detection task, whereas N170 was larger for
other-race faces in an identity task. In a categorization task, how-
ever, larger amplitudes for own-race faces were observed. In sum,
the systematic review of the literature provided here points to
an important contribution of task on the presence vs. absence
of the N170 ethnicity effect, but differences between studies may
have also resulted from additional factors varying between partic-
ipant groups (such as varying long-term expertise with other-race
people in different countries, see Rossion and Michel, 2011).
Moreover, in the study by Senholzi and Ito (2013) task was
manipulated as a between-subjects factor, which introduced the
possibility that group differences other than task that were not
controlled in this study (such as differences in quality or quantity
of contact to other-race people, or the distribution of participant
gender in the three tasks), might have affected the results.
Furthermore, a number of the above-cited studies examined
the so-called face inversion effect (FIE) for own- and other-race
faces. It is well established that the picture-plane rotation of a
face by 180◦ substantially impairs its recognition, and this effect is
2Please note that I do not consider the experiments by Ito and Urland (2005)
in this review, as N170 is unusually small in this study, presumably due to the
untypical use of an average mastoid reference.
disproportionally stronger for faces relative to other objects (Yin,
1969). The FIE has been suggested to result from a substantial dif-
ficulty to process configural or holistic information from inverted
faces (Maurer et al., 2002; Rossion, 2008). Given that other-race
faces are processed less holistically, one might assume that the
FIE should be smaller for these faces, a finding which has indeed
been observed repeatedly (e.g., Rhodes et al., 1989; Hancock and
Rhodes, 2008). Moreover, it is known that face inversion affects
the N170, which is increased and delayed for inverted relative to
upright faces (e.g., Eimer, 2000; Rossion et al., 2000; Itier and
Taylor, 2002). Accordingly, one might expect a larger N170 FIE
for own- relative to other-race faces. However, results on this issue
are also mixed, with some studies showing larger N170 inversion
effects for own-race faces (Vizioli et al., 2010a; Caharel et al., 2011;
Montalan et al., 2013), whereas others do not (Wiese et al., 2009;
Chen et al., 2013). As can be seen in Table 1, the number of rele-
vant studies is relatively small to date, but an enhanced N170 FIE
for own-race faces has been shown repeatedly in categorization
tasks, while the situation with more superficial tasks is less clear.
Finally, a number of ERP studies tested effects of face ethnicity
on the amplitude of the occipito-temporal P2, a positive-going
component subsequent to N170, which has been suggested to
reflect the processing of second-order configurations (Mercure
et al., 2008), i.e., the metric distances between facial features, or
the typicality of a face relative to a prototype (Schulz et al., 2012).
Previous studies have reported substantially larger P2 amplitudes
at both left- and right-hemispheric electrode sites for own- rela-
tive to other-race faces in participants without particular expertise
for other-race faces (Stahl et al., 2008; Lucas et al., 2011), whereas
participants with substantial contact to people from the other
ethnic background showed only small ethnicity effects in the P2
(Stahl et al., 2008; Wiese et al., 2013). Importantly for the present
purpose, the P2 effect has also been found to be modulated by
task demands (Stahl et al., 2010), as it was substantially smaller
and restricted to right-hemispheric electrodes when participants
were asked to rate own- and other-race faces for attractiveness as
compared to categorizing them according to ethnicity. However,
it is unclear whether the higher amount of facial detail neces-
sary for the successful completion of the attractiveness task or the
reduced salience of ethnicity information in this condition led to
the reduced P2 effect.
The present study aimed at testing the following predic-
tions. (i) If the presence vs. absence of the N170 ethnicity effect
for upright faces depended on task demands, this should be
detectable using a within-subjects manipulation, which excludes
the possibility of confounds by uncontrolled group variables.
N170 amplitude should be similar for own- and other-race faces
in a more superficial task, in which detailed facial informa-
tion is not task-relevant (orientation task). By contrast, N170
amplitudes should be larger for other-race faces when category
information is task-relevant (ethnicity task). Only few studies on
categorization tasks are available, and the present study aimed at
adding further evidence to this least often tested task category3.
(ii) A larger N170 FIE for own-race faces has been observed in
3I chose to not test all three tasks, as this would have made the experiment
inappropriately long.
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Table 1 | Previous studies on N170 ethnicity effects, sorted by task categories.
Study Participants’
ethnic group
Other-race faces Images Task N170 Amplitude
Upright faces Inversion
effect
SUPERFICIAL TASKS; CATEGORY OR IDENTITY INFORMATION NOT TASK-RELEVANT
Caldara et al., 2003 Caucasian Asian Grayscale “Count butterfly stimuli” Own = other Not tested
Gajewski et al., 2008 Exp. 1:
Caucasian
Asian, African Grayscale “Detect door stimuli” Own < other No basic
effect
Exp. 2: Asian Caucasian, African Grayscale “Detect door stimuli” Own = other No basic
effect
Wiese et al., 2009 Caucasian Asian Grayscale “Stimulus
upright/inverted?”
Own = other Own = other
Vizioli et al., 2010a Asian/Cauc. African, Asian/Cauc. Grayscale “Detect red/green
faces”
Own = other Own > other
Vizioli et al., 2010b Asian/Cauc. Asian/Cauc. Grayscale “Press if stimulus is
inverted”
Own = other Not tested
Balas and Nelson, 2010 Caucasian African-American Color “Stimulus
upright/inverted?”
Own < other No basic
effect
Ofan et al., 2011 82% Caucasian,
18% Asian
African-American Two-tone “Target word
pleasant/unpleasant?”
Own = other Not tested
Ofan et al., 2013 Caucasian African-American Two-tone “Target word
pleasant/unpleasant?”
Own = other Not tested
Senholzi and Ito, 2013 Caucasian African-American Color “Detect butterfly
stimuli”
Own = other Not tested
Chen et al., 2013 Asian Caucasian Grayscale “Count flowers” Own = other Own = other
FACE CATEGORY TASK-RELEVANT
Caldara et al., 2004 Caucasian Asian Grayscale “Face Asian or
European?”
Own = other Not tested
He et al., 2009 Caucasian Asian, African-American Color “Face female or male?” Own < other Not tested
Brebner et al., 2011 Caucasian African-American Color “Face older or younger
than 21?”
Own < other Not tested
Caharel et al., 2011 Caucasian Asian, African Color “Face own- or
other-race?”
Own < other Own > other
Montalan et al., 2013 Caucasian African Grayscale “Face African or
Caucasian?”
Own < other Own > other
Senholzi and Ito, 2013 Caucasian African-American Color “Race same as in last
image?”
Own > other Not tested
FACIAL IDENTITY TASK-RELEVANT
James et al., 2001 Caucasian Asian Grayscale “Face learned or new?” Own = other Not
differentially
tested
Herrmann et al., 2007 Caucasian Asian ? “Face same as in last
image?”
Own < other Not tested
Stahl et al., 2008 Caucasian Asian Grayscale “Face learned or new?” Own < other Not tested
Walker et al., 2008 Caucasian African Grayscale “Face same as in last
image?”
Own < other Not
differentially
tested
Stahl et al., 2010 Caucasian Asian Grayscale “Face learned or new?” Own < other Not tested
Herzmann et al., 2011 Asian/Cauc. Asian/Cauc. Grayscale “Face learned or new?” Own = other Not tested
Wiese, 2012 Caucasian Asian Grayscale “Face learned or new?” own < Other Not tested
Senholzi and Ito, 2013 Caucasian African-American Color “Face same as in last
image?”
Own < other Not tested
Wiese et al., 2013 Asian/Cauc. Asian/Cauc. Grayscale “Face learned or new?” Own < other Not tested
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tasks which either emphasized the processing of detailed facial
information (Caharel et al., 2011; Montalan et al., 2013) or not
(Vizioli et al., 2010a). Moreover, two further studies with superfi-
cial tasks did not find a larger FIE for own-race faces (Wiese et al.,
2009; Chen et al., 2013). I thus expected to find an increased N170
FIE for own-race faces in the ethnicity task, whereas it was less
clear whether a corresponding effect would emerge in the more
superficial orientation task or not. (iii) If the previously observed
reduction of the P2 ethnicity effect in an attractiveness judgment
relative to an ethnicity categorization task was related to the larger
amount of detailed face processing required for the attractiveness
decision, a more superficial orientation task should result in a
similar (or even larger) P2 effect as a categorization task. If, how-
ever, salience of ethnicity information contributes to the P2 effect,
it should be larger in the categorization relative to the orientation
task. Finally, to test whether any potential task effects were selec-
tive for faces, I added non-facial control stimuli to the experiment
(i.e., Asian and European houses).
METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Twenty right-handed Caucasian students from the University of
Jena (13 female, mean age = 22.0 years ± 2.1 SD) contributed
data. All participants reported normal or corrected-to-normal
vision and no history of neurological or psychiatric disorders.
Participants received course credits or a monetary reward of 5C/h
for partaking. All participants gave written informed consent and
the study was approved by the ethics committee of the Faculty of
Social and Behavioral Sciences at Jena University.
STIMULI
Color images depicting 50 Asian and 50 Caucasian full-frontal
faces with neutral or moderately happy expressions (50% female
respectively), as well as 50 Asian and 50 European houses were
taken from various internet resources. The house stimuli con-
sisted of traditional buildings only to ensure easy differentiation
of their cultural origin. Faces and houses were cut out and pasted
in front of a uniform black background, such that no clothing
or background information was visible. All stimuli were cropped
to a frame of 300 × 380 pixels, resulting in a visual angle of
6.7◦ × 8.5◦ at a viewing distance of 90 cm. Stimuli were matched
for luminance and contrast using Adobe Photoshop. Inverted ver-
sions of all stimuli were created by picture-plane rotations of the
images by 180◦.
Five participants (all female, mean age = 22.2 years ± 2.8 SD),
who did not take part in the main experiment, rated all face stim-
uli in upright orientation for emotional expressions on a 7-point
scale (ranging from 1 = very angry to 7 = very happy; 4 = neu-
tral). An item analysis showed that both Caucasian and Asian
faces were rated as showing neutral expressions (Caucasian faces:
M = 3.93 ± 0.71SD; Asian faces: M = 4.29 ± 0.60 SD). At the
same time, Asian faces were rated more happy than Caucasian
faces [t(98) = 2.74, p = 0.007, Cohen’s d = 0.55].
PROCEDURE
Participants were seated in a dimly lit, electrically shielded and
noise-attenuated cabin (400-A-CT-Special, Industrial Acoustics,
Niederkrüchten, Germany) with their heads in a chin rest. The
experiment consisted of two practice blocks (one for each of the
two tasks) using additional stimuli and eight experimental blocks.
Each trial started with the presentation of a fixation cross that ran-
domly varied in duration between 1000 and 1500 ms, followed by
the presentation of a face or house stimulus for 1000 ms. In dif-
ferent experimental blocks, participants were asked to indicate the
orientation (upright, inverted) or the ethnic/cultural background
of each stimulus (Asian or European). Participants were asked to
respond via key presses using their left and right index fingers as
quickly as possible without compromising accuracy. The assign-
ment of keys to response categories was counterbalanced across
participants.
The experimental design varied the factors stimulus type (face
vs. house), ethnicity (Asian vs. European), orientation (upright
vs. inverted), and task (orientation task, ethnicity task) within-
subjects. The task changed after each block, and task order was
balanced across participants (ABABABAB vs. BABABABA). Each
block contained 100 trials with either 12 or 13 trials per condi-
tion, which were presented randomly intermixed. Each individual
image was presented twice in the course of the experiment, once
in the ethnicity and once in the orientation task.
After the main experiment, all participants completed a ques-
tionnaire (see Wiese, 2012) asking them to indicate the amount of
contact they have with Asian and European people (in h/week),
the number of contact persons (per week) from both ethnic
groups, and the intensity of contact (0 = no contact, 1 = very
superficial to 4 = very intense) with Asian and European people in
daily-life situations (such as job/university, meeting friends/spare
time activities, family, domestic circumstances). Total scores were
calculated for each participant by summing up (h/week, num-
ber of persons/week) or averaging (contact quality) self-report
measures from the different situations separately for Asian and
European contacts.
EEG RECORDING AND ANALYSIS
EEG was recorded using a 64-channel BioSemi Active II system
(BioSemi, Amsterdam, Netherlands). Active sintered Ag/AgCl-
electrodes were mounted in an elastic cap, and EEG was
recorded continuously with a 512 Hz sampling rate from DC
to 155 Hz. Note that BioSemi systems work with a “zero-ref”
setup with ground and reference electrodes replaced by a so-called
CMS/DRL circuit (cf. to http://www.biosemi.com/faq/cms&drl.
htm for further information).
Blink artifacts were corrected using the algorithm imple-
mented in BESA 5.3 (MEGIS Software GmbH, Graefelfing,
Germany). EEG was segmented relative to stimulus onset
from −200 to 1000 ms, with a 200 ms baseline. Trials contam-
inated by non-ocular artifacts and saccades were rejected using
the BESA 5.3 tool, with an amplitude threshold of 100 μV and a
gradient criterion of 75 μV. Remaining trials were re-calculated
to average reference, averaged according to experimental condi-
tion and digitally low-pass filtered at 40 Hz (12 db/oct, zero phase
shift).
Latency of early ERP components (P1, N170) was analyzed
at the electrodes of their respective maximum and the respec-
tive contralateral homologue (O1/O2 for P1; P9/P10 for N170).
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P1 peak amplitude was measured at electrodes O1 and O2 in
a time window from 90 to 140 ms, N170 peak amplitude was
measured at P7/P8, PO7/PO8, P9/P10, and PO9/PO10 in a time
window from 140 to 210 ms. For P2, mean amplitudes were
analyzed at electrodes P7/P8, PO7/PO8, P9/P10, and PO9/PO10
from 210 to 300 ms. Separate repeated-measures analyses of vari-
ance (ANOVAs) were calculated for each component. When




Participants reported substantially more contact to European
relative to Asian people [contact time: MEuropean =
52.4 h/week ± 27.1 SD, MAsian = 3.0 h/week ± 7.5 SD,
t(19) = 7.76, p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = 2.638; number of contact
persons: MEuropean = 31.5 ± 22.9 SD, MAsian = 1.0 ± 1.6 SD,
t(19) = 6.20, p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = 1.879]. Moreover, partic-
ipants indicated more intense contact to European relative to
Asian people [MEuropean = 2.6 ± 1.3 SD, MAsian = 0.7 ± 1.3 SD,
t(19) = 4.42, p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = 1.385].
PERFORMANCE
A repeated-measures ANOVA on mean reaction times for cor-
rect responses (see Figure 1A) with the within-subject factors
task (orientation vs. ethnicity task), stimulus type (face vs.
house), ethnicity (Asian vs. European), and orientation (upright
vs. inverted) revealed significant main effects of task [F(1, 19) =
114.98, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.858], stimulus type [F(1, 19) = 15.10,
p = 0.001, η2p = 0.443], ethnicity [F(1, 19) = 28.73, p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.602], and orientation [F(1, 19) = 5.15, p = 0.035, η2p =
0.213]. These main effects were qualified by significant inter-
actions of task × ethnicity [F(1, 19) = 44.58, p < 0.001, η2p =
0.701], reflecting faster responses for Asian stimuli in the ethnic-
ity but not in the orientation task, task × orientation [F(1, 19) =
5.58, p = 0.029, η2p = 0.227], with faster responses for upright
stimuli in the ethnicity but not in the orientation task, and stimu-
lus type × orientation [F(1, 19) = 16.57, p = 0.001, η2p = 0.466],
with faster responses to upright relative to inverted faces but not
houses.
A corresponding analysis on accuracies (see Figure 1B)
revealed significant main effects of task [F(1, 19) = 11.53, p =
0.003, η2p = 0.378], ethnicity [F(1, 19) = 11.36, p = 0.003, η2p =
0.374], and orientation [F(1, 19) = 5.94, p = 0.025, η2p = 0.238],
as well as significant two-way interactions of task × ethnic-
ity [F(1, 19) = 15.10, p = 0.001, η2p = 0.443], with more accurate
responses for Asian than European stimuli in the ethnicity but not
in the orientation task, and task × orientation [F(1, 19) = 13.84,
p = 0.001, η2p = 0.422], with more accurate responses for upright
relative to inverted stimuli in the ethnicity but not in the orien-
tation task. Finally, an interaction of stimulus type × orientation
[F(1, 19) = 15.42, p = 0.001, η2p = 0.448] was further qualified by
a three-way interaction of ethnicity × stimulus type × orienta-
tion [F(1, 19) = 10.30, p = 0.005, η2p = 0.352]. Follow-up anal-
yses revealed significant inversion effects, with more accurate
responses for upright than inverted stimuli for European faces
[F(1, 19) = 6.79, p = 0.017, η2p = 0.263], Asian faces [F(1, 19) =
6.99, p = 0.016, η2p = 0.269], and Asian houses [F(1, 19) = 5.26,
p = 0.033, η2p = 0.217], but more accurate responses for inverted
relative to upright European houses [F(1, 19) = 6.14, p = 0.023,
η2p = 0.244].
EVENT-RELATED POTENTIALS
ERPs are depicted in Figures 2 and 3. The number of trials per
condition in an individual participant included in the statistical
analyses ranged from 27 to 50 (M = 44 ± 5 SD). In the following
paragraphs, main effects of hemisphere or site, as well interactions
containing only those factors are not reported. In addition, main
effects and interactions qualified by higher-order interactions are
not described in the text. A complete list of all significant effects
and all statistical indices for the omnibus tests can be found in
Table 2.
P1. A repeated-measures ANOVA on P1 peak amplitude with
the factors hemisphere (left vs. right), task, stimulus type, ethnic-
ity and orientation revealed a significant interaction of stimulus
type × orientation, reflecting similar amplitudes for inverted
relative to upright houses, but larger amplitudes for inverted
relative to upright faces. Additionally, an interaction of hemi-
sphere × ethnicity × stimulus type reflected larger amplitudes for
European relative to Asian houses but not faces, an effect which
was slightly larger at electrode O2.
Analysis of P1 latencies at O1 and O2 revealed significant main
effects of stimulus type, reflecting earlier P1 peaks for houses
than faces, ethnicity, with slightly earlier peaks for European stim-
uli, and orientation, with slightly earlier peaks for upright than
inverted stimuli.
N170. Analysis of N170 peak amplitude yielded a significant
interaction of task × stimulus type, reflecting larger amplitudes
for houses in the orientation than ethnicity task. Moreover, an
interaction of site × ethnicity × stimulus type × orientation
was observed. Follow-up tests for face stimuli revealed significant
interactions of ethnicity × orientation, reflecting larger inver-
sion effects for European relative to Asian faces, at electrodes
PO9/PO10 [F(1, 19) = 18.87, p = 0.003, η2p = 0.385], P9/P10
[F(1, 19) = 10.50, p = 0.004, η2p = 0.356], P7/P8 [F(1, 19) = 5.89,
p = 0.025, η2p = 0.237], and PO7/PO8 [F(1, 19) = 6.41, p =
0.020, η2p = 0.252; see Figure 4]. For houses a significant inter-
action of ethnicity × orientation was detected at PO7/PO8
[F(1, 19) = 10.76, p = 0.004, η2p = 0.362], with larger inversion
effects for European relative to Asian houses, but not at any of
the other electrode sites (0.16 < Fs < 4.06, 0.058 < ps < 0.898).
The interactions of task × stimulus type × ethnicity [F(1, 19) =
0.56, p = 0.464, η2p = 0.029] and task × stimulus type × ethnic-
ity × orientation [F(1, 19) = 0.34, p = 0.569, η2p = 0.017] were
not significant in the omnibus ANOVA.
As the substantial between-category effects in N170 (i.e.,
houses vs. faces) may have obscured more subtle within-category
effects (i.e., Asian faces vs. Caucasian faces) in the analyses
described above, an additional ANOVA was carried out, in
which only faces were used (see Wiese et al., 2009 for a sim-
ilar approach). This analysis revealed significant main effects
of site [F(3, 57) = 15.89, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.455] and orientation
[F(1, 19) = 30.19, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.614], as well as significant
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FIGURE 1 | Mean reaction times (A) and accuracies (B), error bars denote standard errors of the mean.
two-way interactions of site × orientation [F(3, 57) = 2.60, p =
0.043, η2p = 0.151], and ethnicity × orientation [F(1, 19) = 10.35,
p = 0.005, η2p = 0.353], reflecting larger inversion effects for
Caucasian relative to Asian faces. Importantly, the five-way inter-
action of hemisphere × site × task × race × orientation was
significant [F(3, 57) = 2.91, p = 0.042, η2p = 0.133]. Post-hoc t-
tests were calculated to see whether N170 amplitude differed
between Asian and Caucasian faces, but I restricted these anal-
yses to those electrode sites that had shown ethnicity effects
in previous studies (P9/P10, PO9/PO10; see e.g., Wiese et al.,
2013). For upright faces, N170 in the ethnicity task was larger
for Asian relative to Caucasian faces at both P9 [t(19) = 2.27, p =
0.035, Cohen’s d = 0.274] 4 and PO10 [t(19) = 2.28, p = 0.034,
Cohen’s d = 0.180], but neither at PO9 [t(19) = 0.98, p = 0.339,
Cohen’s d = 0.108] or P10 [t(19) = 1.34, p = 0.197, Cohen’s
d = 0.119]. In the orientation task, no significant differences
between upright Asian and Caucasian faces were detected [0.69 <
4Please note that the t tests in this section are not corrected for multiple com-
parisons, as they were calculated to clarify the significant interaction in the
ANOVA.
ts < 1.94, 0.067 < ps < 0.499]. For inverted faces, no significant
differences were observed in the ethnicity categorization task
(0.17 < ts < 1.32, 0.203 < ps < 0.864), whereas in the orienta-
tion task N170 was larger for Caucasian faces at PO10 [t(19) =
3.07, p = 0.006, Cohen’s d = 0.226], but not at P9 [t(19) = 1.35,
p = 0.193, Cohen’s d = 0.134], PO9 [t(19) = 1.99, p = 0.061,
Cohen’s d = 0.208], or P10 [t(19) = 1.39, p = 0.179, Cohen’s d =
0.155]. Thus, whereas ethnicity effects in N170 for upright faces
were only evident in the ethnicity task (with larger amplitudes
for other-race faces), ethnicity effects for inverted faces were only
observed in the orientation task (with larger amplitudes for own-
race faces). Finally, two ANOVAs were conducted to confirm that
larger inversion effects for own-race relative to other-race faces
occurred in both tasks. The critical interaction of ethnicity × ori-
entation was significant both in the orientation [F(1, 19) = 7.73,
p = 0.012, η2p = 0.289] and in the ethnicity categorization task
[F(1, 19) = 5.30, p = 0.033, η2p = 0.218].
Analysis of N170 latency at P9/P10 revealed significant main
effects of stimulus type, with delayed peaks for houses relative to
faces, and orientation, reflecting delayed peaks for inverted rel-
ative to upright stimuli (see Table 2). Moreover, an interaction
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FIGURE 2 | Grand mean ERPs from the ethnicity task. Vertical lines indicate the N170 time window.
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FIGURE 3 | Grand mean ERPs from the orientation task. Vertical lines indicate the N170 time window.
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Table 2 | Significant effects of omnibus ANOVAs on ERP data.
F df p η2p
P1 PEAK AMPLITUDE
Hemisphere 7.96 1, 19 0.011 0.295
Ethnicity 25.69 1, 19 <0.001 0.575
Stimulus type 30.59 1, 19 <0.001 0.617
Orientation 15.70 1, 19 <0.001 0.452
Ethnicity × stimulus type 19.28 1, 19 <0.001 0.504
Hemisphere × ethnicity ×
stimulus type
4.79 1, 19 0.041 0.201
Stimulus type × orientation 23.96 1, 19 <0.001 0.558
P1 PEAK LATENCY
Ethnicity 4.94 1, 19 0.039 0.206
Stimulus type 21.63 1, 19 <0.001 0.532
Orientation 12.96 1, 19 0.002 0.406
N170 PEAK AMPLITUDE
Site 25.15 3, 57 <0.001 0.570
Task 9.30 1, 19 0.007 0.329
Ethnicity 8.05 1, 19 0.011 0.297
Stimulus type 122.56 1, 19 <0.001 0.866
Orientation 33.04 1, 19 <0.001 0.635
Site × task 4.11 3, 37 0.010 0.178
Task × stimulus type 10.01 1, 19 0.005 0.345
Site × ethnicity × stimulus
type
3.13 3, 57 0.033 0.141
Site × orientation 13.42 3, 57 <0.001 0.414
Ethnicity × orientation 11.84 1, 19 0.003 0.384
Site × ethnicity × orientation 5.96 3, 57 0.001 0.239
Stimulus type × orientation 11.15 1, 19 0.003 0.370
Site × stimulus type ×
orientation
9.01 3, 57 <0.001 0.322
Site × ethnicity × stimulus
type × orientation
3.12 3, 57 0.033 0.141
N170 PEAK LATENCY
Hemisphere 5.19 1, 19 0.034 0.215
Stimulus type 41.20 1, 19 <0.001 0.684
Orientation 17.67 1, 19 <0.001 0.482
Ethnicity × stimulus type 18.04 1, 19 <0.001 0.487
P2 MEAN AMPLITUDE
Site 100.36 3, 57 <0.001 0.841
Ethnicity 29.09 1, 19 <0.001 0.605
Stimulus type 43.68 1, 19 <0.001 0.697
Orientation 54.28 1, 19 <0.001 0.741
Task × ethnicity 4.76 1, 19 0.042 0.200
Site × task × ethnicity 5.82 3, 57 0.002 0.235
Task × stimulus type 5.82 1, 19 0.026 0.234
Ethnicity × stimulus type 60.86 1, 19 <0.001 0.762
Hemisphere × task ×
ethnicity × stimulus type
4.93 1, 19 0.039 0.206
Stimulus type × orientation 5.64 1, 19 0.028 0.229
Task × stimulus type ×
orientation
5.35 1, 19 0.032 0.220
of ethnicity × stimulus type was observed, with delayed N170
responses for Asian relative to European faces [F(1, 19) = 34.28,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.643], but not houses [F(1, 19) = 2.60, p =
0.123, η2p = 0.120].
P2. A repeated-measures ANOVA on P2 amplitude yielded
significant interactions of ethnicity × stimulus type, with larger
amplitudes for European relative to Asian faces but not houses,
and site × task × ethnicity, reflecting particularly pronounced
ethnicity effects in the categorization task at P9/P10. A further
interaction of task × stimulus type × orientation was indicative
of a larger inversion effect for houses in the orientation com-
pared to the ethnicity task, whereas faces elicited similar inversion
effects in the two tasks. Finally, a significant interaction of hemi-
sphere × task × ethnicity × stimulus type was detected. Post-hoc
analyses for face stimuli revealed significantly larger ethnicity
effects over the left hemisphere in the ethnicity relative to the
orientation task [interaction of ethnicity × task: F(1, 19) = 5.59,
p = 0.029, η2p = 0.227], whereas ethnicity effects over the right
hemisphere did not interact with task (F < 1). At the same time,
European faces elicited significantly more positive amplitudes
than Asian faces in both tasks and over both the left and right
hemisphere, which was reflected in significant main effects of eth-
nicity in all possible combinations of these factors [all F(1, 19) >
27, all p < 0.001, all η2p > 0.592]. Post-hoc tests for house stimuli
revealed no significant ethnicity effects, neither in the ethnicity
nor in the orientation task (all p > 0.1).
DISCUSSION
The present study tested the effect of task demands on the neural
processing of own- (i.e., European) and other-race (i.e., Asian)
faces and non-facial control stimuli (i.e., houses). Concerning
the predictions outlined in the introduction, the following main
results can be summarized: First, task demands affected the N170
ethnicity effect for upright faces. More specifically, the ERP anal-
ysis revealed a larger N170 for upright other- relative to own-race
faces in the categorization task, but no such effect in the orien-
tation task. Second, a larger N170 FIE was observed for own-
relative to other-race faces. This interaction of face ethnicity and
orientation generalized across tasks. Finally, the P2 ethnicity effect
observed over the left hemisphere was reduced in the orientation
relative to the ethnicity task, suggesting that a high saliency of
ethnicity information amplifies this effect, but is not an essential
prerequisite for its emergence. These ERP results and additional
behavioral findings are discussed in the following paragraphs.
Most importantly, the analysis of ERP data revealed larger
N170 amplitudes for upright other- relative to own-race faces
in the ethnicity categorization task but not in the orientation
task. This finding is in line with the literature reviewed in the
introduction (see Table 1), in which the majority of studies using
superficial tasks found no N170 ethnicity effect, whereas the
majority of studies using categorization or identity tasks found
larger N170 amplitudes for other-race faces. Similarly, a recent
study by Senholzi and Ito (2013) observed no N170 ethnicity
effect in a superficial task and larger amplitudes for other-race
faces in an identity task. The present experiment adds to this
previous finding by showing that even tasks that do not explic-
itly require the processing of identity information result in N170
ethnicity effects. It may therefore be seen as a stronger test to
the idea that the N170 ethnicity effect is not elicited by par-
ticularly superficial tasks. At variance with the present findings,
however, Senholzi and Ito (2013) reported larger amplitudes for
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FIGURE 4 | Scalp-topographical voltage maps (spherical spline interpolation, 90◦ equidistant projection) depicting the inversion effect (upright—
inverted conditions) in the N170 time window.
own-race than other-race faces in a categorization task. This pat-
tern has not been reported previously, with the exception of one
study (Ito and Urland, 2005), which used an average mastoid
reference potentially obscuring any experimental effects at the
nearby T5/T6 electrodes where N170 was measured. While the
exact reason for this discrepancy remains unclear, the present
results are in line with the majority of studies using categorization
tasks.
It should be noted that the larger N170 for upright other- rel-
ative to own-group faces seems quite specific to face ethnicity,
and does not reflect a more general mechanism differentiating
between any social in-group vs. out-group faces. For instance,
while the N170 ethnicity effect occurs in both Asian and European
participants (Wiese et al., 2013), a similar interaction of stimulus
category by participant group with larger amplitudes for other-
group faces is not observed for own- vs. other-age or own- vs.
other-gender faces (see e.g., Wiese et al., 2008, 2012b; Melinder
et al., 2010; Wolff et al., 2013). In sum, the present findings sup-
port the idea that ethnicity effects in N170 amplitude critically
depend on task demands.
Interestingly, although N170 was larger for inverted own-race
faces in the orientation task only, the N170 FIE was larger for
own-race faces in both tasks. The N170 inversion effect has been
suggested to reflect perceptual expertise for a given class of stim-
uli (Rossion et al., 2002), and larger effects for own-race faces are
therefore well in line with expertise accounts of the own-race bias
(e.g., Tanaka et al., 2004; Rossion and Michel, 2011). The present
finding is also in line with those previous studies that observed a
larger N170 FIE for own-race faces (Vizioli et al., 2010a; Caharel
et al., 2011), but not with others that did not (Wiese et al., 2009;
Chen et al., 2013). While the reason for this discrepancy remains
somewhat unclear, it may be related to the fact that Chen et al.
(2013) tested exclusively Chinese participants. Recent evidence
suggests that Asian participants show a similar degree of holistic
processing for own- and other-race faces (Crookes et al., 2013),
possibly reflecting a larger degree of variability tolerated by the
face processing system of this participant group. Moreover, it has
been suggested that the presence of non-face stimuli in our pre-
vious study (Wiese et al., 2009) may have affected the results, as
those previous studies showing a larger own-race FIE did not use
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additional non-face stimuli (Caharel et al., 2011). This suggestion
is not supported by the present experiment, which demonstrated
a corresponding result even though house stimuli were randomly
intermixed in all conditions.
The typical finding that N170 amplitudes are larger for
inverted relative to upright faces has been explained by Itier et al.
(2007) and Itier and Batty (2009) by suggesting that N170 to
upright faces reflected the activation of face-sensitive neurons,
whereas N170 to inverted faces was elicited by the combined
activity of both face- and eye-sensitive neurons (see also Kloth
et al., 2013). When upright faces are presented, activity of eye
cells is inhibited. This framework offers a possible explanation of
the present results (see Table 3), as the larger N170 for upright
other-race relative to upright own-race faces may reflect less effi-
cient inhibition of eye cells for other-race faces. At the same time,
larger N170 amplitudes for inverted own-race faces may result
from the fact that the eye region for faces from different ethnic
groups substantially differs, and that eyes of other-race faces may
not be able to elicit eye cell activity to the same extent as own-
race faces. Importantly, the efficiency of inhibition may to some
degree depend on top-down modulations such as task demands.
A task that requires more in-depth face processing (such as a cat-
egorization task) may lead to a sharpening of neural processing
to face cells, and thus to strong inhibition of eye cells. This sharp-
ening, however, may be possible only for own-race faces as these
are more prototypical. In the orientation task, neural processing
may not be tuned as specifically toward face cells, resulting in an
incomplete (and similar) inhibition of eye cells for upright own-
and other-race faces. Moreover, for inverted faces eye cell activ-
ity may reach the respective maximum possible level for both
own- and other-race faces, resulting in larger N170 amplitudes
for inverted own-race faces. Importantly, this interpretation sug-
gests that eye rather than face cells are responsible for ethnicity
effects in N170. Please note, however, that this interpretation
of the present results is speculative and needs further testing in
future studies.
Of note, inversion effects in the N170 time range were also
observed for house stimuli. As can be seen in Figure 4, these
effects did not occur at sites where the N170 FIE was at maximum
(P10/PO10) but had a clearly more dorsal scalp distribution,
with largest effects occurring at PO7/PO8. This finding is in line
with previous reports of inversion effects for houses at similar
Table 3 | A potential mechanism for N170 ethnicity effects.
Ethnicity task Orientation task
Face cells Eye cells Face cells Eye cells
Upright Own-race + + + + + + + + + +++
Other-race + + + ++ + + + ++
Inverted Own-race + + + + + + + + + + + +
Other-race + + + ++ + + + ++
Black crosses indicate actual activity, gray crosses indicate maximum possible
activity.
scalp positions (Eimer, 2000; Itier et al., 2006) and at lateral
occipito-temporal intracranial electrodes (Rosburg et al., 2010).
These findings may suggest that different neural populations elicit
the house and face inversion effects. If so, these populations
seem to respond differently under varying processing demands, as
house inversion effects were larger in the orientation task, while
FIEs were larger in the ethnicity task.
House inversion effects in the N170 time range were larger for
European (“own-race”) relative to Asian (“other-race”) houses.
Importantly, the larger FIE for own-race faces was detected at all
tested electrode sites, whereas the enhanced effect for European
houses was restricted to the more dorsal electrodes PO7/PO8.
Generally in line with this finding, previous studies detected
larger N170 amplitudes for objects of particular expertise rela-
tive to control stimuli at similar scalp sites (Tanaka and Curran,
2001). The present results suggest that larger inversion effects to
own-culture stimuli are not completely face-selective. Instead, the
more dorsal portion may reflect overall enhanced familiarity with
own-culture stimuli, whereas the more ventral part may more
selectively represent the fine-tuning of facial expertise. In sum,
N170 inversion effects were observed to be larger for own- relative
to other-race faces, which was independent of task and cannot be
fully explained by generally enhanced familiarity with European
stimuli. Instead, the larger N170 FIE for own-race faces appears
to be at least partly related to the fine-tuning of processes selective
for face stimuli.
Subsequent to N170, larger P2 amplitudes were observed for
own- relative to other-race faces. This P2 ethnicity effect was
modulated by task, with larger effects in the categorization rel-
ative to the orientation task, which is reminiscent of a previous
study from our group (Stahl et al., 2010). In this previous exper-
iment, we observed clearly bilateral P2 effects in an ethnicity
categorization task, but only a small and right-lateralized effect
in an individualization task, in which participants had to rate
each of the faces for attractiveness. The finding in the present
study, in which a reduced P2 effect in a superficial orientation
task relative to a categorization task was observed, suggests that
it is not the amount of facial detail necessary for a given task that
affects the magnitude of the P2 ethnicity effect. Instead, it appears
that the explicit processing of ethnicity information boosts the
P2 effect over the left hemisphere. The right-hemispheric effect
seems less affected by task demands, but is reduced by long-term
expertise with other-race faces (Stahl et al., 2008). In contrast to
N170, however, P2 effects were not correlated with the own-race
bias in memory in a recent study (Wiese et al., 2013), and the role
of P2 during the processing of own- and other-race faces therefore
remains somewhat unclear.
In a recent study, Balas and Nelson (2010) presented own-
and other-race faces with either consistent shape and pigmen-
tation information (own-race shape + pigmentation, other-race
shape + pigmentation) or inconsistent information (own-race
shape/other-race pigmentation, other-race shape/own-race pig-
mentation). In a time window similar to the P2 in the present
study (230–300 ms) the authors observed larger amplitudes for
own- relative to other-race shape information. Interestingly, pig-
mentation information was observed to have the opposite effect,
with more positive amplitudes for other-race pigmentation.
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These findings suggest that the P2 effects observed in the present
and previous studies from our group (Stahl et al., 2008, 2010;
Wiese et al., 2013) largely reflect differences in shape. It is note-
worthy in this context that we used Asian and Caucasian own-
and other-race faces, whereas Balas and Nelson (2010) used
Caucasian and African-American faces. It is thus likely that pig-
mentation differences between own- and other-race faces were
more pronounced in the latter study and relatively less percep-
tually salient in the present and our previous experiments.
It should be noted that each individual stimulus was pre-
sented twice in the present experiment, and it is thus possible that
participants recognized some of the previously presented faces,
even though the processing of individual identity was never task-
relevant. One might suggest that the recognition of repeated faces
may have been stronger in the categorization task, in which more
detailed facial information was processed. Consequently, larger
P2 ethnicity effects in the categorization relative to the orienta-
tion task may have not been related to ethnicity categorization
per se but to more pronounced recognition of repeated faces.
Although I cannot definitely exclude this possibility on the basis
of the present data, it does not appear parsimonious when results
of previous experiments are taken into account. If larger ethnicity
effects in P2 were related to face recognition, this would suggest
that in our previous study (Stahl et al., 2010) identity process-
ing was stronger in an ethnicity categorization compared to an
attractiveness rating task. This latter task, however, presumably
required stronger processing of individual face information than
the ethnicity task. In sum, while the suggestion that recognition of
repeated faces enhanced the P2 effect in the present study appears
less parsimonious than the alternative interpretation of stronger
effects in case of ethnicity categorizations, further studies that
avoid face repetition would be needed to definitely decide this
question.
In addition to these ERP findings, two aspects of the behavioral
results appear noteworthy. First, participants were faster to make
ethnicity decisions for other-race than own-race stimuli. Similar
findings have been reported by a number of previous studies, and
have been interpreted to reflect the fast detection of an out-group
defining feature in other-race faces (Levin, 1996, 2000). According
to socio-cognitive theories of the own-race bias, this categoriza-
tion advantage resulted in increased attention to general category
compared to individuating information in other-race faces, which
in turn led to less accurate memory (Hugenberg et al., 2010). The
present results demonstrate that such a categorization advantage
is not restricted to faces, but can also be observed for houses
from a different culture. This general categorization advantage
for “other-race” stimuli suggests that it is not face-selective, but
may reflect an effect of overall familiarity extending to various
stimulus classes.
Second, while no inversion effect was observed in the RT
data of the orientation task, inversion slowed down participants’
responses in the ethnicity task. Considering that the FIE is typi-
cally interpreted to reflect the disturbance of configural or holistic
face processing (Rossion, 2008), this finding indicates that the
categorization of facial ethnicity is not solely based on feature pro-
cessing (for a recent demonstration of inversion effects in other
categorization tasks, see Wiese et al., 2012a). This is at some
variance with socio-cognitive accounts suggesting that the detec-
tion of race-specifying features drives ethnicity categorizations
(Levin, 2000).
Finally, a potential limitation of the present study may be seen
in the finding that Asian faces showed slightly but significantly
happier expressions than Caucasian faces. Accordingly, this dif-
ference in expression may in principle have affected the present
results, and may have led for instance to an increased N170 for
happy rather than other-race faces. From my perspective, this
assumption is not particularly likely for the following reasons:
First, as noted above, a recent study from our group that used a
similar face set found that effects of face ethnicity in the N170 and
P2 interacted with participant ethnicity, and that both Caucasian
and Asian participants demonstrated larger N170 amplitudes for
the respective other-race category (Wiese et al., 2013). It is hard
to see how this finding could be explained in terms of happier
expressions in Asian faces. Second, a previous study did not detect
differences in N170 amplitude for upright happy vs. neutral faces
(Ashley et al., 2004). It should be further noted that this previous
experiment used clearly emotional faces whereas in the present
study, although a significant difference was detected, both Asian
and Caucasian faces were rated as neutral on average.
In conclusion, the present results support the idea that differ-
ential processing of own- vs. other-race faces at early perceptual
processing stages is modulated by task demands. More specifi-
cally, the necessity to process faces at a categorical or individual
level appears to result in a larger N170 for own-race than other-
race faces, while the processing of more superficial stimulus
properties does not. At the same time, the N170 FIE is substan-
tially larger for own-race than other-race faces in both tasks. This
latter finding can only partly be explained by larger overall famil-
iarity with more commonly seen stimuli and may thus reflect
the fine-tuning of early perceptual processing stages to faces of
maximum expertise.
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Recent research suggests that the medial temporal lobe (MTL) is involved in perception
as well as in declarative memory. Amnesic patients with focal MTL lesions and
semantic dementia patients showed perceptual deficits when discriminating faces
and objects. Interestingly, these two patient groups showed different profiles of
impairment for familiar and unfamiliar stimuli. For MTL amnesics, the use of familiar
relative to unfamiliar stimuli improved discrimination performance. By contrast, patients
with semantic dementia—a neurodegenerative condition associated with anterolateral
temporal lobe damage—showed no such facilitation from familiar stimuli. Given that
the two patient groups had highly overlapping patterns of damage to the perirhinal
cortex, hippocampus, and temporal pole, the neuroanatomical substrates underlying
their performance discrepancy were unclear. Here, we addressed this question with a
multivariate reanalysis of the data presented by Barense et al. (2011), using functional
connectivity to examine how stimulus familiarity affected the broader networks with
which the perirhinal cortex, hippocampus, and temporal poles interact. In this study,
healthy participants were scanned while they performed an odd-one-out perceptual task
involving familiar and novel faces or objects. Seed-based analyses revealed that functional
connectivity of the right perirhinal cortex and right anterior hippocampus was modulated
by the degree of stimulus familiarity. For familiar relative to unfamiliar faces and objects,
both right perirhinal cortex and right anterior hippocampus showed enhanced functional
correlations with anterior/lateral temporal cortex, temporal pole, and medial/lateral parietal
cortex. These findings suggest that in order to benefit from stimulus familiarity, it is
necessary to engage not only the perirhinal cortex and hippocampus, but also a network
of regions known to represent semantic information.
Keywords: functional connectivity, perirhinal, hippocampus, perception, semantic memory, familiarity
INTRODUCTION
The medial temporal lobe (MTL) is comprised of several highly-
interconnected structures including the hippocampus, entorhi-
nal, perirhinal, and parahippocampal cortices. These regions have
generally been thought to exclusively support functions related
to long-term declarative memory (Squire et al., 2004; Squire and
Wixted, 2011). Recently, however, it has become apparent that
some of these structures play an important role in other cognitive
functions, such as certain perceptual processes. For example, the
perirhinal cortex is important for making perceptual discrimi-
nations among items that share a large number of overlapping
features, particularly when it is necessary to process conjunctions
of these features (Bussey and Saksida, 2002; Barense et al., 2005,
2007; Bartko et al., 2007; Devlin and Price, 2007; O’Neil et al.,
2009). The involvement of the perirhinal cortex in perception has
been demonstrated for a variety of stimulus classes with complex
features, including inanimate objects, but also faces (Lee et al.,
2005a,b, 2008; Barense et al., 2010a). Based on this evidence for a
perceptual function of the perirhinal cortex, as well as on findings
that the hippocampus is involved in the discrimination of three-
dimensional scenes (Lee et al., 2012), it has been argued that the
recruitment of structures within the MTL depends more on the
nature of the items being represented, as opposed to whether the
task explicitly targets long-term memory (Bussey and Saksida,
2007; Graham et al., 2010).
The perirhinal cortex, located caudally in relation to the tem-
poral pole, but also exhibiting strong connectivity with more
posterior inferior temporal visual regions (Suzuki and Amaral,
1994), is well-placed to serve as an interface between perception
and semantic memory. Within the domain of semantic memory,
the perirhinal cortex seems to be particularly important for stor-
ing and binding conceptual information about objects (Murray
and Bussey, 1999; Taylor et al., 2006; Chan et al., 2011), and also
for differentiating between similar members of a single category
that share many conceptual features, particularly among living
things (Moss et al., 2005; Tyler et al., 2013). It is one of several
regions affected by semantic dementia—a neurodegenerative dis-
ease characterized by progressive loss of semantic knowledge
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and degeneration of the anterior temporal lobes (Hodges et al.,
1992)—and perirhinal cortex atrophy in the disorder has been
associated with deficits on a large battery of tasks assessing con-
ceptual knowledge (Davies et al., 2004).
There is evidence that semantic memory and perceptual func-
tions interact, such that the process of perceiving everyday items
like faces and objects is influenced by stimulus familiarity (in
this case, the term “familiarity” refers to the degree to which
participants know and have previous experience with the stim-
uli, and should not be confused with the concept denoting
a feeling of knowing without vivid recollection of contextual
details; e.g., Yonelinas, 2002). For example, the perirhinal cor-
tex mediates aspects of the interaction between perception and
conceptual knowledge, as this structure is necessary for the per-
ception and detection of familiar object feature configurations in
figure-ground tasks (Barense et al., 2012; Peterson et al., 2012). In
general, familiarity significantly affects the efficiency with which
items such as faces and objects are recognized (Bülthoff and
Newell, 2006), and familiarity can alter the default level at which
classes of objects are categorized, such that participants are able
to more quickly categorize familiar items at an individual level
(e.g., Bill Clinton, the Eiffel Tower), but are slower to categorize
these same items at the basic level (e.g., a human face, a building),
which is the reverse of the pattern typically seen with unfamiliar
stimuli (Anaki and Bentin, 2009). Perceptual expertise, which is a
form of familiarity that results from the acquisition of experience
with particular natural classes of objects outside of a laboratory
setting, can alter even the neural representation of these object
categories, such that they come to be processed more in lateral
occipital cortex and fusiform gyrus instead of in earlier visual
cortical regions (McGugin et al., 2012; Wong et al., 2012).
Items with which participants have had some previous experi-
ence automatically prompt the retrieval of more related semantic
or general conceptual information than do novel items. For exam-
ple, viewing unfamiliar faces will result in retrieval of some lim-
ited conceptual information about the individuals’ age, sex, and
emotional expression, whereas viewing familiar faces is accompa-
nied by retrieval of more detailed identity-specific information
(Bruce and Young, 1986). Moreover, faces appear to be a type
of stimulus that is particularly associated with semantic infor-
mation, relative to other personal characteristics such as voices
(Barsics and Brédart, 2012). The retrieval of semantic mate-
rial associated with a stimulus appears to be spontaneous, with
semantic information retrieved automatically even when partic-
ipants are engaged in another irrelevant task (Jung et al., 2013).
Semantic processes are therefore likely to be involved in any task
that contains elements with which participants are familiar.
The automatic retrieval of semantic knowledge associated with
familiar stimuli affects performance on perceptual discrimination
tasks, even when the completion of these tasks does not overtly
require the use of semantic information. In Barense et al. (2010b),
two patient groups with differing profiles of temporal lobe
damage completed perceptual discrimination tasks that required
choosing the odd-one-out among concurrently-presented com-
plex stimuli. The stimuli were either everyday familiar objects
(e.g., cars) or unfamiliar, novel objects (e.g., “greebles,” Gauthier
and Tarr, 1997). Results revealed differential effects of stimulus
familiarity in amnesic patients with non-progressive MTL dam-
age (“MTL amnesics”) vs. patients with neurodegeneration of
the temporal lobes caused by semantic dementia (“SD patients”).
Whereas both healthy controls and MTL amnesics benefitted
from stimulus familiarity, SD patients did not show this facili-
tation. The MTL amnesics did in fact perform significantly worse
than controls when discriminating among both novel and famil-
iar stimuli, but their deficit for familiar stimuli was attenuated by
their relatively unimpaired access to semantic memory. However,
as the lesions in both the MTL and SD patients were widespread
and variable, and both had significant damage to the perirhinal
cortex and temporal pole, it was difficult to draw conclusions
about the specific brain regions responsible for these differential
effects.
To further investigate the neural correlates of familiarity effects
in perceptual discrimination tasks, Barense et al. (2011) scanned
healthy control participants while they identified the odd-one-
out among sets of objects and faces that varied in familiarity
(see Figure 1) and found that a number of regions throughout
the MTL were sensitive to stimulus familiarity. Specifically, the
perirhinal cortex, temporal pole, and anterior hippocampus were
all more active bilaterally during discriminations of familiar faces
relative to unfamiliar faces. Likewise, the perirhinal cortex and
anterior/posterior hippocampus were more active bilaterally for
familiar objects relative to unfamiliar objects. This observed activ-
ity was not simply a reflection of successful encoding, as these
effects were still evident when the analysis was restricted to tri-
als in which participants did not later remember the stimuli in
a surprise recognition memory test. However, the perirhinal cor-
tex, hippocampus, and temporal poles cannot be the sole regions
underlying the familiarity effects observed in patients with tem-
poral lobe damage (i.e., facilitation from familiar stimuli in focal
MTL amnesics, but no such facilitation in SD patients), because
these MTL amnesics had suffered damage to all of these structures
and yet still showed facilitation from the use of familiar stimuli
(Barense et al., 2010b).
Given that brain damage in humans is rarely restricted to
discrete anatomical areas of theoretical interest, insight into the
differences between these patient groups can be gained by exam-
ining how stimulus familiarity affects the broader networks of
regions with which the perirhinal cortex, hippocampus, and tem-
poral poles interact. The measurement of functional connectivity
is one method of acquiring such information. This technique
involves the identification of regions throughout the brain in
which changes in activation occur at the same time and at a sim-
ilar magnitude to the changes in activation in specific regions
of interest, or seeds. Any areas exhibiting such a correlation are
broadly thought to be functionally interacting with the seed
regions in some way (Rogers et al., 2007; Friston, 2011). Using
these techniques, it has already been established that the func-
tional connectivity of the MTL can be affected by changing task
demands (Martin et al., 2011; O’Neil et al., 2012).
In the present study, we examined how the functional con-
nectivity of regions in the perirhinal cortex, temporal pole, and
anterior and posterior hippocampus identified by Barense et al.
(2011) varied during perceptual discrimination, depending on
the degree to which participants were familiar with the items to be
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FIGURE 1 | Example stimuli from five conditions in the oddity
discrimination task. On each trial, participants were presented with a set of
three trial-unique items. Two of these items were pictures of the same stimulus
shown from different viewpoints, while the remaining item was a picture of a
slightly different item shown from another viewpoint. Participants were asked
to select the different item (the “odd-one-out”). Stimuli on each trial were either
familiar (famous faces or everyday objects) or novel (unfamiliar faces or
greebles). On the size baseline task, two of the squares were the same size,
and the third square was slightly smaller or larger; participants were instructed
to choose the different-sized square. In the current study, our primary contrast
of interest was between the familiar and unfamiliar conditions; consequently
the size contrast condition was not analyzed.
discriminated. We hypothesized that for discriminations involv-
ing familiar stimuli (relative to unfamiliar stimuli), at least some
of these four subregions would exhibit significantly greater inter-
action with structures thought to represent semantic information,
including anterior temporal (e.g., Patterson et al., 2007; Binney
et al., 2010; Visser et al., 2010), lateral temporal (e.g., Schmolck
et al., 2002; Levy et al., 2004), and inferior parietal cortex (Binder
and Desai, 2011; Fairhall and Caramazza, 2013). If confirmed, the
findings would offer insight into the performance discrepancies
reported between SD patients and MTL amnesics during percep-
tual discrimination of familiar stimuli (Barense et al., 2010b). To
this end, we conducted a partial least squares (PLS) analysis of
functional connectivity on the data described in Barense et al.
(2011).
MATERIALS AND METHODS
This study involved a re-analysis of the data presented in
Barense et al. (2011) using multivariate statistical imaging tech-
niques, and thus, a full description of the methods can be
found there. Accordingly, only the aspects of the experimental
design that are relevant to the current analyses are presented
here.
PARTICIPANTS
Eighteen young adult participants (12 female, M = 27.3 years
old, SD = 5.5 years) were recruited. All were right-handed and
did not suffer from any neurological abnormalities. All partici-
pants gave informed written consent, and this research received
ethical approval from the Cambridgeshire Local Research Ethics
Committee (LREC reference 05/Q0108/127).
PROCEDURE
An oddity discrimination paradigm was employed, with each par-
ticipant completing 405 trials (81 trials per condition, 105 trials
in each of the first three runs, and 90 trials in the fourth run).
Participants were simultaneously presented with pictures of three
items: two of these pictures were of the same stimulus and the
other was a picture of a different stimulus. Participants were asked
to identify the odd one out (see Figure 1), and indicated their
responses by pressing one of three specified buttons on a four-
button response box held in the right hand. The sets of stimuli
always appeared in the same layout, with two items next to each
other and a third item above the other two, though the location
of the odd-one-out was counterbalanced across trials. All stim-
uli were trial-unique and therefore not repeated across trials. The
stimuli in each trial belonged to one of four possible experimen-
tal conditions: familiar (famous) faces, unfamiliar faces, familiar
objects, and unfamiliar objects (greebles). In addition, there was a
size control condition, in which the stimuli were black squares.
The sets of stimuli were each displayed for 5.5 s, during which
participants indicated the odd stimulus with a corresponding but-
ton press as quickly and as accurately as possible. The inter-trial
interval was 0.25 s, except that on every 11th trial there was an
additional 0.60 s delay, during which the experimental program
checked to ensure that it was synced to the appropriate scan-
ner pulse. Each condition was presented across “mini-blocks” of
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three trials, such that participants were shown three trials in a
row belonging to a single condition before moving on to a mini-
block of a different condition. The order of these mini-blocks
was fixed for each participant and counterbalanced across par-
ticipants. This ensured that a given trial type did not always
follow the same trial type, allowing decoupling of signal across
conditions.
In each of the two face conditions (familiar and unfamiliar
faces), the items presented were grayscale photographs of White
human faces displayed on a white background. On each trial, two
of the three images were of the same face but shown from differ-
ent viewpoints, while the third image was a different face shown
from yet another viewpoint. The familiar faces were famous faces
that were likely known to participants, while the unfamiliar faces
were novel and not known to participants. On each of the 81 trials
per condition, 40 of the trials involved female faces and 41 trials
involved male faces.
In the two object conditions (familiar and unfamiliar objects),
the stimuli were color photographs of objects. On each trial, all
stimuli belonged to the same basic category, with two of the stim-
uli being the same object depicted from different viewpoints, and
the third image showing a second, different object from another
viewpoint. The two objects for each trial were chosen so as to
have as many overlapping features as possible, in order to pre-
vent participants from being able to make their oddity judgments
based upon a single distinguishing feature. The familiar objects
were commonplace and inanimate items selected from a large
database (Hemera Photo-Objects Volumes 1–3), while the unfa-
miliar objects were “greebles” (Gauthier and Tarr, 1997), which
are well-studied stimuli that, like faces, have a homogeneous spa-
tial configuration, but with which our participants had no prior
exposure or expertise.
In the size control condition, the stimuli consisted of three
black squares presented in slightly jittered positions, with two of
the squares being the same size and the third square being slightly
smaller or larger (by a range of 9–15 pixels per side) than the
other two.
MRI PARAMETERS
MRI images were acquired on a Siemens 3.0 Tesla Tim Trio MRI
scanner. Each participant’s anatomical scan was collected using
a magnetization-prepared rapidly-acquired gradient echo (MP-
RAGE) sequence [repetition time (TR) = 2250 ms, echo time
(TE) = 2.99 ms, flip angle = 9◦, field of view = 256 × 240×
160 mm, matrix size = 256 × 240× 160 mm, spatial resolution =
1 × 1× 1 mm]. Functional images were acquired using a T2∗-
weighted echo planar imaging (EPI) sequence with two echoes
(spin echo and gradient echo, Schwarzbauer et al., 2010) in
attempt to avoid the loss of signal that often occurs when col-
lecting images of the inferior temporal lobes and orbitofrontal
cortex (slice thickness = 3 mm, gap = 1 mm, matrix size =
64 × 64, in-plane resolution = 3.5 × 3.5 mm, TR = 2000 ms).
Spin-echo images are generally less prone to susceptibility arti-
facts, but in this case the spin-echo data did not reveal any
effects that were not already evident in the standard gradient-
echo sequence. Consequently, only data from the gradient-echo
sequence is described here. Sixteen slices were acquired in an
interleaved fashion (one spin-echo and one gradient-echo image
per slice, resulting in an effective total of 32 slices), following the
temporal lobes and parallel to the long axis of the hippocam-
pus. Because half of the slices were devoted to the spin echoes
and the time to acquire each volume was effectively doubled, the
brain coverage was focused on temporal regions and our coverage
of frontal regions was limited. Each participant completed four
functional runs, with the first three runs lasting 630 s in duration,
and the fourth run lasting 542 s. The first 5 scans of each run were
discarded to allow the MRI signal to reach equilibrium.
IMAGE PRE-PROCESSING
Functional MRI images were preprocessed using a stan-
dard protocol within Statistical Parametric Mapping software
(SPM5, www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/software/spm5). All func-
tional images were realigned to the first image of the first run,
and un-warped to correct for distortions in the main magnetic
field. All participants’ anatomical images were normalized to the
Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) template, and the result-
ing normalization parameters were then applied to all functional
images (resampled at 3 × 3 × 3 mm voxels). The normalized
images were then spatially smoothed with an 8 mm full-width
half-maximum (FWHM) Gaussian kernel.
PARTIAL LEAST SQUARES ANALYSES
Spatiotemporal partial least squares correlation was used to
analyze the functional MRI data (McIntosh et al., 1996, 2004;
McIntosh and Lobaugh, 2004; Krishnan et al., 2011). PLS is a
highly-sensitive, covariance-based multivariate technique, similar
to principal component analysis (PCA) but instead of operat-
ing on the total variance, PLS focuses solely on the covariance
between the functional data and the task/experimental design,
constraining solutions to be those related to the experimental
conditions (McIntosh et al., 2004). Using PLS software (http://
www.rotman-baycrest.on.ca/index.php?section=84), we first ran
an initial mean-centered task PLS analysis, which identifies pat-
terns of activation that optimally distinguish between experimen-
tal conditions. This was done in order to generate the voxel signal
intensity data for our subsequent seed PLS functional connec-
tivity analysis. Because our planned contrast for this seed PLS
analysis was between the familiar vs. unfamiliar conditions, we
were particularly interested in whether the mean-centered task
PLS analysis would identify regions that discriminated between
familiar and unfamiliar faces/objects. Subsequent seed PLS anal-
yses were conducted to reveal networks functionally connected to
the MTL regions found to be responsive to stimulus familiarity in
Barense et al. (2011).
MEAN-CENTERED TASK PARTIAL LEAST SQUARES ANALYSIS
We initially conducted a mean-centered task PLS analysis
(McIntosh et al., 1996, 2004; McIntosh and Lobaugh, 2004),
from which we planned to extract signal intensity values from
the MTL seed regions identified in the previously-published uni-
variate analysis (Barense et al., 2011). Although the seed-based
functional connectivity analyses were of primary interest in the
current study, the mean-centered task PLS analyses also allowed
us to determine whether an alternate, multivariate approach
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would also implicate the MTLs in the perceptual discrimination
of familiar stimuli, as described by Barense et al. (2011). Mean-
centered task PLS is an exploratory, data-driven form of PLS
in which no a priori contrasts or hypotheses are specified, and
a series of latent variables (LVs) that optimally account for the
covariance between functional data and experimental conditions
are derived using singular value decomposition (McIntosh et al.,
2004). These LVs, which are similar to eigenvectors in PCA, have
three components: a singular value, which describes the propor-
tion of the covariance between the task and the functional data
accounted for by that particular LV, voxel saliences, which iden-
tify the distributed spatial pattern of brain voxels that is most
related to the effect characterized by that LV, and task saliences,
which illustrate the extent to which each experimental condition
is associated with that pattern of voxels. Effects were assessed
over a 16 s temporal window from the onset of each trial. As
we were primarily interested in the differences between the four
experimental conditions (familiar faces, unfamiliar faces, familiar
objects, and unfamiliar objects), as opposed to differences between
the experimental and control conditions, the size control condi-
tion was excluded from these analyses. The functional MRI data
were transformed into a 72 × 282,440 matrix, in which the rows
represented each of the four conditions for each of the 18 par-
ticipants, while the columns contained the signal values for every
voxel at each of the eight 2 s time lags contained within the 16 s
temporal window. Singular value decomposition was performed
on a mean-centered, columnwise averaged form of this matrix,
yielding the three components mentioned above.
The statistical significance of each LV was evaluated with
500 permutation tests, calculated with a threshold of p < 0.05
(McIntosh et al., 1996; McIntosh and Lobaugh, 2004). Each per-
mutation test involves random reordering and reassignment of
every participant’s data to the specified experimental conditions,
determining the likelihood of each LV’s singular value occurring
by chance. Additionally, the reliability of the voxel saliences (i.e.,
the clusters of brain regions identified by each LV) was mea-
sured by bootstrap estimation of their standard errors, entailing
random sampling of participants with replacement 300 times,
determining which voxel responses appear reliably (and therefore
are not heavily influenced by which participants are included in
the sample). Here, clusters with bootstrap ratios (BSR) of greater
than ±3.5 were classified as reliable (A BSR is approximately
equivalent to a z-score, and in this case corresponds to a p-value
of roughly 0.001; McIntosh and Lobaugh, 2004). As PLS analy-
ses are conducted in a single analytic step, correction for multiple
comparisons is not required.
SEED PARTIAL LEAST SQUARES ANALYSES
Following this preliminary mean-centered task PLS analysis, we
then used a “seed” PLS analysis (McIntosh et al., 2004) to examine
the functional connectivity of the four regions identified as being
sensitive to stimulus familiarity in Barense et al. (2011). This form
of PLS can be used to assess functional connectivity by pinpoint-
ing regions across the whole brain in which signal is correlated
with that of user-specified seed regions of interest, and determin-
ing how this connectivity changes across experimental conditions.
In this case, the seed regions were the peak MNI coordinates
that had been identified in the univariate contrasts of the famil-
iar vs. the unfamiliar conditions in Barense et al. (2011). These
regions included the perirhinal cortex, the anterior hippocam-
pus, the posterior hippocampus, and the temporal pole (one seed
in each hemisphere). The voxel signal from each of these seeds
was extracted from the mean-centered task PLS result using PLS
software’s multiple voxel extraction tool, centered on the follow-
ing peak MNI coordinates identified by Barense et al. (2011):
left perirhinal cortex (x, y, z = −33,−12,−27), left anterior hip-
pocampus (x, y, z = −21,−9,−18), left posterior hippocam-
pus (x, y, z = −33,−27,−15), left temporal pole (x, y, z = −
36, 18,−27), right perirhinal cortex (x, y, z = 36,−9, −30),
right anterior hippocampus (x, y, z = 27,−15,−18), right pos-
terior hippocampus (x, y, z = 33,−33,−12), and right temporal
pole (x, y, z = 63, 3,−18), averaging signal intensity across the
two nearest neighboring voxels. Peak signal intensity values were
extracted for each voxel from lag 3 (6 s from trial onset) of the
mean-centered task analysis, as this timepoint corresponds to the
typical peak of the hemodynamic response function (cf. O’Neil
et al., 2012).
These signal intensity values for each participant were entered
in matrix form as the behavioral values in a single non-rotated
seed PLS analysis. This 72 × 8 matrix contained four rows for
each of the 18 participants, and one column for each of the seed
regions. Correlations were computed between this matrix and the
matrix of functional MRI data containing all voxel signal values
as described earlier for the mean-centered task PLS analysis. The
resulting correlation maps were stacked and again analyzed with
singular value decomposition. The non-rotated version of PLS,
instead of being data-driven, constrains the possible solutions to
allow for the explicit testing of hypotheses via specification of a
priori contrasts. Non-rotated PLS analyses yield one LV corre-
sponding to each specified contrast. Considering that we were
primarily interested in the effects of stimulus familiarity, within
this model we specified a contrast for each seed investigating
whether the functional connectivity of that seed differed between
the familiar and unfamiliar conditions (irrespective of whether
the stimuli were faces or objects). The significance of the LVs
and reliability of the voxel saliences were evaluated in the same
manner as the mean-centered task analysis, with 500 permutation
tests (p < 0.05) and 300 bootstrap estimations (BSR = ±3.5).
Peak MNI coordinates from reliable clusters identified in both the
mean-centered and seed PLS analyses are reported in Tables 2–4,
with anatomical labels assigned using the Automated Anatomical
Labeling atlas (Tzourio-Mazoyer et al., 2002). In all figures for
both the mean-centered and seed PLS analyses, conditions and
brain regions with positive saliences are always displayed in red
and those with negative saliences are always displayed in blue.
RESULTS
BEHAVIORAL RESULTS
Accuracy and reaction time (RT) for each of the five condi-
tions are shown in Table 1 (reproduced from Barense et al.,
2011). A repeated-measures ANOVA indicated that there was
no main effect of stimulus familiarity on participants’ accuracy
in the discrimination task, F(1, 17) = 0.90, p = 0.357, indicating
that differences in functional connectivity between the familiar
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Table 1 | Mean accuracy and reaction time (correct trials only) for each condition (reproduced from Barense et al., 2011).
Familiar faces Unfamiliar faces Familiar objects Unfamiliar objects Size
Proportion correct 0.87 (0.07) 0.84 (0.07) 0.77 (0.07) 0.77 (0.09) 0.79 (0.10)
RT (ms) 2616 (415) 2796 (349) 3009 (448) 3300 (386) 2110 (366)
RT, reaction time; standard deviation values are shown in parentheses.
and unfamiliar conditions did not stem from factors related to
accuracy. However, there was a significant main effect of famil-
iarity on RT, F(1, 17) = 41.47, p < 0.001, due to the fact that the
mean RT for the familiar conditions (M = 2813.13, SE = 96.56)
was significantly faster than for the unfamiliar conditions (M =
3048.00, SE = 80.50). Despite this effect, it is unlikely that the
difference in RT underlies any observed differences in functional
connectivity between the familiar and unfamiliar conditions. The
mean RT discrepancy of 234 ms is far shorter than a single TR;
consequently, peak correlations between functionally interacting
regions during both the familiar and unfamiliar conditions would
still fall within the same time lag in our PLS analyses.
MEAN-CENTERED TASK PLS ANALYSIS
The mean-centered task PLS analysis yielded three significant LVs
(see Table 2). The first LV explained 42.53% of the crossblock
covariance (p < 0.001), and differentiated between the face and
non-face conditions. Two negatively-correlated patterns of acti-
vation were identified, one associated with both the familiar and
unfamiliar objects conditions (shown in red in Figure 2A), and
another associated with the familiar faces condition (shown in
blue in Figure 2A). The regions associated more highly with the
familiar faces condition relative to the familiar and unfamiliar
objects conditions included bilateral clusters in the anterior hip-
pocampus and anterior lateral temporal cortex, which are areas
that correspond well to the regions that responded to face famil-
iarity from the univariate general linear model analysis in Barense
et al. (2011). The regions associated more with the two object
conditions relative to the familiar faces condition included large
sections of occipital cortex and bilateral fusiform gyrus.
The second LV explained 33.08% of the crossblock covari-
ance (p < 0.001) and appeared to primarily distinguish the
unfamiliar objects condition from the familiar objects and unfa-
miliar faces conditions. The regions associated more with the
unfamiliar objects condition relative to the familiar objects and
unfamiliar faces conditions included right inferior temporal and
superior/middle occipital gyrus (shown in red in Figure 2B).
The regions associated with the familiar objects and unfamil-
iar faces conditions relative to the unfamiliar objects condition
included the right anterior hippocampus and bilateral insular cor-
tex (shown in blue in Figure 2B). The familiar faces condition was
not significantly associated with either of these two patterns of
activation in LV 2.
Finally, the third LV was of most interest to the current study,
as it differentiated between the conditions involving familiar and
unfamiliar stimuli (explaining 24.39% of the crossblock covari-
ance, p < 0.048). Specifically, this LV highlighted one pattern
of activation that was correlated more with the familiar faces
and familiar objects conditions relative to the unfamiliar faces
condition (shown in blue in Figure 2C), and another correlated
with the unfamiliar faces condition relative to the two familiar
conditions (shown in red in Figure 2C). The unfamiliar objects
condition was not significantly associated with either of these
two negatively-correlated activation patterns. The regions asso-
ciated with the familiar conditions consisted of strong bilateral
activation along the entire extent of the parahippocampal gyrus,
extending into the anterior hippocampus, and also included the
bilateral temporal poles. This activation corresponded well with
the MTL regions identified as being sensitive to stimulus famil-
iarity in Barense et al. (2011). In contrast, the unfamiliar faces
condition was associated primarily with bilateral medial parietal
activation.
SEED PLS ANALYSIS
Following this mean-centered task analysis, we conducted our
non-rotated seed PLS analysis with signal intensity values
extracted from the mean-centered task PLS analysis for each seed.
This analysis revealed that the functional connectivity of two of
the eight seeds (the right perirhinal cortex and the right ante-
rior hippocampus) was modulated by stimulus familiarity, such
that these regions were functionally interacting with different net-
works depending on whether the stimuli to be discriminated were
familiar or unfamiliar. Specifically, the right perirhinal cortex seed
(x, y, z = 36,−9,−30) displayed this pattern (16.43% of cross-
block covariance, p < 0.016). Figure 3 illustrates that during the
two familiar conditions (shown in red), signal in the right perirhi-
nal cortex was highly correlated with a bilateral network including
lateral temporal, anterior temporal, and medial and lateral pari-
etal cortex (see Table 3). In contrast, during the two unfamiliar
conditions, the functional connectivity of this right perirhinal
seed region was significantly different, and instead correlated with
large sections of occipital cortex.
This same contrast of the familiar vs. unfamiliar conditions
was also significant in the right anterior hippocampal seed
(x, y, z = 27,−15,−18, 15.38% of crossblock covariance, p <
0.036). Like the right perirhinal cortex, the right anterior hip-
pocampus showed differential functional connectivity for the
familiar vs. unfamiliar conditions, and many of the regions identi-
fied in the two functionally-connected networks overlapped with
those found in the two networks showing connectivity with the
right perirhinal cortex (see Table 4 and Figure 4). During the
familiar conditions, the network associated with the right anterior
hippocampus included right anterior lateral temporal and lateral
parietal cortex, cuneus and precuneus. For the unfamiliar con-
ditions, the functionally-connected network consisted of regions
such as bilateral occipital cortex and fusiform gyrus. Figure 5
shows the time course of the correlation between signal in the
right perirhinal cortex and right anterior hippocampal seeds
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Table 2 | Regions associated with the latent variables from the mean-centered task PLS analysis.
Latent variable Cluster size (k)* Brain region x y z BSR
1 FAMILIAR OBJECTS AND UNFAMILIAR OBJECTS > FAMILIAR FACES
1170 R Middle occipital gyrus 39 −75 21 10.10
1001 L Superior occipital gyrus −21 −81 36 9.37
463 R Fusiform gyrus 33 −36 −15 8.27
167 L Fusiform gyrus −27 −51 −12 4.96
73 R Inferior frontal gyrus 33 24 −12 4.23
44 L Thalamus −18 −27 6 4.22
20 L Lingual gyrus −6 −69 −6 3.94
16 R Insula 42 −12 6 3.91
17 R Thalamus 12 −21 12 3.86
11 R Insula 42 3 3 3.65
1 FAMILIAR FACES > FAMILIAR OBJECTS AND UNFAMILIAR OBJECTS
338 Precuneus/Posterior cingulate gyrus 0 −60 21 −7.04
177 R Hippocampus 21 −9 −15 −6.70
197 L Hippocampus/Parahippocampal gyrus −21 −6 −9 −6.52
311 R Middle temporal gyrus 66 −48 12 −6.39
101 R Middle temporal gyrus 60 −3 −21 −6.05
109 L Middle temporal gyrus −60 −9 −18 −6.02
52 L Middle occipital gyrus −45 −75 33 −5.64
11 R Cerebellum 42 −45 −27 −4.15
13 L Temporal pole −36 15 −24 −4.04
2 UNFAMILIAR OBJECTS > FAMILIAR OBJECTS AND UNFAMILIAR FACES
1268 R Inferior temporal gyrus 57 −63 −12 7.04
673 L Middle temporal gyrus −45 −63 0 5.98
277 R Superior occipital gyrus 27 −81 36 5.60
140 L Superior occipital gyrus −21 −75 42 5.47
2 FAMILIAR OBJECTS AND UNFAMILIAR FACES > UNFAMILIAR OBJECTS
456 L Postcentral gyrus −51 −21 18 −6.40
103 L Superior temporal gyrus −51 3 −6 −5.34
456 R Insula 36 12 −9 −4.85
77 L Hippocampus −33 −9 −24 −4.77
72 R Middle temporal gyrus 54 −39 0 −4.49
55 R Parahippocampal gyrus 30 −6 −27 −3.86
30 R Putamen 24 12 −9 −3.65
33 R Cuneus 9 −90 6 −3.55
39 L Cuneus −3 −93 15 −3.55
3 UNFAMILIAR FACES > FAMILIAR FACES AND FAMILIAR OBJECTS
624 R Precuneus 6 −72 42 5.45
3 FAMILIAR FACES AND FAMILIAR OBJECTS > UNFAMILIAR FACES
636 R Parahippocampal gyrus 30 −33 −18 −6.44
440 L Parahippocampal gyrus −27 −18 −21 −5.71
170 L Cerebellum −6 −54 0 −5.30
141 L Temporal pole −42 9 −30 −4.28
57 R Inferior frontal gyrus 39 24 −15 −3.91
93 R Middle occipital gyrus 27 −93 18 −3.68
Note: Only clusters evident during the peak timepoint (TR 3) with a bootstrap ratio of greater than +/−3.5 are reported. *Cluster size (k) indicates the number of
voxels comprising the cluster; only clusters with a minimum extent of 10 voxels are reported. BSR, Bootstrap ratio; LV, Latent Variable; L, left; R, right.
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FIGURE 2 | Latent variables identified in the mean-centered task PLS
analysis. On the left, voxel salience maps are shown. On the right, bar
graphs for each of the three LVs illustrate the extent to which each
condition corresponds to each of the positively-weighted (shown in red on
brain images) and negatively-weighted (shown in blue on brain images)
networks. These networks, in the form of voxel salience maps for each LV,
are all shown for TR 3, superimposed on the ch2bet template in MRIcron
(Rorden et al., 2007). (A) LV 1 highlighted the differences between the
face and object conditions, (B) LV 2 highlighted the difference between the
unfamiliar objects condition and the unfamiliar faces and familiar objects
conditions, and (C) LV 3 identified differences between the familiar and
unfamiliar conditions. Maps are thresholded at the equivalent of p < 0.05
for visualization purposes. BSR, bootstrap ratio. Error bars reflect 95%
confidence intervals.
and a sample of the regions identified as functionally connected
during the familiar conditions.
In these same two perirhinal and anterior hippocampal
regions in the left hemisphere, this contrast did not reach
significance. Functional connectivity was not significantly mod-
ulated by familiarity in either the left perirhinal cortex (x, y, z =
−33,−12,−27, 11.14% of crossblock covariance, p < 0.317) or
the left anterior hippocampus (x, y, z = −21,−9,−18, 14.05%
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FIGURE 3 | Regions functionally connected with the right perirhinal
cortex seed. A seed PLS analysis demonstrated that the functional
connectivity of the right perirhinal cortex differed depending on stimulus
familiarity. (A) Regions shown in red are those with which the right perirhinal
cortex seed was functionally connected during the two familiar conditions in
TR 3, whereas (B) displays regions shown in blue with which the perirhinal
seed was correlated during the two unfamiliar conditions in TR 3. The bar
graph in (C) depicts the correlation of the signal in the perirhinal seed with
the two networks during the four experimental conditions. Maps are
thresholded at the equivalent of p < 0.05 for visualization purposes, and
networks are overlaid on the ch2bet template in MRIcron (Rorden et al.,
2007). BSR, bootstrap ratio. Error bars reflect 95% confidence intervals.
Table 3 | Regions showing significant functional connectivity with the right perirhinal cortex seed.
Cluster size (k)* Brain region x y z BSR
REGIONS FUNCTIONALLY CONNECTED DURING THE FAMILIAR RELATIVE TO UNFAMILIAR CONDITIONS
442 R Superior temporal gyrus/Angular gyrus 60 −57 18 5.93
44 R Superior temporal gyrus 57 −30 12 5.24
56 R Inferior/Middle temporal gyrus 63 −18 −24 4.79
151 L Middle temporal gyrus −42 −51 12 4.66
54 R Superior temporal gyrus 51 −6 6 4.35
70 L Inferior temporal gyrus −60 −21 −21 4.34
241 L Cuneus 0 −69 30 4.05
86 R Temporal pole 42 3 −30 3.62
59 L Angular gyrus −42 −69 36 3.53
37 R Precuneus 18 −48 33 3.53
REGIONS FUNCTIONALLY CONNECTED DURING THE UNFAMILIAR RELATIVE TO FAMILIAR CONDITIONS
329 L Superior occipital gyrus −18 −81 42 −5.73
740 R Middle occipital gyrus 54 −69 −9 −4.51
31 L Putamen −27 3 −6 −4.47
Only clusters evident during the peak timepoint (TR 3) with a bootstrap ratio of greater than +/−3.5 are reported. *Cluster size (k) indicates the number of voxels
comprising the cluster; only clusters with a minimum extent of 10 voxels are reported. BSR, Bootstrap ratio; L, left; R, right.
of crossblock covariance, p < 0.078) seeds. Similarly, the contrast
of connectivity for the familiar conditions vs. the unfamiliar con-
ditions was not significant in either hemisphere for the other two
remaining seeds in the posterior hippocampus and temporal pole.
Permutation testing for the LVs in the right posterior hippocam-
pus (x, y, z = 33,−33,−12, 8.41% of crossblock covariance, p <
0.884), left posterior hippocampus (x, y, z = −33,−27,−15,
12.73% of crossblock covariance, p < 0.158), right temporal
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Table 4 | Regions showing significant functional connectivity with the right anterior hippocampal seed.
Cluster size (k)* Brain region x y z BSR
REGIONS FUNCTIONALLY CONNECTED DURING THE FAMILIAR RELATIVE TO UNFAMILIAR CONDITIONS
382 L Cuneus 0 −81 15 4.94
177 R Superior temporal gyrus 60 −57 18 4.67
70 R Middle temporal gyrus 60 −9 −21 4.56
41 R Middle temporal gyrus 60 −39 −6 4.12
21 L Middle temporal gyrus −42 −51 15 3.82
15 L Inferior temporal gyrus −57 −24 −21 3.75
48 L Middle temporal gyrus −66 −51 0 3.63
REGIONS FUNCTIONALLY CONNECTED DURING THE UNFAMILIAR RELATIVE TO FAMILIAR CONDITIONS
1023 R Middle occipital gyrus 33 −84 6 −6.93
150 L Middle occipital gyrus −30 −81 9 −6.14
63 L Fusiform gyrus −48 −42 −15 −5.43
55 L Putamen −30 6 −6 −4.66
31 L Fusiform gyrus −36 −21 −24 −4.13
10 Parahippocampal gyrus −24 0 −33 −4.12
Only clusters evident during the peak timepoint (TR 3) with a bootstrap ratio of greater than +/−3.5 are reported. *Cluster size (k) indicates the number of voxels
comprising the cluster; only clusters with a minimum extent of 10 voxels are reported. BSR, Bootstrap ratio; L, left; R, right.
FIGURE 4 | Regions functionally connected with the right anterior
hippocampal seed. The functional connectivity of the right anterior
hippocampus also differed depending on stimulus familiarity. (A)
Regions shown in red are those with which the right anterior
hippocampal seed was functionally connected during the two familiar
conditions in TR 3. (B) Regions shown in blue are those with
which the seed was correlated during the two unfamiliar conditions
in TR 3. The bar graph in (C) depicts the correlation of the signal
in the anterior hippocampal seed with the two networks during the
four experimental conditions. Maps are thresholded at the equivalent
of p < 0.05 for visualization purposes. BSR, bootstrap ratio. Error
bars reflect 95% confidence intervals.
pole (x, y, z = 63, 3,−18, 8.94% of crossblock covariance, p <
0.828), and left temporal pole (x, y, z = −36, 18,−27, 12.92%
of crossblock covariance, p < 0.152) indicated that the functional
connectivity of these four seed regions did not differ depending
on stimulus familiarity.
DISCUSSION
The aim of this study was to examine the functional connec-
tivity of several MTL structures during a complex perceptual
discrimination task. Specifically, we were interested in whether
MTL functional connectivity during the task would be affected
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FIGURE 5 | Time course of correlations between the right perirhinal cortex
and anterior hippocampus and selected functionally-connected regions.
Line graphs illustrate the correlations over time following stimulus onset
between signal in the seed regions and selected regions within their
functionally-connected networks. (A) Correlations are shown between the
right perirhinal cortex seed and sample peak regions within its
functionally-connected network for the two familiar conditions. (B) Correlations
are shown between the anterior hippocampus seed and sample peak regions
within its functionally-connected network for the two familiar conditions. Each
lag is equivalent to a TR, which in this case is 2 s in duration. Voxel salience
maps are thresholded at the equivalent of p < 0.05 for visualization purposes,
and are overlaid on the ch2bet template in MRIcron (Rorden et al., 2007).
by participants’ prior familiarity with the stimuli to be discrim-
inated. The perirhinal cortex, anterior and posterior hippocam-
pus, and temporal pole were previously shown to be more active
during perceptual discrimination of familiar, relative to unfa-
miliar, faces and objects (Barense et al., 2011). We anticipated
that when participants discriminated between familiar stimuli,
some or all of these areas would show increased connectivity with
anterior temporal, lateral temporal, and inferior parietal regions
known to be involved in semantic memory (Binder and Desai,
2011), relative to when participants discriminated between novel
or unfamiliar stimuli. Our findings indicate that the functional
connectivity of the right perirhinal cortex and right anterior
hippocampus did in fact differ across familiar and unfamiliar con-
ditions, while the connectivity of the left perirhinal cortex, left
anterior hippocampus, and bilateral posterior hippocampus and
temporal pole was unaffected by stimulus familiarity.
During the two familiar conditions, signal in the right perirhi-
nal cortex covaried with signal in bilateral anterior portions of
the middle and inferior temporal gyri, the right temporal pole,
bilateral posterior aspects of the middle and superior tempo-
ral gyri, and bilateral angular gyrus, cuneus and precuneus. In
contrast, during the unfamiliar conditions, the right perirhinal
cortex instead showed connectivity with bilateral occipital cortex
(Figure 3). The pattern of differential functional connectivity
exhibited by the right anterior hippocampus was nearly identi-
cal to that of the right perirhinal cortex for both the familiar and
unfamiliar conditions, though during the familiar conditions,
the network associated with the right anterior hippocampus was
slightly more right-lateralized (Figure 4).
RELATIONSHIP OF OBSERVED FUNCTIONAL CONNECTIVITY
TO ANATOMICAL CONNECTIVITY
The regions identified as being functionally connected to the
perirhinal cortex and anterior hippocampus during perceptual
discrimination correspond well with what is already known about
the anatomical connections of the MTL. Functional correla-
tions between regions during resting states are thought to reflect
intrinsic anatomical connections, and studies using such meth-
ods have demonstrated that the perirhinal cortex and anterior
hippocampus have very similar intrinsic functional connectiv-
ity, while the parahippocampal gyrus and posterior hippocampus
show functional correlations with a separate, more posterior net-
work (Kahn et al., 2008; Ranganath and Ritchey, 2012). Given
the similar resting-state connectivity of the perirhinal cortex and
anterior hippocampus, it therefore is not surprising that the task-
related functional connectivity of these two regions was similarly
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affected by stimulus familiarity. The perirhinal cortex and ante-
rior hippocampus are anatomically associated with an anterior
cortical pathway that encompasses anterior lateral temporal cor-
tex, including the temporal poles and following along the middle
temporal gyrus (Kahn et al., 2008). Moreover, the perirhinal
cortex has intrinsic connectivity with anterior fusiform gyrus,
anterior lateral and inferior temporal cortex, anterior hippocam-
pus, temporoparietal cortex, and multiple aspects of prefrontal
cortex (Libby et al., 2012).
REGIONS FUNCTIONALLY CONNECTED TO THE PERIRHINAL
CORTEX AND HIPPOCAMPUS
The networks that correlated with the perirhinal cortex and ante-
rior hippocampus during the familiar face and familiar object
conditions included anterior temporal, lateral temporal, and infe-
rior parietal regions, which are all areas thought to represent
semantic information. In particular, parts of the inferior parietal
lobe and significant portions of the ventral and lateral temporal
lobes are thought to be high-level “convergence zones” in which
represented information is abstract and independent of specific
modalities (Binder and Desai, 2011; Fairhall and Caramazza,
2013). The anterior temporal lobes have also been proposed to
serve as an amodal semantic hub (Binney et al., 2010; Visser
et al., 2010), representing conceptual similarities among items
that differ drastically in shape, color, and function (e.g., the sim-
ilarities between an ostrich and a hummingbird; Rogers et al.,
2004; Patterson et al., 2006, 2007). Additionally, it has been sug-
gested that the anterior temporal lobes store representations of
unique entities, as anterior temporal lobe activation is often seen
in response to the recognition of specific familiar or famous faces
(e.g., Gorno-Tempini et al., 1998; Leveroni et al., 2000; Damasio
et al., 2004) and famous buildings (Gorno-Tempini and Price,
2001), though others have argued that a more accurate interpre-
tation of anterior temporal lobe function is in the representation
of abstract social knowledge (Olson et al., 2007, 2013).
Within these broad regions, the specific structures identi-
fied in the functionally-connected networks have already been
associated with semantic tasks involving face and object stim-
uli. For example, retrieving non-lexical information about the
professions associated with famous faces produced activation in
anterior middle temporal gyrus, temporoparietal junction, and
temporal pole, while successful naming of famous faces generated
activation in left posterior middle temporal gyrus and left inferior
parietal cortex (Gesierich et al., 2012). All of these regions were
present in the functionally-connected networks associated with
the familiar conditions in the present study. Also identified in
these networks was the angular gyrus, which has been described as
a heteromodal region that is capable of integrating a wide range of
conceptual information, and is consistently activated by a variety
of semantic concepts with different modality-specific associations
(Bonner et al., 2013).
The connectivity of the perirhinal cortex and anterior hip-
pocampus with the cuneus for the familiar conditions may have
been driven primarily by participants automatically activating
conceptual knowledge about the familiar objects, as cuneus acti-
vation is seen in semantic tasks requiring participants to retrieve
knowledge about the proper use of objects (Ebisch et al., 2007)
and when judging the semantic relatedness of words referring to
tools (Tyler et al., 2003). The connectivity with the precuneus,
which is a region most frequently associated with the act of
episodic memory retrieval accompanied by rich visual imagery
(Cavanna and Trimble, 2006), could reflect spontaneous retrieval
of episodic material associated with the familiar stimuli. Similarly,
the presence of the calcarine fissure in the familiar face and object
networks may have resulted from a greater degree of mental
imagery generated for items with which participants are familiar
(Klein et al., 2000; Lambert et al., 2002).
HEMISPHERIC DIFFERENCES
As the intrinsic functional connectivity of the perirhinal cor-
tex and anterior hippocampus is similar in both hemispheres
(Libby et al., 2012), and both left and right perirhinal cortex and
anterior hippocampus were significantly more active for famil-
iar vs. unfamiliar discriminations (Barense et al., 2011), it is not
entirely clear why the effect of stimulus familiarity only signifi-
cantly impacted the functional connectivity for these regions in
the right hemisphere. As mentioned previously, the effect did
approach significance in the left anterior hippocampus. However,
it is possible that the automatic retrieval of semantic informa-
tion associated with non-verbal stimuli in the current perceptual
discrimination paradigm is slightly more lateralized to the right
hemisphere. Previous studies have shown that the recognition of
familiar faces and subsequent retrieval of person-related concep-
tual knowledge has a tendency to show rightward lateralization,
being particularly associated with activation in the right anterior
temporal lobes (Gainotti, 2013).
CATEGORY SELECTIVITY
The functional connectivity of each of the eight seed regions was
not impacted in the same way by stimulus familiarity. The rea-
son for this differential functional connectivity likely stems from
some degree of stimulus category selectivity within these seed
regions. Although all seeds were shown in Barense et al. (2011) to
be sensitive in some manner to stimulus familiarity during per-
ceptual discrimination, this varied for each seed depending on
the stimulus category (i.e., faces vs. objects). More specifically,
while the bilateral perirhinal cortex and anterior hippocampus
were more active for familiar vs. unfamiliar stimuli in general
(irrespective of whether the stimuli were faces or objects), the
temporal pole was only sensitive to the familiarity of faces, and
the posterior hippocampus was sensitive only to the familiarity of
objects. Therefore, it seems likely that while all of these regions
are involved to some extent in representing semantic informa-
tion about the stimuli to be discriminated, this involvement is
modulated by stimulus category and therefore the functional
connectivity of these regions will not necessarily be identical.
MEAN-CENTERED TASK PLS LV1 AND LV2: EFFECTS OF
STIMULUS CATEGORY
The mean-centered task PLS analysis, conducted as a prelimi-
nary step from which to extract signal intensity values for the
functional connectivity analyses, also highlighted the main factors
explaining the covariance between the functional neuroimaging
data and the experimental design. This analysis identified regions
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associated with optimal combinations of the familiar faces, unfa-
miliar faces, familiar objects, and unfamiliar objects conditions.
The first two latent variables primarily distinguished between
specific stimulus categories irrespective of their familiarity. LV1
highlighted differences between the face and object conditions,
and the existence of such differences is unsurprising given the
numerous dissimilarities between faces and objects. LV2 dis-
tinguished the unfamiliar objects (greebles) condition from the
remaining three conditions involving more everyday items, sug-
gesting that there is a fundamental difference between discrimina-
tions involving a completely novel type of stimulus that has never
been encountered before compared to discriminations involving
stimuli to which participants have had some exposure—whether
it be to the stimulus category in general (e.g., faces in gen-
eral) or to the actual exemplars themselves (e.g., specific famous
faces).
In contrast to these first two LVs, LV3 revealed differences
in neural representation that resulted from the varying levels of
stimulus familiarity, irrespective of stimulus type, which was our
main a priori factor of interest. The relative importance of these
three LVs indicate that while differences among stimulus cate-
gories account for a greater degree of covariance than differences
in stimulus familiarity, both of these constructs make significant
and simultaneous contributions.
MEAN-CENTERED TASK PLS LV3: EFFECTS OF STIMULUS
FAMILIARITY
The focus of the current study was on the familiarity-related
effects identified in the third LV. Nevertheless, some of the regions
identified in the first latent variable were also relevant to this issue.
The first LV identified the anterior hippocampus and anterior
lateral temporal cortex as being particularly involved in making
perceptual discriminations among familiar faces, relative to dis-
criminations among familiar objects. The fact that this activation
was located more anteriorly in the temporal lobes supports the
findings of previous studies demonstrating some degree of stim-
ulus selectivity along the longitudinal axis of the MTL, such that
anterior regions are more content-general, responding to face,
object, and some scene stimuli, while posterior regions respond
selectively to scenes (Litman et al., 2009; Liang et al., 2012).
Moreover, the anterior hippocampal and anterior lateral tempo-
ral activation seen in response to familiar faces corroborates the
findings of Trinkler et al. (2009), who found that activation in
the anterior hippocampus and anterior middle temporal gyrus
was associated with greater pre-experimental knowledge about
face stimuli, and that anterior hippocampal activation increased
with the degree to which the faces were personally-known to
participants. The anterior hippocampal activation seen for the
familiar faces condition in the present study may therefore reflect
the retrieval of episodic autobiographical information associated
with the famous individuals whose faces were presented. While
the current implication of the anterior hippocampus in percep-
tual discrimination of familiar faces is consistent with previous
findings (e.g., Lee et al., 2008), it is at odds with a recent sug-
gestion that a bias toward pattern completion processes in the
anterior hippocampus renders it of no use for fine perceptual dis-
crimination tasks (Poppenk et al., 2013). The perirhinal cortex
alone does in fact appear to be capable of making such discrim-
inations among object and face stimuli (Barense et al., 2010a),
and the involvement of the anterior hippocampus may therefore
simply stem from its strong connectivity with the perirhinal cor-
tex (Kahn et al., 2008; Libby et al., 2012). However, the repeated
implication of the anterior hippocampus in the perceptual dis-
crimination of faces suggests the possibility of an additional,
as yet unspecified, role for the anterior hippocampus in such
tasks.
The third latent variable implicated large sections of the MTL
in perceptual discriminations of familiar stimuli in general. For
the combination of the familiar faces and familiar objects condi-
tions, activation was localized bilaterally along the entire extent
of the parahippocampal gyrus, extending into the anterior hip-
pocampus, perirhinal cortex, and slightly into the posterior hip-
pocampus, as well as in the temporal poles. These regions are
generally consistent with those identified as showing greater activ-
ity during the familiar vs. unfamiliar conditions in the univariate
general linear model (GLM) used by Barense et al. (2011), sug-
gesting that the multivariate PLS and univariate GLM methods
detected similar effects. Widespread involvement of the MTL in
perceptual discrimination offers support for the proposition that
aspects of this region serve as an extension of a representational
hierarchy in the ventral visual stream (Cowell et al., 2010; Lee
et al., 2012). Moreover, the observed sensitivity of the MTL to
stimulus familiarity in perceptual discrimination suggests that
these regions also represent semantic information (Murray and
Bussey, 1999; Taylor et al., 2006; Barense et al., 2011).
IMPLICATIONS FOR SEMANTIC DEMENTIA AND MTL
AMNESIA
The current findings offer insight into an intriguing and pre-
viously unexplained pattern of results from Barense et al.
(2010b). As mentioned previously, this study found that two
patient groups—amnesics with non-progressive MTL damage
(“MTL amnesics”) and patients with semantic dementia (“SD
patients”)—were both impaired relative to controls at perceptual
discriminations of complex and visually similar stimuli. However,
only the controls and MTL amnesics showed a benefit from
stimulus familiarity when making such discriminations. By con-
trast, the SD patients failed to show this facilitation from the
use of familiar stimuli, likely because they were unable to engage
support from their impaired semantic system. Nonetheless,
the neuroanatomical correlates of these behavioral differences
were unclear. The two patient groups had largely overlapping
MTL damage, particularly in the perirhinal cortex. Additionally,
although Barense et al. (2011) illustrated that multiple MTL
subregions were sensitive to stimulus familiarity during percep-
tual discrimination, none of these regions were clearly more
damaged in the SD patients than the MTL amnesics. The cur-
rent results suggest that even though the ability to discriminate
between items with overlapping features depends heavily upon
the perirhinal cortex, this structure (and those structures with
which it is closely connected, such as the anterior hippocam-
pus) receives relevant input from other functionally-connected
regions depending on the familiarity of the stimuli to be dis-
criminated. Both the SD patients and the MTL amnesics had
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damage to the perirhinal cortex, which impaired their discrim-
ination performance, but the SD patients’ additional damage
to anterior and lateral temporal cortex, identified here as being
functionally connected with the perirhinal cortex and anterior
hippocampus for familiar stimuli, may have prevented them from
benefitting from the support provided by intact access to semantic
memory.
CONCLUSIONS
In summary, during a perceptual discrimination task in which
participants selected the odd-one-out from a set of three complex
faces or objects with many shared visual features, the functional
connectivity of the right perirhinal cortex and right anterior hip-
pocampus was significantly modulated by the degree to which
participants were familiar with the stimuli being discriminated.
This was the case despite the fact that the task did not explic-
itly require the retrieval of any conceptual information about the
items to be discriminated and could be completed without draw-
ing upon semantic memory. For familiar relative to unfamiliar
faces and objects, both the right perirhinal cortex and right ante-
rior hippocampus showed enhanced functional correlations with
a network of regions associated with semantic knowledge. These
findings illustrate that experience and expertise with particular
classes of objects influences not only the location of their neu-
ral representation (McKeeff et al., 2010; McGugin et al., 2012),
but also the functional interactions of these representations with
broader whole-brain networks. The results have potential impli-
cations for semantic dementia patients, as the results suggest that
it was the patients’ inability to engage a network of regions includ-
ing the lateral temporal cortex and the temporal pole, as opposed
to localized damage in the perirhinal cortex or hippocampus, that
impaired their ability to benefit from the use of familiar stim-
uli in non-semantic perceptual tasks (Binder and Desai, 2011).
Future research in semantic dementia showing diminished inter-
actions between perirhinal cortex, anterior hippocampus, and
anterior/lateral temporal regions relative to normal controls dur-
ing perceptual discrimination tasks will confirm this hypothesis.
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Real-world expertise provides a valuable opportunity to understand how experience
shapes human behavior and neural function. In the visual domain, the study of expert
object recognition, such as in car enthusiasts or bird watchers, has produced a large,
growing, and often-controversial literature. Here, we synthesize this literature, focusing
primarily on results from functional brain imaging, and propose an interactive framework
that incorporates the impact of high-level factors, such as attention and conceptual
knowledge, in supporting expertise. This framework contrasts with the perceptual view
of object expertise that has concentrated largely on stimulus-driven processing in visual
cortex. One prominent version of this perceptual account has almost exclusively focused
on the relation of expertise to face processing and, in terms of the neural substrates,
has centered on face-selective cortical regions such as the Fusiform Face Area (FFA). We
discuss the limitations of this face-centric approach as well as the more general perceptual
view, and highlight that expert related activity is: (i) found throughout visual cortex, not just
FFA, with a strong relationship between neural response and behavioral expertise even in
the earliest stages of visual processing, (ii) found outside visual cortex in areas such as
parietal and prefrontal cortices, and (iii) modulated by the attentional engagement of the
observer suggesting that it is neither automatic nor driven solely by stimulus properties.
These findings strongly support a framework in which object expertise emerges from
extensive interactions within and between the visual system and other cognitive systems,
resulting in widespread, distributed patterns of expertise-related activity across the entire
cortex.
Keywords: expertise, object recognition, visual perception, fMRI, review, visual cortex
WHAT IS EXPERTISE AND WHY IS IT IMPORTANT TO
STUDY IT?
Understanding the impact of experience on human behavior and
brain function is a central and longstanding issue in psychology
and neuroscience. One approach to this question has been to
investigate people with exceptional skill, or expertise, in various
domains (e.g., chess, wine-tasting, bird watching) and determine
how expert processing and the neural substrates supporting it
differ from those in novices. Most broadly, expertise is defined
as consistently superior performance within a specific domain
relative to novices and relative to other domains (Ericsson and
Lehmann, 1996). For example, top soccer players such as Cris-
tiano Ronaldo, may excel at kicking soccer balls but not at pitching
baseballs.1 While there are many possible domains of expertise
engaging diverse facets of human cognition, including perception,
attention, memory, problem solving, motor coordination and
action (Ericsson et al., 2006), they all provide an opportunity
to study the effect of some of the most extreme and prolonged
naturally occurring forms of experience on neural function.
1http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/soccer-insider/wp/2013/08/01/
soccer-and-society-cristiano-ronaldo-juggles-baseball-at-dodger-stadium/
In this article, we will focus on expert visual object recognition,
which is an acquired skill certain people show in discriminating
between similar members of a homogenous object category, a
particularly demanding perceptual task (Jolicoeur et al., 1984;
Hamm and Mcmullen, 1998). Face recognition is, arguably, the
quintessential example of object expertise, as almost all humans
have extensive experience with faces and show remarkable face
recognition abilities (Carey, 1992; Tanaka, 2001; although see
evidence of significant individual differences: Bowles et al., 2009;
Zhu et al., 2010; Wilmer et al., 2012). However, some individuals
develop expertise for other very specific object categories. For
example, ornithologists are very adept at identifying different
types of birds, which all share common features (e.g., feathers,
beak) but are distinct from other animals (Rosch et al., 1976;
Johnson and Mervis, 1997; see Figure 1A for examples of different
domains of object expertise). Such expertise may extend into
even more homogenous groups such as different kinds of wading
birds (Johnson and Mervis, 1997; Tanaka et al., 2005). At an even
more specific level, dog show judges have enhanced recognition
of individual dogs only within the particular breeds they are
familiar with (Diamond and Carey, 1986; Robbins and Mckone,
2007). Similarly, car experts can distinguish between different car
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FIGURE 1 | Expert visual object recognition. (A) Expertise in visual object
recognition has been demonstrated in several domains, including cars (e.g.,
Kanwisher, 2000; Rossion and Curran, 2010; Harel and Bentin, 2013), dogs
(Diamond and Carey, 1986; Robbins and Mckone, 2007), birds (e.g.,
Johnson and Mervis, 1997; Kanwisher, 2000), x-rays (Harley et al., 2009),
fingerprints (Busey and Vanderkolk, 2005), and chess (e.g., Krawczyk et al.,
2011; Bilalic et al., 2012). (B) Discrimination performance of car experts and
car novices with cars and airplanes. Relative to naïve observers (novices),
car experts are very good at telling whether two car images varying in color,
view and orientation are of the same model or not. However, when these
car experts have to perform a similar task with airplane images, their
performance drops dramatically and is as equally poor as of novices. This
exemplifies the definition of expertise as consistently superior performance
within a domain relative to other people and other domains. Figure adapted
from Harel et al. (2010). (C) A schematic representation of the different
levels of visual representation that may be modified by expertise (simple
features, intermediate complexity features, holistic and conceptual
representations). Here we highlight the interaction between these different
representational levels in the visual system. There will be further
interactions between visual representations and the higher-level conceptual
system representing domain-specific knowledge.
models (Bukach et al., 2010; Harel et al., 2010), or make ad-
hoc distinctions, such as between Japanese and European cars
(Harel and Bentin, 2013), even across variations in color, view
and orientation. However, this car expertise does not extend to
other similar domains, such as other modes of transportation
(e.g., airplanes) (Figure 1B).
In this article, we primarily focus on the mechanisms that
support expert visual object recognition through an examina-
tion of their neural correlates. We argue that the neural sub-
strates of expert object recognition are not discretely localized in
visual areas but distributed (e.g., Haxby et al., 2001) and highly
interactive (e.g., Mahon et al., 2007), with the specific regions
engaged defined by the domain of object expertise and the partic-
ular information utilized by the expert (Op de Beeck and Baker,
2010a,b; Van Der Linden et al., 2014). Through experience, this
information comes to be extracted and processed through specific
observer-based mechanisms both within the visual system (e.g.,
tuning changes) and between visual regions and extrinsic systems,
key amongst which are those supporting long-term conceptual
knowledge and top-down attention (Figure 1C). More broadly,
we suggest that such interplay between different neural systems is
a common feature of all forms of expertise. This interactive frame-
work contrasts with the view of expertise as a predominantly
sensory or perceptual skill supported by automatic stimulus-
driven processes localized within category-selective visual regions
in occipitotemporal cortex (e.g., Bukach et al., 2006).
We will first describe the perceptual view of visual object
expertise, contrasting it with an interactive view, before focusing
on the face-centric account of expert object recognition. This
account has had a large influence the field of object expertise but
we will highlight its major theoretical and empirical limitations.
Finally, we will discuss evidence in favor of an interactive account
and conclude by suggesting how this account can be generalized
to explain other forms of expertise.
THE NEURAL SUBSTRATES OF EXPERT VISUAL OBJECT
RECOGNITION
PERCEPTUAL VIEW OF EXPERTISE
What underlies expertise in object recognition? Since the hall-
mark of expert object recognition is making very fine discrimi-
nations between similar stimuli, one intuitive possibility is that
expert object recognition primarily entails changes to sensory
or perceptual processing (Palmeri et al., 2004). Thus, attaining
any form of visual expertise should be supported primarily by
qualitative changes in processing within specific regions of visual
cortex (Palmeri and Gauthier, 2004). We refer to this notion as the
perceptual view of expertise. To the extent that any changes affect
the bottom-up, sensory processing of visual information, expert
processing under this perceptual view is automatic and stimulus-
driven, with little impact of attentional, task demands or other
higher-level cognitive factors (Tarr and Gauthier, 2000; Palmeri
et al., 2004).2
This perceptual view of expertise is supported by the
experience-dependent changes in neural tuning in areas of visual
cortex reported in studies of perceptual learning (e.g., Karni and
Sagi, 1991), that is, “practice-induced improvement in the ability
to perform specific perceptual tasks” (Ahissar and Hochstein,
2Note that the perceptual view of expertise does not claim that the task used
for the training is irrelevant (in fact it is critical for inducing expertise, see
Tanaka et al., 2005), but rather, that real-world experts (who are superior in
within category discrimination) automatically try to individuate objects from
their domain of expertise irrespective of the task at hand. In other words,
once experts master the ability to individuate exemplars, they cannot view
their objects of expertise without attempting to individuate them. Thus, one
should distinguish between task-specific learning effects (e.g., Tanaka et al.,
2005; Wong et al., 2009b) and task-dependence following expertise training
(e.g., Rhodes et al., 2004).
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2004). For example, neurons in early visual areas (V1–V4) have
been reported to show stronger responses and narrower orien-
tation tuning curves following extensive training on orientation
discrimination tasks (e.g., Monkey: Schoups et al., 2001; Yang
and Maunsell, 2004. Human: Schiltz et al., 1999; Schwartz et al.,
2002; Furmanski et al., 2004; Yotsumoto et al., 2008; for a recent
review see Lu et al., 2011). Further, long-term training with
artificial objects in both human (e.g., Op de Beeck et al., 2006;
Yue et al., 2006; Wong et al., 2009b; Zhang et al., 2010) and
non-human primates (e.g., Kobatake et al., 1998; Op de Beeck
et al., 2001; Baker et al., 2002; Woloszyn and Sheinberg, 2012)
have revealed specific changes in the response of high-level visual
cortex such as increases or decreases in response magnitude and
increased selectivity for trained objects and task-relevant stimulus
dimensions (for review, see Op de Beeck and Baker, 2010b). For
example, Op de Beeck et al. (2006) trained human subjects for
approximately 10 h to discriminate between exemplars in one of
three novel object classes (“smoothies”, “spikies”, and “cubies”).
Comparison of fMRI data before and after training revealed
training-dependent increases and decreases in response across
distributed areas of occipitotemporal.
INTERACTIVE VIEW OF EXPERTISE
While these perceptual learning and training studies demonstrate
changes in visual cortex with experience, such visual perceptual
experience is only one aspect of real world object expertise.
Objects, particularly real world natural objects embody rich
information not only in terms of their appearance, but also in
their function, motor affordances, and other semantic proper-
ties.3 Given these extended properties, the cortical representations
of objects can be considered conceptual and distributed rather
than sensory and localized (Mahon et al., 2007; Martin, 2009;
Carlson et al., 2014). Experts and novices are distinguished by
differences in these conceptual associations, since long-term real
world expert object recognition is accompanied by the ability to
access relevant and meaningful conceptual information that is
not available to non-experts (Johnson and Mervis, 1997; Barton
et al., 2009; Harel and Bentin, 2009; Gilaie-Dotan et al., 2012).
However, conceptual properties of objects have not typically been
manipulated in training studies such as those described above
(but see Gauthier et al., 2003; Weisberg et al., 2007). Thus,
in the acquisition of expertise, conceptual knowledge develops,
along with other observer-based high-level factors (e.g., autobio-
graphical memories, emotional associations) in conjunction with
experience-dependent changes in perceptual processing (Johnson
and Mervis, 1997; Johnson, 2001; Medin and Atran, 2004), lead-
ing to a correlation between discrimination ability and conceptual
knowledge within the domain of expertise (Barton et al., 2009;
Dennett et al., 2012; McGugin et al., 2012a).
A complete account of real world expert object recognition
cannot ignore these factors, and must specify how stimulus-
based sensory-driven processing interacts with observer-based
3One of the most striking examples of the importance of semantic information
to object recognition comes from visual associative agnosia, in which patients
show intact shape processing but are unable to connect it to visual knowledge
of the object (McCarthy and Warrington, 1986; Farah, 2004).
high-level factors. For example, the expert’s increased knowledge
and engagement may guide the extraction of diagnostic visual
information, which in turn, may be used to expand existing
conceptual knowledge. We refer to this experience-based interplay
between conceptual and perceptual processing as the interactive
view of expertise. This interactive view of expertise contrasts
with the perceptual view of expertise (i.e., as automatic, domain-
specific, and attention-invariant) and echoes a more general
view of visual recognition as an interaction between stimulus
information (“bottom-up”) and observer-based cognitive (“top-
down”) factors such as goals, expectations, and prior knowledge
(Schyns, 1998; Schyns et al., 1998; Lupyan et al., 2010). It is
important to note while the interactive view does not support a
strict stimulus-driven view of expert processing, it also does not
suggest that the effects of experience are driven solely by top-down
factors that operate independently of the perceptual processing in
sensory cortex (for such a view, see Pylyshyn, 1999). Rather, we
argue expertise arises from the interaction of sensory-driven and
observer-based processing.
In terms of natural experience, faces perhaps best exemplify
the combination of visual and conceptual properties that underlie
object expertise. Faces are not only a distinct category of stimulus
within which we make fine-grained discriminations, but are also
typically associated with rich social, biographic and semantic
information. Thus, faces seem the ideal domain to study real-
world expert object recognition. And indeed, such considera-
tions have led to an approach of studying expertise through the
prism of face recognition. However, somewhat unfortunately,
this approach has been dominated by the perceptual approach
to expertise, focusing almost entirely on the visual aspects of
processing while ignoring the influences of higher-level cognitive
factors on the visual processing. We discuss this perceptually dom-
inated face account of expertise in the following section, before
presenting our interactive view of expertise in greater detail.
THE FACE ACCOUNT OF EXPERT OBJECT RECOGNITION AND FUSIFORM
FACE AREA (FFA)
Face perception shows a number of specific behavioral mark-
ers (e.g., stronger effects of inversion (Yin, 1969)) not typically
observed for other categories of visual stimuli that are thought to
reflect specialized processing mechanisms. However, it has been
claimed that some of these same markers can be observed for
expert object recognition, leading to the suggestion that the face
processing and expertise shared a common mechanism. In their
seminal paper, Diamond and Carey (1986) reported that dog
experts display a similar decrement in recognition of inverted
compared to upright dogs (but see Robbins and Mckone, 2007
for a failure to replicate). They reasoned that the inversion effect
emerges if three conditions are met: (1) members of an object
category must share a prototypical configuration of parts; (2)
it must be possible to individuate the members of the category
on the basis of second-order relational features (spatial relation
of the parts relative to their prototypical arrangement); and (3)
the observers must have the expertise to exploit such features.
According to this perceptual theory of expertise, acquiring exper-
tise in object recognition leads to a unique mode of perceptual
processing, namely, transitioning from a feature-based mode of
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processing into what is often referred to as a “holistic” mode of
processing.4 Consequently, this processing strategy was suggested
to underlie expertise with objects in general (Gauthier et al.,
2003).
In this context, many studies have compared expert and face
processing to provide insight into the mechanisms of object
expertise. When experts view objects from their domain of exper-
tise, some studies have reported effects analogous to those found
with faces. These include behavioral (Gauthier and Tarr, 1997,
2002), electrophysiological (Tanaka and Curran, 2001; Rossion
et al., 2002; Gauthier et al., 2003; Scott et al., 2008) and neu-
roimaging (Gauthier et al., 1999, 2000) measures. However, other
studies find conflicting results (Carmel and Bentin, 2002; Xu et al.,
2005; Robbins and Mckone, 2007; Harel and Bentin, 2013) and
much of evidence supporting the face account of expertise is con-
troversial. In particular, it has been argued that the data presented
in these studies is not sufficient to conclude that object expertise
engages the same mechanisms as face perception (for detailed
discussion see McKone and Kanwisher, 2005; McKone et al.,
2007; McKone and Robbins, 2011). Here, we will focus on the
neuroimaging evidence on expertise, which has predominantly
investigated the role of the Fusiform Face Area (FFA; Kanwisher
et al., 1997), a region in ventral temporal cortex that responds
more when people view faces compared to other objects.
Broadly, there are two possible accounts of the face selectivity
in FFA: (i) Stimulus driven—this region is specialized for pro-
cessing faces only (Kanwisher, 2010)5 or (ii) Process-driven—
this region is specialized for a specific computation (i.e., holistic
processing) that is recruited when processing faces but can also
be recruited for any object of expertise (Tarr and Gauthier,
2000). Under this process-driven account, any category of objects
that share a prototypical configuration of features and require
experience to discriminate between its members will engage the
FFA (Gauthier and Tarr, 2002; McGugin et al., 2012b).
Supporting the process-driven account, Gauthier and col-
leagues reported that FFA showed a higher response to objects of
expertise than to other everyday objects both in real-world experts
(bird and car experts) (Gauthier et al., 2000; see also Xu, 2005)
and in laboratory-trained experts with novel objects—“Greebles”
(Gauthier et al., 1999). They suggested that FFA is recruited when-
ever expert fine discriminations among homogeneous stimuli
are required. Thus, the expertise-enhanced response of FFA was
suggested to be: (i) specific to categories with exemplars sharing a
prototypical configuration of parts and (ii) independent of visual
shape, as the increase in response was found for diverse objects
of expertise (Greebles, cars, and birds). Later studies reported
4Broadly defined, holistic processing refers to the calculation of the relations
between the parts of the object rather than the piecemeal processing of
individual object parts (for a review see Maurer et al., 2002). The term holistic
is notorious in the face perception literature for its many definitions and
associations (Gauthier and Tarr, 2002). In the present article, we use the term
holistic in its most general, inclusive sense subsuming first- and second-order
configural representations as well as holistic (integral) processing.
5Although the stimulus-driven account has often been linked to the notion of
innate face processing, this is a separate issue. This account does not reject a
role of experience, but suggests that experience contributes to the formation
of stimulus-driven representations.
similar response enhancement in FFA (or in its vicinity) using
chess configurations in chess experts (Bilalic et al., 2011; Righi
et al., 2010). Response enhancement in FFA was also observed
in children who were experts with Pokémon cartoon characters
but not for Digimon characters with which they had no expertise
(James and James, 2013).
However, the claim that the FFA supports expert object recog-
nition is highly debated and is subject to much controversy. In
particular, many studies have failed to find an increased response
to objects of expertise in FFA: with real world expertise (Grill-
Spector et al., 2004; Rhodes et al., 2004; Krawczyk et al., 2011),
with short-term laboratory training (Op de Beeck et al., 2006;
Yue et al., 2006) and even with the Greeble stimuli used in
the original studies (Brants et al., 2011). Further, the presence
of any expertise effect in FFA may reflect the perceived nature
of the stimuli, particularly their resemblance to faces (Op de
Beeck et al., 2006; for a discussion, see Sheinberg and Tarr,
2010).
Beyond these empirical concerns, it is important to note,
that while this perceptual face-centric approach has generated a
considerable body of research, it has major theoretical drawbacks
for understanding the general nature of expert object recognition.
These limitations are particularly evident in neuroimaging, where
the theoretical discussion of the neural substrates of expert object
recognition has seemingly reduced to the question of whether
FFA is critically engaged in expertise (Xu, 2005; Bilalic et al.,
2011; McGugin et al., 2012b) or not (Grill-Spector et al., 2004;
Rhodes et al., 2004; Krawczyk et al., 2011), largely ignoring any
neural signatures of expert object recognition beyond FFA that
are nonetheless unique to expertise. In fact, even faces themselves
elicit selective activation in many more regions than just the
FFA, recruiting a whole network of cortical regions including
the Occipital Face Area (OFA), Superior Temporal Sulcus (STS),
Anterior Temporal Lobe (ATL), Ventrolateral Prefrontal Cortex
(VLPFC), and the amygdala (for a review see Haxby and Gobbini,
2011). Further, information about faces is not restricted to these
face-selective regions but is distributed across the ventral occip-
itotemporal cortex (Haxby et al., 2001; Susilo et al., 2010). All
these regions may be highly relevant to different aspects of face
expertise, for example distinguishing facial expressions supported
by STS (Said et al., 2010; Pitcher et al., 2011), accessing infor-
mation about unique identity invariant to visual transformations
supported by ATL (Quiroga et al., 2005; Simmons et al., 2010),
and processing of specialized facial features, such as the eyes,
supported by VLPFC (Chan and Downing, 2011; for a review see
Chan, 2013).
Thus, there is little theoretical justification for focusing solely
on the FFA when many other regions, including those outside
visual cortex, show the ability to support expertise with faces.
Indeed, while faces are certainly a central domain of human visual
expertise there are actually no a-priori reasons why the unique
characteristics associated with their perceptual processing (such
as holistic processing or activation of the FFA) should serve as a
benchmark for all domains of object expertise. More generally, as
we discuss in the next section, there is ample evidence that the
neural manifestations of object expertise can be found not only in
visual cortex, but also in many other cortical areas.
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BEYOND FUSIFORM FACE AREA (FFA): EVIDENCE FOR THE BROADLY
DISTRIBUTED NATURE OF EXPERTISE
Despite the strong focus on FFA in the perceptual account of
expertise, it’s clear that expertise-related activations for non-
face objects are found outside FFA and even outside other
face-selective regions. In fact, even the early fMRI studies of
Gauthier and colleagues revealed expertise-related activations in
the face-selective OFA and in other regions of occipitotemporal
cortex including object-selective Lateral Occipital Complex (LOC;
Malach et al., 1995), and scene-selective Parahippocampal Place
Area (PPA; Epstein and Kanwisher, 1998). Subsequent fMRI stud-
ies of expert object recognition also reported expertise-specific
activity outside of FFA (Harley et al., 2009; Krawczyk et al., 2011),
and long-term training with artificial objects has been reported
to elicit changes in many parts of occipitotemporal cortex (Op
de Beeck et al., 2006; Yue et al., 2006; Wong et al., 2009b; Brants
et al., 2011; Wong et al., 2012) as well as in areas outside visual
cortex such as STS (Van Der Linden et al., 2010), posterior parietal
cortex (Moore et al., 2006) and prefrontal cortex (Moore et al.,
2006; Jiang et al., 2007; Van Der Linden et al., 2014).
To test the full extent of the neural substrates of expert object
recognition across the entire brain, Harel and colleagues pre-
sented car expert and novice participants with images of cars,
faces, and airplanes while performing a standard one-back task,
requiring detection of image repeats (Harel et al., 2010, Exper-
iment 1). Directly contrasting the car-selective activation (cars
vs. airplanes) of the car experts with that of the novices revealed
widespread effects of expertise, which encompassed not only
occipitotemporal cortex, but also retinotopic early visual cortex
as well as areas outside of visual cortex including the precuneus,
intraparietal sulcus, and lateral prefrontal cortex (Figure 2A).
These distributed effects of expertise suggest the involvement
of non-visual factors, such as attention, memory and decision-
making in expert object recognition (Harel et al., 2010; Krawczyk
et al., 2011; Bilalic et al., 2012). Note that these patterns of
activation represent the interaction between object category and
group (experts/naïve observers), that is, reflecting car-selective
activity that is greater in experts relative to novices. Thus the
expert modulation of early visual cortex cannot be explained
away by suggesting that low-level differences in the categories
compared are driving the effect (McGugin et al., 2012b). Further,
the lack of a difference in activation for faces between the experts
and novices argues against a general motivational explanation.
The work discussed so far has focused on the activation dif-
ferences between experts and novices at a group level. However,
recently it has also been suggested that the critical test of the
involvement of a region in object expertise is whether its response
to objects of expertise correlates with the degree of expertise
(Gauthier et al., 2005; Harley et al., 2009). Using this criterion,
McGugin et al. (2012b), in a high-resolution fMRI study at 7T,
reported that car selectivity in FFA correlates with car expertise
(but see Grill-Spector et al., 2004 for a conflicting result). While
these data, if taken alone, would appear to support the process-
driven account of FFA, the focus on FFA may again be mis-
leading. Importantly, significant correlations were found in many
areas outside occipitotemporal cortex including lingual gyrus, and
precuneus, strongly resembling the spatial distribution of expert
activations of Harel et al. (2010; Figures 2A, B). Furthermore,
within visual areas, significant correlations between car selectivity
and expertise were found not only in face-selective voxels but also
in non-selective voxels. Overall, if correlation between degree of
expertise and response to objects of expertise is the critical marker
for the neural substrates of expertise, these results suggest the
involvement of a number of distributed regions and suggest no
privileged status of face selectivity.
While the correlation findings of McGugin and colleagues sug-
gest widespread effects of expertise, due to the nature of the high-
resolution scanning the imaged volume was restricted to parts
of occipitotemporal cortex. Importantly, data was not acquired
from early visual cortex, a region implicated in expertise effects
by Harel and colleagues. To replicate the findings of McGugin
and colleagues and see if the correlation effects extend even to
early visual cortex (suggesting task-based attentional modulation
of visual activity: Watanabe et al., 1998), data from Harel et al.
(2010) was re-analyzed computing the correlation between a
behavioral measure of expertise (pooled across car experts and
novices) and the response to cars in a number of functionally-
defined regions in visual cortex (Harel et al., 2012). Not only was
a positive correlation found in FFA, but also in scene-selective PPA
and object-selective LOC. Critically, a positive correlation was
also found in early visual cortex, highlighting a general tendency
across cortex for car selectivity to correlate with behavioral exper-
tise (Figure 2C). Together, these results suggest that even when
considering the specific correlation between activity and level of
expertise, the neural basis of visual expertise is not relegated to
specific “hot spots” in high-level visual cortex such as FFA (or
any other single localized region, for that matter), but is rather
manifest in a widespread pattern of activity specific to the domain
of expertise, which may reflect the engagement of large-scale top-
down attentional networks (Downar et al., 2001; Corbetta and
Shulman, 2002).
These findings of widespread expertise effects across the cortex
argue strongly against the perceptual view of expertise and instead
support a framework in which a wide variety of different regions
and processes generate expert performance. This characterization
is in keeping with the critical role that non-perceptual factors
play in distinguishing experts from novices. Having discussed the
evidence for the engagement of both stimulus-driven and high-
level cortical regions, we now turn to studies demonstrating how
their interaction supports expertise.
BEYOND PERCEPTION: EVIDENCE FOR THE INTERACTIVE
NATURE OF EXPERTISE
The interactive view of object expertise proposes that expert
object recognition depends on both sensory stimulus-driven
processing as well as more high-level cognitive factors with a
critical interaction between these processes, whereby the expert’s
increased knowledge and attention guides the extraction of diag-
nostic visual information. Indeed, we suggest that a theory
of expert object recognition cannot be complete without tak-
ing both perceptual and top-down contributions into account.
Evidence for this interaction comes from behavioral and neu-
roimaging studies from various domains of visual expertise that
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FIGURE 2 | Widespread distributed effects of expertise across the
cortex. Comparison of car expertise-related effects reported by (A)
McGugin et al. (2012b) and (B) Harel et al. (2010). Common regions outside
FFA visible in both maps include lingual gyrus/collateral sulcus (CoS),
precuneus, and STS. Importantly, the field of view used by McGugin et al.
(outlined in black) did not include early visual cortex, but expertise effects
were observed by Harel et al. (2010) in these areas. (C) Re-analyzed data
from Harel et al. (2010), Experiment 1 showing correlations between
behavioral car expertise (car discrimination relative to airplane
discrimination) and car-selective activity (expressed as the difference
between percent signal change for cars and the mean of percent signal
change of the other two categories tested) in the four independently
defined regions used in that study (for details see Harel et al., 2010): FFA,
early visual cortex, object-selective cortex and scene-selective cortex.
Together, the distributed expertise effects (a, b) and the widespread
correlations between expertise and car selectivity (c) strongly suggest that
the expertise effect reported by McGugin et al. reflects attentional
engagement.
involve interactions among diverse high-level cognitive processes,
particularly task-based attentional engagement and domain-
specific conceptual knowledge. We first focus on two of the
domains of expertise that have been most intensively investigated
(cars, chess), followed by a brief review of other domains of
expertise, focusing in particular on spatial navigation and reading.
EXAMPLE OF INTERACTIONS WITH TASK-BASED ATTENTION IN
CAR EXPERTISE
As noted above, the expertise effects found in Harel et al. (2010),
Experiment 1 are so widespread, it seems most plausible that
they reflect some non-specific effect, such as the increased level
of top-down engagement that the experts have with their objects
of expertise. For example, experts may direct more attention to
their objects of expertise (Hershler and Hochstein, 2009; Golan
et al., 2014), leading both to the increased activation observed
inside (Kanwisher, 2000; McKone et al., 2007) and outside (Harel
et al., 2010) FFA. Thus, an alternative account is that the enhanced
activation observed for objects of expertise reflects a top-down
attentional effect rather than the operation of an automatic
stimulus-driven perceptual mechanism (Harel et al., 2010).
To directly test the role of attention in expertise, Harel
et al. (2010), Experiment 2 explicitly manipulated the attentional
engagement of both car experts and novices. Participants were
presented with interleaved images of cars and airplanes but were
instructed to attend only to cars in one half of the trials, and to
attend only to airplanes the other half of the trials, responding
whenever they saw an immediate image repeat in the attended cat-
egory only. A purely perceptual view of expertise as an automatic
process would predict that the spatial extent of expert car-selective
activation would be similar in both conditions, that is, irrespective
of the engagement of the experts (Gauthier et al., 2000; Tarr
and Gauthier, 2000). Contrary to this prediction, experts showed
widespread selectivity for cars only when they were task-relevant
(Figure 3, top row). When the same car images were presented,
but were task-irrelevant, the car selectivity in experts diminished
considerably, to the extent that there were almost no differences
between the experts and novices (Figure 3, bottom row). These
findings strikingly demonstrate that the neural activity character-
istic of visual object expertise reflects the enhanced engagement
of the experts rather than the mandatory operation of perceptual,
stimulus-driven expert recognition mechanisms.
Further support for the role of attention comes from a behav-
ioral study showing expert categorization of even car fragments
involves top-down mechanisms (Harel et al., 2011). Specifically,
when car experts categorized car fragments of intermediate com-
plexity varying in their diagnostic value (Ullman et al., 2002;
Harel et al., 2007), they did not utilize the information differently
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FIGURE 3 | The effect of attentional engagement on the neural
correlates of expertise. Data from Harel et al. (2010), Experiment 2
demonstrating that when experts are attending to their category of
expertise (high engagement, top row), there are widespread effects of
expertise compared with novices. However, these effects diminish
drastically when car experts (compared with novices) engagement is drawn
toward another object category (low engagement, bottom row). For further
details see Harel et al. (2010).
from novices, as might have been expected had their perceptual
representations changed, but rather showed a general enhance-
ment of response speed, indicative of a general bias or atten-
tional effect. Further, when car experts search for cars among
other common objects, they show a more efficient deployment
of attention to cars relative to other object targets. The efficiency
of visual search can be assessed by calculating search slopes, that
is, estimating the linear increase in search speed as a function
of the number of distractors displayed, with less efficient search
resulting in greater increase in reaction times with increasing
display size (Wolfe, 1994). Accordingly, car experts showed a
shallower search slopes for objects from their domain of expertise
relative to objects they are not experts with, suggesting a more
efficient search (Hershler and Hochstein, 2009; Golan et al., 2014).
Interestingly, the search for objects of expertise was still much
less efficient than that for faces, which often result in nearly
flat search slopes (Hershler and Hochstein, 2005), indicative of
automatic and preattentive processing. This difference between
non-face objects of expertise and faces is another demonstration
that expertise in object recognition does not involve automatic
perceptual processing.
While these neuroimaging and behavioral findings highlight
the importance of top-down attention in expertise, experts not
only direct more attention to objects of expertise, they engage
in a multitude of other unique cognitive and affective processes,
including accessing domain-specific knowledge. Ironically, the
central role of top-down cognitive factors in object expertise can
be illustrated in a domain of expertise that has been extensively
studied from a perceptual perspective (e.g., Gauthier et al., 2000,
2003, 2005; Rossion et al., 2007; Bukach et al., 2010; but see Harel
and Bentin, 2013). However, car experts are also more knowl-
edgeable about cars, both about their shape and function, often
possessing highly-specialized domain-specific knowledge (e.g.,
acceleration, horsepower). We suggest that this domain-specific
conceptual knowledge interacts with and guides the extraction
of visual information (Figure 1C). Several behavioral studies
show that car discrimination ability is highly correlated with
conceptual knowledge of cars (Barton et al., 2009; Dennett et al.,
2012; McGugin et al., 2012a). These behavioral studies converge
on the conclusion that car expertise integrates both visual and
conceptual knowledge (for a similar conclusion, Van Gulick and
Gauthier, 2013).
Finally, in addition to the fMRI studies discussed above which
highlight the role of attentional engagement in car expertise, evi-
dence for the involvement of non-visual factors can also be found
in a structural MRI study. Gilaie-Dotan et al. (2012) showed that
car discrimination ability is positively correlated with increasing
gray matter density in prefrontal cortex. This finding is in contrast
to the prediction of the perceptual view of expertise of specific
changes to category-selective regions in visual cortex.
Taken together, the behavioral, structural and functional imag-
ing studies suggest that when experts view objects from their
domain of expertise, they differ from novices not only in their
stimulus-driven perceptual processing of the objects, but they also
direct more attention to them and access domain-specific knowl-
edge. It is important to note that the interactive view of expert
object recognition does not exclude the involvement of perceptual
mechanisms in expertise that may or may not engage the FFA.
Rather, changes in brain activity induced by expertise with objects
reflect a multitude of interacting factors, both stimulus-driven
and observer-based.
EXAMPLES OF INTERACTIONS WITH TASK-BASED ATTENTION AND
PRIOR KNOWLEDGE IN CHESS EXPERTISE
So far we have discussed evidence for the involvement of atten-
tion and conceptual knowledge in expertise, however, studies of
chess expertise suggest that these two factors may operate in
tandem. Chess employs multiple cognitive functions, including
object recognition, conceptual knowledge, memory, and the pro-
cessing of spatial configurations (Gobet and Charness, 2006).
And while chess expertise has been associated with selective
activations in visual cortex, and in particular FFA (Bilalic et al.,
2011, but see Krawczyk et al., 2011; Righi et al., 2010), a mul-
titude of cortical regions are reported to be active in chess
experts when viewing chessboards (Bilalic et al., 2010, 2012;
Krawczyk et al., 2011). Expert-related activity was found to be
widespread, extending beyond visual cortex to include activa-
tions in collateral sulcus (CoS), posterior middle temporal gyrus
(pMTG), occipitotemporal junction (OTJ), supplementary motor
area (SMA), primary motor cortex (M1), and left anterior insula.
These regions have been suggested to support pattern recogni-
tion, perception of complex relations, and action-related func-
tional knowledge of chess objects (Bilalic et al., 2010). The exact
nature of the interactions between the different areas supporting
chess expertise is yet to be determined, especially how visual
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information is utilized and accessed by higher-level cognitive pro-
cesses ubiquitous to chess, such as problem solving and decision-
making.
Critically, Bilalic and colleagues demonstrated that task con-
text and prior knowledge play an essential role in driving cortical
activations in chess experts (Bilalic et al., 2010, 2011, 2012). The
expert-specific pattern of activation manifested only when the
task was specific to the domain of expertise (e.g., searching for
particular chess pieces), and not when a comparable control task
was used (i.e., a task that did not require the recognition of partic-
ular chess pieces) with identical visual input. In other words, there
was little activity that distinguished experts and novices when they
were not engaged, directly echoing the findings of Harel et al.
(2010). Further, activity in some of the visual areas that displayed
task-specific expertise effects (e.g., CoS) were also modulated by
prior knowledge, demonstrated in a lower magnitude of response
when the chess displays represented random, impossible chess
positions relative to possible ones.
INTERACTIONS IN OTHER DOMAINS OF EXPERTISE
The interactive view of expert object recognition can be expanded
to account for the neural manifestations of other types of exper-
tise involving visual information based on the totality of the
cognitive processes they recruit. In essence, the interactive view
suggests that expertise is supported by a multitude of brain areas,
the identity of which determined by the informational demands
imposed by the particular domain of expertise. Critically, these
different brain areas do not operate independently, as activity
in one area is mutually constrained by activity in the others,
reflecting the interactive nature of visual processing in general,
and expertise in particular.
The interactive view is supported by the extensive and var-
ied activations observed for many domains of expertise (e.g.,
architecture: Kirk et al., 2009; reading musical notation: Wong
and Gauthier, 2010; archery: Kim et al., 2011; basketball: Abreu
et al., 2012). Critically, the specific networks involved are defined
by the diagnostic information for those domains. For example,
professional basketball players also excel at anticipating the con-
sequences of the actions of other players (i.e., success of free shots
at a basket: Aglioti et al., 2008), reflected in activations in frontal
and parietal areas traditionally involved in action observation, as
well as in the extrastriate body area (EBA, a body-selective region
in a occipitotemporal cortex: Downing et al., 2001), probably due
to their expert reading of the observed action kinematics (Abreu
et al., 2012).
Whereas many examples of visual expertise involve recognition
of objects or discrete stimuli, expertise can also be found for large-
scale spatial environments, for example taxi drivers navigating
London (Woollett et al., 2009). Structural MRI studies have
reported an increased hippocampal volume in taxi drivers relative
to controls (Maguire et al., 2000; Woollett and Maguire, 2011).
Importantly, these changes in hippocampus were not observed in
London bus drivers with equivalent driving experience, indicating
that specific navigation strategies interact with experience in
producing changes to neural substrates (Maguire et al., 2006).
However, in accord with the interactive view, the hippocampus is
not the only region involved in navigation expertise. For example,
visual inspection of landmark objects in city scenes by London
taxi drivers (Spiers and Maguire, 2006) results in widespread
patterns of activation along the dorsal (Kravitz et al., 2011) and
ventral (Kravitz et al., 2013) visual pathways, as well as parahip-
pocampal cortex, retrosplenial cortex, and various prefrontal
structures all strongly associated with scene processing (Epstein,
2008), navigation, and spatial processing generally (Kravitz et al.,
2011). Of course, all of these areas are strongly interconnected
with the hippocampus, and thus constitute a network wherein
multiple types of information are integrated to support complex
spatial behavior.
Reading is an example of a domain in which the neural
substrates supporting the interaction between conceptual and
perceptual processing may be more predictable. Reading is a
means of accessing the language system through vision, hence,
involving the activation of multiple brain regions and intercon-
nections supporting the processing and representation of different
types of linguistic information (phonological, lexical, semantic;
for a review, see Price, 2012). The visual component of read-
ing, word processing, has been primarily linked to experience-
dependent activations in ventral occipitotemporal cortex (Baker
et al., 2007; Wong et al., 2009a; Dehaene et al., 2010) in a region
often referred to as the Visual Word Form Area (VWFA; for a
review see Dehaene and Cohen, 2011). Exemplifying the inter-
action between orthography and other language systems, VFWA
activity following training with novel orthography was found to
represent not only visual form, but also phonological and seman-
tic information (Xue et al., 2006). In contrast to face-selective
activation, which is typically stronger in the right relative to the
left hemisphere, VWFA shows the opposite lateralization, with
stronger responses in the left hemisphere. To explain the relative
locations of face- and word-selective regions, Plaut, Behrmann
and colleagues proposed a competitive interaction between face
and word representation for foveally-biased cortex, constrained
by the need to integrate reading with the language system that
is primarily left-lateralized (Behrmann and Plaut, 2013; Dundas
et al., 2013). This computational approach, which attempts to
understand how higher-level, non-visual information constrains
category specialization in visual areas, is likely to be a fruitful
avenue for future research.
Together, these studies demonstrate that the neural substrates
of visual expertise extend well beyond visual cortex, and are man-
ifest in regions supporting attention, memory, spatial cognition,
language, and action observation. Importantly, the involvement
of these systems is predictable from their general functions, sug-
gesting that expertise evolves largely within the same systems that
initially process the stimuli. Overall, it is clear that more complex
forms of visual expertise recruit broad and diverse arrays of corti-
cal and subcortical regions. Visual expertise, in its broadest sense,
engages multiple cognitive processes in addition to perception,
and the interplay between these different cognitive systems is what
unites these seemingly different domains of expertise. Notably,
studying the different networks that form the neural correlates
of expertise may inform us of the diverse cognitive processes
involved in particular domains of expertise, as these processes
are often not consciously accessible for the experts themselves
(Palmeri et al., 2004).
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org December 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 885 | 187
Harel et al. Interactive view of object expertise
SUMMARY AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Real-world expertise provides a unique opportunity to study
how neural representations change with experience in humans.
In this article, we focused on expertise in visual object recog-
nition, reassessing its common view as a predominantly auto-
matic stimulus-driven perceptual skill that is supported by
category-selective areas in high-level visual cortex. We pro-
pose an interactive framework for expert object recognition,
which posits that expertise emerges from multiple interactions
within and between the visual system and other cognitive sys-
tems, such as top-down attention and conceptual memory.
These interactions are manifest in widespread distributed pat-
terns of activity across the entire cortex, and are highly sus-
ceptible to high-level factors, such as task relevance and prior
knowledge.
While the interactive framework provides a more complete
account of the neural correlates of visual expertise across its
diverse domains, many questions are still open. Having estab-
lished the involvement of multiple cortical networks in object
expertise, the next natural question is what are the relative
contributions of each of these processes to the unique behavior
displayed by experts. For example, examining the role of top-
down attention in expertise, what is the precise effect of the high
engagement of experts with their objects of expertise (inherent to
real world expertise) on the perceptual processing of these objects?
Using experimental paradigms that are known to affect top-down
attention, such as divided attention, will allow researchers to test
the extent of the involvement of top-down attention in expertise.
Further, given the modulation of activation by task relevance, how
do different tasks affect the neural manifestations of expertise?
Similar questions can be asked about the role of conceptual
knowledge in guiding perceptual processing. Of particular interest
here is how accumulating knowledge over time interacts with and
affects the way experts extract information from their objects of
expertise.
Finally, it should be noted that the great advantage provided
by studying real-world expertise—its high ecological validity—
also poses a real challenge. How can the perceptual elements be
teased apart from the other high-level top-down factors in real-
world experts, which possess both qualities? One potential way to
address this challenge is by studying long-term expertise in more
controlled settings, which allow the researcher to tease apart the
different factors involved in a particular domain of expertise. For
example, one can study the time course of intensive, relatively
short-term training with real world objects while controlling the
visual input, the conceptual knowledge, and the level of engage-
ment to manipulate the relationship between conceptual and
sensory information. For example, Weisberg et al. (2007) showed
that training participants to treat novel objects as tools engages
action-related “tool” areas (left intraparietal sulcus and premotor
cortex) that were not active before training or for objects not
treated as tools. These findings demonstrate how a particular
type of experience with objects is incorporated with perceptual
visual information to form new object concepts. This approach
can be extended to further our understanding of complex and
diverse cortical networks and interactions underlying real-world
expertise.
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Ever since Diamond and Carey’s (1986)
seminal work, object expertise has often
been viewed through the prism of face
perception (for a thorough discussion, see
Tanaka and Gauthier, 1997; Sheinberg and
Tarr, 2010). According to Wong and Wong
(2014, W&W), however, this emphasis has
simply been a response to the question of
modularity of face perception, and has not
been about expertise in and of itself. It
is precisely this conflation of questions of
expertise and modularity, the consequent
focus on FFA, and the detrimental effect
this had on the field of object expertise
research that we discussed as part of our
original review (Harel et al., 2013).
We fully acknowledge that some
recent works on visual expertise—
particularly outside the domain of real
world object recognition (the focus of our
article)—have started to discuss object
expertise beyond sensory cortex (e.g.,
Wong and Gauthier, 2010; Wong et al.,
2012). However, at the same time, other
high-profile works continue to focus on
expertise solely in the context of FFA
and face-selectivity (McGugin et al., 2012,
2014), arguing that their results are incon-
sistent with the notion that “learning
effects are distributed throughout cor-
tex with no relation to face selectivity”
(McGugin et al., 2012, p. 17067).
Focusing on discrete regions when the
question is modularity, but focusing on
distributed effects when the question is
expertise itself, comes across as hold-
ing the stick at both ends and leads to
the widespread misconception that FFA
plays a privileged role in expertise. Of
course, one can show that expertise effects
occur within FFA while simultaneously
acknowledging the widespread effects
of expertise across the cortex. However,
the significance of the former result to
the understanding of object expertise is
greatly reduced by the latter. Put simply,
the more distributed expertise effects are,
the less significant is the role of one partic-
ular region for our understanding of the
general mechanisms of object expertise.
Take for example, the widespread effects
of car expertise, which includes even early
visual cortex (Harel et al., 2013, Figure 2).
Thus, a continued focus on the relation-
ship between expertise and face processing
detracts from the study of the general
principles underlying real-world object
expertise.
Beyond the issue of modularity, W&W
suggest we mischaracterized prior research
by stating it often emphasized expertise as
an automatic, stimulus-driven skill, with
little impact of attention, task and high-
level cognitive factors. However, we found
this criticism rather surprising given (i)
the extensive discussion of automaticity
and interference in the expertise literature
with many studies suggesting that process-
ing becomes more automatic with exper-
tise (Tarr and Gauthier, 2000; Gauthier
and Tarr, 2002; McCandliss et al., 2003;
McGugin et al., 2011; Richler et al.,
2011), and (ii) recent work explicitly
testing the hypothesis that car exper-
tise effects are invariant to modulations
of attention or clutter (McGugin et al.,
2014). In their response W&W suggest
that experts “tend to automatically pro-
cess their objects of expertise in a certain
way” but those processes can be “overrid-
den by higher-level cognitive processing.”
It is unclear how an automatic process can
be sometimes engaged and occasionally
overridden. This comes across as another
instance of holding the stick at both
ends.
Despite the points of contention we
have highlighted here, we are encour-
aged that W&W fully agree with the dis-
tributed interactive view of visual expertise
we discussed (Harel et al., 2010, 2013).
We are certain that future research fully
focused on addressing the distributed and
highly interactive nature of visual expertise
will provide new insights into the cortical
mechanisms underlying real world object
expertise.
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To understand the neural correlates of
expert object recognition, Harel et al.
(2013) proposed the use of an existing the-
oretical framework (Mahon et al., 2007;
Martin, 2007) that emphasizes the interac-
tion between different parts of the visual
pathway as well as between the visual
and other cognitive systems. While we
agree that focusing more on the role of
these interactions in expertise acquisition
is a fruitful research direction, we would
like to clarify the position of percep-
tual expertise researchers 1. In fact, per-
ceptual expertise researchers never regard
face-selective areas as the only neural
substrates important for expert object
recognition. Nor do they deny the role
of interaction between the visual sys-
tem and other cognitive systems. Instead,
perceptual expertise researchers have been
considering the interaction between per-
ceptual and cognitive processing as an
important component in understanding
perceptual expertise for different objects.
It is therefore unnecessary to create the
debate between the so-called “perceptual
view” and “interactive view” of expert
object recognition, as the interaction
between perceptual and cognitive process-
ing has been well accommodated in per-
ceptual expertise research. We elaborate on
this idea through the following two points:
1 Here “perceptual expertise researchers” refer to those
who investigate perceptual expertise in object recog-
nition. To evaluate our interpretation of the position
taken by perceptual expertise researchers in general,
we encourage readers to refer to the papers we cited,
including mainly but not limited to the works of
researchers from the Perceptual Expertise Network
(PEN).
PERCEPTUAL EXPERTISE
RESEARCHERS DO EMPHASIZE THE
ROLE OF ATTENTIONAL AND
HIGHER-LEVEL COGNITIVE FACTORS IN
EXPERTISE ACQUISITION AND
EXPRESSION
Harel et al. (2013) states that according
to perceptual expertise researchers, “expert
processing. . . is automatic and stimulus-
driven, with little impact of attentional,
task demands or other higher-level cog-
nitive factors” (p.2). Unfortunately, this
characterization of the views of perceptual
expertise researchers is inaccurate. Palmeri
and Gauthier (2004), for example, pro-
poses the abandoning of the strict dis-
tinction between perceptual and cognitive
processes in understanding expert object
recognition. Bukach et al. (2006), another
landmark paper detailing the perceptual
expertise framework, affirms that there
are different kinds of perceptual expertise
for different objects, and to distinguish
between them both physical and concep-
tual (e.g., functional knowledge) proper-
ties should be considered.
Research has shown the importance of
task demands in the development as well
as expression of expertise in object recog-
nition. Task demand during training is
always a major factor determining whether
or what kind of expertise would be formed
(e.g., Tanaka et al., 2005; Scott et al.,
2006; Krigolson et al., 2009; Wong et al.,
2009a,b, 2012). Task demand during test-
ing also affects whether and how much
expertise effects can be observed (Wong
et al., 2009b, 2012, 2014). For example,
in Wong et al. (2009b), two groups of
observers learned to categorize the same
set of artificial objects (ziggerins) in dif-
ferent ways, leading to different changes of
neural selectivity patterns for the trained
objects. Importantly, the neural changes
were better observed when the testing
task matched the training task. Even the
FFA shows higher activity to different
objects in tasks that requires more atten-
tion such as old/new recognition than
passive viewing (Rhodes et al., 2004).
Therefore, using Harel et al.’s (2013) terms
(their footnote 2), both “task-specific
learning effects” and “task dependence
following expertise training” have been
well identified among perceptual expertise
researchers (see also Box 2 of Bukach et al.,
2006).
Perceptual expertise researchers put a
lot of emphasis on the engagement of
non-visual factors and the involvement of
visual and non-visual areas outside the
FFA (James and Gauthier, 2003, 2004,
2006; James and Atwood, 2009; James and
Cree, 2010; Wong and Gauthier, 2010a;
Bilalić et al., 2011a, 2010, 2012; Behrmann
and Plaut, 2013; Kersey and James, 2013).
For example, Wong and Gauthier (2010a)
found that expert perception of musi-
cal notes engages not only higher visual
regions that are distinct from the face- or
letter-selective regions, but also bilateral
early retinotopic cortex, and a wide range
of multimodal regions including audi-
tory, audiovisual, somatosensory, motor,
parietal, frontal, and various subcortical
areas. Similarly, a distributed network of
areas including the motor and inferior
frontal cortices is also engaged selectively
for visual judgments of letters (James and
Gauthier, 2006). A wide range of brain
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regions in the occipital, temporal, and
frontal regions has also been found to be
more active when chess experts performed
visual judgment of chess pieces on chess-
boards (Bilalić et al., 2010; JEPG).
Training studies also show clearly
the engagement of a widespread neu-
ral network of areas for expert object
processing. When comparing the neural
training effects of two traditions of visual
perceptual training protocols (namely
perceptual learning and perceptual exper-
tise training), a wide range of brain
regions has been investigated, includ-
ing the recruitment and disengagement
of early retinotopic cortex, higher visual
cortex, parietal cortex, and the superior
temporal sulcus (Wong et al., 2012). James
and Gauthier (2003, 2004) also found
that participants who verbally learned to
associate artificial objects with conceptual
features showed activations in non-visual
areas during subsequent, perceptual judg-
ment on these objects, including superior
temporal gyrus (hearing), inferior frontal
gyrus (semantics), etc.
Perceptual expertise researchers often
emphasize that experts tend to automati-
cally process their objects of expertise in a
certain way (e.g., holistically, at a subordi-
nate level of abstraction) or by recruiting
certain brain areas even without explicit
task instructions or requirements (e.g.,
Gauthier et al., 2000; Wong et al., 2009a,b).
Importantly, however, this does not mean
that such processes cannot be influenced
or even overridden by higher-level cog-
nitive processing 2. On the contrary, as
described above, both training studies and
studies with real-world expertise demon-
strate that cognitive processing (e.g., atten-
tion shaped by the current task demand,
multimodal integration, and semantics) is
often engaged even in tasks requiring only
perceptual judgments.
Furthermore, it has been postulated
that non-visual processing not only is
2 Take as an example the composite task frequently
used to measure holistic processing in expert object
recognition (e.g., Richler et al., 2008; Wong and
Gauthier, 2010b; Wong et al., 2011). A typical
observer would spontaneously process all parts of an
object of expertise even though the task instruction
requires the observer to focus on one part, leading
to imperfect performance. However, the performance
is mostly well above chance, indicating that one can
override their natural tendency of holistic processing
at least to a certain extent to fulfill task requirement.
engaged but also plays a crucial role in
shaping neural selectivity for expert object
categories. For example, writing training
is found to be more effective than visual
practice in contributing to the formation
of letter selectivity in the fusiform gyrus,
indicating a close interaction between
motor and perceptual areas (James and
Atwood, 2009; Kersey and James, 2013).
Recently, Behrmann and Plaut (2013) pro-
pose that, the selective engagement of the
left and right fusiform gyri for word and
face processing respectively may originate
from the constraint to keep the connec-
tions between visual word processing areas
and language processing areas (both left-
lateralized) as short as possible. Therefore,
even when accounting for selectivity in
visual areas, a distributed network of brain
areas should be and have been considered.
EARLY PERCEPTUAL EXPERTISE
RESEARCH FOCUSES MORE ON THE
FACE-SELECTIVE AREAS IN ORDER TO
ADDRESS THE “FACE MODULARITY”
DEBATE, BUT THAT DOES NOT
NECESSITATE THAT RESEARCHERS
REGARD FACE-SELECTIVE AREAS AS
THE ONLY BRAIN REGIONS
IMPORTANT FOR EXPERT OBJECT
RECOGNITION
Despite the abundant research on the
interaction between visual and cognitive
processing in expert object recognition,
why may perceptual expertise researchers
be regarded as face-centric, as in Harel
et al. (2013; p.4)? It has to do with the “face
modularity debate” that heat up from the
late 90’s in the field of face perception.
The face modularity debate concerns
the nature of the fusiform face area (FFA)
in face processing: Is the FFA a mod-
ule specialized for face recognition, or is
it responsible for expert subordinate-level
recognition of any objects? As stated in
Bukach et al. (2006) and McGugin et al.
(2012), the degree to which FFA activ-
ity is exclusive for faces lies in the center
of the debate. In support of the latter
view, perceptual expertise researchers have
shown that acquisition of expertise with
various object categories (e.g., cars, birds,
“Digimon” cartoon characters, chess, and
artificial objects like greebles) either leads
to or is associated with increased selec-
tivity in the FFA (Bilalić et al., 2011b;
e.g., Gauthier et al., 1999, 2000; Grelotti
et al., 2005; Xu, 2005). The modularity vs.
expertise debate, however, is still ongoing
(e.g., McGugin et al., 2012; Rezlescu et al.,
2014). Therefore, a more accurate depic-
tion of the field of expert object recogni-
tion is that, researchers (including those
holding the modular and expertise views)
have been focusing a lot on the FFA due
to their research question concerning face
modularity.
It is important to note that, although
early perceptual expertise research focuses
more on the face-selective areas in order
to address the “face modularity” debate,
that does not necessitate that researchers
regard face-selective areas as the only brain
regions important for expert object recog-
nition. As an analogy, that one focuses
on studying expert object recognition does
not mean that one regards expert object
recognition as the only important func-
tion of vision. As detailed in our first point,
perceptual expertise researchers have been
tackling issues other than the face mod-
ularity debate in recent years, and have
expanded their investigations to differ-
ent domains of perceptual expertise in a
widespread network of brain areas.
CONCLUSION
Perceptual expertise researchers have been
actively investigating the neural changes
associated with expertise both inside and
outside of the visual cortex. Tackling the
face modularity debate, the majority of
early effort has been put into clarifying
the nature of the FFA. However, much
work has since been devoted to studying
the role of other high-level cognitive fac-
tors, including the effects of task demand
on both the development and expression
of expertise, the involvement of visual and
non-visual areas in expert object recogni-
tion, the effects of conceptual associations,
the way non-visual processes helps deter-
mine the pattern of visual object selective
activity, etc. In sum, there is no such thing
as a rivalry between the so-called “per-
ceptual view” and “interactive view” of
expert object recognition, and the inter-
action between perceptual and cognitive
processing has been well accommodated in
perceptual expertise research.
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Bilalić, M., Turella, L., Campitelli, G., Erb, M., and
Grodd, W. (2012). Expertise modulates the neu-
ral basis of context dependent recognition of
objects and their relations. Hum. Brain Mapp. 33,
2728–2740. doi: 10.1002/hbm.21396
Bukach, C. M., Gauthier, I., and Tarr, M. J. (2006).
Beyond faces and modularity: the power of
an expertise framework. Trends Cogn. Sci. 10,
159–166. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2006.02.004
Gauthier, I., Skudlarski, P., Gore, J. C., and Anderson,
A. W. (2000). Expertise for cars and birds recruits
brain areas involved in face recognition. Nat.
Neurosci. 3, 191–197. doi: 10.1038/72140
Gauthier, I., Tarr, M. J., Anderson, A. W., Skudlarski,
P., and Gore, J. C. (1999). Activation of the middle
fusiform ‘face area’ increases with expertise in rec-
ognizing novel objects. Nat. Neurosci. 2, 568–573.
doi: 10.1038/9224
Grelotti, D. J., Klin, A. J., Gauthier, I., Skudlarski,
P., Cohen, D. J., Gore, J. C., et al. (2005). fMRI
activation of the fusiform gyrus and amygdala
to cartoon characters but not to faces in a boy
with autism. Neuropsychologia 43, 373–385. doi:
10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2004.06.015
Harel, A., Kravitz, D., and Baker, C. I. (2013). Beyond
perceptual expertise: revisiting the neural sub-
strates of expert object recognition. Front. Hum.
Neurosci. 7:885. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2013.00885
James, K. H., and Atwood, T. O. (2009). The role of
sensorimotor learning in the perception of letter-
like forms: tracking the causes of neural special-
ization for letters. Cogn. Neuropsychol. 26, 91–110.
doi: 10.1080/02643290802425914
James, K. H., and Gauthier, I. (2006). Letter process-
ing automatically recruits a sensory-motor brain
network. Neuropsychologia 44, 2937–2949. doi:
10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2006.06.026
James, T. W., and Cree, G. (2010). “Perceptual and
conceptual interactions in object recognition and
expertise,” in Perceptual Expertise: Bridging Brain
and Behavior, eds I. Gauthier, M. J. Tarr, and D.
Bub (New York, NY: Oxford University Press),
333–352.
James, T. W., and Gauthier, I. (2003). Auditory
and action semantic feature types activate
sensory-specific perceptual brain regions. Curr.
Biol. 13, 1792–1796. doi: 10.1016/j.cub.2003.
09.039
James, T. W., and Gauthier, I. (2004). Brain areas
engaged during visual judgments by involun-
tary access to semantic information.. Vision
Res. 44, 429–439. doi: 10.1016/j.visres.2003.
10.004
Kersey, A. J., and James, K. H. (2013). Brain activa-
tion patterns resulting from learning letter forms
through active self-production and passive obser-
vation in young children. Front. Cogn. Sci. 4:567.
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00567
Krigolson, O. E., Pierce, L. J., Holroyd, C. B., and
Tanaka, J. (2009). Learning to become an expert:
reinforcement learning and the acquisition of per-
ceptual expertise. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 21, 1833–1840.
doi: 10.1162/jocn.2009.21128
Mahon, B. Z., Milleville, S. C., Negri, G. A. L.,
Rumiati, R. I., Caramazza, A., and Martin, A.
(2007). Action-related properties shape object rep-
resentations in the ventral stream. Neuron 55, 507.
doi: 10.1016/j.neuron.2007.07.011
Martin, A. (2007). The representation of object con-
cepts in the brain. Ann. Rev. Psychol. 58, 25–45. doi:
10.1146/annurev.psych.57.102904.190143
McGugin, R. W., Gatenby, J. C., Gore, J. C.,
and Gauthier, I. (2012). High-resolution imag-
ing of expertise reveals reliable object selectivity
in the fusiform face area related to perceptual
performance. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 109,
17063–17068. doi: 10.1073/pnas.1116333109
Palmeri, T. J., and Gauthier, I. (2004). Visual object
understanding. Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 5, 291–303. doi:
10.1038/nrn1364
Rezlescu, C., Barton, J. S., Pitcher, D., and Duchaine,
B. (2014). Normal acquisition of expertise with
greebles in two cases of acquired prosopagnosia.
Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 111, 5123–5128. doi:
10.1073/pnas.1317125111
Rhodes, G., Byatt, G., Michie, P. T., and Puce,
A. (2004). Is the fusiform face area special-
ized for faces, individuation, or expert indi-
viduation? J. Cogn. Neurosci. 16, 189–203. doi:
10.1162/089892904322984508
Richler, J. J., Tanaka, J. W., Brown, D. D., and Gauthier,
I. (2008). Why does selective attention fail in face
processing? J. Exp. Psychol. Learn. Mem. Cogn. 34,
1356–1368. doi: 10.1037/a0013080
Scott, L. S., Tanaka, J. W., Sheinberg, D. L., and
Curran, T. (2006). A reevaluation of the elec-
trophysiological correlates of expert object pro-
cessing. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 18, 1453–1465. doi:
10.1162/jocn.2006.18.9.1453
Tanaka, J. W., Curran, T., and Sheinberg, D. L.
(2005). The training and transfer of real-world
perceptual expertise. Psychol. Sci. 16, 145–151. doi:
10.1111/j.0956-7976.2005.00795.x
Wong, A. C.-N., Bukach, C. M., Yuen, C., Yang,
L., Leung, S., and Greenspon, E. (2011). Holistic
processing of words modulated by reading expe-
rience. PLoS ONE 6:e20753. doi: 10.1371/jour-
nal.pone.0020753
Wong, A. C.-N., Palmeri, T. J., and Gauthier,
I. (2009a). Conditions for face-like expertise
with objects: becoming a Ziggerin expert - but
which type? Psychol. Sci. 20, 1108–1117. doi:
10.1111/j.1467-9280.2009.02430.x
Wong, A. C.-N., Palmeri, T. J., Rogers, B. P., Gore, J.
C., and Gauthier, I. (2009b). Beyond shape: how
you learn about objects affects how they are rep-
resented in visual cortex. PLoS ONE 4:e8405. doi:
10.1371/journal.pone.0008405
Wong, Y. K., Folstein, J. R., and Gauthier, I. (2012).
The nature of experience determines object repre-
sentations in the visual system. J. Exp. Psychol. Gen.
141, 682–698. doi: 10.1037/a0027822
Wong, Y. K., and Gauthier, I. (2010a). A multimodal
neural network recruited by expertise with musi-
cal notation. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 22, 695–713. doi:
10.1162/jocn.2009.21229
Wong, Y. K., and Gauthier, I. (2010b). Holistic
processing of musical notation: dissociating fail-
ures of selective attention in experts and novices.
Cogn. Affect. Behav. Neurosci. 10, 541–551. doi:
10.3758/CABN.10.4.541
Wong, Y. K., Peng, C., Fratus, K. N., Woodman, G. F.,
and Gauthier, I. (2014). Perceptual expertise and
top-down expectation of musical notation engages
the primary visual cortex. J. Cogn. Neurosci. doi:
10.1162/jocn_a_00616. [Epub ahead of print].
Xu, Y. (2005). Revisiting the role of the fusiform
face area in visual expertise. Cereb. Cortex 15,
1234–1242. doi: 10.1093/cercor/bhi006
Conflict of Interest Statement: The authors declare
that the research was conducted in the absence of any
commercial or financial relationships that could be
construed as a potential conflict of interest.
Received: 22 January 2014; paper pending published:
21 February 2014; accepted: 25 April 2014; published
online: 20 May 2014.
Citation: Wong AC-N and Wong YK (2014) Interaction
between perceptual and cognitive processing well
acknowledged in perceptual expertise research. Front.
Hum. Neurosci. 8:308. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2014.00308
This article was submitted to the journal Frontiers in
Human Neuroscience.
Copyright © 2014 Wong and Wong. This is an open-
access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, dis-
tribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted,
provided the original author(s) or licensor are credited
and that the original publication in this journal is cited,
in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use,
distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not
comply with these terms.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org May 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 308 | 196
OPINION ARTICLE
published: 01 November 2013
doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2013.00740
Expertise paradigms for investigating the neural substrates
of stable memories
Guillermo Campitelli* and Craig Speelman
School of Psychology and Social Science, Edith Cowan University, Perth, WA, Australia
*Correspondence: g.campitelli@ecu.edu.au
Edited by:
Robert Langner, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Germany
Reviewed by:
Vaibhav A. Diwadkar, Wayne State University School of Medicine, USA
Karl Friston, UCL, UK
Keywords: stable memories, long-term memory, expertise, experimental paradigm, brain imaging
One of the hallmarks of acquiring exper-
tise in any area of life is the ability to
maintain relevant information over a long
period of time (i.e., years or decades).
Understanding the neural implementa-
tions of this ability requires the elucidation
of two issues. First, the processes whereby
recently acquired pieces of information
become stable over time (i.e., memory
consolidation); and second, the localiza-
tion of these stable memories in the brain.
Unlike neurobiological and neuropsy-
chological memory research, brain imag-
ing research has paid little attention
to these issues. Instead, most memory
research in brain imaging has focused on
the processes of memory encoding and
retrieval. In this article we first succinctly
present the current debate on the local-
ization of stable memories in neurobiol-
ogy and neuropsychology. We then discuss
the difficulties in studying the localization
of stable memories in human neuroimag-
ing. After presenting the most traditional
paradigm in studying long-term mem-
ory and the autobiographical memory
paradigm, we present three expertise brain
imaging paradigms. We also discuss how
the latter help overcome the technical diffi-





Memory consolidation has been inten-
sively studied in mainstream neurobiol-
ogy of memory with animal models (e.g.,
McGaugh, 2000; Dudai, 2004; Izquierdo
et al., 2006). Moreover, neuropsychologi-
cal studies of patients with brain lesions
have been relevant to investigate the
brain localization of stable memories (e.g.,
Milner et al., 1968; Squire and Alvarez,
1995; Nadel and Moscovitch, 1997).
A synthesis between these lines of
research led to the development of two
main models of the neural implementa-
tions of stable memories: the standard
consolidation theory (SCT, Burnham,
1904; Squire and Alvarez, 1995; McGaugh,
2000; Dudai, 2004) and the multiple trace
theory (MTT, Nadel and Moscovitch,
1997). A comparison between these theo-
ries is beyond the scope of this article (see
Winocur et al., 2010, for further details).
Suffice it to say that they agree on that,
after acquiring new information, there
is a period of synaptic consolidation that
lasts from seconds to days, and that the
hippocampus is essential in this process.
They also agree on that there is a second
type of consolidation—system consolida-
tion—that lasts from months to decades,
and that the result of this process is the
formation of stable memories. However,
there is no agreement whether these stable
memories are localized in the hippocam-
pus, in associative areas of the cortex, or in
both.
DIFFICULTIES IN STUDYING THE
LOCALIZATION OF STABLE MEMORIES
IN BRAIN IMAGING
Brain imaging studies are paramount to
the testing of those theories in healthy
humans. In their influential review on
brain imaging, Cabeza and Nyberg (2000,
p. 22) clearly indicated why this is a chal-
lenging endeavor:
“Encoding refers to processes that
lead to the formation of new mem-
ory traces. Storage designates the main-
tenance of memory traces over time,
including consolidation operations that
make memory traces more permanent.
Retrieval refers to the process of access-
ing stored memory traces. Encoding and
retrieval processes are amenable to func-
tional neuroimaging research, because
they occur at specific points in time,
whereas storage/consolidation processes
are not, because they are temporally dis-
tributed (Buckner and Koutstaal, 1998).”
TRADITIONAL PARADIGM
Long-term memory tasks typically involve
a learning phase and a test phase. In the
former, participants are presented with a
set of items, and they are requested to
memorize them. In the test phase partic-
ipants are presented with items and they
are requested to indicate whether or not
each item was present in the previously
presented set. The top row of Table 1
illustrates this approach. After subtracting
the brain activation of a perceptual-motor
control task, the activation due to the long-
term memory task is believed to represent
the neural correlates of long-term memory
(e.g., Duncan et al., 2012).
Brain imaging studies that use this
traditional paradigm of long-term mem-
ory provide information on the neural
implementations of how people learn new
information, and how people retrieve
information learned a few minutes or
hours ago. However, the traditional
paradigm fails to provide information on
whether stable memories have a specific
localization, and if so where such stable
memories are localized in the brain.
AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORY
The field of research that aims at fill-
ing this gap is the field of autobiograph-
ical memory. Instead of using a learning
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Table 1 | Experimental paradigms to investigate neural correlates of long-term memory (LTM).
Main condition Control condition
Task Stimuli Task Stimuli
Traditional paradigm Learning-test General Perceptual-motor General
Pre-scan interview Test Autobiographic Test General
Expert archival paradigm Test Domain specific (own) Test Domain specific (others)
Expert memory paradigm Delayed response Domain specific Delayed response General
Expert vs. novice paradigm Simple domain-specific (experts) Domain specific (experts) Simple domain-specific (novices) Domain specific (novices)
phase and a test phase, autobiographical
memory studies use personal informa-
tion provided by participants to gener-
ate experimental situations in which past
information or experiences are retrieved
during the experiment. For example,
the pre-scan interview paradigm (e.g.,
Maguire and Mummery, 1999; see second
row of Table 1) uses information gathered
in a previous interview with participants
to generate cues that would trigger past
personal experiences. As a control condi-
tion participants answer general knowl-
edge questions. One of the problems of
this paradigm is that the brain activity dur-
ing the experiment may reflect aspects of
the interview, rather than the targeted past
personal memories. A number of tech-
niques have been proposed to overcome
this problem, but they also have draw-
backs. For example, Cabeza et al. (2004)
proposed the “photo paradigm,” in which
participants are given a camera to keep
track of events of their lives. After a few
days or weeks, participants are shown pho-
tos taken by them or other photos in a
brain imaging session. The assumption is
that the subtraction of the pattern of brain
activation between these conditions would
reveal the neural implementation of past
personal memories. This paradigm solves
the problem of contamination of memo-
ries from the interview, but it does not
enable the study of remote memories.
Below we present three paradigms—the
expert archival paradigm, the expert mem-
ory paradigm and the expert vs. novice
paradigm—used in expertise studies that
shed light on the neural localizations of
stable memories. Memory theories based
on expertise research (e.g., chunking the-
ory, Chase and Simon, 1973; template
theory, Gobet and Simon, 1996) empha-
size the role of stable memories acquired
through a period of practice of years or
decades. Therefore, it is not surprising
that brain imaging studies with experts
have focused on the neural localization of
these stable memories. We illustrate these
paradigms with studies using chess players
as participants.
EXPERT ARCHIVAL PARADIGM
Given that experts learn domain-specific
patterns, and that these patterns are sta-
ble memories, expertise studies aiming
to uncover the brain localization of sta-
ble memories do not require a learn-
ing phase as in the traditional paradigm.
Indeed, the learning phase occurred years
ago. Moreover, if archival data is available,
stimuli can be constructed, thus avoid-
ing the interview of participants typical of
autobiographical memory studies.
These features afford the possibility
to design experiments with stimuli that
would trigger the activation of well-
consolidated memories. The third row
of Table 1 illustrates this paradigm. For
example, Campitelli et al. (2008) used the
expert-archival paradigm, in which chess
international masters were presented with
positions of games they played in the past
and positions belonging to other play-
ers. The task was to identify whether the
positions belonged to their own games
or not. In other words, this is a long-
term memory task in which the learning
phase occurred years before the experi-
ment was conducted, and it is an autobio-
graphical memory task in which a pre-scan
interview was not necessary. The authors
found a left-lateralized pattern of brain
activation in the chess players. The pat-
tern included activity at or near the left
temporo-parietal junction, and a number
of areas in the left frontal lobe, which is
consistent with previous autobiographical
memory studies (Maguire and Mummery,
1999; Maguire et al., 2000; Gilboa et al.,
2004; Levine et al., 2004). The fact that the
study with the expert archival paradigm
showed similar results to the typical auto-
biographical memory paradigms provides
evidence that the results found with the
pre-scan interview are not an artifact of the
paradigm.
EXPERT MEMORY PARADIGM
The previous paradigm sheds light on
the neural localization of autobiograph-
ical stable memories. The expert mem-
ory paradigm helps understanding of the
neural substrate of stable episodic and
semantic memories. The expert mem-
ory paradigm also takes advantage of the
fact that experts possess well consolidated
memories of domain-specific patterns. It
involves the comparison of experts’ brain
activity performing a task (e.g., a delayed-
response task) using domain-specific stim-
uli and the same task with another
type of stimuli. For example, Campitelli
et al. (2007) compared the brain activ-
ity of chess experts performing a delayed-
response task in two conditions: 1. stimuli
were chess positions; and 2. stimuli were
scenes with gray and white backgrounds
and black and white shapes. This con-
trast is intriguing because it identifies the
neural implementations of stable memo-
ries of domain-specific material by using
a “working memory” task. This is because
the working memory component of the
delayed-response task is canceled out in
the contrast. Incidentally, using the same
task in this subtraction avoids the problem
of “pure insertion” (i.e., the assumption
that adding a process component to a task
does not produce an interaction between
the new component and other compo-
nents of the task; Friston et al., 1996).
With this paradigm Campitelli et al.
(2007) found activation in medial
temporal areas. In a more localized study
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Bilalić et al. (2011b) found activity in a
medial temporal area—the fusiform face
area in the fusiform gyrus. This study pro-
vides evidence in favor of the view that
this area is involved in expertise acquired
to differentiate between members of the
same class (e.g., Curby and Gauthier,
2010), as opposed to the view that this
is an area specialized in processing faces
(e.g., Kanwisher and Yovel, 2006).
EXPERT vs. NOVICE PARADIGM
The expert vs. novice paradigm, popular-
ized by Chase and Simon (1973), can also
shed light on the neural localization of
stable memories. It involves recruiting a
group of non-experts, who are requested
to perform the same tasks as experts (i.e.,
a simple task of the domain of expertise).
For example, Bilalić et al. (2011a) asked
experts and novices to determine whether
the king was in check in a chess posi-
tion (see also Bilalić et al., 2010, 2011b,
2012, for similar approaches). A compar-
ison of the brain activity in experts to
that of non-experts affords the possibil-
ity of identifying whether stable mem-
ories are located in the same areas as
not-so-well consolidated long-term mem-
ories. For example, Guida et al. (2012,
2013) conducted a review of expertise and
training studies, and they identified that,
in comparison to non-experts, when per-
forming “working memory” tasks experts
use less brain activity in working memory
areas. Furthermore, experts show more
activity than non-experts in long-term
memory areas. These results support a
two-stage model of neural implementa-
tions of expertise; the first stage involves
efficiency in working-memory processing,
and the second comprises a restructuring
of brain areas involved in the consolidation
of domain-specific long-term memories.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have described three expertise
paradigms that have contributed to inves-
tigating the neural localization of stable
memories. The expert archival paradigm
aims at investigating the localization of
stable autobiographical memories, the
expert memory paradigm investigates
the localization of episodic and seman-
tic memories, and the expert vs. novice
paradigm is important when investigating
whether stable memories are localized in
the same areas as the not-so-well consol-
idated long-term memories, or whether
they become stable in other areas of the
brain. An additional advantage of exper-
tise paradigms is that they typically show
large effect sizes, which increase the prob-
ability of finding statistically significant
results.
Given that the ability to maintain rel-
evant information over years or decades
is apparent in domain-specific experts and
everyday life experts these paradigms have
the potential to shed light not only on
the neural implementations of expertise,
but also on the neural implementations of
long-term memory in general.
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How can experts, sometimes in exacting detail, almost immediately and very precisely
recall memory items from a vast repertoire? The problem in which we will be interested
concerns models of theoretical neuroscience that could explain the speed and robustness
of an expert’s recollection. The approach is based on Sparse Distributed Memory, which
has been shown to be plausible, both in a neuroscientific and in a psychological manner, in
a number of ways. A crucial characteristic concerns the limits of human recollection, the
“tip-of-tongue” memory event—which is found at a non-linearity in the model. We expand
the theoretical framework, deriving an optimization formula to solve this non-linearity.
Numerical results demonstrate how the higher frequency of rehearsal, through work or
study, immediately increases the robustness and speed associated with expert memory.
Keywords: sparse distributed memory, non-linearity, critical distance, theoretical neuroscience, expert memory
1. INTRODUCTION
Szilard told Einstein about the Columbia secondary-neutron exper-
iments and his calculations toward a chain reaction in uranium
and graphite. Long afterward [Szilard] would recall his surprise
that Einstein had not yet heard of the possibility of a chain reac-
tion. When he mentioned it Einstein interjected, “Daranhabe ich gar
nicht gedacht!”-“I never thought of that!” He was nevertheless, says
Szilard, “very quick to see the implications and perfectly willing to do
anything that needed to be done.”
—July 16, 1941, meeting between Leo Szilard and Albert
Einstein concerning atomic weapons (Rhodes, 2012, p. 305).
How can experts—like Albert Einstein—immediately find
meaning given very few cues? How can experts—like Leo
Szilard—recollect, sometimes in exacting detail, memories that
non-experts would find baffling? These abilities span wide across
the spectrum of human activity: From full chess games played
decades ago, to verses written by Dante, to exotic wines, or to
the script and actors involved in movie scenes, experts can almost
immediately and very precisely recall from a vast repertoire. How
can neuroscience explain the speed and robustness of experts’
recollection?
The work done herein can be related to the work done
by Shepard (1957) and further developed by Nosofsky (1986);
Shepard (1987) in the sense that the models investigated here
use conceptual approximation and distancing in what could be
considered a psychological space. However, this work does not
aim to continue these authors’ approaches to identification, cat-
egorization, similarity and psychological distance. Here we aim
at discovering the bounds and limits of conceptual retrieval
in human memory via the Sparse Distributed Memory (SDM)
proxy.
Recently, Abbott et al. (2013) explored a computational level
(as defined by Marr, 1892) account of SDM as a model of
inference. We provide here an initial exploration that may further
the work done by these authors, providing a theoretical founda-
tion for a computational account of the edges of recollection via
Sparse Distributed Memory (and possibly other architectures, by
means of the connectionist common-ground).
Other approaches that are neurally plausible could include the
template and chunk theory by Gobet et al. (Gobet and Simon,
2000; Gobet et al., 2001; Harré et al., 2012; Harré, 2013). Chunks
are stored memory items, and templates include slots in which
items can vary.
Recent findings by Huth et al. (2012) suggest that human
semantic representation resides in a continuous psychological
space. The authors provide evidence in the form of fMRI results
supporting that human semantic representation resides in a
continuous multidimensional space. The SDM model explored
herein is consistent with these findings in that SDM permits hier-
archical relationships between concepts, and instantiates a multi-
dimensional conceptual space which holds attractors to memory
items that are, in fact, continuous (as a function of their distance
from the reading point).
Two of the concepts with which we will deal here are reflected
in this 1941 meeting: information content, shown by Einstein’s
surprise involved in unexpected information; and the ability to
rapidly access memory, in detail, shown by Szilard’s “long after-
ward” recollection of the meeting. A third concept we will use is
that evidence points toward memory being organized around cell
assemblies, and Sparse Distributed Memory takes advantage of
this concept.
2. CELL ASSEMBLIES AND THE SPARSE DISTRIBUTED
MEMORY MODEL
2.1. CELL ASSEMBLIES
How is information encoded in the brain? We postulate that
information is encoded by cell assemblies, not by individual
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neurons (Sakurai, 1996, 1998, 1999). There are at least five rea-
sons leading to this position. (1) Neurons constantly die—yet
the brain is robust to their loss. (2) There is large variability
in the activity of individual neurons—as would be expected on
anatomical and physiological grounds alone. (3) A single neu-
ron does not participate in a single function; as Sakurai (1998)
puts it:
Even the famous “face neurons” in the temporal cortex do not
respond to single unique faces but to several faces or to several
features comprising the several faces. (p. 2)
(4) Studies of activity correlation between neighboring neurons
show very low, if not zero, correlation. (5) Finally, while the num-
ber of neurons is quite large, it is minute in comparison with
the different combinations of incoming stimuli one experiences
during one’s lifetime.
Furthermore, recent literature suggests the connection
between the increased activation of the fusiform face area (FFA)
and the acquisition of expertise (Gauthier et al., 1999; Xu, 2005;
McGugin et al., 2012). Current results hold strong evidence
that FFA activation is correlated with domain-specific expertise
in naturalistic settings (Bilalić et al., 2011b). Additionally, it
is shown that expertise in object-recognition tasks modulates
activation in different areas of the brain (Bilalić et al., 2011a),
including homologous right-left hemispheric activation in both
object and pattern recognition expertise (Bilalić et al., 2010,
2012). This evidence and the preceding points serve to further
emphasize the distributed role of activation in recognition and
expertise.
Hence we subscribe to the hypothesis that the unit of infor-
mation encoding is not the individual neuron, but groups of
neurons, or cell assemblies (Sakurai, 1996, 1998, 1999). In this
model, shown in Figure 1, a single neuron may participate in a
large number of assemblies, and the possible number of assem-
blies is enormous. Cell assemblies, rather than being encumbered
by such combinatorial explosions, actually take advantage of
them, as we will see in Sparse Distributed Memory.
2.2. SPARSE DISTRIBUTED MEMORY
A promising research programme in theoretical neuroscience is
centered around Sparse Distributed Memory, originally proposed
by Kanerva (1988). SDM is a neuroscientific and psychologically
plausible model of human memory.
2.2.1. A large space for memory items
SDM introduces many interesting mathematical properties of
n-dimensional binary space that, in a memory model, are psy-
chologically plausible. Most notable among these are robustness
against noisy information, the tip-of-the-tongue phenomenon,
conformity to the limits of short-term memory (Linhares et al.,
2011), and robustness against loss of neurons. The model has
been explored in the study of vision and other senses (Olshausen
et al., 1993; Laurent, 2002; Rao et al., 2002; Mazor and Laurent,
2005). In spite of the increasing number of neuroscientists dis-
playing interest in Sparse Distributed Memory (Ballard et al.,
1997; French, 1999; Ludermir et al., 1999; Silva et al., 2004;
Laurent, 2006; Bancroft et al., 2012), we still have limited
understanding of its properties.
As in some other neuroscientific models, inhibitory and exci-
tatory signals are represented in binary form. In SDM, both the
data and the storage space belong to {0, 1}n, hence a particular
memory item is represented by a binary vector of length n, hence-
forth called a bitstring. These binary bitstrings are stored (as with
most computational memory models) in addresses. In SDM, these
also take the form of n-dimensional binary vectors.
The distance between two bitstrings is calculated using the
Hamming distance. Hamming distance is defined for two bit-
strings of equal length as the number of positions in which the bits
differ. For example, 00110b and 01100b are bitstrings of length 5
and their Hamming distance is 2.
The size of the {0, 1}n address space grows exponentially
with the number of dimensions n; i.e., N = 2n. While Kanerva
(1988) suggests n between 100 and 10, 000, recently he has pos-
tulated 10, 000 as a desirable minimum n (Kanerva, 2009). This
is, of course, an enormous space, unfeasible to be physically
implemented.
To solve the feasibility problem of implementing this mem-
ory, SDM takes a uniformly distributed random sample of {0, 1}n,
having N ′ elements, and instantiates only these points of the
space. These instantiated addresses in the sample are called hard
locations and each hard location implements a set of n counters,
which we will see in more detail. The hard locations allow SDM
to use the entire (virtual) {0, 1}n space through distributed read
FIGURE 1 | Cell assemblies: the information encoded in a single neuron is negligible and fragile. Multiple neurons may provide the best description of
human information processing.
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and write operations (described in more detail below). A ran-
dom bitstring is generated with equal probability of 0’s and 1’s
in each dimension. Thus, the average distance between two ran-
dom bitstrings has a binomial distribution with mean μ = n/2
and standard deviation σ = √n/4. For large n, the vast majority
of the space lies “close” to the mean (i.e., between μ − 3σ and
μ + 3σ ) and has few shared hard locations: as n grows, two bit-
strings with distance far from n/2 are very improbable. We define
two bitstrings to be orthogonal when their distance is close to n/2.
Figure 2 provides a simplified view of the model, with a small
space for hard locations and a large space for possible locations.
The model instantiates a random sample of about one million
hard locations—which is in fact, a minute fraction of the space:
for n = 100, only 100 · 106/2100 = 7 · 10−23 percent of the whole
space “exists” (i.e., is instantiated), and for n = 1000 only 100 ·
106/21000 = 7 · 10−294 percent.
2.2.2. Creating a cell assembly by sampling the space at μ−3σ
The activation of addresses takes place according to their
Hamming distance from the datum. Suppose one is writing
datum η at address ξ , then all addresses inside an n-dimensional
circle with center ξ and radius r are activated. So, η will be stored
in all of these activated addresses, which are around address ξ , as
shown in Figure 3. An address ξ ′ is inside the circle if its hamming
distance to the center ξ is less than or equal to the radius r, i.e.,
distance(ξ, ξ ′) ≤ r. Generally, r = μ − 3σ . The radius is selected
to activate, on average, 1/1000th of the sample, that is, approx-
imately 1000 hard locations for a model with one million hard
locations. To achieve this, a 1000-dimension memory uses an
access radius r = 451, and a 256-dimensional memory, r = 103.
This will generate a cell assembly to either store or retrieve a
memory item. With this activation mechanism, SDM provides a
method to write and read any bitstring in the {0, 1}n space.
2.2.3. Writing an item to the memory
Table 1 shows an example of a write operation being performed
in a 7-dimensional memory.
FIGURE 2 | Hard-locations randomly sampled from binary space.
One way to view the write and read operations is to visualize
neurons (hard locations) as vectors, that is vectors pointing to cer-
tain areas of the space. In the SDM model, the cell assembly (i.e.,
the set of active hard locations) work in unison, rather like a sum
of vectors: as one writes bitstrings in memory, the counters of the
hard locations are updated.
When a bitstring activates a set of hard locations, the active
hard locations do not individually point to the bitstring that acti-
vated them, but, taken together, they point to a coordinate in
space (that is, the bitstring that activated them). In this fashion,
any one hard location can be said to simultaneously point to many
different areas of the space, and any point in space is represented
by the set of hard locations it activates.
In other words, both reading and writing depend on many
hard locations to be successful. This effect is represented in
Figure 4: where all hard locations inside the circle are activated
and they, individually, do not point to η. But, as vectors, their sum
points to the general direction of η. If another datum ν is written
into the memory near η, the shared hard locations will have infor-
mation from both of them and would not point (directly) to
either. All hard locations, inside and outside of the circle, may also
point elsewhere to other additional data points: as we have seen,
even “face” neurons have multiple functions.
The write operation works as follows: Suppose one is writ-
ing datum η at address ξ : then all hard locations inside an
n-dimensional circle with center ξ and radius r are activated. So,
η will be stored in all these activated addresses, which are close
to address ξ . An address ξ ′ is inside the circle if its hamming
distance to the center ξ is less than or equal to the radius r, i.e.,
FIGURE 3 | Activated addresses inside access radius r around center
address.
Table 1 | Write operation example in a 7-dimensional memory of data
η being written to ξ , one of the activated addresses.
η 0 1 1 0 1 0 0
ξbefore 6 −3 12 −1 0 2 4
⇓ −1 ⇓ +1 ⇓ +1 ⇓ −1 ⇓ +1 ⇓ −1 ⇓ −1
ξafter 5 −2 13 −2 1 1 3
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distance(ξ, ξ ′) ≤ r. The information will be written to the entire
cell assembly: thus, all hard locations within the circle will be
updated.
Each hard location has both an address (given by its bitstring)
and a value. The value is stored in counters. Each hard location
has one counter for each dimension in the space. Each counter
stores, for its dimension, the bit value that has been written
more frequently (0’s or 1’s) to its hard location. So each counter,
corresponding to each dimension, is incremented for each bit
1 and decremented for each bit 0 written to that hard location.
Thus, if the counter is positive, the hard location has had more
1’s than 0’s written to it, if the counter is negative, more 0’s than
1’s, and if the counter is zero, there have been an equal number of
1’s and 0’s written to that particular dimension in that particular
hard location.
Each datum η is written into the counters of every activated
hard location inside the access radius, centered on the address ξ
that equals the datum: ξ = η. If some neurons are lost, only a
fraction of the datum is lost, and the memory remains capable
of retrieving the right datum due to the high redundancy of the
model.
2.2.4. Reading an item from memory
Table 2 illustrates a read operation over a 7-dimensional memory.
The read operation is performed by polling each activated hard
location and choosing the most-written bit for each dimension.
A hard location is considered activated if it is within a hamming
FIGURE 4 | Hard-locations pointing, approximately, to the target
bitstring.
Table 2 | Read operation example.
ξ1 −2 12 4 0 −3
ξ2 −5 −4 2 8 −2
ξ3 −1 0 −1 −2 −1
ξ4 3 2 −1 3 1
∑ −5 10 4 3 −5
⇓ ⇓ ⇓ ⇓ ⇓
0 1 1 1 0
distance (radius) of the activating bitstring cue. Activated hard
locations are taken into account in calculating the result of a read
operation, while others are ignored. Reading consists of adding
all n counters from the activated hard locations and, for each bit,
setting it to 1 if the counter is positive, setting it to 0 if the counter
if negative, and randomly setting it to 0 or 1 if the counter is zero.
Thus, each bit of the returned bitstring is chosen according to all
written bitstrings in the entire cell assembly (i.e., all active hard
locations) and is equal to the bit value most written in that dimen-
sion. In short, the read operation depends on many hard locations
to be successful. If another datum ν is written into the memory
near η, the shared hard locations will have information from both
of them without directly pointing to ν either. In this way, any
one hard location may, in a fashion, simultaneously “point” to
multiple addresses.
An imprecise cue ηx shares hard locations with the target bit-
string η—yet it should be possible to retrieve η correctly, even
if additional reading operations become necessary to retrieve η
exactly. When reading a cue ηx that is x bits away from η, the cue
shares many hard locations with η (see Figure 5). The number
of shared hard locations decreases as the distance of the cue to
η increases, in other words, as x = d(ηx, η) increases. The tar-
get datum η is read in all addresses shared between η and ηx,
thus they will bias the read output toward the direction of η.
If the cue is sufficiently close to the target datum η, the output
of the read operation will be closer to η than ηx originally was.
Iterating the read operation will obtain results increasingly closer
to η, until it is exactly the same. So ηx0 will yield an ηx1 that is
closer, reading at ηx1 yields an ηx2 that is closer still and so on until
ηxi = η, if the iteration converges. Hence, performing a sequence
of successive read operations will allow convergence onto the
target data η.
Since a cue ηx near the target bitstring η shares many hard
locations with η, SDM can retrieve data from imprecise cues (i.e.,
as an autoassociative memory). In spite of this characteristic, it
is crucial to know how imprecise this cue could be while still
converging. What is the maximum distance from our cue to the
FIGURE 5 | Shared addresses between the target datum η and the
cue ηx.
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original data that still retrieves the right answer? There is a pre-
cise point in which a non-linearity occurs, and the qualitative
behavior of the model changes.
A striking feature of this model is its reflection of the psycho-
logical “tip-of-tongue” phenomenon, which seems to reflect the
limits of human recollection. It is the psychological state in which
one knows that one knows some pre-registered memory item, yet
one is unable to recollect it at a given time.
The tip-of-the-tongue phenomenon occurs when a person
knows that he/she has been previously exposed to a certain stimu-
lus, but is unable to recall some specifics. In SDM, a tip-of-tongue
memory event occurs when the expected time to convergence
(or divergence) approaches infinity. In other words, when succes-
sive read iterations fail to converge or to diverge. Kanerva (1988)
called this particular instance of x, where the output of the read
operation averages x, the critical distance. Intuitively, it is the dis-
tance from which smaller distances converge and greater distances
diverge. In Figure 6, the circle has radius equal to the critical dis-
tance and every ηx inside the circle should converge. The figure
also shows an example of convergence in four readings. We put
that this is a proxy for the edge of human recall: a threshold until
which recollection occurs, and beyond which it no longer occurs.
Kanerva describes this critical distance as the threshold of con-
vergence of a sequence of read words. It is “the distance beyond
which divergence is more likely than convergence” (Kanerva,
1988). Furthermore, “a very good estimate of the critical distance
can be obtained by finding the distance at which the arithmetic
mean of the new distance to the target equals the old distance to
the target” (Kanerva, 1988).
Kanerva has analytically derived this non-linearity for a very
particular set of circumstances. His original book analyzed a spe-
cific situation with n = 1000 (N = 21000), 1,000,000 hard loca-
tions, an access-radius of 451 (with 1000 hard locations in each
circle) and 10,000 writes of random bitstrings in the memory.
FIGURE 6 | In this example, four iterative readings are required to
converge from ηx to η.
This is a very particular set of parameters, and doesn’t shed light
on questions of speed and robustness of expert recollection. In
the next section we deal with this non-linearity and the issue of
analyzing critical distance as an optimization problem.
In subsequent sections, we will derive an equation for the crit-
ical distance, in terms of SDM’s parameters. We will then present
empirical results of the evolution of the critical distance under
varying conditions,which shed light on the model’s behavior. It
is worth noting that, since SDM is itself a computer simulation,
what we call empirical results refer to conclusions obtained over
data from thousands of runs of the simulation. All data and con-
clusions (aside from theory) herein refer to trials over computer
simulations.
3. MATERIALS AND METHODS
3.1. DERIVING THE CRITICAL DISTANCE AS A MINIMIZATION
PROBLEM
Kanerva has shown that, when 10, 000 items are stored in the
memory, and the number of dimensions N = 1000, then the crit-
ical distance is at a Hamming distance of 209 bits: if one reads
the item at a distance smaller than 209 bits, one is able to itera-
tively converge toward the item. If, on the other hand, one reads
the item at a distance higher than 209 bits, the memory can-
not retrieve the item. Furthermore at the juncture of about 209
bits, expected time to convergence grows to infinite. This reflects
the aforementioned tip-of-the-tongue phenomenon: when one
knows that one knows a particular bit of knowledge, yet is unable
to retrieve it at that point. Psychologically, this would entail some
top–down mechanism which would force the iterated search to
halt. We establish a maximum number of iterated reads, based on
repeated simulations (see section 4.2).
Kanerva thus fixed a number of parameters in order to derive
this mathematical result:
1. the number of dimensions, N = 1000;
2. the number of other items stored into the memory, at 10, 000;
3. the reading method (by pooling all hard locations);
4. a single write of the target bitstring in the memory;
5. the access radius of 451, activating approximately 1000 hard
locations per read or write operation.
As Kanerva defined it, approximately half of read operations 209
bits away from the target data will bring us closer to the target and
approximately half will move us away from the target. His math
could be simplified to this: each item will activate approximately
1000 hard locations, so writing 10, 000 items randomly will acti-
vate a total of 10, 000, 000 hard locations, giving an average of 10
different bitstrings written in each hard location. When one reads
from a bitstring η200, 200 bits away of the target η, η200 will share
a mean of 97 hard locations with the target (Kanerva, 1988, Table
7.1, p. 63). This way, it is possible to split the set of active hard
locations into two groups: one group having 903 hard locations
with 10 random bitstrings written into each; and other group
having 97 hard locations each with 9 random bitstrings plus our
target bitstring η.
Let us analyze what happens to each bit of the read bitstrings.
To each bit we have 903 · 10 + 97 · 9 = 9903 random bits out of a
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total of 10, 000 bits. The total number of 1-bits is a random vari-
able that follows the Binomial distribution with 9903 samples and
p = 0.5. It has a mean of 9903/2 = 4951.5 and standard deviation√
9903/4 = 49.75. If our target bit is 0 we will choose correctly
when our sum is less than half total, or 10, 000/2 = 5000. If our
target bit is 1, our sum is the random variable of total 1-bits added
by 97 1-bits from our sample. Adding a constant number changes
only the mean and does not affect the standard deviation. So
we will choose correctly when our sum of means 4951.5 + 97 =
5048.5 and standard deviation 49.75 is greater than 5000. Both
probabilities here equal 83% of choosing the same bit as the tar-
get. As we have 1000 bits, in average, we can predict that the result
of the read operation will be 170 bits away from the target.
The critical distance is the point where the aforementioned
probability equals the distance from the bitstring ηx to the tar-
get η, or x = n(1 − p), where x is the distance from the bitstring
to the target, p is the probability of choosing the wrong value
of a bit (given by the above technique), and n is the number of
dimensions.
Given that we intend to study the critical distance as a theo-
retical proxy for the limits of human recollection, we would like
to explore a larger number of possibilities and parameter settings
of the model. Hence we compute the non-linearity of the critical
distance as minimization problem. Let:
• d: be the distance to the target;
• h: be the number of hard locations activated during read and
write operations (note that this value depends on that access
radius);
• s: be the number of total stored bitstrings in the SDM;
• H: be the number of instantiated hard locations;
• w: be the number of times the target bitstring was written in
memory;
• θ : be the total of random bitstrings in all h hard locations
activated by a read operation; i.e., the size of a cell assembly;
and
• φ(d): be the mean number of shared hard locations activated by
two bitstrings d bits away from each other. One can find values
for a 1000-dimensional SDM in Kanerva’s book, Table 7.1, p.
63, or the equations to calculate to any SDM in (de Pádua Braga
and Aleksander, 1995; Kanerva, 1988, Appendix B, p. 125).
Consider a memory in which a total of s bitstrings have already
been stored via write operations. Each of these write operations
would have activated approximately h hard locations. This way,
on average, all write operations together activate a total of sh hard
locations. This gives an average of sh/H random bitstrings stored
in each hard location.
Knowing the average number of bitstrings stored in each hard
location, it is simple to find an equation for θ . Each read operation
performed for a cue ηd has φ(d) hard locations shared with the
target bitstring η, and h − φ(d) non-shared hard locations. The
non-shared hard locations have only random bitstrings stored in
themselves. However, the shared hard locations have the target
bitstring written w times, resulting in fewer random bitstrings. As
the average number of bitstrings written in each hard locations is
sh/H, we have:
θ = s · h
H







θ = s · h
2
H
− w · φ(d)
Suppose the k-th bit of our target bitstring is zero. The read oper-
ation will correctly choose bit 0 if, and only if, more than half of
the bitstrings from the activated hard locations has the k-th bit
0 (setting aside the case of an equal number of zeros and ones1).
As each hard location has sh/H bitstrings and the read operation
activates h, half of the bitstrings equals h · sh/(2H) = sh2/(2H).
Then, to choose correctly, we should have
∑θ
i = 1 Xi < sh2/(2H),
where Xi is the k-th bit of the i-th bitstring stored in each activated
hard location.
Suppose the k-th bit our target bitstring is 1. The read opera-
tion will choose bit 1 when more than half of the bitstrings from
the activated hard locations has the k-th bit 1. We have already
seen that half of the bitstrings is sh2/(2H). But here, as the bit
equals 1 and there are w target bitstrings in each φ(d), we have to
add w · φ(d) to the sum. In other words, we must account for the
number of times the target was written into the hard locations
which are activated by both the target and the cue which is at a
distance d. This gives us w · φ(d) +∑θi = 1 Xi > sh2/(2H).
Summarizing, we have:















− w · φ(d)
)
We already know that P(Xi = 1) = P(Xi = 0) = 1/2. Since each
Xi corresponds to a Bernoulli trial,
∑θ
i = 1 Xi ∼ Binomial(θ; 0.5),
which has mean θ/2 and standard deviation
√
θ/4.
The critical distance is the distance where the chance of con-
vergence to the target equals the distance of divergence from the
target. That is, in the critical distance, the probability of a wrong
choice of the bit, times the number of bits, is equal to the origi-
nal distance to the target. Then, the critical distance is the d that
satisfies equation P(wrong) · n = d or P(wrong) = d/n.
Using the theorem of total probability, we have:
P(wrong) = P(wrong|bit = 0) · P(bit = 0)












1the case for a random coin toss is negligible, since, as θ becomes large, its
probability tends toward 0 quickly.
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· [(1 − α) + β]
This way, the equation to be solved is:
1
2
· [(1 − α) + β] = d
n
Since d is an integer value and θ is a function of d, this equality
may not be achievable (this describes a range, where for a cer-
tain d: leftside > rightside and for d + 1: leftside < rightside). In
these cases, the critical distance can be obtained minimizing the





· [(1 − α) + β] − d
n
}2
If the size of the cell assembly, θ , is large enough, a good approx-
imation to the Binomial(θ; 0.5) is the normal distribution. Let
N be the normalized normal distribution with mean zero and








































And we have to minimize the following function with restrictions












In the case studied in Kanerva (1988), n = 1000, h = 1000,
H = 1, 000, 000, s = 10, 000, w = 1, and θ = 10, 000 − φ(d).












When d = 209, we have φ(d) = 87 and f̃ (209) ∼= 0.00032, which
is the global minimum.
We note once again that equations to calculate φ(d) have been
derived in Kanerva (1988, Appendix B) and need not be repeated
here—see also the derivations for higher d by de Pádua Braga and
Aleksander (1995). The example calculated above used Table 7.1
of Kanerva (1988), which has the values of φ(d) for d in a 1000-
dimensional SDM with one million hard locations.
In the following section we briefly reiterate and discuss the
contribution of the theoretical model, and turn to empirical
results pertaining to the exploration of the critical distance.
We vary parameters of the memory model in order to explore
the changes to the critical distance. These empirical trials yield
enlightening results pertaining to the critical distance as a paral-
lel for the edge of human recollection and for human expertise
in SDM.
4. RESULTS
In this text, we show that, given α̃, β̃, and d, minimizing the












solves the issue of non-linearity involved in the critical distance of
the model, that is, the psychological limits of human recollection
at a given point in time. Such result should be valuable to assess
whether the memory is prone to convergence or divergence.
This result may help provide avenues of exploration in theoret-
ical neuroscience and can be readily available to cognitive model-
ers. Yet, it still falls short of giving us an intuitive understanding of
the speed and robustness of the memory of experts. Therefore, we
will explore the critical distance behavior at different configura-
tions. We have implemented the model and conducted a large set
of computational experiments, whose visualizations illuminate
the issue of expert memory.
4.1. NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS: VISUALIZING THE MEMORY
DYNAMICS
So far we have seen a single particular case with set parameters,
and our goal is to understand the speed and robustness of expert
memory. Let us consider variations of these parameters, and com-
pute, through simulations, the behavior of the critical distance.
We vary the number of dimensions N ∈ {256, 1000}, we vary the
number of stored items from the set {1000, 2000, . . . , 50000}, and
we vary the rehearsal number: the number of times an item has
been stored in the memory.
The following figures depict heat maps describing the behav-
ior of the critical distance. In these simulations, all items are
stored at their respective locations, that is, a bitstring x is
stored at the location x. Generating each heat map proved
computationally demanding: when N = 1000, approximately
305, 000, 000, 000, 000 bit-compares are required (storage of
items in memory: 5 · 1013, and to read items from memory:
3 · 1015 bit-compares). Each individual pixel demands an average
of 7, 000, 000, 000 bit-compares.
All figures presented below have three colored lines. The green
line marks the first occurrence of non-convergence to the exact
target bitstring. The red line marks the last occurrence of the
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convergence to the exact target bitstring. Finally, the blue line
marks the estimated critical distance, that is where the read output,
on average, equals the input distance to the target bitstring. It is an
estimation because the critical distance is not exactly defined this
way. Critical distance is the point or region in which both diver-
gence and convergence have a 50% chance to occur. That is, all
points before the green line converged, all points after the red line
diverged, and the points between these lines sometimes converge
and sometimes diverge.
One may notice that, despite not having an exact convergence,
almost all points between the green and the red line are near the
target bitstring.
4.2. INFLUENCE OF ITERATIVE READINGS IN CRITICAL DISTANCE
The number of iterative-readings is an important parameter of
an SDM implementation. Simulations were done in a 1000 and
256-dimensional SDM. Both with one million hard locations,
activating (on average) 1000 hard locations per operation and
varying the number of times the target bitstring η is written to
memory.
For each write-strength of η (written once, twice, five times,
nine times) we varied the saturation of the SDM, that is, the num-
ber of random bitstrings written (once each) along with eta in the
memory. We varied this from 1000 to 50, 000 random bitstrings,
in increments of 1000. Once populated with eta plus the random
bitstrings, we performed 1–40 iterative-readings at each possible
distance from the target (from zero to the number of dimensions).
Figures 7A–D show, respectively, a 1000-dimensional SDM
checked with a single read, 6, 10, and 40 iterative-readings. It is
easy to see a huge difference from a single read to more reads,
but a small difference from 6 to 10 and from 10 to 40 iterative-
readings. These observations also apply to our tests with the
256-dimensional SDM. As compared to the 1000-dimensional
SDM, we found a smaller, more gradual difference from a sin-
gle read to more reads, yet a minute difference from 6 to 10
and from 10 to 40 iterative-readings. Following these results,
due to the number of computations needed in each simulation,
all other simulations were done using 6 iterative-readings, since
40 iterative-readings have only a slight improvement in relation
to six.
It is unexpected that, after 40, 000 writes in the 1000-
dimensional memory, the critical distance is so small. Kanerva
(1988) showed that, under these parameters, the memory capac-
ity is slightly less than 100, 000 items. The author defines SDM
capacity as saturated when its critical distance is zero. In the 256-
dimensional memory, this behavior starts after 20, 000 writes.
This is unexpected, since Kanerva’s estimation for N = 256 is
between 112, 000 and 137, 000 random bitstrings stored.
Our principal hypothesis for the discrepancies between our
empirical results and the original theory is that, while the hard
locations are instantiated as samples from a uniform distribution
and our simulations wrote bitstrings randomly, they do not satu-
rate uniformly. Any write activates a fixed average (around 1000
in our case) of hard locations, but the variance in this case is not
insignificant. One bitstring read may activate 900 while another
(in another area of the space, be it close or far) may activate 1100
hard locations. Thus, certain hard locations would become more
FIGURE 7 | Influence of number of iterative-readings in a 1000-dimen-
sional SDM memory.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org April 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 222 | 208
Brogliato et al. Speed and robustness of expert memory
noise than signal during activation sooner, rather than a uni-
form degradation occurring. This discrepancy would cause, in the
aggregate, a saturation of the SDM with fewer bitstrings stored
than expected in theory. This remains one possibility, though we
hope the issue will be explored in future work.
4.3. INFLUENCE OF THE NUMBER OF WRITES ON THE CRITICAL
DISTANCE
The influence of the number of writes on the critical distance was
not analyzed by Kanerva. It is important because, when a random
bitstring is seen only once, it is psychologically plausible that it
will be gradually forgotten with new incoming information. What
matters is not exactly the number of writes, but the proportion of
the number of times a bitstring was stored in relation to others.
A remark on cognitive psychology is in order here. Consider,
as an example, the aforementioned exchange between Szilard
and Einstein. As an expert confronts unexpected information,
it is reasonable to expect that additional memory writes will
occur. If we presume that evolution brought the human memory
close to optimality, as explored by the rational analysis approach
(Anderson and Milson, 1989; Anderson, 1990; Anderson and
Schooler, 1991), one would expect some mechanism akin to
Shannon’s idea of information content to be in play.
That is, as an expert is surprised by new, unforeseen, informa-
tion, say, an outcome 
, with information I(
) = −log(P(
)),
where I stands for the information content in outcome 
. One
would therefore expect the expert’s memory to either place addi-
tional attention to the outcome, leading to: (1) additional writes
to memory, or (2) amplification of the write operation’s signals,
or possibly (3) both effects.
Figures 8A–D show a 1000-dimensional SDM with 1, 2, 5, and
9 writes of the target bitstring η. It is easy to see a huge difference
from 1 to 2 writes. Although the green line has a strange behavior
near 50, 000 items stored, the critical distance was much greater
than with 1 write. From 2 to 5 to 9 rehearsals, the critical distance
starts growing rapidly and slows down near six writes. This makes
sense, since it should have a threshold smaller than 500 bits.
The 256-dimensional memory has a similar behavior, but less
abrupt. It keeps growing, but slower than a 100-dimensional
memory. It never crosses the 50 bits on x-axis in 256 bits, while
the 1000-dimensional reaches the 200 bits on x-axis and almost
hits 400 bits on the x-axis.
These figures display the immense power of reinforcement or
rehearsal: additional writes of a memory item significantly raise
the attractor basin (critical distance) for that memory item.
This behavior is plausible, as the human brain rapidly recog-
nizes a pattern when it is used to it. Many times, the patterns
appear in different contexts, giving cues far from the target con-
cept, much like a chess player, who looks at a position and rapidly
recognizes what is happening (Bilalić et al., 2009; Rennig et al.,
2013).
5. DISCUSSION
This is the first work focused on better understanding the criti-
cal distance behavior of a Sparse Distributed Memory (Kanerva,
personal communication). Our future research intends to explore
the rehearsal mechanisms in cognitive architectures for one of
the most studied domains of expertise: (Linhares, 2005; Linhares
FIGURE 8 | Influence of number of target writes in a 1000-dimensional
SDM memory.
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and Brum, 2007; Linhares and Freitas, 2010; Linhares et al.,
2012; Linhares and Chada, 2013; Linhares, 2014), and attempt
to bridge the low-level world of neurons and their assemblies
with the high-level world of abstract thought and understand-
ing of strategic scenarios. We have argued here that, as SDM
remains both a psychologically plausible and a neuroscientifically
plausible model of human memory, the study of its critical dis-
tance may provide insights into the edges of our own recollection.
Without a precise understanding of the critical distance behavior,
one cannot advance the theoretical model. Moreover, one can-
not develop robust applications without knowing the limits of
convergence.
The empirical tests shown here confirmed that the critical dis-
tance in SDM constitutes a “band” wherein both convergence
and divergence become less and less likely. This is a palatable
result because, intuitively, the Tip-of-the-Tongue phenomenon in
humans seems like an attractor, something we sometimes “fall
into.” We argue this is a parallel between SDM and human rec-
ollection, and posit that our theoretical and empirical results
provide evidence that the critical distance is a correlate to the edge
of human recollection.
While humans sometimes fall into the TotT, there are also
times when we almost fall into it and, after a bit of effort, are able
to recall the desired information. In the model, this would mean
we enter the critical band, but leave it after one or two iterations
and converge. Likewise, it seems one can be very certain of what
one is saying and, in mid-sentence, completely diverge from the
next piece of information we wished to recall. In SDM this would
amount to entering the critical band, but then diverging.
As Figure 6 shows, the speed of convergence is a function of
the number of read operations: additional read operations bring
one closer to the memory item (assuming that the original cue
was not past the critical point). We also see that this effect is
greatly reduced after 6 to 10 read operations. As Figure 7 shows,
expertise can be correlated with providing additional writes to
the memory, and we show that increasing the rehearsal num-
ber greatly increases the margin for error or ambiguity, and greatly
decreases the relevant information needed for convergence, as the
critical threshold is increased. In human terms, experts “know
what you are talking about” with fewer cues. Their memory has
much greater robustness.
Yet, it is the combination of these two dynamics that sheds light
on experts’ speed. Taking the SDM model as a plausible account
of human memory, we can compare by saying that, for experts,
having a much higher threshold may signify being able to converge
within fewer, or even a single, read operation. As the hard locations
have been reinforced with the original information, read oper-
ations converge faster. With very few cues and noisy, ambiguous,
information, experts may still manage to recollect and understand
almost immediately the object, situation, or event in question. It is
no wonder Albert Einstein could immediately grasp Leo Szilard’s
concerns.
5.1. DATA SHARING
All the computational methods developed in this study are avail-
able as an open-source project, and can be found at https://
github.com/msbrogli/sdm.
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In 2012, Guida, Gobet, Tardieu and
Nicolas proposed a two-stage framework
to explain how cognitive changes due to
practice could shape experts’ brain physi-
ologically and thus explain neuroimaging
data of expertise acquisition. In this paper,
after presenting the motivations for such
a framework and the framework itself, we
examine the idea that functional cerebral
reorganization (FCR) could be used as a
signature for expertise.
CHUNKS, TEMPLATES AND RETRIEVAL
STRUCTURES
In the mid-nineties, Ericsson and Kintsch
(1995) and Gobet and Simon (1996) pro-
posed Long-Term Working Memory the-
ory (LTWMT) and Template Theory (TT),
respectively, in order to account for behav-
ioral data in the domain of expertise.
These data were difficult to explain with
the sole concept of chunk (Chase and
Simon, 1973), given the severe limita-
tions of working memory (WM) (7 ± 2
for an optimistic estimation, Miller, 1956;
but for recent reevaluations, see Cowan,
2001; Gobet and Clarkson, 2004; Mathy
and Feldman, 2012). For example, sev-
eral experiments (e.g., Charness, 1976;
Frey and Adesman, 1976; Glanzer et al.,
1984) showed that interfering tasks had
almost no effect on WM performance
or text comprehension with experts. Yet,
according to chunking theory (Chase and
Simon, 1973), interfering tasks should
wipe out the content of WM where infor-
mation is stored. This led Ericsson and
Kintsch (1995) and Gobet and Simon
(1996) to suggest that information was
not stored in WM as initially proposed,
but was rapidly and efficiently trans-
ferred in LTM, where the interfering
tasks has no effect. Both theories pro-
posed that this was possible only if
knowledge structures were built. These
structures were called templates with TT
and retrieval structures with LTWMT.
Even if differences exist between the
two theories (e.g., Ericsson and Kintsch,
2000; Gobet, 2000a,b), LTWMT and TT
revolve around the same fundamental
core idea: Fast and reliable transfer in
LTM becomes possible with expertise via
knowledge structures, which enables LTM
to be used during WM tasks, thus giv-
ing the appearance of expanding individ-
uals’ WM capacity. These two cognitive
theories have been used to explain not
only behavioral but also neuroscientific
data (e.g., Pesenti et al., 2001; Ericsson,
2003; Campitelli et al., 2007; Bilalić et al.,
2010).
EXPLAINING NEUROIMAGING DATA IN
EXPERTISE ACQUISITION: A
TWO-STAGE FRAMEWORK
Recently, the core idea of the two theo-
ries has been used by Guida et al. (2012)
to bridge together, for the first time, (a)
neuroimaging data acquired from novice
undergoing practice in WM-related tasks
and (b) neuroimaging data acquired from
experts in WM-related tasks. The results of
the two groups of studies, which belong to
two separate domains of research, diverge.
Neuroimaging of novices practicing from
2 h up to 5 weeks show mainly a decrease
of activation in prefrontal and parietal
areas (for similar conclusions, see Kelly
and Garavan, 2005; Hill and Schneider,
2006; Buschkuehl et al., 2012). Conversely,
neuroimaging studies of experts who are
compared to novices are more compati-
ble with FCR, viz., experts and novices use
different brain areas and different men-
tal operations to perform similar tasks
(for similar conclusions, see Ericsson,
2003). Notwithstanding these divergent
findings (brain activation decrease vs.
FCR), the core idea behind LTMWT and
TT allows bridging these two neuroimag-
ing patterns into a coherent two-stage
framework.
FIRST STAGE: DECREASE OF
ACTIVATION DUE TO CHUNK
CREATION AND RETRIEVAL
When novices start practicing, and if the
activity is new, the first important process
is chunk creation. While executing their
new activity several times, novices will
start gradually chunking separate elements
together through binding, viz., encoding
the relations among stimuli that co-occur
(Cohen and Eichenbaum, 1993). Once
chunks have been created and thus stored
in LTM, chunk can be retrieved and there-
fore used, allowing encoding multiple ele-
ments in WM with one chunk (e.g., “f,”
“b,” “i,” can be encoded as one element
in WM instead of three), using fewer
resources.
At a physiological level, chunk creation
(through binding) and chunk retrieval
are two reasons to expect brain activa-
tion decrease. First, if the binding process
occurs in prefrontal regions (Prabhakaran
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et al., 2000; Raffone and Wolters, 2001)
and in parietal regions (Shafritz et al.,
2002; Oakes et al., 2006), less activation
should be observed in these regions after
a period of training, because as training
progresses, fewer chunks will be created.
Second, the use of chunks through chunk
retrieval makes it possible to encode infor-
mation in WM with less resources, as
elements are grouped. Several researchers
have shown that, physiologically, there
is a correlation between the number of
elements in WM and brain activity in
prefrontal and parietal areas1 (Todd and
Marois, 2004; Vogel and Machizawa, 2004;
Cowan, 2011). Therefore, if less WM space
is used through chunk retrieval, decrease
of brain activity should be expected
in prefrontal and parietal WM areas
(Figure 1).
1 It is particularly the case in the intra-parietal sulcus
(e.g., Majerus et al., 2010; Cowan et al., 2011).
SECOND STAGE: FUNCTIONAL
CEREBRAL REORGANIZATION DUE TO
KNOWLEDGE STRUCTURES CREATION
AND RETRIEVAL
With practice (e.g., Cowan et al., 2004;
Chen and Cowan, 2005) and expertise
(e.g., Chase and Simon, 1973; Gobet and
Simon, 1996), chunks get larger and more
complex, and with years of training they
become knowledge structures. For experts,
the peculiarity of these structures, when
used in their domain of expertise, is
to allow rapid and reliable encoding in
episodic LTM, even in WM-like conditions
(fast presentation times of multiple ele-
ments) when usually elements can only be
encoded reliably in WM (Figure 1).
In terms of brain activation, at this
stage, not only a cerebral activation pat-
tern compatible with WM activities is
expected but conjunctly a pattern com-
patible with episodic LTM, that is, medial
temporal lobe (MTL) activations (Gabrieli
et al., 1997; Young et al., 1997; Lepage
et al., 1998; for reviews, see Squire et al.,
2004; Eichenbaum et al., 2007) due to the
utilization of knowledge structures. From
a longitudinal standpoint, this implies a
FCR, which can be defined by two changes
occurring with practice: (a) the decrease
of brain activity undergirding cognitive
processes that are used less with prac-
tice (here WM in stage 1), and (b) the
emergence of brain activity in new areas
supporting new cognitive processes (here
episodic LTM in stage 2). Therefore, a
FCR involving episodic LTM2 is expected
(Figure 1). Unfortunately, to our knowl-
edge, nobody has followed the develop-
ment of expertise in a WM-related task
with neuroimaging long enough to test
2 FCR, in this article, means, a shift of a way of per-
forming a task to another way, without specifying the
new way. FCR involving episodic LTM, in this arti-
cle, means that the new way of performing the task
is through episodic LTM
FIGURE 1 | Schematic representation of the Two-Stage Framework
linking the cognitive and cerebral levels in expertise acquisition,
through two examples. The “Examples” section shows the evolution of
the effect of knowledge on how items to-be-remembered are processed:
at first, items are processed almost separately, later, items are regrouped
in chunks, and finally in knowledge structures, which can be viewed as
super-chunks that regroup multiple chunks into a high-level pattern. In the
“Cerebral Level” section, the representation of brain activity is at an
ordinal scale. SST stands for statistical significance threshold; if brain
activity is beneath this threshold, it goes undetected. PFC stands for
prefrontal cortex, PL for parietal lobe, and MTL for medial temporal lobe.
The first MTL activity on the left is almost at the same level than the
statistical significance threshold in order to indicate that for novices, brain
activity is sometimes detected (see section “Concluding Remarks”). For
novices, detection seems to vary according to the kind of experimental
paradigm, the parameters and maybe the participants of the experiments.
If one considers that the MTL activity is above the statistical significance
threshold for novices then functional cerebral reorganization is better
suited to describe expertise acquisition; if it is beneath, then functional
cerebral redistribution is better suited.
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this hypothesis. Instead, what is possible is
to compare novices against experts. This
was the aim of Guida et al.’s (2012) review,
which showed that most of the studies
were compatible with FCR involving LTM.
FUNCTIONAL CEREBRAL
REORGANIZATION: A SIGNATURE OF
EXPERTISE?
Given that a link has been established
between expertise and FCR, an important
question is to know whether FCR could be
used as a signature for expertise. A simple
way to answer this question is to exam-
ine empirically whether the implication
“expertise thus FCR” observed by Guida
et al. (2012) could be reversed. In other
words, when one looks for patterns com-
patible with FCR—viz. a decrease of brain
activity concerning one cognitive process
and the emergence of brain activity con-
cerning new cognitive processes—is exper-
tise found? If it is not the case then FCR
does not imply expertise.
At first glance, this does not seem to be
true. There are multiple examples show-
ing that the simple utilization of different
strategies can involve patterns of activa-
tion similar to FCR. For instance, the lit-
erature of WM-related tasks shows that
when different groups of individuals use
spontaneously different strategies—verbal
strategy vs. visual strategy (Burbaud et al.,
2000), or verbal strategy vs. spatial strategy
(Glabus et al., 2003)—then completely dif-
ferent patterns of activation are detected.
This seems to be true even when the
strategies are dictated by the experimenter,
as observed by Bernstein et al. (2002)
when imposing different encoding strate-
gies in a task of face recognition. These
three between-subject studies bring only
indirect evidence, but they are confirmed
by a within-subject study. When Reichle
et al. (2000) asked the same individuals
to process a sentence-picture verification
task with different strategies (linguistic vs.
visual), completely different patterns of
activity appeared: there was a decrease of
brain activity concerning cognitive pro-
cesses (e.g., linguistic) and the emergence
of brain activity concerning new cognitive
processes (e.g., visual). In all these cases,
a pattern consistent with FCR is present
but no expertise is found. Therefore, the
implication “expertise thus FCR” does not
seem reversible.
However, when considering precisely
FCR involving episodic LTM areas, the
picture is different. First, we found only
one study (Kondo et al., 2005); secondly, it
is the only study where participants were
taught how to use knowledge structures.
Kondo et al. (2005) asked their novice
participants to encode ten object pictures
using the method of loci, basing them-
selves on the visuospatial knowledge of
their house. When comparing neuroimag-
ing before and after using the method
of loci, they observed a pattern consis-
tent with FCR at retrieval. Hence, if one
argues that the method of loci is based on
the utilization of expertise (Guida et al.,
2009, 2013), the conclusion from Kondo
et al. (2005) could be that for FCR involv-
ing episodic LTM areas, the implication
“expertise thus FCR” can be reversed,
making the proposal that FCR is a signa-
ture for expertise verisimilar (when involv-
ing episodic LTM).
However, when trying to relate
expertise and FCR and before one can
be conclusive on the link between these
two concepts, two elements need to be
taken into consideration, functional cere-
bral redistribution and brain connectivity.
These will constitute our concluding
remarks.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
A very recent growing body of data sug-
gests that in some cases, functional cere-
bral redistribution could also occur with
practice. Both FCR and functional cerebral
redistribution involve a combination of
increases and decreases in activation (Kelly
and Garavan, 2005); however, only FCR
necessitates the emergence of new areas
with practice. Recent evidence suggests
that MTL could also be involved in WM
tasks with no practice (e.g., Ranganath
and Blumenfeld, 2005; Olson et al., 2006;
Lee and Rudebeck, 2010; Campo et al.,
2013). The debate is still ongoing and these
results are considered artifactual by some,
mainly because the tasks used seem more
LTM-like than WM-like (Jonides et al.,
2008). Squire and Wixted (2011) observed
that if WM capacity were not exceeded,
MTL was not involved (e.g., Shrager et al.,
2008; Jeneson et al., 2012). Nonetheless,
these data suggest that in some cases, MTL
activation could be expected at the early
stages of training. It is plausible that this
activation could increase with expertise
when knowledge structures are available,
which means that this pattern would be
better described by functional redistribu-
tion than FCR, because this last pattern
implies no MTL activation at the initial
stage of practice (Figure 1). However, the
additional areas of experts are sometimes
the same structures than that of novices
but on the opposite hemisphere (e.g.,
Bilalić et al., 2011, 2012), a.k.a. “double
take” phenomenon (e.g., Scalf et al., 2007),
which complicates sometime the distinc-
tion between functional redistribution and
FCR. To conclude concerning MTL, more
work needs to be done to ascertain its
involvement, especially in practice-related
studies where this kind of evidence is
scarce (but, see Dahlin et al., 2008), there-
fore, presently, these are only assumptions.
Finally, when considering expertise-
related FCR, which constitutes a com-
bined increase and decrease in activation
across the brain, it is also crucial to under-
stand how the different brain areas work
together in terms of network connectiv-
ity. Fundamental in this respect is the idea
of “neural context” proposed by McIntosh
(1998; also, see Bressler and McIntosh,
2007), according to which the frame of
activation (or the neural context of acti-
vation) around a determined brain area
is at least as important as the activation
of that brain area. If one relates this idea
to practice, then the consequence is that
even if the activation of a region does not
change with practice, it can still be cru-
cial, by influencing the increase or decrease
of activation in other brain areas (Kelly
and Garavan, 2005). The neural context
could thus be important for the study of
functional reorganization, and its applica-
tion should be disseminated (Bressler and
Menon, 2010).
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Training studies, in which the structural or functional neurophysiology is compared before
and after expertise is acquired, are increasingly being used as models for understanding
the human brain’s potential for reorganization. It is proving difficult to use these results
to answer basic and important questions like how task training leads to both specific and
general changes in behavior and how these changes correspond with modifications in
the brain. The main culprit is the diversity of paradigms used as complex task models.
An assortment of activities ranging from juggling to deciphering Morse code has been
reported. Even when working in the same general domain, few researchers use similar
training models. New ways to meaningfully compare complex tasks are needed. We
propose a method for characterizing and deconstructing the task requirements of complex
training paradigms, which is suitable for application to both structural and functional
neuroimaging studies. We believe this approach will aid brain plasticity research by making
it easier to compare training paradigms, identify “missing puzzle pieces,” and encourage
researchers to design training protocols to bridge these gaps.
Keywords: expertise, plasticity, training, MRI, multisensory learning
INTRODUCTION
The idea that the structure and function of the human brain
remains somewhat open to alteration by experience over the lifes-
pan is now well established (Wan and Schlaug, 2010; Zatorre et al.,
2012), although researchers have not yet formed a comprehensive
view of how – and under which conditions – this occurs.
In this paper, we focus on the research looking at training-
related plasticity in human subjects that uses complex skills as
models, such as juggling (e.g., Draganski et al., 2004; Boyke et al.,
2008; Scholz et al., 2009), golfing (e.g., Bezzola et al., 2011), or var-
ious aspects of making music (e.g., Lappe et al., 2008; Hyde et al.,
2009). Work using such skills complements earlier and ongoing
research on more basic aspects of brain–behavior relationships,
such as learning a simple finger-tapping task (e.g., Ungerleider
et al., 2002).
Complex tasks offer several advantages over simpler tasks, as
models: they involve more ecologically valid learning experiences;
they offer an opportunity to study higher-order and domain-
general aspects of learning; they are often inherently interesting
to subjects, which offers benefits particularly for longitudinal
studies in motivation and compliance; and most significantly,
recent evidence suggests that the multisensory and sensorimotor
nature of such tasks is particularly effective in inducing plasticity
both in sensory and association cortical areas (Lappe et al., 2008;
Paraskevopoulos et al., 2012).
The complex nature of the tasks also introduces major chal-
lenges for the comparison and integration of results across training
studies. These studies usually produce complex results, including
changes in activity or structure in many different brain regions.
Strictly speaking, only a direct comparison can demonstrate
specificity of plastic changes. Rarely are these available, though;
the majority of training studies have used either control groups
without training, or comparison with a within-subject baseline
to assess the possibility of developmental or other non-specific
changes. In a recent review of 20 studies on the structural effects
of a range of cognitive and multisensory training paradigms,
for example, only three compared the task of interest with a
second task (Thomas and Baker, 2013). Since few direct com-
parisons are available, inferences regarding the specificity of task
effects rest on arguments about the relevance of the brain struc-
ture to apparently related tasks, or on correlational evidence in
the form of relationships with behavioral change. Typically, this
works well when outcomes can be predicted beforehand, and
indeed training studies report changes in brain areas (or other
physiological measurements) that are known from previous work
to be involved in related activities (e.g., in auditory and motor
areas for musical training; Hyde et al., 2009). Findings which
are not predicted, for example because relationships of higher-
order cognitive systems to training are yet unknown, can pose
greater interpretation problems. This is due to the dissimilarity
of the studies available for comparison – studies using unalike
paradigms offer only very weak and caveated support for one
another.
As well as for explaining unexpected results, the diversity of
complex task paradigms makes it hard for researchers to draw
general bigger-picture conclusions about brain plasticity from
the aggregate results. As Erickson (2012) notes, “it is difficult
to retrieve much homogeneity in the outcomes from such a
heterogeneous set of studies and primary aims.” There are basic
questions about brain plasticity which remain unresolved. For
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example, why does acquiring some skills lead to increases in
measures of brain structure or activity (generally interpreted as
strengthening existing capacity or recruiting additional machin-
ery), whereas others lead to decreases (generally interpreted as
improved efficiency and requiring less processing effort)? What
determines whether a skill is transferable to other behaviors or
results in a highly specific behavioral gain? It will be difficult
to piece together answers from such a heterogeneous group of
studies.
In sum, complex tasks are problematic because their study
design space is vast. Because neuroimaging studies such as these are
resource-intensive, particularly longitudinal studies which allow
us to test causal hypotheses directly, systematically varying each
aspect of the training paradigms is an impractical solution. The
wide and sparse coverage of potential complex tasks that is already
represented in literature implicates nearly every cognitive system,
and in various combinations. Even when studies ostensibly use
similar tasks, they may differ on tens of potentially important
training design parameters, among them the control condition
used (i.e., none, between subjects, or within subjects), the sample
size, population characteristics, the duration and intensity of train-
ing, and the subjects’ attained proficiency. Concurrently, rapid
evolution of neuroimaging and analysis methods further reduce
the comparability of studies.
One might argue for a return to simpler training paradigms
until basic mechanisms of plasticity are more fully understood,
were it not for the fact that a better understanding of complex
task training-related plasticity and its underlying mechanisms is
needed now. Important motivations fuelling the observed increase
in research comes from promising yet early attempts to improve
neurological rehabilitation after injury or stroke (Altenmüller
et al., 2009), to prevent of cognitive decline in old age (Wan
and Schlaug, 2010), to develop auditory training tools that tar-
get the brain to treat auditory processing disorder (Musiek et al.,
2002; Loo et al., 2010), and possibly to transform the way the
effectiveness of therapeutics and training techniques is evaluated
(Erickson, 2012).
We must find new ways in which to integrate knowledge gen-
erated using many models. In the remainder of this paper, we
propose one such approach.
A FRAMEWORK TO CHARACTERIZE TRAINING TASKS
In professional environments in which training of personnel
must be both effective and efficient, instructional designers have
refined the art of training; i.e., producing trainees with spe-
cific skills and knowledge. Briefly, one such instructional design
process known as the Dick and Carey Systems Approach Model
(Dick et al., 2004) begins with the definition of a set of con-
crete goals called “performance objectives” (POs). Flow charts
are then used to illustrate the analysis of complex activities into
smaller activities or functions. The POs and task breakdown
serve as a reference when designers create evaluation measures,
define an appropriate instructional strategy, develop and select
instructional materials, and finally, evaluate the effectiveness of
the training.
Whereas the goal of instructional designers is the successful
and measurable transmission of skills and knowledge, the goals
of researchers are usually either to design a training paradigm
which provokes change in a certain brain structure or function,
or to better understand what changes might have been caused
by an existing training paradigm or naturalistic learning experi-
ence. In either case, two ideas can be borrowed from instructional
design; the use of POs, and the task analysis. These are useful both
when designing studies and when evaluating existing designs for
comparability.
PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES
A PO consists of a description of the desired outcome behav-
ior; the circumstances under which the outcome should be met
including any equipment, instructions, environmental variables
like condition of the subjects and availability of feedback or coach-
ing; and the criteria used to judge the learner’s performance. It is
worthwhile to create POs for a training study because they help
researchers to maintain coherence between the performed task,
the subjects’ instructions, and the behavioral-dependent variables,
and to consider addressing possible alternative explanations with
additional controls or measures. In Figure 1A, we include some
suggestions for writing and using POs.
The POs for some training studies are relatively straightforward
and can be easily deduced from the methods description. For
example, a recent study (Landi et al., 2011) investigated structural
changes associated with motor adaptation. The PO for this task
could have been written as follows:
• Objective: Minimize the average target–cursor distance over the
session.
• Circumstances: Controlling a joystick using the thumb and
index fingers of the right hand to follow a moving target, while
a complex perturbation is applied.
• Criteria of performance: The distance between target and cur-
sor averaged for each block and expressed as a percentage of the
baseline.
Extracting POs from other training studies, particularly ones
involving naturalistic designs on leisure activities, is sometimes less
straightforward because the tasks are not always comprehensively
described. This might be because a detailed account of a very
popular activity seems unnecessary, because the training is not
strictly under the experimenter’s control, or because the aim of a
study might be only to show that any change was caused by doing
some activity.
In the study reports, conclusions are nevertheless almost always
drawn about the relationships between many specific physiolog-
ical findings and possible task-relevant cognitive activity. The
details of how real-life complex tasks are taught and learned
may be relevant for this interpretation. For example, a novice
violinist who is encouraged to play entirely by ear will exer-
cise a different set of cognitive skills than one who is learning
by reading musical notation, which could explain differences
in activity in visual and auditory areas. Making a clear state-
ment about the intended focus of the training early in the study
design phase makes it easier to identify supplementary measures
and controls that might have explanatory value (e.g., a post-
practice questionnaire to provide insight into the instructor’s
strategy).
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FIGURE 1 | Suggested steps and considerations for writing performance objectives (A) and for task decomposition (B).
TASK DECOMPOSITION
Task analysis has a long tradition in cognitive psychology and
behaviorism where it has been applied to develop models for
behavioral contingencies (e.g., Skinner, 1954), to create compu-
tational models (Newell and Simon, 1972), to analyze individual
differences in reasoning (Sternberg, 1977), and to build computer
models of cognitive architecture (Anderson et al., 2003, 2009; Qin
et al., 2003).
Unlike previous work in which creating models of behav-
ior and cognition was the goal, our motivation is to be able to
compare the neuroplasticity results from multifaceted tasks and
from researchers of different theoretical persuasions. We must
therefore target a level of generality that can be linked to the func-
tional networks and modules accessible to neuroimaging methods,
rather than on finer-grained analyses, such as specific thought
processes. We must also prioritize training-related changes, and
we must try to remain as theoretically neutral as possible, such
that two researchers studying complex tasks need not first agree
on cognitive and mechanistic models for each of many task
components.
We propose a “task decomposition” in which a complex task
is broken down into elements that are necessary to achieve the
PO (see Figure 1B for suggested steps). To facilitate agreement
and limit inherent theoretical assumptions, we suggest that the
elements be formulated as potentially measurable behaviors (e.g.,
hold a sequence of notes in mind) rather than as cognitive con-
structs (e.g., auditory working memory). Choices must be made
as to the generality of the elements, for example, whether a
hand movement is broken down into finger movements. This
will depend on the ability of the experimental design to resolve
smaller elements, but if modeled hierarchically, elements could be
expanded or collapsed to different levels of detail to accommodate
different comparative goals. A common taxonomy of behavioral
elements would aid task comparison. To the best of our knowl-
edge a suitable taxonomy does not exist, but one readily observes
multiple reoccurring elements when working through several
decompositions. Enumerating and standardizing the wording of
these would be a necessary step for any meta-analysis.
We relate the elements temporally, which is straightforward and
does not introduce many cognitive assumptions. Elements may
occur in sequence or concurrently, and series of events may occur
as a discrete unit or as a loop. We have included behaviors normally
considered both lower and higher-order cognition as elements
(e.g., visual observation vs. evaluating the success of an action).
Metacognitive elements like the selection of different strategies
could also be included, but this would add a level of complexity, for
example, if one evaluation element switched between two possible
structures. It should first be considered if the component is a focus
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of neuroplasticity; i.e., likely to have changed with the training in
a way that was measurable.
For some tasks, the selection of elements and their arrangement
may lead to several competing structures which represent neuro-
physiologically relevant differences. In the case of a longitudinal
study in which transient effects are observed over several measure-
ment points (e.g., Taubert et al., 2010), different structures could
usefully be related to expertise acquisition. Different structures
could be caused by incorrect assumptions or inter-individual dif-
ferences; we believe that even in these cases it will be valuable to
document the task as a basis for discussion – problems can then
be resolved empirically.
In the following section, we illustrate how task decomposition
might be used to compare two tasks. We focus on multisensory
training tasks in this paper, but this approach might also be applied
to more purely cognitive training (see for example reviews by
Buschkuehl et al., 2012; Guida et al., 2012).
AN EXAMPLE OF USING TASK DECOMPOSITION
Using this approach, we start to explore how changes in gray mat-
ter concentration as measured by voxel-based morphometry are
related to two training tasks; visuomotor tracking described previ-
ously (Landi et al., 2011) and 40 h of amateur-level golf practice as
an uncontrolled leisure activity (Bezzola et al., 2011). The conclu-
sions we can draw from this two-task analysis might seem trivial as
it is not difficult to compare two studies without decomposition.
However, our goal here is to offer examples of task decomposi-
tion diagrams (TDDs) and a simple illustration of the principle of
using them to compare tasks.
We have prepared a possible task decomposition for each study
(see Figure 2) and highlighted the elements that differ between
the tasks (bold font). We expect to find similar neurophysiological
changes in tasks that share a component, and no change in this
area with other tasks that do not have this component or do not
stress adaptation and learning of this component.
FIGURE 2 |Task decomposition diagrams for two training paradigms,
(A) the visuomotor tracking task of Landi et al. (2011), and (B) a golf
swing which we presume was a major part of golf training (Bezzola
et al., 2011). Sub-tasks of the main activity are shown with boxes. We have
grouped similar elements into classes for the purposes of visualization
(perception – green, motor – blue, evaluation/error calculation – red,
memory – yellow), though the elements themselves are likely to be more
useful for task comparison. Arrows show dependencies between sub-tasks
and thick bars indicate concurrent activities. Components that differ
between the visuomotor tracking task and the golf swing are in bold font.
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The PO of the visuomotor tracking task was to minimize the
average target–cursor distance over the session, whereas the PO
of the golf practice was presumably to execute a golf swing so as
to move ball to target location. The TDDs show overlap of task
requirements relating to motor planning and execution. These
can account for the convergent findings of changes in motor areas
in the dorsal stream encompassing primary motor cortex (M1)
contra-lateral to the (most) trained hand in both studies. In con-
trast, the divergence of the tasks in some aspects, in particular
visuomotor control in two vs. three dimensions, hand vs. full
body action including balance, and a tight coupling of action
and outcome vs. integration of several separate movements into
a larger sequence that involves more planning, could account for
a discrepancy in findings in the frontal and parietal association
areas, as these areas have been shown to be related to plan-
ning action sequences and visuomotor integration (Andersen and
Buneo, 2002; Molnar-Szakacs et al., 2006) and the representation
of one’s own body in spatial reference frames (Vallar et al., 1999) –
elements that are important parts of golf, but not visuomotor
tracking.
This sort of analysis could then be used to investigate explana-
tory hypotheses. For example, based on a previous functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study using the same task
(Della-Maggiore and McIntosh, 2005), Landi et al. (2011) had
expected changes in a network including M1, posterior parietal
cortex (PPC), and cerebellum, but found only the M1 result.
Cerebellum and PPC are relevant functionally for online error
correction, but the lack of structural changes might be due to the
similarity of the manual tracking task to everyday tasks in these
respects. The more novel kinds of whole-body and multisensory
error corrections that are necessary for learning golf swings might
stimulate greater neurophysiological adaptation. Next steps might
be to compare these results with those from other manual tasks
with these error correction requirements, or to design one.
OTHER APPLICATIONS AND CAUTIONS
Beyond uncovering patterns of task demands and neurophysio-
logical effect across training studies, task decomposition could
be used in other ways in plasticity research. Characterizing tasks
used in human and animal research could facilitate cross-field
comparisons from systems to circuit level (e.g., Sagi et al., 2012).
Hypotheses as to the cause for divergent empirical findings can
be tested by designing tasks in which only those sub-components
suspected of causing the change are manipulated. It would also
be possible to start with a brain region of interest, identify
common characteristics or components of trainings that lead to
enhancements, and design rehabilitative tasks emphasizing those
elements.
There are several possible pitfalls to this approach: post hoc
models could be biased toward task components that have known
neural correlates that are in line with the results of the study;
omitting crucial task components due to oversight or bias might
result in incorrect assignment of neuroimaging results to task com-
ponents that are included in the model; and since most brain
regions are involved in multiple, different cognitive processes,
changes in the same brain region may be due to different task
components depending on context. These challenges parallel chal-
lenges interpreting neuroimaging data in general (e.g., Vul et al.,
2009; Simmons et al., 2011), and can be partially addressed by
a priori model setup and awareness of these limitations during
interpretation.
CONCLUSION
In the rapidly evolving field of training-related plasticity, integra-
tion of results across studies will be crucial. For this, an approach
like task decomposition could be useful to disentangle the respec-
tive influences of task demands on neuroplasticity, and increase
the informational value and impact of each resource-intensive
training study. By integrating across studies, we will be able to
reveal specific and general mechanisms of plasticity within and
across modalities such as the motor, visual, and auditory sys-
tems, and enhance our understanding of the role of higher-order
functions and association areas in cortical plasticity. We argue
that if researchers systematically consider what sub-tasks par-
ticipants must perform in order to achieve training goals, and
communicate them in the literature along with other aspects of
their study design, it may turn the diversity in training studies
into an advantage rather than an impediment by allowing us to
extract meaning from aggregate results and to target future studies
efficiently.
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Amongst the most significant questions we are confronted with today include the
integration of the brain’s micro-circuitry, our ability to build the complex social networks
that underpin society and how our society impacts on our ecological environment. In trying
to unravel these issues one place to begin is at the level of the individual: to consider
how we accumulate information about our environment, how this information leads to
decisions and how our individual decisions in turn create our social environment. While
this is an enormous task, we may already have at hand many of the tools we need. This
article is intended to review some of the recent results in neuro-cognitive research and
show how they can be extended to two very specific and interrelated types of expertise:
perceptual expertise and social cognition. These two cognitive skills span a vast range of
our genetic heritage. Perceptual expertise developed very early in our evolutionary history
and is a highly developed part of all mammals’ cognitive ability. On the other hand social
cognition is most highly developed in humans in that we are able to maintain larger and
more stable long term social connections with more behaviorally diverse individuals than
any other species. To illustrate these ideas I will discuss board games as a toy model
of social interactions as they include many of the relevant concepts: perceptual learning,
decision-making, long term planning and understanding the mental states of other people.
Using techniques that have been developed in mathematical psychology, I show that we
can represent some of the key features of expertise using stochastic differential equations
(SDEs). Such models demonstrate how an expert’s long exposure to a particular context
influences the information they accumulate in order to make a decision.These processes
are not confined to board games, we are all experts in our daily lives through long exposure
to the many regularities of daily tasks and social contexts.
Keywords: expertise, perceptual template, theory of mind, social cognition, neural networks, stochastic differential
equations
1. INTRODUCTION
Those that have spent decades mastering a complex task have
been the subject of considerable research and popular interest
throughout the twentieth century and it is now a mature and well
established area of research for the twenty-first century. Much of
the interest in popular culture comes from the remarkable feats
of accuracy, memory and speed these experts demonstrate with
such relative ease when compared with the rest of us. It is hard
not to be impressed by a chess Grand Master who can play against
a half dozen other Grand Masters with little effect on the quality
of their play (Gobet and Simon, 1996). Even more impressive is
the ability of some chess players to play dozens of simultaneous
games while blindfolded (Saariluoma, 1991). These are remark-
able cognitive feats, but the basis of much current research is the
idea that experts are not naturally or genetically privileged. There
are aspects that are important; at what age training begins and
the many hours of deliberate practice (Ericsson et al., 1993) play
a vital role, but these are external factors. In principle at least, we
all have the basic mechanisms that enable similar feats of excel-
lence to be developed, up to some (possibly significant) degree
of personal variation (Hambrick et al., 2013). On the other hand
much of the scientific interest in this area stems from new ways
in which neuro-imaging can be combined with expertise-specific
tasks in order to analyze the basic neural processes that underpin
these cognitive abilities and their development.
This article begins with the principle that there are universal
mechanisms that exist in all of us but that experts have exploited
these mechanisms to the very limits of their abilities. The sig-
nificance of the universality of these mechanisms lies in the role
“expertise” plays in all of our lives. For example we are all experts
in facial recognition, we have a specific part of the brain dedicated
to this task called the fusiform face area (Sergent et al., 1992). We
are also experts in social reasoning, we have dedicated regions of
the brain [such as the precuneus (Huth et al., 2012)] that enable
us to perceive some situations as specifically social in nature. From
this point of view, board games are a highly focused, complex task
that involves multiply interacting processes, the constituent parts
of which may be compared to what is already understood regard-
ing simpler and comparatively well understood systems that may
be differentially integrated and activated in experts.
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This article addresses two specific aspects of expertise in board
games using stochastic differential equations (SDEs), this is an
approach to expertise that has not yet been explored in the lit-
erature but has been used extensively as a realistic model of
neural dynamics in decision making and has lead to significant
insights into the theoretical and computational modeling of neu-
ral dynamics (Bogacz et al., 2006; McMillen and Holmes, 2006).
The first is the categorization of board positions by a fast feedfor-
ward mechanism and its integration with other neural processes
as a source of contextual information (Harré et al., 2012). This
framework captures the rapidity with which an expert can uncon-
sciously appreciate a game’s gestalt (Simon, 1986) and generate
good options for the next move without conscious deliberation.
The second is the ability of experts to understand the perspec-
tive of their opponent in deciding their next move. While strategic
perspective taking is a little studied aspect of board game expertise
there is considerable neuro-imaging evidence suggesting that per-
spective taking in economic games has mechanisms in common
with board game expertise. With this in mind, the key contri-
butions of this article are threefold: the introduction of an SDE
formulation of expertise, its application to perceptual categoriza-
tion in board games and its application to perspective taking in
board games.
2. PERCEPTUAL CATEGORIZATION FOR EXPERTS
It has been hypothesized that expert perception in complex tasks
is based on implicit learning of the statistical regularities of the
environment to which the expertise pertains (Kahneman and
Klein, 2009; Kellman and Garrigan, 2009; Harré, 2013). For
example these statistical regularities allow a Grand Master chess
player to rapidly categorize the current state of a game and gen-
erate good intuitive guesses as to what the next move might be.
This requires a neural process of rapid consolidation of experi-
ence weighted percepts into a single categorical “whole” (Serre
et al., 2007; Kriegeskorte et al., 2008; Wan et al., 2011; Harré and
Snyder, 2012; Huth et al., 2012). An important implication is that
for unconscious perceptual categorization of this sort there is no
need for reward feedback, it is an unsupervised learning pro-
cess as suggested by the early visual processing model in Serre
et al. (2007). Such processes have been the subject of psycholog-
ical studies at least since the early work of Ratcliff (1978) on the
brain’s statistical accumulation of percepts to a decision boundary
and Nosofsky’s (1984) work on categorical similarity for decision
making.
2.1. STOCHASTIC PROCESSES AS MODELS OF DECISION-MAKING
This section introduces the mathematical framework in which
perceptual decisions are modeled by SDEs. While the focus of
this work is on binary decisions due to their simplicity of expo-
sition, real decisions are the selection of one option from many
alternatives. So while the work on stochastic decision boundaries
(the basis of what follows) has recently been extended to multi-
ple alternatives (McMillen and Holmes, 2006), the focus here is
on the binary case. The simplest form of these equations is that
of a time series of the incremental changes in a noisy variable x
that has a constant (fixed) “drift” component μ and a statistical
“diffusion” term σdW (dW is a standard Wiener process with unit
variance). During a time interval dt the change in x is given by:
dx = μdt + σdW . (1)
With σ → 0 the noise term reduces to zero and x = μt + c with
integration constant c, i.e., a straight line with gradient μ and
so the drift is thought of as the linear change in the accumula-
tion of a signal x. With σ = 0 the path followed by x fluctuates
around the expected increase μt with the fluctuations propor-
tional to the variance σ2. In the perceptual decision literature this
drift diffusion model is often interpreted as a threshold decision
process: if x > Z1 or x < Z2 then x has crossed a decision bound-
ary, Z1 or Z2, and a decision has been reached favoring one of
two hypotheses, H1 or H2, represented by these two boundary
values. This accumulation to a decision threshold is shown in
Figure 1. A common interpretation, and the one adopted here,
is that a neuron (or an assembly of neurons) can be thought of
as a noisy accumulator of signals from other neurons such that
when the neuron is excited to a level Z it fires thereby signaling
a decision to those neurons to which it is (forward) connected.
This is loosely described as a neuron’s decision-making process or
a neuron having “made a decision.”
There are three variations to this model that are interesting
in the current context. The first is that the μ term can be split
into as many components as needed to represent the dynamic
microstructure within the interval dt providing these values are
constants. For instance the composite term μ∗ = μ1 − μ2 + μ3
is the “net drift” in x as the term μ∗ is still constant, but the
FIGURE 1 | A schematic of the net accumulation of evidence in favor of
one choice over another and the mean trajectory followed by the
“average” time course of evidence accumulation. μ is the average
amount of information received during dt over the time course of evidence
accumulation. Note that because there is some statistical variation in the
time course of the accumulation of information, for a non-zero σ (cf.
Equations 1–4) there is a finite chance that the signal will cross the wrong
boundary (and therefore the neuron signals the wrong decision) in the
sense that the underlying signal is distorted to the extent that the boundary
that is crossed is different from the boundary that would have been
crossed in the absence of noise. So as σ increases so too does the chance
that the wrong boundary is crossed.
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component parts μi may have neurological, psychological or
perceptual interpretations that are useful to distinguish.
The second generalization is to split the process into two
separate and independent stochastic variables: If μ1 and μ2
are independent stochastic processes with fluctuations σi then
Equation (1) can be generalized:
dx1 = μ1dt + σ1dW1 (2)
dx2 = μ2dt + σ2dW2 (3)
This is often referred to as the race model: x1 races against x2 to
reach their respective decision boundaries. In neurological mod-
eling studies the xi are seen as independent accumulators, they
collect noisy signals from other neurons until they cross their
respective decision boundaries. The average signals they receive
are the μi plus fluctuations σidWi, so these are thought of as feed-
forward neural models, neurons that fire at a pervious time feed
an average signal of μi that is aggregated in the decision variable
xi encoded by a neuron.
A third generalization is to introduce a dependency of the rate
of change in x on the current state of x. In this case dx is driven by
a constant drift term μ as well as the present state of x:
dx = (μ + λx)dt + σdW (4)
again noting that μ can be split into its (constant) constituent
parts. This is called an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck (O-U) SDE, a com-
mon model of the neural processes involved in stochastic deci-
sions (Bogacz et al., 2006). The interpretations of these models
will be introduced as needed.
2.2. STOCHASTIC DECISIONS REGARDING CATEGORY MEMBERSHIP
These SDEs can be used as a model of neural interactions and
category formation in the early stage, feedforward perceptual sys-
tems of the brain (DiCarlo et al., 2012). From this point of view
a neuron receives signals from other neurons at an earlier stage
of perceptual processing that encode a simpler set of percepts
and this later neuron then aggregates these signals into a more
complex representation. This is a process with some statistical
variation due to the inherently noisy nature of the external envi-
ronment as well as neural activity, but over a large population
of neurons the information a higher level “scene categorization”
neuron receives will represent the correct category. Figure 3A
shows an abstract representation of the set of neurons that either
excite or inhibit one of two higher level category neurons as mod-
eled by Equations (2, 3). Figure 3B shows how two neurons (E1
and I2) can encode a signal that excites one categorical neuron
while inhibiting the other.
The decision neurons C1 and C2 represent two different
hypotheses regarding the state of the world. H1 : the current scene
can be represented as a category encoded by C1, H2 : the current
scene can be represented as a category encoded by C2. A deci-
sion regarding the state of the world is reached when evidence
for one category accumulates to one boundary before an alter-
native boundary is crossed and so either C1 or C2 fires signaling
the category for which there is more evidence. This process can
be thought of as a stream of signals arriving at the retina and
being processed by neurons that encode increasingly more and
more complex representations that span an ever larger range of
the visual field as the signals pass through a feedforward neural
network (Serre et al., 2007).
An SDE representing changes in the level of excitation of neu-
rons C1 and C2 is given by (see the caption of Figure 3 for the cell
groups notation):
dx1 = [
C1 excitatory signals︷ ︸︸ ︷
E1 + E1E2 + E1I2 − (
C1 inhibitory signals︷ ︸︸ ︷
I1 + I1E2 + I1I2)]dt + σ1dW1
= μ∗1dt + σ1dW1 (5)
dx2 = [E2 + E2E1 + E2I1︸ ︷︷ ︸
C2 excitatory signals
− (I2 + I2E1 + I2I1︸ ︷︷ ︸
C2 inhibitory signal
)]dt + σ2dW2
= μ∗2dt + σ2dW2 (6)
Note the similarities of Equations (5) and (6) to Equations (2)
and (3) and that the μ∗i are simply constants independent of
the xi (also note the discussion regarding μ∗ just before these
equations). In Equations (5) and (6) the μ∗i terms represent the
deterministic component of the net drift of the stochastic vari-
able xi toward a threshold value Z, this threshold represents the
evidence necessary to recognize a category. This drift in dxi is an
aggregation of visual signals and such aggregation of signals is not
perfect, so some signal (such as the detection of a “spikey hat” on
the top of a chess piece) might suggest a Queen piece or a King
piece when in fact it is a bishop, however, when aggregated over
many different visual cues we often accurately differentiate Kings
from Queens from Bishops. These stochastic infelicities occur at
all levels of the processing of visual signals, so we model these
noisy signals using SDEs just as is done in studies of simple per-
ceptual decision making, the key difference here lying principally
in how far along the perceptual hierarchy the neurons in ques-
tion happen to lie, this perceptual hierarchy runs along the ventral
stream from right to left in Figure 2 and from top to bottom in
Figure 3. So in order to categorize a whole board, a bishop in a
certain position might inhibit the recognition of a certain game
opening (because it never occurs in that position for that par-
ticular opening) while it excites the recognition of an alternative
opening, but such a recognition is again imperfect, the square on
which the bishop is placed may be misidentified by the player or
a critical nearby pawn might be overlooked. Some of these infe-
licities might be addressed through slower and more deliberate
analysis of the board position, but this may not always be effec-
tive as the perception of the game category can set the context on
which further deliberate analysis of the board is based.
The visual processing of scene information goes from the per-
ception of simple lines and angles in region V1 through to actual
objects such as single chess pieces and ultimately to a representa-
tion of the category to which the board configuration belongs,
if the player is experienced enough to have learned such cat-
egorical representations, see Figure 2 that summarizes some of
the key ideas in the literature. This is different from recogniz-
ing every individual game element on the board, a category in
the current sense means the broad strategic layout of the game,
usually indicated by a number of key game pieces in particular
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FIGURE 2 | A representation of the category formation mechanism.
Information arrives at the eye and passes to the anterior regions of the
brain where these signals arrive at V1 (an early visual processing region of
the cortex). These signals then pass along the ventral stream of the
inferotemporal cortex (IT). Most people from a western country are likely to
be able to recognize a single chess piece, more experienced players
develop “Chunks” that are aggregates of games pieces as well as
schematics for the whole board that include key pieces and their spatial
relationships, these “Templates” enable the rapid comprehension of the
current state of the game and provide “slots” into which the smaller chunks
can be fitted [see for example Gobet et al. (2001) and Gobet and Lane
(2010) who have modeled unsupervised template learning in their CHREST
model and suggested a neural model for it (Chassy and Gobet, 2011), as
does the perceptual templates in Harré (2013) and Harré and Snyder (2012)].
Some of the information (individual pieces) are shown obscured in the
Template (far left), only information which is necessary to distinguish one
category from the many other possibilities is needed, such game pieces
need to have frequently co-occurred in the same places over and over again
through a player’s training and experience of the game. In this diagram only
one template is shown, however, an expert will have encoded thousands of
such templates in their IT and each one “competes” to be recognized:
signals that originate from earlier neurons encode simpler representations
(a line detected by V1 is simpler than a game piece, a game piece is
simpler than a chunk and a chunk is simpler than a template) that combine
to make larger and more complex representations of the game, eventually
signaling the most complex learned representation such as a template. The
neuron that accumulates enough (typically noisy) information to cross that
neuron’s threshold is the winner [see the race model, Equations (2) and (3)]
i.e., for two categories the competition would be between neurons C1 and
C2 in Figure 3 and the thresholds would be Z1 and Z2 in Figure 1.
key positions (Harré and Snyder, 2012; Harré, 2013). So minor
variations on a particular chess opening can belong to a single cat-
egory, indicated by key pieces in key positions that have frequently
occurred in these same positions. This is what is meant by the sta-
tistical regularity of the environment, it enables a chess player to
implicitly learn the strategic context of a game and then, as they
grow in experience, to use this context in their search for good
moves based on the implicitly recognized cues involving spatial
relationships, color and some pieces. But an expert player will
have acquired many thousands of different such categories over
their career so the i in dxi of Equations (5) and (6) runs into the
1000’s. Recent work has extracted these templates and enumer-
ated them using an artificial neural network and real games of
amateurs and professionals (Harré, 2013). And just as identifying
a single game piece can be a statistically uncertain process, so too
is identifying the current game’s categorical membership out of
the many thousands of possibilities.
These SDEs are similar in nature to those described in Bogacz
et al. (2006) as well as the hierarchical structure recently proposed
by Serre et al. (2007) and DiCarlo et al. (2012) where feedfor-
ward inhibitory and excitatory signals compete to accumulate
evidence for one category over another. The key notion of this
new approach is the use of SDEs to describe the neural mecha-
nisms and to apply these ideas to expertise. So in this model a
visual signal will elicit a combination of signals from neurons in
precursor neural assemblies (of intermediate complexity) E1, E2,
I1, and I2 (Equations 5, 6). The solutions to these equations can
be usefully expressed in terms of the probability that one of the
category boundaries is crossed (Bogacz et al., 2006):





j, k ∈ {1, . . . , 1000’s} (7)
where β = 2z/σ2 (for simplicity symmetrical decision boundaries
are used: j ∈ {1, 2}, Z1 = Z2 = z), see Figure 1 for a schematic of
the binary categorization dynamics and the probability of cross-
ing one threshold versus another. Equation (7) has a very simple
interpretation: The probability of recognizing “board category” j
is a function of the sum of the evidence μ∗j in favor of that cate-
gory (relative to the evidence for other categories μ∗k ) subject to
some statistical variability parameterized by β.
3. PERSPECTIVE TAKING AND OUR “STRATEGIC THEORY OF
MIND”
The previous section extended the well studied modeling
paradigm of SDEs to the issue of expert board perception and
rapid categorization. While this is a novel extension of recent
work the goal is relatively modest in that it aims to connect the
theoretical principles of two approaches to the modeling of both
simple and complex perceptual decisions.
This next section has a more ambitious goal: to use an exten-
sion of these SDEs (a hybrid combining Equations 2, 3 with
Equation 4) as a model of decision-making processes whereby the
decision-maker has an internal representation of the perspective
of another person such as a chess opponent. One of the assump-
tions made in what follows is that in order to understand another
person’s perspective an individual needs a representation of the
other’s internal mental states e.g., their constraints and goals, and
that these might be different from those of the first person. At
this point two concerns arise: Is this a reasonable assumption? and
What is the evidence for such an assumption? The latter will be cov-
ered in sections 3.1–3.3 but a few words are needed first to justify
the reasonableness of this approach.
When a skilled player looks at a game in progress there may
be sufficient information available in the first few moments of
viewing the game for the player to make a decision as to where
to move their eyes in order to refine their search such that only
the most promising areas of the board are explored (De Groot
et al., 1996). This fast perceptual comprehension is an uncon-
scious aspect of expertise and it is an important part of an expert’s
remarkable speed in selecting a good move from a very short
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FIGURE 3 | A feedforward schematic of how percepts of intermediate
complexity either excite or inhibit more complex percepts. C1 and C2 are
neurons that encode high order scene categories that are composed of
percepts of an intermediate complexity. (A) A conceptual framework of cell
assemblies that act to excite and/or inhibit more complex categorical
representations. The groups of neurons E1, E2, I1, and I2 are each a set of
neurons some of which have overlapping functionality between excitation
and inhibition. For example the cells in the group E1I2 = E1 ∩ I2 excite C1 and
inhibit C2 whereas the cells in group I1I2 = I1 ∩ I2 inhibit both C1 and C2. (B)
A more detailed model showing how a neuron in assembly E1 receives noisy
inhibitory and excitatory signals from other percepts. It can then directly
excite percept C1 while indirectly inhibiting C2 via the excitation of
intermediary inhibitory neurons that terminate on C2. The “Ventral Stream” is
the feedforward direction of the neural signaling as shown in Figure 4.
exposure to a game position (de Groot and de Groot, 1978). The
idea is that for exceptionally familiar positions the next move is
so well understood that very little (if any) further analysis is nec-
essary in order to know what the best move is. In such situations
no comprehension of the other player’s mental state is necessary,
purely perceptual processes based on their extensive experience
are sufficient to explain an expert’s behavior and performance.
If this is the case then very little planning and control beyond
the early stages of perception is needed and a player’s decision-
making can circumvent the slow and computationally expensive
sequential process of searching multiple alternative branches of
play in order to find the best strategy and instead can move
directly to organizing the motor pathways necessary to physi-
cally move the player’s arm to make the move on the board. In
Figure 4 this is shown as the frontal region of the inferotemporal
cortex providing a contextual signal directly to the primary motor
area, i.e., a contextual signal generated by the activation of a sin-
gle Template (see Figure 2) can contain sufficiently unambiguous
information on which to base the next move. Also in Figure 4
can be seen how such a contextual signal might connect directly
to the frontal eye fields in order to signal the eyes of an expert [an
expert’s Templates guide their visual search Chun and Jiang, 1998]
to quickly orientate their eyes to relevant regions of the board.
Even for very experienced players skilled perception is often
necessary but it is not always sufficient for strong play, in such
cases the state of the game will have information that enables a
player to refine their choices but still leaves ambiguous exactly
which move to make. So templates need to be supplemented with
more deliberate strategic planning and analysis. Such executive
control for any task is thought to occur in the prefrontal cor-
tex (PFC, Figure 4) (Koechlin and Summerfield, 2007). The PFC
integrates information from diverse regions of the brain (Miller
and Cohen, 2001), this is part of a bottom–up process but note
that the PFC can be circumvented for rapid and automatic behav-
iors (Miller and Cohen, 2001). The PFC also exerts top–down
control, for example modulating earlier perceptual signals (Bar
et al., 2006) and even directly eliciting long term memories stored
FIGURE 4 | A schematic representation of the major cortical pathways
of expertise: feedforward visual processing (red), strategic Theory of
Mind and associated reward mechanisms (green) and top down
planning and control (blue) discussed in the main text. The
anterior-most frontal regions integrate information from a strategic ToM
network and a perceptual network for recognizing individual items of
intermediate complexity. The categorical signal projects to a region
posterior to the anterior regions of the frontal cortex that are associated
with high level strategic planning and control processes. This allows for the
possibility of the contextual signal to rapidly activate an eye saccade (and
other motor activities) to a strategically relevant portion of the visual field
without passing through the top–down planning areas in the PFC. Such
search guided by implicitly learned visual cues was established by Chun
and Jiang (1998, 1999) for large but relatively simple environments. V1,
visual area 1 in the occipital cortex; OTJ, occipitotemporal junction; TPJ,
temporoparietal junction; STS, superior temporal sulcus; IT, inferotemporal
cortex; PC, precuneus; CN, caudate nucleus; ACC, anterior cingulate cortex;
PFC, prefrontal cortex; Cont., visual context integration; FEF, frontal eye
field; PM, primary motor cortex.
in the inferotemporal cortex (IT) (Tomita et al., 1999) (Figure 4
only shows feedforward signals to the PFC, but feedback path-
ways exist from the PFC to the IT). From this point of view the
PFC modulates and integrates perceptual signals with internally
generated goals, plans future actions and acts as an informational
switchboard for other regions of the brain. So it is in the PFC that
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we should expect planning, strategic analysis and forward search
to be carried out for complex tasks such as chess (see sections 3.1–
3.3 for a selection of the literature supporting this), which might
include a representation of another player’s state of mind.
In terms of chess playing, when a player is planning their next
sequence of moves, each player will associate a different “value”
or place different constraints on the same move, for example a
Black Kingside castling is never a move that white can make, so
the constraint on this move is “illegal” for white but “legal” for
black. A more sophisticated example is how a player represents
the motivations on which another player bases their decisions. To
illustrate this imagine a very well known chess opening has been
played out for the fist three moves by each player. How does player
1 consider their choice of next move given that it is only a “good”
move within the context of what player 2 might do in reply? It
is not sufficient for player 1 to have a singular value of a move,
a move’s value is contextualized by the other player’s likely next
move, and player 2’s likely next move is based on how player 2
values their move within the context of what player 1 will do fol-
lowing player 2’s move. From this point of view player 1 needs to
encode their estimate of the value of a move as well as the value
player 2 will attach to the move player 2 is likely to make next.
This regressive process of player 1 evaluating their choices in the
context of player 2’s likely choices is also the basis of economic
game theory and requires each player to be able to approximate
the other’s mental strategic space which can include the other
player’s evaluation of the game, the strategy they seem to be fol-
lowing as well as the other’s experience and habits, should these
be known to player 1. These cognitive processes of the PFC are
informed by the early perceptual signals the PFC receives from
regions such as the IT but they are also based on a player’s internal
representation of their own strategy and how this strategy is con-
textualized by their internal representation of the other player’s
strategy.
With these ideas in mind, research into our “Theory of Mind”
(ToM) focuses on the psychological and neurological mechanisms
through which we understand the internal mental states and goals
of other people (Lieberman, 2007) but it has not previously been
connected with board games and expertise, and only in simple
economic games such as those used in neuro-economics have
SDEs been used to model these simple choices. ToM research
covers a very broad range of topics, from psychological and neu-
rological development through to genetic differences, traumatic
brain injury and neuro-degenerative diseases. This breadth is due
at least in part to the extensive interrelated cognitive processes
that are involved and the very deep connection that our ToM has
to the way in which we introspectively view ourselves, others and
the choices we individually and collectively make.
In this section the goal is to first emphasize the overlapping
neurological processes that play a role during ToM processing
tasks, economic games (simple games), and board games (com-
plex games). An important caveat is that the resultant model rep-
resents a strict subset of neurological processes that will be called
our strategic ToM. Having illustrated the plausibility of a common
neural mechanism, an SDE model of strategic social interactions
will be introduced. The significant components are the cogni-
tive ability to separate rewards received in the first person versus
rewards received in the second person and a conscious perception
of the relevant components in the external environment.
3.1. NEURO-ECONOMIC GAME THEORY AND OUR “STRATEGIC IQ”
The term strategic IQ was introduced in Bhatt and Camerer
(2005) where the neural correlates of self-referential strategic rea-
soning, i.e., reasoning about someone else reasoning about you,
in economic games were demonstrated using fMRI analysis. As
discussed above, this is a minimal cognitive ability necessary to
understand our actions in the context of other people’s actions,
but it is not the only necessary mechanism. In this section a sam-
ple of the fMRI literature on game theory, strategic IQ and ToM is
explored and in the section that follows our strategic ToM is intro-
duced and the literature from board game expertise supporting
such an extension is surveyed.
A key point of interest in neuro-economics involves the neural
regions that are active when we are thinking about our deci-
sions in the context of other people’s decisions. This entails at
least some of the mechanisms that are active during ToM tasks
and so there is an overlap between ToM research and neuro-
economics. This has recently lead Yoshida et al to proposes a game
ToM (Yoshida et al., 2008) using the simpler economic games
to motivate their basis of a ToM. ToM studies include a broadly
defined and general purpose network that is activated in many
situations in which inferences need to be made regarding the cog-
nitive states of others. But there is also a specific sub-network
that is activated in strategic interactions such as economic games
where assessing another person’s internal states is necessary for
our performance in strategic decision making. As such accurate
predictions regarding how others think about their environment
as well as how they think about us improves our outcome in
the interaction. This second definition narrows our focus, the
ToM networks of neuro-economics are concerned with strate-
gies and expected rewards and this circumscribes the situations
considered.
The broad definition of a ToM neural network frequently
includes (Amodio and Frith, 2006) the medial prefrontal cor-
tex (mPFC), the temporal pole, the superior temporal sulcus
(STS), the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and the temporopari-
etal junction (TPJ). Many of these areas may or may not be active
during strategic interactions as they might play a role in more
general social cognition. The TPJ for example appears to be active
in many different social contexts such as when a person is simply
observing other people interacting (Saxe and Kanwisher, 2003).
Using a combination of results from game theory and fMRI
studies a related network of neural activity can be identified. This
article is not a review of this entire field, but there are two specific
types of task to focus on. In the first type a subject plays a game
against a computer or a human and differentiated neural activ-
ity shows brain regions that are active when we play strategically
against another socially aware subject. This enables us to differen-
tiate between “social” and “non-social” strategic interactions and
the associated brain activations. The second type is one in which
subjects play games that involve different levels of strategic think-
ing regarding their opponent’s thought processes. In this second
task, a key finding is the correlation between the reward earned
and increases in brain activity in specific areas.
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When playing strategic games against a human as opposed
to a computer the brain regions that are differentially activated
include the ACC (McCabe et al., 2001; Gallagher et al., 2002;
Sanfey et al., 2003), the STS (Rilling et al., 2004; Fukui et al., 2006;
Coricelli and Nagel, 2009), the TPJ (Krueger et al., 2008; Coricelli
and Nagel, 2009; Carter et al., 2012), the mPFC (McCabe et al.,
2001; Bhatt and Camerer, 2005; Coricelli and Nagel, 2009) and the
caudate nucleus (CN) (Bhatt and Camerer, 2005; Delgado et al.,
2005; Rilling et al., 2008). As these regions are differentially more
active for human opponents than computer opponents it suggests
that these brain regions play a role in social competitive situa-
tions. This does not preclude them from playing a role in other
strategic and/or social tasks of course.
On the other hand a player’s strategic IQ is correlated with
a related network of brain regions. In one recent study stronger
activity in the precuneus and the CN (Bhatt and Camerer, 2005)
correlate with strategic IQ in games that differentiated between
degrees of belief regarding the other player’s strategy. In a similar
study it was shown that the depth of interpersonal strategic rea-
soning co-varied with activity in the medial PFC (Coricelli and
Nagel, 2009). In a third study, along with the reward prediction
based activity of the medial PFC it was shown that activity in the
posterior STS was strongly correlated with the influence a player’s
action’s had on another player (Hampton et al., 2008). These
studies identify a network of key brain regions that are active in
strategic situations involving economic rewards: the mPFC, the
CN, the ACC, the posterior STS and the PC, all of which are
strongly related to the strategic success of a player and that have
an overlap with those regions that also play a role in our ToM
network.
3.2. PERCEPTION, GAMES AND A STRATEGIC THEORY OF MIND
Board game expertise activates a large neural network with many
interacting brain regions that can be differentiated on the basis of
the task involved. In recent work it has been shown that the neural
networks activated by game experts involves a large number of
brain areas, some belong to the visual system and some to the
ToM system, but these findings have not yet been integrated in
terms of the overlaps and differences possibly due to the different
research areas to which they belong. This section discusses four
particular articles that have recently shed significant light on the
different brain regions involved in board game expertise. These
results are discussed in terms of a single system for board game
expertise that encompasses both ToM and visual perception.
In two recent fMRI studies (Bilalić et al., 2010, 2012), Bilalić
et al have explicated the brain regions that are activated in expert
chess play and their relationship to rapid eye movement toward
areas of strategic importance. This is a purely perceptual body of
work and so usefully isolates the perceptual mechanisms that gen-
erate eye movements without the need for considering the social
context in which games are played (cf. the introductory remarks
to section 3). Specifically they identified the ventral visual path (in
the temporal cortex) as playing an important role in recognizing
game pieces as well as familiar positional relationships between
the game pieces in support of the role the IT plays in generat-
ing eye movement signals (cf. Figure 4). In the dorsal visual path
the region forming a conjunction with the parietal, occipital and
temporal cortices was found to be related to specific game pieces
and their functional roles. A further activation in the retrosplenial
cortex was also observed, a region that has been identified with
scene context and the authors suggested this region plays a role
in parsing the relationships between objects. Beyond the neuro-
logical findings, both of these studies highlighted the differences
in eye movement between novices and experts. Experts focused
quickly on the task relevant pieces in the scene and ignored irrel-
evant pieces whereas novices attended to irrelevant pieces much
more often. In control tasks in which game piece relationships
could not be used to guide the expert’s behavior their perfor-
mance decreased significantly but still maintained an advantage
over novices.
A third article by Wan et al. (2011) considered three ranks
of players, low ranked amateurs, high ranked amateurs and pro-
fessionals of the Japanese board game Shogi. The players were
required to generate the next move as quickly as possible while
fMRI brain imaging followed the time-course of neural activity.
The PC and CN were two regions that were strongly activated in
professionals but not amateurs. As previous studies have shown
that the PC is activated in understanding social contexts (Huth
et al., 2012) and the CN is activated in strategic interactions with
other people (Delgado et al., 2005; Rilling et al., 2008) as well as
correlating with depth of strategic reasoning (Bhatt and Camerer,
2005), this suggests that the results of Wan et al. (2011) overlap
with strategic reasoning, and as argued above strategic reason-
ing is a subset of the cognitive processes used during some ToM
tasks. There was also considerable activity in the dorsolateral PFC
for both amateurs and professionals when contrasts were made
with control tasks. The authors concluded in part that this was
not a direct “stimulus-response” activation as the players reported
being unable to figure out a complete strategy before making their
next move selection. Instead they concluded that “the generation
of the next best move had to be based on perception of key fea-
tures extracted from the pattern but not the pattern itself. In other
words the mapping from inputs to outputs had to be categorical.”
Furthermore, the players were not able to picture all of the nec-
essary intermediary moves required to complete the checkmate
task they were given, instead they were only able to “get an idea
of the arrangement of key pieces at the final checkmate.” Beyond
the activation of the PC and CN, an indicator of a socio-neural
response, the conclusion that can be drawn is that categorical
recognition and pattern completion are two key aspects of an
expert’s ability to quickly generate the next move in board games.
The fourth study was on the role of expertise in board
games (Duan et al., 2012) in combination with the “default mode
network” (DMN) (Raichle et al., 2001). The DMN is the rest-
ing activity of the brain and it plays a significant role in our
understanding of ToM (Spreng et al., 2009). What is most inter-
esting about this network is that it is significantly deactivated
during goal directed tasks, presumably so that our cognitive func-
tions can focus on the external environment rather than internal,
reflective or introspective ruminations. In the study by Duan et al.
(2012) Masters and Grand Masters (experts) of the game Chinese
chess were imaged using fMRI for their resting state neural activ-
ity and for their task induced (Chinese chess problem solving)
neural activity. There were two key findings: experts significantly
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deactivated the DMN relative to novices and the CN was consid-
erably more active in the expert’s DMN than that of the novice’s.
This should be contrasted with the areas commonly associated
with ToM, in the earlier list of ToM brain regions the CN was
excluded, this finding by Duan et al suggests that the DMN net-
work (and therefore the ToM network) is significantly different
for experts.
The relevance of these findings is in the relationship between
the neural networks activated during economic games, during
expert task execution and our understanding of another person’s
cognitive state. With this in mind the CN plays a striking role: it
is significantly active in the DMN for experts, board game experts
and in strategic economic games. The role the CN is commonly
attributed with is in relation to feedback based learning (Haruno
et al., 2004) so it is not so surprising that it should be active in
economic games when rewards are earned based on performance,
and perhaps even in the case of board games where rewards tend
to be more abstract (winning or losing after many moves are made
as opposed to money received immediately). But its role in the
DMN is not immediately intuitive, but it might be understood to
play a role in the encoding of another’s payoffs as well as personal
payoffs. Three recent papers have shown that this is a plausible
role for CN; the macaque monkey CN encodes its own rewards
as well as social status (Santos et al., 2012), in humans the CN
is active in cooperation between people where no rewards are
forthcoming (Krill and Platek, 2012) and it also encodes another’s
“moral character” in economic games (Delgado et al., 2005).
These studies point to the CN as potentially encoding value judge-
ments regarding other players as well as our own. Such estimates
of another person’s evaluation of the situation seems a likely mini-
mum for estimating the motivations for another person’s choices,
and so representing another person’s estimated value in order to
model their motivations may well co-opt the pre-existing system
of reward feedbacks that play a critical role in motivating our own
decisions in a non-social context.
Strategic IQ is a measure of the depth to which we are able
to reason about other people thinking about us thinking about
them thinking about us etc. as measured by payoffs in economic
games (Coricelli and Nagel, 2009). This is potentially an infi-
nite regress for which there is no stopping point, however, it
has been shown that an equilibrium point can be reached in
this dynamic, and this equilibrium has been measured in the
neural activity of people playing economic games (Bhatt and
Camerer, 2005), but to date no theoretical model of the neural
mechanisms involved has been proposed. On the other hand, a
ToM is a very general cognitive process (Lieberman, 2007) that
enables people to build a representation of the cognitive states of
another person, including their beliefs, constraints, perceptions
and potentially a ToM allows one person to build an internal
representation of another person’s representation of them. So
the definitions of ToM and strategic IQ have commonalities but
they are either too broad (ToM) or too narrow (strategic IQ)
to capture the processes that are likely being used by decision-
makers in complex, social-competitive situations. To address this
the term Strategic ToM encompasses the psychological aspects,
neural dynamics and subsequent equilibrium points necessary to
finitely represent our representation of another person thinking
about us, but expanding on the strategic IQ notion to include
the ToM components important to complex social-competitive
decision-making.
Taken collectively, these studies have identified a network of
activity that encodes visual perceptual cues and task specific
objects as well as reward and social learning mechanisms in
combination with aspects of a strategic ToM. Some of the most
commonly cited and important brain regions in this network are
identified in Figure 4 for the perceptual aspects (red) and the
strategic ToM aspects (green). This is necessarily a reduction to
only the simplest functional roles and relationships, but it gives an
indication of how these regions likely combine together to form a
multifunctional network of interrelated brain regions. In the next
section a theoretical model of rewards and strategic ToM is intro-
duced, providing a theoretical approach to understanding some
of the mechanisms discussed in this section.
3.3. AN EXAMPLE OF PLAUSIBLE NEURAL ACTIVATIONS DURING
GAME PLAY
Before introducing the SDE dynamics of a strategic ToM we want
to motivate what follows by illustrating the ideas presented so far
with a worked example. To begin, a chess game opening is already
in progress (as shown in Figure 5) and we ask what are the brain
regions that might be activated in seeing this game and what roles
do they play? We use the simplifying assumptions that most of the
signals we are interested in will first pass through region V1 so that
we are only considering the visual aspects of the game and that the
players only ever consider two moves as they search forwards in
the game looking for good moves to make. This second simplifi-
cation makes the discussion much simpler, but the ideas can be
readily extended to multiple base moves and multiple subsequent
branches.
The social and reward related neural networks (green path
in Figure 4) are activated when the player first sees the game.
Generally the TPJ is activated if the situation requires under-
standing the internal mental states of another person (Saxe and
Kanwisher, 2003), it is activated when strategically thinking about
other people rather than computers (Krueger et al., 2008), its
activation level correlates with the depth of strategic reason-
ing (Coricelli and Nagel, 2009) and it is associated with socially
guided decisions (Carter et al., 2012). The PC is activated if the
current situation is a social context involving people, movement,
certain animals, cars, tools, equipment, talking etc. (Huth et al.,
2012) as well as ToM tasks (Saxe and Kanwisher, 2003), but in this
case it happens to be a chess game in progress (Wan et al., 2011),
perceived visually by the chess board, game pieces and another
player. The CN activation is strongly associated with activation
of the PC in board games (Wan et al., 2011) and with the ACC
when learning (reward feedback) in economic games (Sanfey,
2007) and in distinguishing between “me” and “not me” based
rewards (Tomlin et al., 2006). Finally in this social/reward path
the STS is activated during ToM tasks (Saxe and Kanwisher,
2003) and in the perception of intentional behavior in other
people (Gallagher and Frith, 2003). Taken as a combination of
activations, this neural network recognizes the social context of
the board game and the tools of this social context (the board and
chess pieces). It also recognizes that another person is involved in
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FIGURE 5 | The game tree for forward search in a game. Black is to play
first from the initial position and the tree analysis is simplified to considering
only two possible branches at each stage. Knight to f6 and Pawn to d6 are
two different “base moves” from which black then begins their analysis of
subsequent play. In order for black to estimate the success of these two base
moves they need to consider how White will reply, and the way White will
reply depends on how white evaluates how black will reply to White’s moves,
hence Black needs to evaluate how white will evaluate Black’s reply to
White’s next move. Note that Black’s final move choices shown here (pawn to
d5 and Bishop to c5) are the same irrespective of what White chooses prior
to these moves, this is a strategy that might occur in a real game. However,
white values Black’s possible responses differently depending on what move
White is considering (either the Knight or the pawn) and subsequently this
changes what Black might prefer to do when choosing either the Knight or
the pawn as their very first move in this sequence. Such considerations in
complex games have some commonality with economic games.
the situation and that they have internal mental states that will
play a role in the decisions that will need to be made. Finally the
feedback from the outcome needs to distinguish between rewards
received by the first player (“me”) and the second player (“not
me”) for their respective choices in order to accurately attribute
each player’s gain or loss to the relevant player and strategy, see
section 3.4 for further discussion about each player’s rewards and
their influence on choices. This establishes the immediate social
context in which decisions will be made.
The visual perception of this opening position is also acti-
vated when first seeing the game. The occipito-temporal junction
(OTJ) is differentially activated for chess experts when compared
to both controls and non-expert chess players as well as playing
a role in guiding the eye movements of experts when searching
the board for their next move (Bilalić et al., 2010, 2012). The ven-
tral stream along the inferotemporal cortex as a whole has been
extensively studied in humans and other primates (Kriegeskorte
et al., 2008) and it has been computationally modeled in terms
of more and more complex visual representations of larger and
larger portions of the visual scene (Serre et al., 2007). So this
ventral pathway identifies visual objects such as individual chess
pieces and constructs progressively more complex representations
of these objects, including their familiar spatial relationships. As
has been suggested in Wan et al. (2011) sufficiently complex rep-
resentations of a board game are categorical representations, it
is not an exact pattern matching process. Once the ventral path
has aggregated the visual scene to the extent the player’s experi-
ence makes this possible, a “context” signal can follow one of two
paths. If there is sufficient information in the contextual signal to
suggest a single move then the primary motor area (PM, Figure 4)
is signalled to make that move. Alternatively a signal arrives at the
frontal eye field (FEF, Figure 4) to tell the eyes where to move
to next in order to explore different regions of the board, this is
the basis of expertise guided search based on the contextual cues
embedded in scenes (Chun and Jiang, 1998) and games (Bilalić
et al., 2012). This establishes the initial perceptual processing of
the board as a visual “scene.”
The final process shown in Figure 4 is the activation of the
PFC and the subsequent processes that lead to the player actually
making a move on the board (blue path). In the chess example
this is where the social context, the differentiated roles of the two
players and the perceptual information are integrated so that a
coherent strategy can be developed. If a move has not yet been
made (i.e., the context was not sufficient to suggest a move to
make immediately) then the eyes are searching the scene provid-
ing more information to the PFC. This information needs to be
integrated in terms the constraints, plans, goals and incentives of
the player as well as a representation of the same mental states
of their opponent. With this in mind Koechlin et al. (2003) and
Koechlin and Summerfield (2007) have proposed a model of cas-
cading levels of processing that begins in the most anterior regions
of the PFC and ends at the posterior region of the PFC just before
the PM cortex, this is the anterior to posterior path shown in blue
of Figure 4. Importantly, the most anterior regions of the PFC
seem to play a role in the integration of the outcome of multiple
cognitive processes when a person is pursing a higher behavioral
goal (Ramnani and Owen, 2004). In terms of exploring and plan-
ning possible moves in chess, the eyes foveate a potentially useful
region of the board, this is called a “base move” (Gobet, 1997),
guided by perceptual templates and from this region branching
strategies of potential moves the player and their opponent might
make are then searched to find a good intermediate position in
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the game (either a piece captured or a strong strategic config-
uration). So in Figure 5 the Black player’s eyes initially saccade
to the pawn at d7 and the player considers moving this pawn to
d6 from which a number of alternatives are possible for White
to then play and Black to then reply etc., two of White’s options
are shown in Figure 5. The black player’s eyes then saccade to
the knight at g8 and considers the sequence of moves that begins
with a move of the knight to f 6 and a sequence of possible plays
is shown in Figure 5. Once the black player has decided which
of these two strategies to adopt (knight to f 6 or pawn to d6),
the neural activation cascades (Koechlin and Summerfield, 2007)
from the anterior regions of the PFC in which strategic planning
and branching has been mapped out at the conceptual level to
the posterior regions of the PFC where a motor plan leads to the
moving of the relevant parts of the body (Ramnani and Owen,
2004) to shift a game piece in order to make the first move. While
this style of reasoning is somewhat similar to that used in the
much simpler (and strategically different) economic games (Bhatt
and Camerer, 2005), it is far more complex in that perception,
constraints, learning and uncertainty in evaluations play signif-
icant roles in the decision-making process over and above the
purely strategic structure of the game and the payoffs of economic
theory.
3.4. STOCHASTIC DYNAMICS FOR A STRATEGIC THEORY OF MIND
In order to model one player’s internal representation of another
player, and how they use this perspective to evaluate their own
strategy, it is necessary to represent the neural processes that are
used in evaluating multiple different strategic alternatives that
both players might consider, as illustrated in Figure 5. In order
to do so, the following borrows significantly from the economic
game theory literature in a similar fashion to that of Yoshida
et al. (2008) but within the context of strategically complex games
and using SDEs to model the underlying neural dynamics within
the PFC. To begin, we identify the neural encoding of a player’s
strategy with levels of neural activity, a strongly favored strat-
egy is reflected in higher levels of neural activity in an analogous
fashion to other decision-making activations in other regions of
the brain (Gold and Shadlen, 2001; Brown et al., 2009; Simen
et al., 2009; Rorie et al., 2010). In this case Kb represents the level
of neural activity associated with Black’s encoding of the choice
Knight to f6 and Pb represents the level of neural activity associ-
ated with choice pawn to d6. We will also use the notation p(Kb)
and p(Pb) to represent the probabilities of black choosing each
of these two moves. Either of these two choices by Black leads to
different choices by White when they move next (see Figure 6)
and Black needs to estimate the “value” or “weight” (greek let-
ters in Figure 6) attributed to each of these two outcomes for
Black; Black plays Knight and either White knight to g5 = φkg5
or White knight to c3 = φkc3, alternatively Black plays pawn and
either White pawn to c3 = ϕpc3 or White pawn to h3 = ϕph3.
So Black also needs to encode a representation of White’s likely
choices, we represent the neural activity in Black’s PFC associated
with White’s choices using labels for White’s four possible moves
shown in the left of Figure 6: Kg5w and Kc3w if Black plays Knight,
P c3w and Ph3w if Black plays pawn. With this interpretation we can
represent changes in the level of neural activity for each move’s






dt + σbKdWK (8)
dPb =
(
ϕpc3P c3w + ϕph3Ph3w
)
dt + σbPdWP (9)
These are a pair of Ornstein-Uhlenbeck (drift diffusion) equa-
tions in which the drift terms are not constant as they depend on
other dynamic variables, in this case the levels of neural activ-
ity Kg5w , Kc3w , P c3w , and Ph3w , discussed shortly. Looking at the
rate of change in neural activity for Black’s Knight move dKb it
is composed of a weighted sum (the weights are the constants
φkg5 and φkc3) of the current level of activity of Black’s neural
encoding of White’s options of two different Knight moves. Just
as in Equation (1) there are noise terms σbK and σ
b
P represent-
ing non-systematic errors in the encoding of the strategies. Both
dKb and dPb are independent of each other in that the level of
activity of one variable does not influence the other (neither term
appears in the expression for the other). The four weights that
appear in Equations (8, 9) (φkg5, φkc3, ϕpc3, and ϕph3) are based
upon Black’s previous experience of their own ability in playing
these two strategies. For example Black believes they play Kb with
strength φkg5 against White’s Kg5w and with strength φkc3 against
White’s Kc3w . These are subjective estimates a player has developed
through experience and are subject to uncertainty in there estima-
tion, particularly when the strategies in question are unfamiliar or
the other player’s ability is unknown.
The Black player arrives at the decision to play either the
Knight or the pawn when the absolute value of either Kb or Pb
reaches a certain threshold value thereby signaling a decision (in
principle similar to Figure 1, but see Bogacz et al. (2006) for
details) and this signal cascades from the anterior PFC to the pos-
terior PFC where this first move in Black’s strategy is then turned
into a motor plan by the PM cortex. The rate at which the neu-
ral activity of either Kb or Pb reaches this threshold depends on
the fixed weights and the neural activity associated with White’s
strategy. The fixed weights can be attributed to learned and rein-
forced behaviors and so do not change during the time-course
of a single decision, but note that these feedback (reward) based
weights need to be correctly attributed to each player, so the neu-
ral encoding needs to reflect which player did what and what each
player received as feedback. Incorrectly attributing feedback to
the actions of different players will result in misattributing the
weights associated with each player’s strategy in future games.
The neural activity associated with White’s choices is a dynamic
quantity associated with Black’s representation of what Black
believes White will choose to do after Black has made their move.
This requires Black to represent White’s decision-making pro-
cess and White will choose the strategy that best advantages them
given what White thinks Black will do following White’s move.
Just looking at dKb above, Black needs to encode the following
decision-making processes in order to accurately represent what





dt + σwg5dWK (10)
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FIGURE 6 | A matrix representation of the estimated weights that Black
uses to analyze their next move (left) and how White will respond to
each of these moves and the rational that White will use to evaluate
their subsequent choices given Black’s prior choices (right). In order for
Black to understand White’s preferences for their next move, Black needs to
encode a representation of the way in which White will select their move.
This is the same process as Black uses to make their decision but using





dt + σwc3dWK (11)
Note that White’s move of either Kg5w or Kc3w have fixed weights on
the right hand side of Equations (10, 11) representing the learned
payoffs White has for Black’s moves of pawn to d5 and Bishop to
c5, but while there are only two Black moves in Equations (10, 11)
(see the caption to Figure 5), the weights White attributes to these
two possible choices of Black’s are different because White play-
ing Knight to g5 first is strategically different to White playing
pawn to c3 first, hence the payoff weights for White are differ-
ent and this has a follow-on effect in Black selecting a move in
Equations (8, 9). In this sense Black has an internal representa-
tion that is encoded in their neural activity of how White will
make a decision, and this in turn depends on what Black will do in
response to White’s choices. Also note that Black needs to be able
to encode the payoffs to White in order to estimate White’s pos-
sible choices, so Black needs to distinguish between their payoffs
and White’s payoffs.
In such a situation it is not obvious that there is a solution to
these dynamics that allow Black to settle on a decision as to which
is the best move to make. Fortunately these types of SDEs have
known solutions, particularly in the case where the drift term,
that which appears immediately before the dt in Equations (8),
(9), (10), and (11), is linear in the dynamic variables (Plastino
and Plastino, 1998). These solutions take the form of probability






































where p(Kg5w ) and p(Kc3w ) are probability distributions defined
in an analogous fashion as Equations (12, 13) but for the White
player and a similar substitution for βb as for Equation (7) has
been made in order to simplify the expression. Both p(Kg5w ) and
p(Kc3w ) have a further dependence on the probabilities over Black’s
subsequent move choices after White’s next move. Note that
although Equation (7), (12), and (13) describe entirely different
cognitive processes they have a very similar functional form:
p(xi) = exp[βfi(c, x)]∑
k exp[βfk(c, x)]
(14)
in which β is a noise parameter, fi(c, x) are linear functions
of constants cj and dynamic variables xi represented here by
a vector of such terms c and x. Such exponential forms of
probability distributions over choices are common in models
of bounded rationality in economics (McKelvey and Palfrey,
1995; Wolpert et al., 2011), in computational models of simple
reinforcement learning (Williams, 1992; Sato et al., 2002) and
as models of neural activity in theoretical psychology (Bogacz
et al., 2006; McMillen and Holmes, 2006). However, to date the
connection between the generic dynamics of SDEs, theoretical
neuropsychology and expertise does not appear to have been
made.
4. DISCUSSION
The need to distinguish between that which motivates a person’s
choices and that which motivates another person’s choices, and
how these motivations interact in a single individual’s decision
making processes is a critical component to the way in which we
interact socially. How such strategic considerations are then inte-
grated with our perceptual understanding of the environment is
a challenging question that can be discussed in terms of skill in
competitive board games.
This article has developed a model of visual perception and
opponent modeling within the framework of SDEs represent-
ing task specific neural activity and subsequent decision-making.
The modeling of game-scene perception follows a well developed
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research paradigm of progressively more sophisticated represen-
tations of the scene culminating in the most complex representa-
tions that a player’s experience allows for. In the highest ranking
experts this can result in an initial, rapid perception of the board
being sufficient to initiate a single good move almost immedi-
ately after being presented with a game. More generally this expert
perception activates the eyes to rapidly and efficiently search the
board for the most likely candidate regions and base moves from
which to explore possible branches of play. Once one of a small set
of good base moves has been selected an expert is able to search
forward in the game tree with greater strategic depth than a non-
expert and to be able to more effectively estimate the likely replies
of their opponent and how these replies influence the player’s
choice of the next move to make. While these general psycho-
logical results have existed for some time now, there appears to
be no previous analysis of how SDEs, their dynamics and prob-
abilistic outcomes in terms of neural activity are related to the
psychological literature of expertise.
The formal representation of how a player might model their
opponent’s state of mind, particularly their strategy space, incen-
tives, constraints, and the influence these aspects have on their
decisions, is a challenging task. However, the formal techniques
have been available for some time and the results in terms of
probability distributions are not particularly divergent from some
previously established theoretical models. The demanding task
is in the integration of the vast amount of data available from
the neuro-imaging literature into a coherent whole that is both
consistent and convincing. Theoretical (Yoshida et al., 2008) and
empirical (Bhatt and Camerer, 2005) arguments for a game the-
oretical basis of a ToM have appeared in the literature, but these
have not previously been extended to more complex tasks, exper-
tise or used SDEs as the basis for their modeling. Furthermore,
the relationship to the broader neuroscience literature has had
almost no coverage in this respect, specifically how the different
neural networks and their functional roles might be integrated as
a whole in the modeling of expertise. The critical difference in
the approach put forward here is that, unlike previous neural-
connectionist-reinforcement paradigms, this model represents
a player’s internal representation of the other player’s internal
strategic state of mind, not just their own. This entails several
important cognitive steps, principally recognizing that the task
environment contains another cognisant entity that will dynami-
cally adapt their choices according to their beliefs or expectations
about the choices others will make. It also requires the motiva-
tions and constraints of this other entity to be internally rep-
resented and so we need to consider how our ToM and reward
mechanisms interact with our strategic perspective (and how we
model the strategic perspective of others). This represents a sig-
nificant step in showing how different cognitive processes might
be integrated to help explain some of the prodigious skills we
are all capable of expressing to some extent, and the role these
skills might play in a broader context, such as our everyday social
lives.
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